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The inspiration for the present volume came from Anthony Julius upon 
his appointment as University College London’s first professor of law 
and the arts at the beginning of 2017. Given UCL’s close association 
with Jeremy Bentham, and his own misgivings concerning the way in 
which Bentham, utilitarianism and political economy is standardly – 
and unsympathetically – contrasted with Coleridge, Romanticism and 
literature, Julius believed that the time was ripe for a reassessment. With 
a view to considering the question of ‘Bentham and the arts’, which, 
to those who had absorbed the standard account, would appear to be 
an oxymoron, he approached Philip Schofield, his colleague in UCL’s 
Faculty of Laws and director of the Bentham Project and general editor of 
the new authoritative edition of The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham. 
They invited Malcolm Quinn at the University of the Arts London to 
join the enterprise. Quinn formed the perfect link between Bentham and 
the arts, having recently published, under the title of Utilitarianism and 
the Art School in Nineteenth-century Britain, a study of the influence of 
utilitarian thought, and of Bentham in particular, on the introduction of 
publicly funded art education in Britain at the beginning of the Victorian 
era.1 It was decided to invite scholars from a variety of backgrounds – 
including history, philosophy, psychology, literary studies and the arts – 
to contribute to a seminar series, which duly took place at UCL in the first 
half of 2018. It was hoped that the presentations would be of sufficient 
interest and importance to form the basis for a collection of essays – 
hopes that were not simply realized but far surpassed. In order to bring 
coherence and focus to the putative volume, the contributors were all 
asked to take Bentham’s recently published writings on sexual morality 
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as their core material. These writings consisted of three essays entitled 
‘Of sexual irregularities – or, irregularities of the sexual appetite’, ‘Sextus’, 
and ‘General idea of a work, having for one of its objects the defence of 
the principle of utility, so far as concerns the liberty of taste … Not Paul, 
but Jesus’, which had been published in Of Sexual Irregularities, and 
Other Writings on Sexual Morality (Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham),2 
and in Not Paul, but Jesus, Volume III (the work announced in ‘General 
idea’), which had been made available online,3 pending its appearance 
in the Collected Works as part of the authoritative three-volume edition 
of Not Paul, but Jesus.4 All these writings date from the mid-1810s. As 
was to be expected, the contributors ranged much more widely across 
Bentham’s corpus, but these essays, together with John Stuart Mill’s 
critique of Bentham and in particular of his views on poetry, form a 
common thread through the present volume.
The orthodoxy to which Anthony Julius was exposed during his 
undergraduate studies at Cambridge, and which forms the impetus for 
the present volume, had been propagated by F.R. Leavis, arguably the 
most influential literary scholar of the twentieth century, who had used 
John Stuart Mill’s complementary essays on Bentham and Coleridge 
– in Mill’s view, the two major representative thinkers of the age – in 
order to draw the distinction between utilitarianism and Romanticism, 
and thereby had pitted political economy against literature. This theme 
is the starting-point for Julius’s own chapter below, but for present 
purposes it is worth drawing attention to the fact that, while his essays 
contained both praise and criticism of Bentham and Coleridge, Mill was 
particularly disdainful of Bentham’s attitude towards notions of taste. In 
drawing attention to taste, Mill anticipated the issue that looms large in 
the present volume because of its centrality to the debate on the relation-
ship between utilitarianism and literature and between Bentham and the 
arts.
Mill argued that every human action could be considered from 
three ‘aspects’. The moral aspect concerned its rightness or wrongness, 
addressed itself to reason and conscience and led to approval or 
disapproval; the aesthetic aspect concerned its beauty, addressed itself to 
the imagination and led to admiration or despising; and the sympathetic 
aspect concerned its loveableness, addressed itself to human fellow-
feeling and led to love, pity or dislike. Bentham’s ‘error’ had been to 
treat ‘the moral view of actions and characters, which,’ Mill admitted, 
‘is unquestionably the first and most important mode of looking at 
them, as if it were the sole one’, and had thereby ignored the aesthetic 
and sympathetic aspects. Mill claimed that it was ‘not possible for any 
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sophistry to confound these three modes of viewing an action’, although 
it was ‘very possible to adhere to one of them exclusively, and lose sight 
of the rest’, which was precisely what Bentham had done. Mill continued:
He carried this so far, that there were certain phrases which, being 
expressive of what he considered to be this groundless liking or 
aversion, he could not bear to hear pronounced in his presence. 
Among these phrases were those of good and bad taste. He 
thought it an insolent piece of dogmatism in one person to praise 
or condemn another in a matter of taste: as if men’s likings and 
dislikings, on things in themselves indifferent, were not full of the 
most important inferences as to every point in their character; as if 
a person’s tastes did not show him to be wise or a fool, cultivated or 
ignorant, gentle or rough, sensitive or callous, generous or sordid, 
benevolent or selfish, conscientious or depraved.
Mill claimed that nothing had done more than Bentham’s ‘error’ in this 
respect ‘to place him in opposition to the common feelings of mankind, 
and to give to his philosophy that cold, mechanical, and ungenial air 
which characterizes the popular idea of a Benthamite’.5
Mill went on to draw attention to ‘Bentham’s peculiar opinions on 
poetry’. While denying that Bentham held the fine arts in contempt, Mill 
explained that he ‘entertained no favour towards poetry’:
Words, he thought, were perverted from their proper office when 
they were employed in uttering anything but precise logical truth. 
He says, somewhere in his works, that, ‘quantity of pleasure being 
equal, push-pin is as good as poetry:’ but this is only a paradoxical 
way of stating what he would equally have said of the things which 
he most valued and admired.
Mill explained that Bentham’s basic view was that poetry ‘consisted 
essentially in exaggeration for effect: in proclaiming some one view of 
a thing very emphatically, and suppressing all the limitations and quali-
fications’. Such a criticism was too extensive, since it could be applied 
to each and every form of writing ‘which undertakes to make men feel 
truths as well as to see them’, and that justifiably did so ‘if the portion of 
truth which it thus enforces be that which is called for by the occasion’.6
The passage on push-pin and poetry to which Mill famously refers 
appears in Bentham’s Rationale of Reward, a text that had first appeared 
as the second volume of Étienne Dumont’s French recension Théorie des 
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peines et des récompenses in 1811, but based on manuscripts written in 
the 1770s, and translated into English by Richard Smith and published 
in 1825. In the context of a discussion of the arts and sciences of 
amusement and curiosity, as distinguished from the arts and sciences of 
utility, Bentham remarked:
Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts 
and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish 
more pleasure, it is more valuable than either. Everybody can play 
at push-pin: poetry and music are relished only by a few.7
The above passage is one of the most often quoted passages from 
Bentham’s vast corpus, and constitutes the locus classicus for those 
who deem him to be a philistine. Mill was quite correct that Bentham 
regarded exaggeration as essential to poetry as Bentham noted in a 
passage written for Not Paul, but Jesus, Vol. III: ‘The connection in the 
way of causality between things in themselves so disparate as music and 
virtue has been announced by Poetry, and Reason proves it. In Poetry, 
the force of the connection had indeed been exaggerated: for without 
exaggeration, that is falsification in a certain form, there can scarce be 
Poetry.’ In the case in question, however, the exaggeration had ‘at least 
a platform of truth to stand upon’. Bentham went on to point out that 
Shakespeare’s sentiment that, 
The man who has not music in his soul
Is fit for treasons, stratagems and spoils8
was not universally true: ‘But what is true is, that the more occupied a 
man’s mind is with music, and with the sentiments with which music is 
most accustomed to be accompanied … is so much the less exposed to 
the temptation of engaging in any such destructive enterprizes.’9 This 
was a point that Bentham also made in Rationale of Reward: namely 
that taking delight in the fine arts, apart from the pleasure it gave to the 
practitioner, also had a societal benefit in keeping the practitioner out of 
mischief.10 Returning to Not Paul, but Jesus, Bentham went on to say that, 
in this respect, ‘by filling up with innocent recreation that time which 
might otherwise have been occupied by vice’, trap-ball and chess might 
be said to be ‘equally favourable to virtue’.
But in favour of music, I am inclined to think, we may go farther, 
and pronounce it to have a connection with virtue peculiar to itself. 
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The artificial notes, which music is occupied in the production 
of, bear for the most part a natural resemblance to the notes 
expressive of the social affections, of those affections which are so 
many modifications of benevolence: complaint, entreaty, soothing, 
condolence, congratulation, co-exultation and the like. There is 
Music for War, it may be said, as well as for Love. True: but happily 
the War-music is comparatively but little in vogue: and even in 
War-Music, it is rather what there is of sociality in war, rather than 
what there is of malice and cruelty, that is expressed by it.11
Again, Mill was quite correct to argue that Bentham did not recognize 
any separate spheres for aesthetics and sympathy – all was reducible 
to morality, or, in other words, to feelings of pleasure and pain. For 
Bentham, if taste referred to the sensations derived from the palate, 
then the notion made sense;12 if taste referred to the propensity to 
derive pleasure from an object, then the notion made sense;13 but if taste 
referred to some sort of mental faculty, whether inherited or acquired, 
then the notion made no sense. The point was that when a person said 
that they had a taste for something, it made sense insofar as it indicated 
that the speaker derived pleasure from experiencing it, while to say that 
something was in ‘good taste’ could not mean anything more than that, 
since there was no other standard than the expected pleasure against 
which to measure the goodness of the taste. The phrase ‘good taste’, 
therefore, if it meant anything, meant ‘I like it’, but it was nonetheless 
typically used by members of the ruling classes as a claim of superiority 
over those members of the subject population who, it was pretended, 
did not have access to this (non-existent) standard. In contrast, the 
commitment to pleasure as the standard of taste implied social (and 
political) equality.
Bentham’s approach to the relationship between pleasure and taste 
was the key to his attitude towards sexual morality in the writings from 
the mid-1810s that, as noted above, form a common thread through the 
present volume. Bentham had condemned the punishment of homosex-
uality in his first major published work A Fragment on Government, which 
had appeared in 1776, defended sexual liberty in the ‘Pederasty’ essay 
written for his penal code in the mid-1780s and continued to espouse the 
views he had developed under the influence of the radical Enlightenment 
and transmit them into the Romantic period.14 As late as the mid-1820s, 
when working on another draft of his proposed penal code, and around 
the time that Mill was beginning to work on Bentham’s writings on 
evidence, Bentham returned, albeit briefly, to some of the themes that he 
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had developed in his writings on sexual morality in the mid-1780s and 
reiterated in his writings on sexual morality in the mid-1810s. In a short 
sequence of manuscripts entitled ‘Innoxious eccentricities of the sexual 
appetite, why not included in the scheme of punishment’, he pointed out:
Nature has given to man two cups of physical sweets: the one, 
containing those which are the produce of the operations by which 
the individual is preserved; another, containing those which are 
the produce of the operations by which the species is preserved. 
Into both, seconded by blind antipathy and pride, what is called 
Religion has now for about 18 centuries exerted itself in the 
endeavour either to dash the cup from the hand, or, by the infusion 
of its gall, to convert the cup of sweets into a cup of bitterness.
The ‘pretence’ given for denying pleasure in relation to food and drink, 
whether through the interdiction of certain foodstuffs or fasting in 
general, was ‘the acquisition of the sympathy and the appeasing the 
antipathy of an Almighty being, who, by a self-contradictory proposition, 
is at the same [time] stiled benevolent: and not simply benevolent, 
but supremely benevolent’. All this was despite the fact that to Jesus, 
‘asceticism in all its forms was an object of undissembled scorn and 
ridicule. Asceticism is not Christianity, but Paulism.’15 In relation to 
both food and drink and sexual gratification, ‘the law of appetite’ was 
‘Maximize enjoyment’, subject to the limits imposed by prudence and 
benevolence, whereby pleasure should not be experienced at the cost of 
greater pain either to oneself or to others.16
In relation to sexual gratification, Bentham pointed to five 
categories of ‘error’ that deviated from the ‘standard’ that the ‘tyrant’ had 
identified, namely sexual intercourse between one man and one woman 
for the procreation of children. The error tempore related to women’s 
menstrual periods, the error loci to the use of parts of the body that would 
not lead to procreation, the error sexus to activities with members of the 
same-sex, the error species to activities with non-humans, and the error 
numeri, where (presumably) any other number of persons than two were 
involved.17 Bentham wondered whether a casuist would reckon that the 
sin was greater, the further ‘the aberration from the seat and standard 
of rectitude’. On this basis, the error sexus would be worse than the error 
loci where a man’s partner was a woman, the error species would be worse 
than the error sexus, but worst of all would be sex with an inanimate 
object. Recollecting an incident from his childhood, Bentham continued:
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Never shall I forget the horror with which a reverend divine once 
communicated a discovery which, in the field of sin, he had just 
made. Once upon a time among the antients, wise as they were, 
Statues – statues soft and flexible made on purpose – had been but 
too successful rivals to the originals: such was the pride of learning, 
so delectable to it the discovery, the presence of a schoolboy, 
son of him to whom it was communicated, was no bar to the 
communication of it.
The acme of heinousness in this line is not yet reached. If an 
elastic statue of a faultless biped is in some respects less unlike 
the original than an original quadruped is, in other respects it is 
more far removed. But between a woman and a french roll, how 
immeasurable the distance! A° 1789 at [… ?], while Turks and 
Russians were in arms,18 a hapless wigh[t] became the town-talk 
on account of the extraordinary use he had found for so ordinary 
an article. But it was to beauty in its proper seat that this passion 
had been excited: and to the one woman so far inferior were all 
others, the oven presented to him a less unworthy representative 
than any he could have found in the appropriate bed chamber. A 
substitute had he found for her (the lady was told) at a baker’s? At 
what baker’s? answer – at any baker’s. Unhappy man! it was by the 
lady’s inexorable cruelty he had been driven to this distance.
As in this rather singular instance woman beheld her 
successful rival and substitute at the baker’s, man is in the habit of 
beholding his at the wax and tallow chandler’s.19
Mill, who welcomed the prospect of men’s ‘natural passions’ becoming 
‘as it already is with a large number of women, completely under the 
control of the reason’,20 would, no doubt, not have regarded Bentham’s 
recounting of this anecdote, and indeed the whole passage, to be in good 
taste, but it also suggests that Bentham may have rather more to say to us, 
on these matters at least, than his successor in the utilitarian tradition.
The contributions to the present volume are distributed among 
three parts dealing broadly with first, philosophy and sexuality; second, 
intellectual history and literature; and third aesthetics, taste and art. 
Part I on ‘Philosophy and sexuality’ opens with Philip Schofield’s chapter 
on ‘The epicurean universe of Jeremy Bentham: Taste, beauty and reality’, 
which provides an account of Bentham’s utilitarianism within the context 
of his deeper commitment to a materialist ontology, and is intended to 
provide some historical context for the ensuing chapters. According to 
Schofield, Bentham appears to have adopted a materialist ontology and 
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a sceptical attitude towards religion by the time when, aged 16, he was 
required to subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England 
in order to take his degree at the University of Oxford. He later confessed 
himself to be ‘an Epicurean’, and this, Schofield suggests, is the key to 
appreciating why Bentham continues to divide opinion so strongly. What 
is at stake is illustrated by reference to the respective attitudes of French 
philosopher Michel Onfray and American political theorist Cathy Gere. 
Onfray approves of Bentham’s positioning himself in opposition to the 
dominant intellectual tradition represented by Plato, Christianity and 
Kant, whereas Gere sees his rejection of Kantian autonomy as opening 
the way for the abuse of marginalized individuals in order to benefit 
society in general. For Bentham, Schofield explains, there was the 
physical world and nothing more, at least nothing more that could be 
known, and all notions (ideals, concepts, angels, gods) that purported to 
refer to the non-physical world were so much nonsense. The same was 
true for statements about beauty and taste, insofar as they were made 
with reference to some metaphysical standard, while those making these 
statements were claiming not only aesthetic but political superiority 
over the bulk of the population who failed to appreciate the pretended 
non-existent standard. In his typology of ethical theories, Bentham had 
distinguished adherents of the principle of utility from adherents of the 
principle of sympathy and antipathy. The latter attempted to exercise 
power and influence by elevating their own opinions into standards that 
were binding on others. Hence proponents of ‘taste’ were adherents of 
the principle of sympathy and antipathy.
In the second chapter entitled ‘Not Kant, but Bentham: On taste’, 
echoing Bentham’s Not Paul, but Jesus, Frances Ferguson points to 
the comparison that is standardly drawn in aesthetics between the 
‘commanding figure’ of Immanuel Kant and the ‘philistine’ Bentham, 
but comes to the non-standard conclusion, through tracing their 
respective attitudes towards sexuality, that the latter’s approach has 
more to commend it. Both thinkers were operating in a wider cultural 
environment in which individuals were increasingly claiming a right to be 
‘acknowledged’, as manifested, for instance, in demands for a democratic 
franchise. Kant’s approach, Ferguson explains, was grounded in the 
notion of individual autonomy, with aesthetic judgment consisting in 
disinterested first-personal experience. To make an aesthetic judgment 
was to go beyond the mere perception of an object and any use it might 
have and to recognize its inherent beauty and sublimity. It was also a 
judgment that was independent of any social convention. For Bentham, 
aesthetics in general and taste in particular was reducible to pleasure 
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and pain. He turned to history – represented in both purportedly factual 
and fictional literature – in order to show what activities had been 
regarded as pleasurable and desirable. This gave him the opportunity to 
criticize the law of his own time that punished male-male sex and which, 
he claimed, originated in a particular reading of certain passages in the 
Bible. In what she sees as his most striking argument, Bentham points to 
Jesus’s non-condemnation of irregular sexual activities and his rejection 
of asceticism, not as a means of stating his own views, but as a means 
of impressing upon persons confessing themselves to be Christians 
the views that, given this commitment, they ought to hold. Hence, in 
contrast to Kant’s first-person, present judgment, Bentham presents ‘a 
significant expansive account of aesthetic judgment’ that draws on the 
historical record, avoids relativism and yet leaves individual judgment 
liable to criticism and reformulation.
In the third chapter entitled ‘“Envy accompanied with antipathy”: 
Bentham on the psychology of sexual ressentiment’, Stella Sandford 
draws attention to important parallels between Bentham’s and Sigmund 
Freud’s writings on sexuality, particularly the latter’s Three Essays on the 
Theory of Sexuality (1905). Understanding sexuality primarily in terms 
of pleasure (rather than reproductive teleology) and presupposing 
sexual orientation to be a matter of taste, Bentham, like Freud, defends 
sexual freedom and denies that same-sex desire is either pathological or 
unnatural. In some respects, Bentham presents a more radical account 
of sexual freedom than Freud in that he sees consensual sexual activity 
as not merely morally neutral but as a positive good. This is linked, 
Sandford suggests, to Bentham’s more straightforward account of 
pleasure. She points out that, for Bentham, it was not homosexuality, but 
its virulent condemnation, that required explanation, given that there 
was no utilitarian justification for condemning it. Bentham identifies the 
principles of asceticism and antipathy as the grounds for this condemna-
tion. He traces the origin of the ascetic principle, insofar as it condemns 
sexual pleasure in its ‘irregular’ shapes, to the Mosaic law and sees it 
given further and decisive support in the teachings of St Paul. This gives 
rise, however, to a puzzle. Given Bentham’s general theory of motivation 
– that all actions are motivated by a desire for pleasure and an aversion 
to pain – how can the principle of asceticism, which seeks to suppress 
pleasure, be a motive for anything? It turns out that asceticism does in 
fact give rise to motives, and in the case of the condemnation of homo-
sexuality, the motive is envy. The condemner is envious of the pleasure 
enjoyed by the partaker in male-male sex and in ‘irregular’ sexual gratifi-
cation more generally, the punishment of which leads to the gratification 
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of ill-will or vengeance, and thereby satisfies the pleasure of antipathy. 
Bentham’s psychological explanation for the social antipathy towards 
same-sex sexuality, Sandford notes, not only anticipates Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s psychology of ‘ressentiment’ and the unconscious of Freud, 
but reveals, in this area at least, a more complicated picture of Bentham’s 
psychological theory than has hitherto generally been recognized.
In the fourth chapter entitled ‘Literature, morals and utility: 
Bentham, Dumont and de Staël’, which commences Part II on ‘Intellectual 
history and literature’, Emmanuelle de Champs places Bentham’s views 
on taste in the context of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment debates 
in the Francophone literature on the relationship between aesthetics, 
morals and politics. In the eighteenth century it was a commonplace to 
associate improvement in morals with refinement in aesthetic judgment 
and to view the diffusion of artistic taste as a means of promoting a 
cohesive and stable society. Good taste in morals was linked to good taste 
in the arts, with education providing the means to improve both morals 
and the appreciation of the arts. This association, De Champs explains, 
was rejected by Bentham, whose radically individualist account of 
pleasure led him to deny the existence of any collective standard of taste. 
Bentham claimed that literary critics robbed the people of innocent 
pleasures while poetry promoted falsehood. To a writer such as Turgot, 
the utilitarian emphasis on individual pleasure threatened the consensus 
on which society rested. De Champs then illustrates how Bentham’s 
ideas on taste were received by two representative figures, namely 
Étienne Dumont, Bentham’s friend and translator, and Germaine de 
Staël, the writer and literary critic. Dumont attempted to take elements 
from both Rousseau and Bentham – adhering to the former’s views on 
morals and aesthetics but rejecting his politics, and adhering to the 
latter’s social science but rejecting his views on taste. Dumont defended 
literary criticism on the grounds that it promoted interest in artistic 
endeavour and helped to form public opinion, accepting that there was 
good and bad taste, as opposed to Bentham who denied that the notions 
of good and bad could be applied to taste. Influenced by her reading 
of Kant, de Staël argued that idealism bridged the gap between morals 
and politics through a universal aesthetic sensitivity. She therefore 
rejected Bentham’s approach as part of her rejection of Enlightenment 
rationalism and materialism more generally.
In the fifth chapter entitled ‘Jeremy Bentham’s imagination and the 
ethics of prose style: Paraphrase, substitution, translation’, Jan-Melissa 
Schramm explores Bentham’s techniques of phraseoplerosis and 
paraphrasis, whereby abstract terms were placed in propositions that 
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were then translated into equivalent propositions that contained terms 
representing real (physical) objects, in the context of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century debates on translation. At the end of the seventeenth 
century, the parameters of the debate were set by John Dryden, who 
had identified three categories of translation: the first was metaphrase 
or literal translation; the second was paraphrase, where the translator 
followed the sense, though not the exact words, of the author; and the 
third was imitation, where the translator merely took inspiration from 
the original. The question arose as to whether the form and style of 
a passage could ever be separated from its content. At one end of the 
spectrum was the view that word-for-word translation was possible, 
while at the other end was the view that each author had an inimitable 
style that expressed an untranslateable individuality.
Bentham believed that his techniques of phraseoplerosis and 
paraphrasis provided an accurate method of connecting linguistic 
representation with physical reality, but this translation of ideas put 
him at odds with those literary critics who rejected the possibility of 
such a reductive exposition, and saw instead an unbreakable synthesis 
between form and content. Bentham’s own writings, moreover, proved 
challenging for his contemporaries to assess. Critics, notably but not 
only William Hazlitt in The Spirit of the Age (1825), commented on his 
prolixity and inaccessibility while appreciating the value of his ideas. 
At the same time it was recognized that Bentham’s translator Étienne 
Dumont, while not providing literal translations of Bentham’s prose, 
a task that Dumont himself regarded as impossible, had translated 
his ideas and hence made them accessible. Schramm then draws a 
connection between the techniques of substitution in language and 
that of representation and substitution in ethics and politics. Critics of 
Bentham’s approach, and of utilitarianism more generally, deplored 
the treatment of individuals as interchangeable units in a calculation 
of utility undertaken for the benefit of the community as a whole. John 
Stuart Mill, for instance, criticized Bentham for his lack of imaginative 
sympathy – he could not change places with, or ‘enter into the mind and 
circumstances of’, another – while Charles Dickens in Hard Times was 
concerned with the implications of treating individuals as elements in 
a utility calculation. Schramm concludes by reminding us that the issue 
at stake is how to reconcile ‘fairness for all’ with ‘personal fulfilment for 
each uniquely valuable human being’.
In the sixth chapter entitled ‘“Is it true? … what is the meaning of 
it?”: Bentham, Romanticism and the fictions of reason’, Tim Milnes notes 
that assessments of the relationship between Benthamite utilitarianism 
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and Romanticism have been heavily influenced by John Stuart Mill’s 
characterization of Bentham and Coleridge as the great counterweights 
of early nineteenth-century British thought. According to Mill, the 
fundamental imperative of Bentham’s thought is epistemological and 
empirical and hence concerned with truth, while in Coleridge’s work, it 
is hermeneutic and aesthetic and hence concerned with meaning. Milnes 
argues that Mill presents a simplistic and misleading picture and that the 
relationship between Bentham’s utilitarianism and Romanticism needs 
to be rethought. The critical point of reference for both utilitarians and 
Romantics, as represented by Bentham and William Hazlitt respectively, 
was David Hume’s account of language as a product of social convention, 
which thereby sustained certain fictions of belief that made civilized life 
possible. Bentham’s response to Hume’s theory of fictions was to develop 
his technique of paraphrasis, which translated figurative language into 
less figurative language that was ultimately grounded in real entities, 
including pleasure and pain. What counted as a real entity, notes Milnes, 
was not correspondence between word and object, but coherence within 
the linguistic community in question. Hence, Bentham subordinated 
truth to meaning. Hazlitt, who had famously criticized Bentham and 
associated him with what he regarded as the objectionable philosophy of 
empiricism, materialism and egoism, responded to Hume by relocating 
fictions of belief from the sphere of social convention into that of mental 
construction, elevating the imagination and subordinating reason, and 
thus privileging the artist at the expense of the philosopher. Far from 
abandoning truth, Hazlitt idealized it by placing it at the indeterminate 
boundary between reason and imagination. Mill’s binary opposition 
between utilitarianism, fact and truth on the one side, and Romanticism, 
feeling and meaning on the other, appears far less plausible, concludes 
Milnes, when Bentham is read as a ‘proto-pragmatist’ and the Romantics 
as ‘thwarted idealists’.
Continuing the theme of the relationship between Bentham and 
Romanticism, in the seventh chapter entitled ‘More Bentham, less Mill’, 
Anthony Julius complains that literature and the visual arts are neglected 
in the liberal defence of free speech, and he lays much of the blame at the 
feet of John Stuart Mill, both because of the nature of his writings on the 
subject and the enormous influence that they have had and continue to 
have. Despite his reputation among literary critics, Mill, claims Julius, 
is ‘feeble in his aesthetic positions’ and in On Liberty, which contains his 
classic defence of free speech, he is ‘hostile to literary free speech’. Julius 
shows how Mill’s pronouncements on poetry were superficial and how 
he deprecated the novel, and goes on to explain how Mill’s approach 
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to higher and lower pleasures opened the door to literary and artistic 
censorship. The point was that Victorian progressivism made a link 
between sexual continence and human improvement, and hence Mill 
would not have entertained the idea that sexual material might serve a 
literary or aesthetic purpose.
Bentham, Julius notes, has been characterized as a philistine, due 
in part to Mill’s criticism of his attitude towards poetry, as expressed 
in the two aphorisms that he attributed to him, namely that ‘pushpin 
is as good as poetry’ and that ‘all poetry is misrepresentation’. Mill 
was worried first, that by refusing to acknowledge the superiority 
of poetry over a child’s game, the utilitarians were vulnerable to the 
charge that their philosophy was fit only for pigs; and second, ‘that a 
shared understanding of language leaves no space for poetry’. Julius 
retorts that in relation to the first aphorism, Bentham was opening up 
debate, while Mill was shutting it down, and in relation to the second, 
that Bentham was no more culpable than any other philosopher who 
worked within a positivist account of language, including Mill himself. 
Julius then proceeds to reconstruct Bentham’s aesthetics – confessedly 
from a charitable point of view – through his ‘several engagements 
with Romanticism’. He argues that Bentham is just as much a creature 
of Romanticism as he is of the Enlightenment, and sees his attitude to 
the arts not so much as rejecting the Romantic but giving an alternative 
conceptualization of it in terms of pleasure. ‘Bentham found common 
ground with his fellow Romantics, but then pushed beyond them’, notes 
Julius. Indeed, both Bentham and the Romantics championed pleasure, 
disparaged the notion of taste, refused ‘to separate the corporeal from 
the spiritual’, and were, crucially, committed to free speech. Bentham’s 
defence of the liberty of taste, particularly in sexual matters, combined 
with his condemnation of censorship, implied freedom of literary speech 
– ‘what may be practised’, writes Julius, ‘may also be written about’. If 
liberalism is to find a defence of free speech that convincingly incorpo-
rates aesthetic expression, concludes Julius, it will be necessary to ‘work 
with Bentham’.
In the eighth chapter entitled ‘Enlightenment unrefined: 
Bentham’s realism and the analysis of beauty’, which commences Part 
III on ‘Aesthetics, taste and art’, Malcolm Quinn begins by discussing 
attacks on Bentham’s hedonic utilitarianism as a form of cultural 
barbarism. He argues that we should not concur with Karl Marx’s view 
that ‘the arch-philistine, Jeremy Bentham’ was the ‘heavy-footed oracle 
of the “common sense” of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie’, but 
instead should interpret Bentham as recognizing that a ‘common-sense’ 
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approach to the analysis of beauty would be self-defeating if it attempted 
to impose social norms that could separate the beautiful from the ugly. 
Bentham’s praise for William Hogarth’s prints Beer Street and Gin Lane 
of 1751 exposes the contradictions of the position that Hogarth adopted 
in his manifesto The Analysis of Beauty, published two years later. In this 
text, Hogarth attempted a rational, impartial analysis of the truth of 
beauty, to assist the ordinary observer and defeat the artificial rules of art 
promoted by so-called connoisseurs. In advocating an aesthetics of ‘plain 
truth’, Hogarth argues that the body of a living woman is more beautiful 
than a statue of Venus and that the form of a woman’s body surpasses 
that of a man. In Bentham’s terms, however, a definition of beauty based 
on reproductive sexuality was not tenable, because sexuality was an 
inclination without a fixed object that ignored the distinction between 
the beautiful and the ugly.
In the ninth chapter entitled ‘Jeremy Bentham’s principle of 
utility and taste: An alternative approach to aesthetics in two stages’, 
Benjamin Bourcier contrasts Bentham’s commitment to legislative non-
interference in matters of taste with his provision for moral education 
in the private sphere. It was the duty of government to ensure respect 
for and equal treatment of each person’s taste, that is the disposition to 
derive pleasure from a particular activity or state of affairs. It was also 
incumbent on government to avoid imposing one particular conception 
of happiness on everyone. The point was that the liberty of taste was 
necessary in order to bring about the greatest happiness. For Bentham, 
all pleasure was good, and the only legitimate criterion of morality was 
the quantity of pleasure, and hence prohibiting some enjoyment on the 
grounds that it was distasteful was morally wrong. Making ‘war upon 
pleasure’ in this way, which characterized the adherent of the principle 
of asceticism, was the trademark of the tyrant and despot. Veiled in the 
pretence of promoting virtue, it was a means of securing the interests of 
the ruling few at the expense of the subject many.
In private ethics, Bourcier points out, there is a danger that the 
radical subjectivism of taste will lead to anarchy. In response, Bentham 
gave the deontologist the role of educating individuals as to how they 
might reap the greatest pleasures from the choices that they made. 
Each individual was the best judge of their own pleasure, and it was 
senseless to tell a person that something that they enjoyed was in bad 
taste. Nevertheless, a person’s tastes might change, either because they 
become better informed or because they no longer derive pleasure from 
the experience in question. The advice of the deontologist was necessary 
to support the individual in understanding how to join their interest 
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with their duty by pointing out the pains and pleasures that were likely 
to result from the alternative courses of action open to them. The deon-
tologist also helped to form public opinion, through which the moral 
sanction operated, and acted as a further constraint on individual choice.
In the tenth chapter entitled ‘From pain to pleasure: Panopticon 
dreams and Pentagon Petal’, Fran Cottell and Marianne Mueller explain 
the background to an artwork consisting of a long bench in the shape 
of five interconnected pentagons and installed on a site that is now the 
Rootstein Hopkins Parade Ground adjacent to Tate Britain in Millbank, 
London, but where Bentham at one time had hoped to construct his 
panopticon prison. The panopticon scheme was effectively rejected by 
government in 1803, and in 1813 construction began for a very different 
design of prison: the Millbank Penitentiary.  Cottell and Mueller’s 
work explores the relationship between architectural form and social 
behaviour, which was the central theme of Bentham’s panopticon, but 
rather than modelling behaviour, as Bentham intended, their aim is to 
advance the possibilities for social intercourse in an open-ended way. In 
this chapter, Cottell and Mueller describe the architectural features of 
the proposed panopticon and its aim of facilitating surveillance. They 
contrast the openness and airiness of the unrealized prison with the 
darkness and unhygienic conditions of the prison that was actually built. 
Moreover, while the panopticon was intended to be circular, Millbank 
Prison was configured as a series of hexagons, each of them with a central 
watchtower, but from which very little could in fact be seen. Millbank 
Prison was closed in 1892, and the site turned over to a military hospital.
Cottell and Mueller point out that, in general, people are resistant 
to the use of architecture to determine their behaviour. Inspired by the 
Dutch architect Herman Hertzberger, they attempt to design spaces 
that ‘allow for and stimulate the spontaneous interpretation of users in 
pursuit of pleasure and empowerment’. In using the Rootstein Hopkins 
Parade Ground, they wanted to subvert the historical associations of 
the site with the exercise of power and the imposition of pain (even 
Bentham’s panopticon, despite its humanitarian features, would still 
have been a place of punishment and hence a space for the infliction of 
pain) by installing a structure that could be used in multifarious ways and 
promote pleasurable activities. The pentagon design of Millbank Prison 
was reinterpreted to form a flower-shaped bench, though its dimensions 
were such that it could as easily be walked upon or lain upon as sat upon. 
It might be used for private one-to-one conversations or for social group 
encounters. Cottell and Mueller describe the various ways in which the 
space was used by the diverse communities that lived in, worked at, 
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or merely visited the Millbank site. The anti-Benthamism of the archi-
tectural concept was translated into the very Benthamic enterprise of 
converting pain into pleasure.
In the eleventh and final chapter of the volume, dealing appropri-
ately with Bentham’s auto-icon, entitled ‘Bentham’s image: the corpo-
reality check’, Carolyn Shapiro argues that Bentham’s own auto-icon 
is ‘the corpo-realization of what underlies Bentham’s theories of logic, 
language and legislation’. That Bentham wished to ground everything in 
the physicality of the human body is shown in the constant references in 
his writings to real entities, that is to physical bodies and in particular the 
sensations of pleasure and pain – this is the corporeality that underlies the 
greatest happiness principle. His interest in etymology involved relating 
the meaning of words to the physical image that lay at their ‘root’. Shapiro 
points out that Bentham’s writing was a physical activity related by pain 
and pleasure to all other activities, including those involving sexual 
gratification. She highlights the parallels between Bentham’s manuscript 
corpus and his own body – his corpse – in that they both needed to be 
crafted by other hands – the editor and the surgeon – following instruc-
tions of various sorts left by Bentham himself.
Shapiro points out that Bentham criticized religion for its unjustifi-
able leap from the notion of physical to that of moral impurity, and its 
consequent demand for punishment, and hence the infliction of physical 
pain, for those deemed to be impure, despite the lack of any physical 
grounding. This was an example of the operation of the principle of 
antipathy, a passion located in the breasts (physical bodies) of rulers, in 
order to subdue those subject to them. Moving from the real, physical 
body to the imaginary paved the way for tyranny. The religiously inspired 
principle of asceticism, propagated by Paul despite being opposed by 
Jesus, was characterized by groundless pronouncements of immorality. 
The solution for Bentham was to remove fiction from language and link 
language to the physical by means of the techniques of phraseoplerosis 
and paraphrasis. The body, when language loses its connection to the 
physical, is claimed for mischievous and malign purposes, as exemplified 
in the condemnation of homosexuality when the body is co-opted by 
asceticism. Shapiro posits that the homosexual body, like that of Jesus, 
stands open to other bodies, while Bentham in turn proposes an inter-
coursing body with its ‘inlets’ to pleasure. Bentham proposed to invite 
William Beckford, novelist and homosexual, to collaborate with him on 
the Not Paul, but Jesus manuscripts and thereby to give form and order 
to his corpus, just as his surgeon Thomas Southwood Smith would be 
invited to give form and order to his corpse.
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Finally, it is worth remembering that, in the spring and early 
summer of 2018, Bentham’s auto-icon, consisting of his skeleton, clothes 
and wax head, was transported across the Atlantic ocean in order to 
appear in a major exhibition entitled ‘Like life: Sculpture, color, and the 
body’ at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.21 Given the received 
view of Bentham as a philistine, there is some irony in the fact that 
Bentham’s own remains have themselves been transformed into a work 
of art.
Notes
 1 Quinn, 2013.
 2 Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2014.
 3 Bentham, 2013.
 4 The preparation of Of Sexual Irregularities and Not Paul, but Jesus, Vol. III for publication was 
generously funded by the Leverhulme Trust. Bentham discussed many of the same themes in 
material headed ‘Pederasty’, written in about 1785 for a proposed penal code, and published 
in a non-authoritative but mainly reliable version in Crompton, 1978.
 5 Mill, ed. Robson et al.,1969, 75–115 at 112–13.
 6 Mill, ed. Robson et al., 1969, 113–14.
 7 Bentham, ed. Bowring, 1843 [hereafter Bowring], ii. 253.
 8 See The Merchant of Venice, v. i. 83–5, usually rendered as ‘The man that hath no music in 
himself, / Nor is not mov’d with concord of sweet sounds, / Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and 
spoils’.
 9 University College London Library, Bentham Papers [hereafter UC], box cxlix, fo. 64; 
Bentham, ed. Quinn, 2001, 131 n.
 10 Bowring, ii. 254.
 11 UC cxlix. 65.
 12 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983, 79.
 13 Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2014, 4.
 14 Henry Sidgwick, usually recognized, along with Bentham and John Stuart Mill, as the third 
of the triumvirate of great classical utilitarian philosophers, claimed that Bentham was the 
pre-eminent representative of the Enlightenment and that Benthamism was ‘the legacy left to 
the nineteenth century by the eighteenth’, being the force against which the new ‘philosophy 
of Restoration and Reaction has had to struggle continually with varying success’. See 
Sidgwick, 1904, 136 ff.
 15 UC clviii. 10 (20 December 1824).
 16 UC clviii. 11 (20 December 1824).
 17 UC clviii. 12–13 (20 December 1824), 14–15 (13 January 1825).
 18 The name of the place in which the following anecdote is set has so far proved to be illegible, 
but if Bentham was referring to the time he spent at Krichëv in Russia, he has misremembered 
the date. The Russo-Turkish war broke out on 5/16 August 1787, and Bentham left Krichëv on 
19/30 November 1787, arriving back in England in early February 1788.
 19 UC lxviii. 15–16 (13 January 1825).
 20 See Mill to Lord Amberley, 2 February 1870, in Mill, ed. Mineka and Lindley, 1972, 1692–3.
 21 See Anon, 2018.
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The Epicurean universe of Jeremy 
Bentham: Taste, beauty and reality
Philip Schofield
1. Fountain and the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of 
England
The French artist Marcel Duchamp (1887–1968) is credited with 
creating the first ‘ready-made’, that is a manufactured, mass-produced 
object, with or without some degree of modification, presented as an 
artwork. An early example was Fountain, an upturned, pseudonymously 
signed urinal that he submitted for exhibition in New York in 1917, and 
which is one of the best known and most controversial artworks of the 
twentieth century.1 According to the French philosopher Michel Onfray, 
for instance, Fountain ‘demolished Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason 
and thus Platonism in art and elsewhere. More than twenty centuries 
of classical theory about Beauty went up in smoke in the blink of an 
eye.’2 In an interview given in or around 1961, Duchamp distinguished 
ready-mades from objets trouvés or ‘found objects’, such as pebbles 
or feathers. He stated that ‘the so-called “found object” is completely 
directed by personal taste’ that ‘decides that this is a beautiful object 
and is unique’, whereas his own ready-mades could be and often were 
‘duplicated, thus avoiding the cult of uniqueness, of art with a capital 
“A.”’ He continued: ‘I consider taste – bad or good – the greatest enemy of 
art. In the case of the ready-mades, I tried to remain aloof from personal 
taste and to be fully conscious of the problem.’ He had produced his 
ready-mades in small numbers, since to produce a large number ‘would 
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immediately produce a personal taste’, while he had added ‘as little as 
possible’ to them in order to ‘try to keep them pure’. Duchamp, however, 
was aware that he had not necessarily provided a satisfactory solution 
to the problem of taste, ‘because many people can prove I’m wrong by 
merely pointing out that I choose one object rather than another and 
thus impose something of my own personal taste’.3
Michel Onfray, as we have seen, argues that Duchamp’s Fountain 
represents the point at which the Platonic ideal of beauty was shown to be 
a sham, though Duchamp himself was less confident that he had delivered 
the fatal blow against the notion of taste that he had hoped to deliver. It 
might be argued, however, that Duchamp’s aim had been accomplished 
a century and a half earlier by Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), whose 
objection to the notion of taste can be traced back to his reluctance, at the 
age of 16 in 1764, to subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church 
of England in order to take his Bachelor of Arts degree at the University 
of Oxford. Fifty years later in Church-of-Englandism he admitted that 
he still felt ‘shame’ at ‘the sin of [his] boyhood’, and that confessing his 
disbelief was an ‘expiation; an atonement for that early sin’.4 Bentham 
explained that he had his doubts about the truth of the Articles. He was 
sent, together with some other students, to a Fellow of his College whose 
role was to assuage such doubts, and who told them that it was not for 
‘uninformed youths … to presume to set up [their] private judgments 
against a public one, formed by some of the holiest, as well as best and 
wisest men that ever lived’. In the end, Bentham subscribed because he 
did not want to disappoint his father Jeremiah, who had earmarked him 
for a career in the law in the hope that he would rise to its very eminence 
as Lord Chancellor of England.5 It is remarkable, given his background, 
that Bentham had any doubts at all. Both of his grandmothers’ fathers 
had been Church-of-England clergymen.6 His father Jeremiah, himself 
a staunch Church-of-England man, was a lawyer in the City of London 
who had acquired an extensive property portfolio and had bought a 
house in Queen’s Square Place, Westminster with an enormous garden, 
adjacent to St James’s Park, which Jeremy eventually inherited in 1792. 
Aged seven, Jeremy was sent to Westminster School, where he wrote 
devotional Latin verses on Christ’s passion.7 Aged 12, he was sent to the 
Tory University of Oxford, where he dutifully attended his classes and 
translated Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations at the command of his father.8 
He was, therefore, immersed into the culture of a politically conservative, 
religiously orthodox, financially privileged, upper-middle class and by 
all expectations upwardly mobile metropolitan family (his step-brother 
did eventually become a peer of the realm).9 How could he, by the age 
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of 16, have become sceptical about religion, and resent for the rest of 
his life being forced to subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles? There is a 
hint in young Jeremy’s translation of the Tusculan Disputations that not 
everything was as it should be.10 To the passage that he had translated 
as, ‘for tho’ Plato were to give no reason for his Assertions (see what 
deference I pay him) he would even bear me down by his Authority’, 
Bentham added a footnote for his father:
N.B. a very poor reason, truly! That Tully should believe any thing 
that Plato said, merely because he said it, is, in my Opinion, as 
absurd as if I were to believe the Soul was mortal, merely because 
you said it … .11
One wonders whether the comment raised concerns in Jeremiah’s mind 
about his son’s orthodoxy.
Bentham is, of course, noted for his utilitarianism, but, according 
to his own account, he did not formulate his version of the principle 
of utility until 176912 – hence his unwillingness to subscribe to the 
Thirty-nine Articles could not have been based upon any explicitly 
utilitarian consideration. His unwillingness arose from doubts about 
the truth of the Articles, and his resentment concerned the compromise, 
as he saw it, of his intellectual integrity – that is, being forced to lie. 
Bentham emphasized the point when he explained that, while attending 
William Blackstone’s lectures in 1764, he had been concerned about the 
fictions – in other words, the lies, the untruths – that he had detected 
in Blackstone’s account of English law.13 The question, therefore, turns 
on the young Bentham’s understanding of truth. While he gives us no 
contemporary account, there are plausible grounds for reading back 
his view of truth from his later writings on ontology and epistemology 
in order to appreciate the nature of his doubts about the Thirty-nine 
Articles. Having said that, we need not read back too far. Although his 
most detailed writings on these subjects date from the mid-1810s,14 he 
had formulated his central ideas by the early to mid-1770s. In short, he 
argued that the only thing that had any real existence was the ‘substance’ 
that formed the physical universe, that any proposition that made any 
claim grounded ultimately on a non-physical entity was nonsensical, 
and that any claim that misrepresented events or states of affairs in the 
physical world was untrue. He presumably held this view, or had more 
than an inkling of it, by the time that he subscribed to the Thirty-nine 
Articles.
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It seems plausible to assume that, at some point during his studies 
at Oxford, he had discovered Epicurus. He may have been attracted to 
Epicureanism through the account, albeit not a sympathetic one, that 
he had found in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations. It is worth remembering 
that he had always been a voracious reader, and so he may have gone 
on to study more recent and contemporary writers who belonged to 
the Epicurean tradition.15 Given what Bentham says later about his 
formative influences, one of these Epicurean writers, and perhaps the 
most important, was the French materialist philosopher Claude Adrien 
Helvétius. There is no evidence, however, that Bentham had read 
Helvétius’s De l’esprit before subscribing to the Thirty-nine Articles: 
according to Bentham’s later reminiscences (not always totally reliable), 
a copy ‘fell into [his] hands’ when he was aged 20.16 At some point he 
read Lucretius’s On the Nature of Things (De Rerum Natura), which 
contains the most detailed surviving account of Epicurus’s philosophy.17 
One might speculate that it was his profound fear of ghosts, instilled 
into him at a young age by mischievous servants, that made a materialist 
account of the universe attractive to him – if all that existed was the 
physical world, there were no spirits and hence no ghosts of which to be 
afraid.18
There is no doubt that Bentham explicitly allied himself with the 
Epicurean tradition in opposition to the nonsense that he regarded as 
emanating from Plato and the Stoics. In an early manuscript from the 
mid-1770s, Bentham noted that he ‘had [the principle of utility] from 
Epicurus, from Carneades, from Horace, from Helvetius, from Beccaria’.19 
In 1818 Bentham gave the title ‘The Epicureans the only philosophers 
deserving of the name’ to a proposed section of Not Paul, but Jesus, 
Vol. III. He began the section as follows:
From the days of their founder to the present, Epicurus and those 
who have discoursed and acted as he is said to have acted, constitute 
a standing but[t] to the invectives of hypocrisy and imbecillity, 
whether cloathed in the mantle of philosophy or that of religion.
They have, in a word, been so many utilitarians, or rather 
non-ascetics: no where have they looked for happiness but where 
it was to be found … .20
Where they looked for it, of course, was in pleasure. In a similar vein, 
in a note at the head of a manuscript written for the same essay, he 
wrote: ‘Limitations [to the pursuit of pleasure] are those dictated by 
1. prudence. 2. probity. 3. benevolence. Conceditur this Epicureanism: 
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but Stoicism is either folly or hypocrisy.’21 In Deontology, his extensive 
work on ethics dating from the mid-1810s, at the start of a chapter 
discussing the summum bonum of the ancient philosophers, Bentham 
noted: ‘Summum bonum consummate nonsense’ and ‘Anti-Epicureans 
quarrellers with their bread & butter.’ The problem was that neither 
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, nor any of their disciples, nor the Stoics, having 
rejected pleasure, could agree what the summum bonum consisted in or 
even say anything intelligible about it.22 Going on to condemn Socrates 
and Plato for ‘talking nonsense, on pretence of teaching morality and 
wisdom’, he described how the people in general, ‘who were content 
with reaping pleasures under the guidance of common sense’, were for 
that very reason ‘considered [by them] as ignorant and as composing 
the vulgar herd’.23 If the Platonists and Stoics were wrong, ‘how must it 
have been’, asked Bentham ironically, ‘with those sensualists, with those 
hogs, the Epicureans?’ According to the account in Ethices Compendium 
in usum juventutis academicae, the elementary textbook on moral 
philosophy used by undergraduates at Oxford and which Bentham 
himself had studied,24 the Epicureans, he noted, ‘Hogs as they were’, had 
looked for the summum bonum in bodily pleasure. Bentham doubted, 
however, whether the Epicureans had looked for a summum bonum at 
all, whether they believed in the existence of such a thing, and whether 
‘in their account of pleasure, pleasure in every shape that was not bodily 
should have been omitted’. The Epicureans, he continued, could not have 
been unaware, since everyone knew it, that some pleasures had their 
‘seat’ in the mind, while others had their ‘seat’ in the body. The author 
of Ethices Compendium had gone on to criticize the bodily pleasures 
on the grounds that they were ‘ignoble’, ‘short’, and ‘unsavoury’, and 
in this latter case gave rise to ‘blushes’.25 Bentham pointed out that the 
term ‘ignoble’ meant nothing, and in any case it was the mind that felt 
pleasure, whatever its ‘seat’, and not the body. If a pleasure was indeed of 
short duration, he asked, what did that matter? And finally, if the recol-
lection of a pleasure taken in an ‘improper manner’ led to an ‘unsavoury’ 
recollection, what did that matter for a pleasure taken in a ‘proper 
manner’?26
2. Bentham versus Kant
Whether Bentham was inspired by Epicurus or by some other sceptical 
writer, the moment when his scruples as a 16-year-old boy were 
brushed aside by the combined might of the University of Oxford and 
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the Church of England, seconded by the considerable weight of paternal 
authority, was arguably not only a seminal moment in his own life, but 
also a seminal moment in the history of Western philosophy and in the 
history of aesthetics. Recent works by Michel Onfray and Cathy Gere 
illustrate what is at stake. In A Hedonist Manifesto, Onfray character-
izes the overwhelmingly dominant philosophical tradition in Western 
civilization as Platonic, Christian and Kantian. This tradition, accepted 
by the majority of contemporary philosophers, is characterized by the 
acceptance and celebration of a non-materialist universe that is superior 
to the physical universe that our bodies inhabit. Onfray points out that 
Plato has his forms, Christianity has its God and Kant has his ideals. A 
dualism is posited between the material and the ideal, the body and the 
spirit, phenomena and noumena, the descriptive and the prescriptive, 
with the latter elevated over the former. In short, Platonism, Christianity 
and Kantianism all posit a metaphysics that ascribes superiority to 
the ideal domain over the physical, to the other-worldly over the this-
worldly, to the spirit over the body. Those Epicurean philosophers who 
have opposed the dominant tradition, including Bentham and John 
Stuart Mill, are branded as pigs.27 Yet their concern, states Onfray, was to 
deconstruct myths, to get rid of gods, to provide solutions for the actual 
world, and to value pleasure and the common good.28 In relation to art 
and aesthetics, Onfray argues, as we have seen, that Marcel Duchamp’s 
Fountain, intended for exhibition in New York in 1917, was the point at 
which the dominant approach was exposed as nonsense.
Having rejected the dominant Kantian world view, Onfray advocates 
‘The Revolutionary Transformation of Individuals’, based to a significant 
extent on Benthamite utilitarianism. While generally admiring Karl Marx 
and Michel Foucault, Onfray criticizes them for doing
much damage to Anglo-Saxon Utilitarianism. First, they harmed 
it for reasons surrounding the intellectual and political power 
struggles of their time. Second, they harmed it by promoting 
excessive specialization: Foucault’s sole focus on the panopticon, 
without concern for the project’s totality, inspired him to write 
foolish things about Bentham. Hedonist utilitarianism is much 
more than a grocer’s philosophy or the invention of modern 
totalitarianism! … It’s a funny kind of grocer who pushes for the 
decriminalization of homosexuality (Essay on Pederasty, 1785!), 
the rights of minorities (women and children), a dignified status 
for animals who were cruelly tortured as if by executioners, and 
a humanization of the conditions of incarceration in Panopticon 
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(1791). The supposed inventor of totalitarianism also wrote a 
catalog of the crimes committed by religion (The Influence of 
Natural Religion Upon the Temporal Happiness of Mankind, 1822), 
and called out the hypocrisy of politicians (Book of Fallacies, 1824). 
In Deontology, he subordinated politics to ethics; all hedonist 
politics is concerned with the greatest good for the greatest number. 
The goal remains valid.29
While some of the detail in this passage might be revised, and indeed 
a great deal added, Onfray has appreciated the radical challenge that 
Benthamism entails to the dominant Kantian world-view.
While Onfray praises Bentham for his Epicureanism, a far different 
assessment is offered by Cathy Gere in Pain, Pleasure, and the Greater 
Good. In her history of medical ethics, she allies herself with Onfray’s 
dominant tradition and contrasts Benthamite utilitarianism, with its 
Epicurean foundations in materialism and the sensations of pain and 
pleasure, with the notions of autonomy, transcendent human dignity, 
self-determination and free consent, which she associates with Kant 
and Christian humanitarianism. According to Gere, in A Table of the 
Springs of Action Bentham ‘established the framework that would unite 
medicine, utilitarianism and politics’ for 150 years,30 until ‘the decisive 
victory’ of patient autonomy over ‘medical utility’ at Robert Kennedy’s 
American Senate hearings into health care and human experimenta-
tion in 1973.31 ‘In place of tradition, sentiment and rights,’ notes Gere, 
‘Bentham insisted on the brute physicality of pain and pleasure’ and 
thereby invented, without noticing it, a whole new discipline of ‘moral 
physiology’.32 The manipulation of human subjects by the application 
of pain and pleasure formed the basis of his proposed system of pauper 
panopticons. Taking particular exception to Bentham’s use of the 
treadmill (or the walking wheel, as she terms it), Gere contends that 
‘the poor were to be manipulated in the spirit of training non-human 
animals’ – a project that was eventually realized in the laboratories of the 
twentieth-century behavioural psychologists, where oppressed classes, 
who were ‘deemed to have least to lose’, were sacrificed for the sake of 
the greater good.33 Hence, she draws a lineage from the utilitarianism 
of Bentham, through the deterministic and associationist psychological 
theories of James Mill and Edward Bain, to the twentieth-century behav-
iourists Edward Thorndike and B.F. Skinner. Echoing those who have 
linked utilitarianism with totalitarianism, she sees no essential moral 
distinction between fascist human experimentation in Hitler’s Germany 
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and American utilitarian medicine as practised in the years after the 
Second World War.34
Gere’s contempt for utilitarianism appears to be all the more bitter 
since, as she confesses, she had once been ‘a zealot of utility’, but had 
eventually abandoned it, describing it as a ‘delinquent … path’, after 
finding an ‘alternative, based on respect for others and self-respect’.35 
She tells us that ‘utilitarianism can send scientists down the proverbial 
well-paved road to hell’, that utilitarianism constitutes ‘flagrant moral 
elitism’, that Bentham had ‘exposed the vein of moral nihilism in utilitar-
ianism’, that Skinner was ‘[e]very bit as bumptious’ as Bentham, speaks 
of the ‘totalitarian/utilitarian error’, and refers to utilitarianism as being 
‘like a greased pig’,36 thus invoking the traditional characterization of 
Epicureanism by its opponents. ‘The “concept of man” that stepped into 
the breach’ was ‘the vision of autonomy, dignity and freedom’ found in 
Kant’s moral philosophy. ‘The activists and reformers of the 1960s found 
that their disgust with the utilitarian calculus of human experimenta-
tion resonated precisely with [Kant’s] injunction that no rational being 
should be used as a means to an end.’ Kantianism encapsulated ‘the spirit 
of informed consent and the sanctity of autonomous decision making’.37 
But the victory over medical utilitarianism in the 1970s did not prove 
to be the end of the problem, according to Gere. In the 1980s two new 
disciplines emerged – neuroeconomics and behavioural economics 
– both explicitly indebted to Bentham: ‘Unchained from the walking 
wheel of Bentham’s Panopticon, Epicurus has been set to work greasing 
the machinery of global capitalism.’38 There is, therefore, more work to 
be done, in Gere’s view, to oppose the re-emergence and resurgence of 
utilitarianism.
Gere relies on emotive language and on literary fiction (Mr 
Gradgrind et al.)39 as the basis for her condemnation of utilitarianism. 
A difficulty with her account is that she conflates the moral injunctions 
of the principle of utility with the psychological claim that sentient 
creatures are motivated by a desire for pleasure and an aversion to pain. 
Her assumption is that where there is experimentation that involves 
the investigation of pain and pleasure as stimuli to action, there also 
is utilitarianism. She states, for instance, that David Ferrier ‘turned … 
psychology into an experimental science, driving utilitarianism deep into 
the emergent discipline of neurology’, and that ‘Skinner’s mechanistic 
psychology more or less entailed extreme utilitarian ethics’.40 She 
admits, moreover, that most of the scientists who gave evidence at the 
Kennedy hearing in 1973 did not defend their practices on the grounds 
of utilitarianism,41 and even states that the physicians and researchers 
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who she condemns considered themselves as having ‘inalienable rights’ 
to promote the greater good, which is a Kantian and not a utilitarian 
justification, and which she might have acknowledged given that she is 
aware that Bentham branded notions of inalienable rights as nonsense.42
Gere does at least appreciate that animal experimentation would 
have ‘troubled’ Bentham,43 but points out that the logic of treating 
humans as animals was that, once animal experimentation had 
become acceptable, it was a short step to make human experimentation 
acceptable.44 One such experiment that Gere finds particularly obnoxious 
was Robert Heath’s anti-homosexual therapies, which were eventually 
discredited and replaced by an ‘ethic of choice and self-determination’.45 
It need scarcely be said that Gere seems to be unaware of Bentham’s 
writings on sexual morality, containing his arguments in favour of sexual 
liberty and in particular the decriminalization of male same-sex relation-
ships.46 There is, moreover, no antithesis between Bentham’s utilitarian-
ism and the notion of consent.47 Bentham would, however, have objected 
to Kantian notions of ‘inalienable dignity’ and ‘autonomy’, and that every 
person had to be treated as an end in themselves and not as a means to an 
end,48 as being either nonsensical or trivial. In The Book of Fallacies, for 
instance, Bentham referred to the claim that ‘the end justifies the means’ 
as the ‘Atrocity-justifier’s argument’. His criticism had been sparked by 
a report in a newspaper that the Peterloo Massacre of 16 August 1819 
(the means) had been justified by the need to rescue the country from 
seditious meetings (the end). The danger and absurdity lay in treating 
some objective as an end and thereby justifying the obtainment of that 
end at any cost. The end might, for instance, be the acquisition of a 
penny loaf. The goodness of the end was ‘indisputable’, but that did not 
mean that one was justified either in giving a pound for it or in getting 
it for nothing by cutting the baker’s throat. For Bentham, the good and 
evil associated with both the means and the end needed to be weighed 
against each other in order to decide whether an action was justified.49 
Finally it seems to be without irony that Gere, in her ‘Afterword’, places 
some hope for the future of humanity in her own delight at encouraging 
a threatened species of butterfly to thrive in her Californian garden50 – 
Epicurus would have approved! Bentham, for his part, was not content 
merely to tend his own garden – though he did do that assiduously at 
Queen’s Square Place – but had a much broader ambition of tending 
everyone’s garden – of being, as his Guatemalan admirer José del Valle 
put it, the ‘legislator of the world’.51
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3. Bentham’s critique of metaphysics
I have suggested above that Bentham found Epicureanism attractive 
because of its materialism and the associated rejection of any form of 
metaphysics. It is important, then, to explore how Bentham presented 
his own views in order to appreciate why he would have rejected any 
claim concerning the existence of a metaphysics of beauty, whatever 
form that metaphysics took, whether as a mathematical proportion and 
symmetry, a set of ideal forms or an inherent sense of the sublime and 
the beautiful akin to the notion of the moral sense. This brings us back 
to Bentham’s ontology and epistemology. A difficulty in addressing this 
topic is that, since the revival of Bentham scholarship in the 1960s, it has 
suffered from two related problems. The first is that insufficient attention 
has been given to Bentham’s ontology as the basis for his utilitarianism, 
and the second is that, where attention has been paid to it, fictions have 
often been confounded with fictitious entities. The confusion stems from 
Charles Kay Ogden’s edition of Bentham’s Theory of Fictions, published 
in 1932.52 The title seems to have been Ogden’s invention, while the 
content is arranged under main headings that Ogden also devised. 
Ogden’s text is not one that Bentham himself organized, but consists 
in a compilation containing the whole of ‘A Fragment on Ontology’ 
and extracts from ‘Rationale of Judicial Evidence’, ‘Essay on Language’, 
‘Essay on Logic’, ‘Chrestomathia’, and ‘A Fragment on Government’. All 
this material is taken from the Bowring edition of Bentham’s Works, 
and, with the exception of the extracts from ‘Rationale of Judicial 
Evidence’ and ‘Fragment on Government’, was edited by Bentham’s 
physician Thomas Southwood Smith. The Bowring/Smith versions of 
‘Ontology’, ‘Language’ and ‘Logic’ are themselves a mish-mash taken 
from Bentham’s unpublished manuscripts.53 Ogden, therefore, created 
his own mish-mash out of the Bowring/Smith mish-mash and called it 
Bentham’s ‘Theory of Fictions’.54 Ogden did not recognize any important 
distinction between a fiction and a fictitious entity – to the text of 
Theory of Fictions he appended both a discussion of legal fictions from 
Bentham’s Rationale of Judicial Evidence and an extract from Bentham’s 
nephew George’s An Outline of a New System of Logic, under the heading 
‘The Classification of Fictions’, in which he provided succinct expositions 
of the various ‘entities’, including fictitious entities, that his uncle 
referred to.55 Ogden’s confounding of fictions and fictitious entities has 
been unreflectingly followed in much of the succeeding scholarship.56 It 
is necessary, therefore, to disambiguate fictions and fictitious entities, 
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and show the relation of the latter to real entities, in order to understand 
the philosophical basis of Bentham’s materialism. The expositions of 
all these terms involve, in one way or another, the notions of truth and 
utility.57
We have seen above how the youthful Bentham reacted against 
what he viewed as the falsehood in the Thirty-nine Articles and the 
fictions relied on by Blackstone in his lectures on English law. In A 
Fragment on Government, published in 1776, his critique of a short 
passage in Blackstone’s ‘Introduction’ to Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, Bentham remarked that English law was characterized by 
‘Fiction, tautology, technicality, circuity, irregularity, [and] inconsistency 
… . But above all the pestilential breath of Fiction poisons the sense of 
every instrument it comes near.’58 In ‘Constitutional Code Rationale’, 
written in 1822, he noted: ‘By fiction, in the sense in which it is used 
by lawyers, understand a false assertion which, though acknowledged 
to be false, is at the same time argued from, and acted upon, as if true.’ 
He went on to argue that fiction served the sinister interest of lawyers 
and other officials on the particular occasions on which it was used, 
but more generally it served their interest and that of rulers together 
by producing ‘demoralization’ in the community as a whole. The ‘object 
and effect’ of demoralization was to cause men to regard with indiffer-
ence, or even with approval, both ‘the perpetration of injustice’ and the 
employment of ‘falshood – wilful, deliberate and self-conscious falshood 
– in a word mendacity’ as a means of producing that injustice.59 In the 
passage on fictions reproduced by Ogden, and taken from Rationale of 
Judicial Evidence, Bentham condemned fictions on the grounds that they 
consisted in falsehood and that their effect was mischievous: ‘Fiction of 
any use to justice? Exactly as swindling is to trade?’ Bentham went on to 
give examples of fictions in English law, including the common recovery 
whereby entails were ‘barred’, the addition of an ac etiam clause to writs 
whereby actions could be tried in the central common law courts that 
were not otherwise entitled to try them, and the action of ejectment for 
the trial of freehold title.60 Throughout this passage lies, falsehoods and 
fictions are equated.61 A fiction, therefore, was a proposition that was 
known to be false in fact. A fictitious entity, on the other hand, was not 
a proposition, but a term. In order to understand Bentham’s notion of a 
fictitious entity, we need first to turn to the notion of a real entity.
In ‘Essay on Logic’, Bentham explained that the ‘source of perception’ 
– and, it might be added, the only source – was ‘an individual portion of 
matter’, ‘a real, corporeal entity’, ‘a body’, by which an ‘impression’ was 
made on ‘sense’. Strictly speaking, these impressions were the immediate 
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source of perception, and the body itself but the ‘secondary and compar-
atively remote’ source. The existence of the object of perception was, 
therefore, ‘a subject of inference [rather] than of perception’, and such 
inference was frequently found to be erroneous – we heard a sound, for 
instance, and assumed it was raining, but when we looked out of the 
window we saw that it was the wind rustling the leaves in a tree.62 Hence, 
Bentham described a two-stage process by which the mind, or more 
specifically the perceptive faculty, experienced the physical universe – at 
the first stage, the physical object gave rise to an impression in the organs 
of perception, and at the second stage, the impression was recognized 
by the perceptive faculty in the mind. Knowledge of the physical world 
was inferential, because what we perceived were impressions and not 
the objects themselves. There were, therefore, two different, but related 
notions that Bentham termed perceptible real entities. The first were our 
own perceptions, whether impressions produced ‘by the application of 
sensible objects to the organs of sense’ or ideas ‘brought to view by the 
recollection of these same objects’.63 The second group were ‘bodies of all 
sorts’.64 Again, he explained that these (he presumably meant impressions 
and ideas) were in fact the sole perceptible entities, while corporeal 
substances were inferential. He went on, however, to make a second 
distinction that also involved inference, namely a distinction within real 
entities between perceptible and inferential entities, the former being 
those of whose existence we were persuaded directly through perception, 
and the latter those of whose existence we were persuaded by a process 
of reasoning or reflection. With reference only to substances, the term 
perceptible real entities applied to corporeal substances, and inferential 
to incorporeal ones, that is to such inferential, because imperceptible, 
entities as the human soul, God, angels and devils. The soundness of 
the inference from perceptions to the existence of the corporeal body of 
which it was a perception was far stronger, Bentham noted, than that 
from the existence of corporeal to that of incorporeal substances:
Suppose the non-existence of corporeal substances – of any hard 
corporeal substance that stands opposite to you – make this 
supposition and as soon as you have made it, act upon it, pain, 
the perception of pain, will at once bear witness against you, and 
be your punishment, your condign punishment. Suppose the 
non-existence of the above-mentioned inferential incorporeal 
substances, of any of them, or all of them, and the supposition 
made, act upon it accordingly – be the supposition conformable 
or not conformable to the truth of the case, at any rate no such 
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immediate counter-evidence, no such immediate punishment, will 
follow.65
Inferential real entities, such as the human soul and God had never been 
perceived, and their reality ‘can not, therefore, be considered otherwise 
than as a matter of inference’. If one were not persuaded of the inference, 
that is that the human soul or God were real entities, it was likely that one 
would assign the former to the class of fictitious entities, consisting of the 
aggregate of such ‘psychical entities’ as were said to compose the mind, 
and the latter to the class of non-entities.66 To summarize, there were 
two inferences: the first, from perceptions to substances; the second, 
from substances perceived to substances unperceived. For Bentham, to 
assume the physical non-existence of entities that revealed themselves 
to us through sense perception would tend to produce evil consequences. 
Such evil consequences would not follow were we to assume the physical 
non-existence of entities that had not been perceived and were possibly 
not perceivable. The individual bodies that we did perceive and could be 
assumed to have physical existence were real entities.
Bentham did not only refer to real and fictitious entities, but to 
fabulous entities and also, as we have seen, to non-entities. The basic 
distinction, to which all others had to be referred, was that between 
real and fictitious entities: ‘Real entities – fictitious entities – under one 
or other of these denominations may be comprehended every object 
that ever was or can be present to any faculty of the human frame – to 
perception, memory, or imagination.’ Bentham recognized that the 
term ‘fictitious entity’ seemed to involve a contradiction in that the term 
‘entity’ suggested that the thing represented had existence, while the 
term ‘fictitious’ suggested that it did not. Why not, then, use the term 
‘non-entity’? Bentham answered that the ‘root’ of the contradiction lay in 
language, ‘that instrument without which, though of itself it is nothing, 
nothing can be said, and scarce any thing can be done’.67 Hence, while 
fictitious entities did not exist, the names of fictitious entities did exist 
(sounds and written words are, after all, perceptible): ‘To language then 
– to language alone – it is that fictitious entities owe their existence – 
their impossible, yet indispensable existence.’ Every name that existed 
in a language (Bentham presumably meant every name that would 
potentially make sense when placed in a proposition) was either the 
name of a real entity or the name of a fictitious entity.
What will moreover be seen is, that the fiction – the mode of 
representation by which the fictitious entities thus created, in so far 
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as fictitious entities can be created, are dressed up in the garb, and 
placed upon the level, of real ones – is a contrivance but for which 
language – or at any rate language in any form superior to that of 
the language of the brute creation – could not have existence.68
It is important to note that Bentham refers to the fiction involved in 
the creation of fictitious entities, and not that fictitious entities were 
fictions. The fiction was the apparent predication of real existence to the 
subject represented by the name of a fictitious entity.69 In other words, 
to claim that the subject so represented had physical existence would 
be a falsehood, but unless we spoke as though it did have existence, 
our language would not rise above that of animals, and since thought 
was dependent on language, our thought would not rise above that 
of animals. Bentham explained that names were first applied to real 
entities, and thereby an association formed between the name and the 
reality of the object to which it was assigned. There had then arisen ‘a 
very natural propensity’ to ascribe reality to every object given a name, 
including fictitious entities.70
Bentham warned against confusing fictitious entities with fabulous 
entities, which were ‘either fabulous persons or fabulous things’. They 
were ‘supposed material objects of which the separate existence is 
capable of becoming a subject of belief: and of which accordingly the 
same sort of picture is capable of being drawn in the mind as of any 
really existent object’.71 Fabulous entities were, therefore, created by the 
imagination, and consisted of a combination of entities that had not been 
perceived, but if the fabulous entity did exist, it would be perceivable: 
for instance a golden mountain, a diamond billiard ball, Hamlet, and 
so forth. Fictitious entities, on the other hand, although represented by 
noun substantives, did not, unlike fabulous entities, ‘raise up in the mind 
any correspondent image’.72 Bentham explained the notion of non-exis-
tence in terms of the annihilation of physical substance or body:
Of body … the annihilation is conceivable without difficulty. Why? 
because in whatsoever place, that is within whatsoever portion of 
space, within whatsoever receptacle composed of mere space, any 
body is at any given time conceived to be, it may thenceforward be 
conceived to be removed from that place, and so successively from 
any and every other portion of space.73
It was through the idea of absence that ‘the transcendent and awful 
idea of non-existence’ was ‘attained’. Take a body existing in a particular 
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place, and suppose it non-existing in that place, ‘you suppose its absence, 
its relative non-existence: expell it in like manner from every place, you 
suppose its absolute non-existence’. An entity was either in existence or 
not in existence: there was no other possible state for an entity to be in.74 
A fabulous entity, then, was, in strictness, a non-entity, which, in turn, 
was the absence of any real entity.
How, then, did Bentham make sense of fictitious entities with their 
necessary, but merely linguistic existence? As he pointed out, in law – 
which was, of course, his main philosophical and practical concern – 
many of the leading terms, such as right, duty, obligation and power, 
did not correspond to any physical thing. Similarly, the words ‘matter’, 
‘form’, ‘quantity’, ‘quality’, ‘relation’, ‘place’, ‘time’, ‘motion’ and ‘action’, 
together with their related ideas, all designated fictitious entities.75 They 
were like terms in algebra, which were used as shorthand to represent 
more complex entities. Such terms, the names of fictitious entities, made 
sense insofar as they could be expounded by showing their connection 
with real entities, objects that existed in the physical world. One took a 
proposition that contained the name of a fictitious entity and reformu-
lated it in a proposition that had the same meaning but contained the 
names only of real entities, or were closer to real entities (one might 
say, for instance, that a person enjoyed liberty when he had the capacity 
to move his limbs without impediment, wherein motion or movement 
was a step closer to the physical world than liberty). Bentham gave the 
name ‘paraphrasis’ to this process of demonstrating the relationship of 
the names of fictitious entities or abstract terms to real entities or objects 
that had physical existence. Insofar as this operation could be success-
fully carried out, the proposition containing the abstract term made 
sense; insofar as there existed no physical ‘root’ for the abstract term, 
the proposition in which it was contained made no sense. Hence, it made 
sense to talk about a legal right, where it was possible to identify the 
legislator who had commanded its creation and enforcement, whereas 
it made no sense to talk about a natural right, because there was no such 
legislator.76
In short, the name of a fictitious entity did not represent an object 
that had physical existence, but it facilitated discourse to speak of it as 
though it did exist. It made sense to say that a certain person lay under 
an obligation to another person, or enjoyed a right, but no one had 
ever seen, heard, touched, tasted, smelled or, assuming a sixth sense,77 
had sex with an obligation or a right. A proposition including the term 
‘obligation’ or the term ‘right’ would make sense if it could be expounded 
by paraphrasis, that is if it could be translated into another proposition 
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with the same import but which contained only real entities. According to 
Bentham, the only source of knowledge was sense-perception. The only 
source from which sense-perception could be derived was the physical 
substance of the universe. There were no innate ideas. To the objection, 
made by Platonists and Kantians, that we must have the innate idea of 
a perfect circle in order to recognize that a particular geometric shape 
is a circle, Bentham would have responded that there is no such thing 
in the physical universe as a perfect circle, that the only place that a 
perfect circle exists is in the imagination, and that the idea is created by 
the mind’s power of abstraction, based on all the imperfect circles that 
we have encountered in the physical world. Similarly, the proposition 
1 + 1 = 2 would in itself be meaningless for Bentham – there is no innate 
mathematics in the mind. The sum 1 + 1 = 2 is an abstraction, derived, 
for example, from the experience of taking an apple, and then taking 
another apple, placing them next to each other, and calling the resulting 
situation ‘two’ apples. The proposition makes sense only when it is related 
to objects in the physical world. When, in his account of paraphrasis, 
Bentham referred to the ‘fictitious proposition’ that ‘An obligation is 
incumbent on a man’,78 he did not mean that this proposition was a legal 
fiction or any other sort of fiction. It might, of course, have been false 
to state that, in a certain situation, a certain person lay under a legal 
obligation, but equally it might have been true. A fiction was a lie, but 
a proposition containing a fictitious entity or several fictitious entities 
might be true: a true fiction was a contradiction in terms.79
4. Aesthetics as sympathy and antipathy
We can now see why, for Bentham, talk about any notion of the sublime 
or the beautiful that was based on some form of metaphysics, in other 
words appealed to some non-physical quality, was so much nonsense. If 
the proposition that some entity was beautiful were to make sense, the 
notion of ‘beautiful’ had to be expounded by the process of paraphrasis, 
and thus be shown to have its root in real entities. In the end, for me to 
say that something was beautiful was to say nothing more than that I 
liked that thing, and to say that I liked that thing was to say that it gave 
me pleasure. Conversely, for me to say that something was ugly made 
sense only if it meant that the thing in question gave me pain.80 The point 
was that, for Bentham, feelings of pleasure and pain were real entities. 
It was this assumption that underlay his threefold division of moral 
theories into the principle of utility, the principle of asceticism and the 
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principle of sympathy and antipathy or of caprice. An adherent of the 
principle of utility, noted Bentham, ‘approves or disapproves of every 
action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have 
to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in 
question’, where happiness was understood as a balance of pleasure over 
pain.81 To talk about the principle of utility made sense because it was 
founded on the real entities of pleasure and pain. All rival theories, which 
were necessarily wrong if the principle of utility were right, fell into two 
groups. The first group, which consisted in variants of the principle of 
asceticism, was ‘constantly opposed’ to the principle of utility; while 
the second, which consisted in variants of the principle of sympathy 
and antipathy, was ‘sometimes opposed to it, and sometimes not’. The 
adherent of the principle of asceticism ‘approves or disapproves of any 
action, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment 
or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question; but 
in an inverse manner [to the principle of utility]: approving of actions in 
as far as they tend to diminish his happiness; disapproving of them in as 
far as they tend to augment it’. An adherent of this principle was ‘any one 
who reprobates any the least particle of pleasure, as such, from whatever 
source derived’. The principle had been adopted by ‘a set of religionists’, 
who had done so in the hope of avoiding punishment in an afterlife, 
and by ‘a set of moralists’, namely the Stoics, who had condemned what 
they had considered to be the ‘gross’ pleasures of the body in order to 
pursue whatever was ‘refined’, which they had called ‘the honourable, 
the glorious, the reputable, the becoming, the honestum, the decorum’, in 
fact any thing but pleasure. Both branches of ascetics had come together 
‘upon various occasions against the common enemy, the partisan of the 
principle of utility, whom they joined in branding with the odious name 
of Epicurean’.82
The adherent of the principle of sympathy and antipathy approved 
or disapproved of actions, neither on account of their tendency to 
increase, nor on account of their tendency to decrease, the happiness of 
the persons affected by them, ‘but merely because a man finds himself 
disposed to approve or disapprove of them: holding up that approbation 
or disapprobation as a sufficient reason for itself, and disclaiming 
the necessity of looking out for any extrinsic ground’. The amount of 
punishment that the adherent of the principle of sympathy and antipathy 
attached to any action was measured by the degree of his dislike: ‘if you 
hate much, punish much; if you hate little, punish little: punish as you 
hate. If you hate not at all, punish not at all: the fine feelings of the soul 
are not to be overborne by the harsh and rugged dictates of political 
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utility.’83 All so-called standards of right and wrong, apart from the 
principles of utility and asceticism, were in fact reducible to the principle 
of sympathy and antipathy. By dressing up his own opinions or sentiments 
in the garb of some fictional standard, whether termed the moral sense, 
common sense, the law of nature, right reason, or repugnancy to nature, 
the adherent of the principle of sympathy and antipathy attempted 
both to avoid ‘the obligation of appealing to any external standard’ and 
to persuade others to take his own sentiments as authoritative.84 The 
notion of ‘repugnancy to nature’ was a particular aspect of the principle 
of sympathy and antipathy that Bentham criticized in his later writings 
on sexual morality, but he had made the same point, as he noted, in An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.85 Bentham there 
explained that acts, such as the exposing of children by the Greeks and 
Romans, were often condemned, ‘upon the principle of antipathy’, for 
being ‘unnautral’, but all that unnatural meant, if it meant anything, was 
‘unfrequent’. However, the usual complaint was that the act was all too 
frequent. The term ‘unnatural’ expressed nothing but ‘the disposition 
of the person who is talking of it: the disposition he is in to be angry at 
the thoughts of it’. The person who claimed that an act was unnatural 
was in fact saying that he did not like to practise it and, therefore, it 
should not be practised by others.86 There was no ‘difference in taste’ 
and no ‘difference in opinion’ from which the adherent of the principle 
of sympathy and antipathy might not ‘extract a ground of punishment’.87
Hence, to say, I like this, or, I like that, and so ought you (or so must 
you), was to be an adherent of the principle of sympathy and antipathy. 
Taste was capricious, and herein lay Bentham’s opposition to the notion 
of taste. Insofar as those who referred to taste were appealing, or 
pretending to appeal, to some metaphysical standard, they were talking 
nonsense; but what they were in fact doing was making a claim that 
their own opinion was to be the standard for others. This was as much 
as to say that their pleasure was more important than any other person’s 
pleasure, or perhaps that the pleasure of persons of their social class 
– persons who shared a similar place in ‘the conjoint scales of power, 
opulence and factitious dignity’88 – were more important than those of 
another social class. This was the claim made by the highest class, the 
aristocracy, and they had the advantage that their wealth and power 
made the claim appear plausible, and even be accepted, by their inferiors 
in power, wealth and titles. Bentham remarked that, ‘The Democratical 
[section of the community] refers or soon will refer every thing to the 
standard of Utility … the Aristocratical, to as great an extent and as long 
as possible, to the standard of taste: itself being the arbiter of taste’.89 
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The adherent of the principle of utility had no basis for claiming that the 
pleasure of one person was worth more than the equal pleasure of any 
other person, and hence ruled out all claims based on superiority of taste. 
It might be objected that the ‘person of taste’, when thinking of an object 
or action of which he disapproved, experienced pain as a result, and that 
such pain should be taken into account by the adherent of the principle 
of utility. Moreover, if the pain was sufficiently intense, or experienced by 
a sufficiently large number of people, then the adherent of the principle 
of utility should condemn the object or action in question. Bentham’s 
response would be that the problem did not lie in the object or action 
complained about, but in the attitude, often founded in prejudice, of the 
complainant.
An explanation of this point requires a brief discussion of sanctions. 
For Bentham, a sanction was a source of pain and pleasure. In An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation he identified four 
sanctions: the physical sanction arose ‘from the ordinary course of nature’; 
the political sanction from an official acting under the authority of the 
state; the moral or popular sanction from members of the community 
in general; and the religious sanction from a supernatural being.90 In 
his later writings, Bentham added the sympathetic and antipathetic 
sanctions, which were imposed by specific or ‘assignable’ individuals, as 
opposed to the moral sanction where there were no assignable persons 
as such. An instance of the operation of the sympathetic sanction 
occurred when an individual imposed some pain on a person who had 
harmed his friend, while an instance of the operation of the antipa-
thetic sanction occurred when an individual imposed some pain on a 
person who had benefited his enemy.91 The sympathetic and antipathetic 
sanctions arose, therefore, from pre-existing feelings of sympathy and 
antipathy, which themselves might be based on prejudices of various 
kinds. Hence, a person who today we would term ‘homophobic’ would be 
so-called because of his inclination to punish two males who he believes 
or imagines are experiencing pleasure from having sex with each other. 
The males in question consent and undertake the action because it gives 
them or they expect it to give them pleasure. The observer condemns it 
because the thought of it causes him pain. That pain arises from the anti-
pathetic sanction, that is from his own internal beliefs, and not from the 
action itself. Addressing the adherent of the principle of sympathy and 
antipathy, Bentham stated: ‘it is for you to get the better of your antipathy, 
not for him [the actor of a non-mischievous action] to truckle to it’.92 The 
point is that, if the action is prevented, the pain is not experienced, but 
neither is the pleasure of the actors. If the prejudice is removed, the pain 
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is not experienced, but the pleasure of the actors remains. Hence, the 
latter course is that which is approved by the adherent of the principle 
of utility.
In summary, there was no independent value of beauty to which the 
‘person of taste’ could claim privileged access; all that taste reflected was 
the pleasure that one gained from a particular object or state of affairs. 
Once this was recognized, since no one person’s pleasure was more 
important than that of another person’s equal pleasure, no one person’s 
‘taste’ could be regarded as superior to that of any other person’s. It took 
Bentham many years and many projects to work through the implica-
tions of the materialist, Epicurean world-view that he had adopted, and 
which incorporated a radical scepticism towards the metaphysics that 
had hitherto been the dominant tradition in the history of ideas, but as 
he did so, established institutions and practices in law, religion, politics 
and economics became the subject of ferocious criticism, and the systems 
of thought on which they rested were attacked. Bentham’s utilitarianism 
brought the radical Epicurean tradition into the mainstream, but only 
briefly. John Stuart Mill, who was Bentham’s most influential successor 
in the utilitarian tradition, while not rejecting his Epicurean legacy, 
began the retreat from outright materialism back towards metaphysics 
through his condemnation of Bentham’s critique of taste93 and with his 
distinction between higher and lower pleasures and his associated claim 
that it was ‘better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; 
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’.94 Mill would have 
disapproved of Duchamp’s Fountain, but Bentham would have been 
greatly amused by it.
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Chapter 2
Not Kant, but Bentham: On taste
frances ferguson
1. Kant avec Bentham
The history of modern aesthetic thought is usually traced to Immanuel 
Kant and his Critique of the Power of Judgment, with an obligatory nod 
to the German philosopher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, who had 
first used the term ‘aesthetics’ in 1735 to identify judgements of taste.1 
Kant’s place in modern aesthetic thought is so secure that it commands 
acknowledgement: even writers who oppose it root and branch feel 
the need to frame their work as a response to it. Bentham, by contrast, 
has scarcely figured in discussions of aesthetics, in spite of his avowed 
interest in measuring actions and objects in terms of their ability to 
generate pleasure and losses to it. 
Kant’s account of aesthetics revolved around individual autonomy, 
and he treated aesthetic judgement as an emblem of the freedom of 
individuals, their ability to form judgements themselves even when 
others did not share them. Bentham’s first-personal stance, by contrast, 
was seen to be mired, on one hand, in sensory experience that could not 
move past its commitment to ‘number one’ and, on the other, to strategic 
thinking that was all too oriented to outcomes. Kantian aesthetics aimed 
to achieve a first-personal experience that was at the same time disin-
terested – that is, unconcerned with the actual existence of the aesthetic 
object and detached from immediate satisfactions. Bentham was seen 
to suggest that judging subjects thought only about improving their 
situations. To support this view of Bentham’s thought, literary critics 
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and aesthetic historians cited John Stuart Mill’s remark that Bentham 
‘says, somewhere in his works, that “quantity of pleasure being equal, 
push-pin is as good as poetry”.’2 Subsequent readers felt no need to look 
to Bentham for illumination on anything like aesthetic pleasure, because 
Mill had painted Bentham as a philistine. Mill conceded that Bentham 
was an admirer of music and even ‘painting, sculpture and the other arts 
addressed to the eye’, but he accused Bentham of disparaging ‘All poetry 
[as] misrepresentation’.3 Bentham’s philosophy could, in Mill’s words, 
‘teach the means of organizing and regulating the merely business part 
of the social arrangement’4 but it could not speak to emotions such as 
love or religious feeling. Bentham’s intellectual project was thought to 
be utilitarian in the narrowest sense, both aesthetic and anti-aesthetic. 
In the following discussion, I affirm the recurrent consensus that 
Kant and Bentham lay out opposed positions, but I argue that Bentham 
should be credited with a significant and expansive account of aesthetic 
judgement. Although Kant and Bentham did not address one another’s 
views directly, juxtaposing their positions on taste helps to focus their 
foundational questions and their characteristic answers. Kant’s thinking 
about aesthetics springs from his sense of the inadequacy of explanations 
of aesthetic feeling if those explanations can be resolved into cognitive 
statements about what objects are or statements about sensory satisfac-
tion. The reflective judgement of aesthetics is provoked by perceptual 
experience, in Kant’s view, but it quickly shows itself to exceed the 
sensory experience that occasions it. Sexuality does not figure in any 
of his discussions of aesthetic judgement, but appears, instead, in The 
Metaphysics of Morals, in an itemization of the duties of spouses to one 
another. ‘In this act a human being makes himself into a thing,’ a situation 
that is only admissible because ‘while one person is acquired by the other 
as if it were a thing, the one who is acquired acquires the other in turn; for 
in this way each reclaims itself and restores its personality’.5 
In contrast to Kant, Bentham highlighted the importance of sexual 
appetite in ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ and Not Paul, but Jesus, expanding 
the catalogue of senses from five to six to include the sexual sense, which 
he termed Sextus and abbreviated in his manuscripts as ‘Sex’.6 He thus 
reserved a central place for sexual experience in his thinking about taste. 
In addition to installing sensory experience – and sexuality considered 
as sensory experience in its most intense form – in taste, Bentham gave 
a public face to sexuality. In other words, he analysed the legal system 
as a social transcendental, treating it as an entity that needed to be 
considered as a self-consistent whole (rather than the iteration of laws 
tested primarily by their longevity, which he took William Blackstone 
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to have laid out in his Commentaries on the Laws of England).7 In An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham had 
argued for rationalizing English law, in particular to assign punishments 
that were proportional to the crimes they aimed to prevent or redress.8 In 
‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ and Not Paul, but Jesus, he aimed both to argue 
against the severe punishments that were meted out to persons who 
practised ‘irregular’ pleasures and to demonstrate how the penal system 
created a new layer of derivative pleasures and pains. The English laws 
governing sexuality privileged some persons’ judgement (of disgust) 
on other persons’ pleasure, and allowed the practitioners of ‘regular’ 
pleasures to take pleasure in the sufferings visited on practitioners of 
‘irregular’ pleasures.
Bentham held up the English law as an aesthetic regime that 
became systematic in the moment that it meted out capital punishments 
for male-male sexuality.9 Such an analysis of the English law as structured 
human interaction made it possible for him on the one hand to maintain 
a resolutely sensual aesthetics, and on the other to depict how social 
interaction created occasions for aesthetic judgement at a different level. 
Aesthetic experience did not for him, as it did for Kant, begin in first-
personal experience and end in first-personal reflection. It needed to be 
tracked to its social manifestations. Kant and Bentham both rejected the 
idea that aesthetic judgements were and should be justified by appeal to 
the taste of the majority. But Bentham had a more robust answer than did 
Kant to the time-honoured claim that there is no point in disputing about 
taste because everyone thinks his own taste best. Bentham’s analysis 
of the laws governing sexual behaviour in what he called its ‘irregular’ 
forms amounted to an argument that one should dispute the validity of 
the taste (the disgust of the many) that English law encourages about 
taste (the sexual pleasure of the minority).
Kant omitted sexuality from his treatment of aesthetics, because 
his account of sexual objectification in the Metaphysics of Morals made 
it seem that a literature that evidenced sexual desire would be a contra-
diction in terms. Sexuality, one might imagine him saying, is so much 
concerned with the existence of one’s sexual object as an object that it 
allows no latitude for the reflective judgement that operates in taste. 
Bentham, however, discovered something like evidence of reflection in 
two opposed directions. He identified an extensive literature eulogizing 
sexuality that he counted as public reflection. Canvassing an assortment 
of literary works that included Virgil’s Aeneid and eclogues, Plutarch’s 
lives, and Plato’s dialogues, he treated them as evidence of pleasures 
that continued to declare themselves even when the immediate physical 
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sensations that occasioned them were past, or only anticipated.10 
Moreover, he treated the legal statutes that enforce the taste of some 
(who feel disgust) in criminalizing the taste of others (who practise 
male-male sexuality) as, equally but oppositely, a representation of 
aesthetic judgement. Kant’s exclusion of sexuality from discussions of 
taste made aesthetic judgement primarily individual and incidentally 
social. Bentham’s inclusion of sexuality in discussions of taste made 
aesthetic judgement at least as social as individual.
Kant and Bentham thought that aesthetic discussion needed to 
address two quite different issues. Kant’s way of framing his central 
problematic obliged him to draw a sharp line of distinction between 
aesthetic experience and what he termed the merely sensuous. A full 
stomach or the gratifying warmth of a fire might give sensory satisfac-
tion, but Kant thought that reflective aesthetic experience could not 
be explained in those terms. He aimed to identify what was involved 
in taking pleasure in imitations or derivatives of actual phenomena. 
When one could look at a mountain, why did one need a painting of a 
mountain? When a viewer was hungry, how did one explain his ability to 
admire a beautiful painting of food that he could not eat? And, further, 
why would one take pleasure in natural objects that remained what they 
were whether they pleased or not? For Kant, the treatment of aesthetic 
judgement needed to explain why the understanding did not exhaust our 
relation to the world – needed to say why we are drawn to what Niklas 
Luhmann calls a ‘doubling of reality’.11
For Kant, sensuous experience triggers aesthetic response: one 
needs to have a perceptual object rather than merely a non-sensuous and 
allegorical thought for aesthetic experience. But in his view sensuous 
experience quickly refers beyond itself to supersensuous faculties that 
can recognize beauty and sublimity in objects that were not designed for 
human appreciation. Aesthetic pleasure, because it is outside the realm 
of any human negotiation or exchange, is enough of an accomplishment 
for it to seem proximate to morality. Bentham, by contrast, continually 
imagines sensory experience in terms of the possibilities of pleasure 
between persons. And while Kant suggests that aesthetic pleasure 
provides something like training in individual autonomous judgement 
that is an intimation of morality, Bentham argues that the laws governing 
sexuality provide a basis for challenging the morality of the law itself.
Kant, in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, and Bentham, in 
‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ and Not Paul, but Jesus, develop very different 
pictures of the way in which aesthetic judgement relates to social 
judgement. Kant sees aesthetic judgements as symptoms of individual 
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freedom because they cannot be compelled, and when he introduces the 
question of the acknowledgement of other people’s aesthetic judgements, 
his discussion of taste comes close to depicting other people’s individual 
judgements as both imaginable enough for discussion and unavailable 
to be taken up. The aesthetic judgement dictates agreement with its 
pronouncements even in the absence of actual social endorsement. 
Bentham, on the other hand, begins and ends in examples of shared 
experience – to such an extent that he names masturbation as the only 
non-violent form of sexual pleasure-taking that he would proscribe.12 
His stated reason is that masturbation, being a form of sexual pleasure 
that an individual always has available to himself or herself, can become 
addictive.13 Masturbation is for him the sensuous version of Kant’s 
projecting that an individual might become monomaniacal and go ‘mad 
with reason’.14 Many might exculpate masturbation on the grounds that 
it is, if a crime, at any rate a victimless crime, but Bentham objects to 
it as an example of antisociality, of allowing oneself to become what 
twenty-first-century parlance terms a loner. For Bentham continually 
imagines experience taking place in a world that always includes other 
people, a world in which one has partners to sexual activity and allies 
and opponents in games and the various representations of games that 
he devises in his plans for prisons and schools. 
Kant, defending the importance that individuals attach to 
their own aesthetic judgements, struggles to reconcile individual 
aesthetic judgements with sociability. Although he suggests that social 
motivations underwrite aesthetic judgements of both the beautiful and 
the sublime, his discussions of taste show him searching for a principle 
of reconciliation that would allow aesthetic judgements to cement 
social relations rather than disrupt them. Aesthetic judgements for him 
present themselves as such thoroughly inaugural moments that they 
raise questions about their possible integration into a social world. 
While Kant wants to analyse the importance of the faculty of judgement, 
Bentham looks at pleasure from the outside, citing various love songs 
and historical accounts and accepting them as a plausible record of a 
history of pleasure that has been built up over time. The love song that 
was written to appeal to a particular person and the biographical sketch 
that was intended to recount a particular person’s activities are for him 
especially important for philosophy precisely because they were not 
devised as philosophical examples developed to illustrate an account of 
aesthetic experience. Their evidentiary use is all the more compelling 
because he takes them merely to have expressed pleasure-seeking desires 
not KAnt,  but bEntHAM 51
and not to have participated in a philosophical debate about pleasure 
and its objects. That is to say: he takes love songs at their word.
2. Kant on taste and other people
Kant offered up an account of aesthetics that conspicuously minimized 
the importance of sensation, and of immediate advantage and purpose. 
Moreover, he had no interest in assessments that might claim any degree 
of confirmation or success of the kind that games of bridge or whist or 
push-pin do when they identify winners and losers as play unfolds. In 
subordinating anything like actual purposes to what he termed purpo-
siveness, he made the look of purposiveness the very mark of the self-
transcendence that aesthetic experience might afford. He centred his 
discussion on our appreciation of natural beauty and the difficulty we 
have explaining it if we do not have the reasons of the landscape gardener 
or the forester. He thus distinguished purposiveness from purposes – in 
his famous phrase ‘purposiveness without purpose’ – and treated the 
pleasure that we take in representations as a symptom of individual 
human freedom because we are treating unmotivated beauties as if they 
were meant for us. When we find this tree or that flower beautiful, our 
pleasure is disinterested and entirely unforced – by others and even by 
a distinct purpose. And when we realize that we take pleasure in green 
even though our friends like blue, Kant would say that we see further 
evidence that aesthetic judgement is symptomatic of freedom. We like 
what we like from a first-personal perspective. Aesthetic judgement is 
insistently first-personal. We as aesthetic individuals like what we like; 
we do not like it because someone else does. And this first-personal basis 
allows Kant to frame aesthetic judgement as a distinct counter to the kind 
of imitativeness that he associates with the unfreedom of childhood.15 
Indeed, autonomy is so central a notion for Kant that children become 
his example of the difference between a mere imitation of someone 
else’s taste and aesthetic judgement that deserves the name. Aesthetic 
judgement for Kant involves not just an expression of individual 
freedom. In the process of freeing an individual from recognizing an 
object exclusively in terms of its purpose – what it is supposed to be – 
acts of aesthetic judgement in Kant reveal both the subjective element 
of the experience of beauty for a perceiver and catch objects up in the 
allure that results from the ‘activity of the subject’ in lingering over ‘the 
consideration of the beautiful because this consideration strengthens 
and reproduces itself’.16
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Here I am simply rehearsing some of the most basic elements of 
Kantian aesthetic doctrine as he lays it out in the third and last of his three 
critiques. Most starkly put, the three different critiques identify three 
different stages of freedom or subjectivity. In the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant describes how our perceptions of physical objects in the world are 
determined by the existence of those objects. Although he takes human 
faculties of representation to fall short of capturing the thing-in-itself 
(the Ding an sich), judgements of the understanding are as minimally 
subjective as he thinks it is possible to be. In the Critique of the Power 
of Judgement, however, the pleasure in perception operates in advance 
of and independent of any cognition of the object, so that aesthetic 
judgement escapes from the trammels of the determining judgements 
that pure reason makes. And, finally, the Critique of Practical Reason 
establishes moral judgement as the supreme expression of individual 
autonomy, ‘the supersensible attribute of the subject, viz. freedom’.
The three Kantian critiques – in so far as they try to isolate three 
different ways that humans have for operating in the world – identify the 
conditions of possibility for cognitive, aesthetic and moral judgements. 
But because they aim to distinguish the various relations to experience, 
the examples – particularly for the aesthetic judgement – betray their 
origin in laboratory conditions. On the one hand, we might imagine that 
the Critique of the Power of Judgement rightly treats all its examples as 
provisional, mere ways of gesturing towards the basic lines of argument. 
On the other hand, the observations for living that Kant offered his 
students in the lectures on anthropology that he delivered between 1772 
and 1796 continually take up examples of pleasure and displeasure 
in social conduct that sit uneasily with the position he lays out in the 
Critique of the Power of Judgement. The anthropological lectures describe 
and rationalize social roles and modes of behaviour; the Critique provides 
a tortuous path for human sociability. For even though Kant maintains 
that we only decorate our houses out of a sense of sociability, he also 
insists that our aesthetic judgements do not arise – or should not arise – 
from imitating others.
The philosopher Paul Guyer has suggested friendly amendments 
to Kant’s account of the individualized sociality of aesthetic judgements, 
even as the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has, in opposition to Kant, insisted 
that aesthetic judgements are such thoroughly socio-economic and 
socially imitative acts that they can be used to diagnose class positions.17 
But neither of them addresses the worry I have developed – largely as a 
result of reading Bentham’s ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ and Not Paul, but 
Jesus. The examples in the Critique of the Power of Judgement are designed 
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to distinguish aesthetic experience from mere recognition of both an 
object (‘that’s an oak’) and of someone else’s aesthetic experience (‘she 
likes oaks’). They thus depict the possibility of individuals acknowledging 
something new to the world – whether for oneself alone or for presenta-
tion to others. This is the aspect of Kant’s attack on imitativeness that has 
convincingly led to the kind of interest in language games and conver-
sations that proceed by someone’s saying something, being understood 
and being replied to not with a repetition of the same words but with 
statements that are themselves new. We do not need an example from 
someone else, he thinks, to take pleasure in natural beauty, just as we do 
not need to have heard a particular statement before to understand it.
But the claim about universal communicability operates in a 
surprising way. This is the claim that we hold firm to our evaluations of 
aesthetic objects and insist that they are shareable even if others do not 
immediately share them. It is a position that Kant lays out as a gener-
alization from experience rather than a mere conjecture. While the 
inability to ground aesthetic judgements in distinct acts of cognition 
might make someone look comparatively unwilling to take their stand 
on aesthetic judgement, Kant represents them, paradoxically, as more 
assertive than acts of understanding. The rather surprising result of this 
line of argument is that, as Kant describes them, reports on the physical 
senses are open to more pluralistic accounts than aesthetic judgments. A 
sensory statement of taste is definite but not universalizable. Someone 
tasting cilantro (coriander) can readily pronounce it to be a pleasant herb 
even while accepting someone else’s assertion that it tastes like soap. 
Someone who is colour-blind may not see red or green where I do, but 
they do see some colour (something like brown). We may label it a mild 
disability not to experience the taste of cilantro as pleasant and not to see 
colour as most other people see it, but we do not require every individual 
to uphold our most common statements about cilantro or colour. While 
we do not relinquish our perceptions, we make room for the possibility 
that others’ perceptions might differ from ours.
Aesthetic judgement as Kant presents it is, however, more militant. 
It has a certain intransigence and intractability. While it can seem accom-
modative in yielding up claims to rational explanation and suasion, I 
am suggesting that we can hear in Kant something like the snarl with 
which Wordsworth says in the preface to Lyrical Ballads that he does not 
imagine that he can reason his readers into an appreciation of the kind of 
poetry he is offering them.18 Kant tends to present concessiveness about 
the first-personal aesthetic judgement as appropriate only in the future – 
as an acknowledgement of one’s future self. In the kind of example that 
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will be repeated in lionizing literary biographies, Kant suggests that the 
artist is someone heroic enough to maintain his poetic convictions in 
the face of his friends’ disparagements. He may change his mind later, 
when he is another person who can see his earlier work differently, but 
Kant suggests that he is right not to accept editorial judgements and 
amendments at the time he is writing.19 
What I mean to stress about Kant’s account of aesthetic judgement 
as he lays it out in the Critique of the Power of Judgement in 1790 and 
in the lectures on anthropology is its emphasis on the importance of an 
individual’s trusting himself. The anthropological account stages itself 
as a discussion of persons who are social persons, and in that sense it 
values the social exchange of observations about the beautiful between 
persons. Thus he can affirm that ‘Taste is … a faculty of making social 
judgements of external objects within the power of imagination’,20 and 
that ‘taste concerns the communication of our feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure to others, and includes a susceptibility, which this very 
communication affects pleasurably, to feel a satisfaction … about it 
in common with others (sociably)’.21 In the Critique this appeal to the 
common and communicable appears with the greatest intensity in the 
discussion of a common sense. He maintains that, even though we are 
grounding our judgment only on our feeling, we treat that feeling ‘not 
as a private feeling, but as a common one’.22 In other words, we perform 
acts of aesthetic judgment as ourselves but also as exemplars. We can 
thus see ourselves as exemplifying humanity in our own persons (as he 
says in the discussion of the sublime).
Yet what I mean to stress here is that this line of argument develops 
something of a one-way street for the communicability of aesthetic 
judgements. Kant makes it clear that he thinks aesthetic judgements 
cannot count on being accepted, but at the same time he thinks that the 
experience of non-confirmation does not undermine the experience of 
conviction: ‘Now this common sense cannot be grounded on experience 
for this purpose, for it is to justify judgements that contain a “should”: 
it does not say that everyone will concur with our judgement but that 
everyone should agree with it.’23 Through something very much like a 
grammatical sleight of hand, Kant, by moving from the first-person 
singular to the first-person plural, makes individual aesthetic judgements 
look as though they have a claim on other people, even if their assent is 
not forthcoming. But both the Critique and the lectures on anthropology 
continually warn us against being taken in by pleasures that others put 
on offer. We rightly cease to take pleasure in the song of a bird, he thinks, 
when we realize that a young boy made it and not a nightingale. And 
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we should distance ourselves from the fashionable, because it appeals to 
‘a compulsion to let ourselves be led slavishly by the mere example that 
many in society give us’.24 
Kant’s emphasis on the centrality of individual judgement in 
aesthetics and in morality has produced a legacy of important restate-
ments and extensions of his first-personal stance. Onora O’Neill, for 
instance, offered a powerful, and powerfully Kantian, treatment of the 
issue of trust in the lectures she presented several years ago on the BBC. 
There she essentially argued against imagining that external standards, 
benchmarks and supervision could generate trust: ultimately trust arises 
from an individual’s requiring herself to be trustworthy – and thus 
inspiring others to be so as well.25 For Ludwig Wittgenstein and many of 
his commentators, the problem of pain assumed serious proportions – 
pain being indubitable from the first-person perspective, but laying one 
open to scepticism when someone else tells you about it. When I have a 
headache I know I do. When you have a headache I may wonder how bad 
it is and, even, whether you are simply producing an excuse that rests 
only on your testimony and is both unimpeachable and open to other 
people’s doubt. Trusting others becomes, in one line of Kantian thought, 
a moral obligation to recognize them and their first-personal exemplarity 
of humanity in the absence of any possible empirical confirmation of the 
truthfulness of their statements.
But it is in his discussion of emotions that Kant offers a particular 
challenge to trust in the form of scepticism about one’s ability to assess 
one’s own emotions and their entanglement in a mixture of motives. 
In the Lectures on Anthropology, Kant offers numerous observations on 
pain and pleasure. By making pain internal to human nature, he makes 
it ineliminable and even fortunate. It is merely a stage on the road to 
pleasure and productivity: ‘As an incentive to activity, nature has put 
pain in the human being that he cannot escape from.’26 But he does not 
merely make statements about the way that nature has arranged us as 
individuals. He also notices how we notice other people’s pain. ‘It is’, he 
says, ‘not exactly the nicest observation about human beings that their 
enjoyment increases through comparison with others’ pain.’27 He does 
not mention Schadenfreude alone. He also focuses on cases that involve 
mixtures of pain and pleasure: an object such as the death of a woman’s 
husband ‘can be unpleasant; but the pain [the grieving widow feels] 
concerning it pleasing’.28 With such a shift from the widow’s pain to her 
observer’s pleasure, Kant expands the range of pleasurable objects.
With remarks like those I have just quoted, Kant seems to be 
replying without directly confronting the centrality that Bentham 
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accorded to Epicurus as the truest philosopher. Using pleasure and pain 
as the measure of human conduct, Kant seems almost to be saying, is 
impractical because pleasure and pain are so intimately interconnected. 
But at the beginning of his Lectures on Anthropology, he also seems to 
be anticipating a criticism of his first-personal position and attempting 
to distinguish it from egoism. He relieves himself of an obligation to 
connect his metaphysics to his remarks, and insists that anthropology 
concerns thinking ‘in which one is not concerned with oneself as the 
whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of 
the world’.29 The human being may, from the day he ‘begins to speak by 
means of the “I” … [bring] his beloved self to light’ if egoism is allowed 
to progress ‘unchecked’.30 And appeals to other people make it possible 
for him to imagine himself as mistaken. One avoids logical egoism, the 
egoism of the understanding, whenever one checks with others about 
the testimony of one’s own senses – to ask, say, whether experiencing 
a room as hot is ‘just me’. One avoids aesthetic egoism by recognizing 
that he ‘deprives himself of progress’ by ‘[isolating] himself with his 
own judgements’ and not listening to the appraisals of others.31 And he 
objects to what he identifies as an eudaemonism wherein a moral egoist 
‘limits all ends to himself’ and prefers ‘utility to duty’.32
This tendentious equation between moral egoism and utility may 
have set the tone for much of the criticism of Benthamite utilitarianism 
and its characterization as a philosophy that always begins from ‘number 
one’. But precisely because Bentham is infinitely less concerned than Kant 
to identify an appropriate first-person perspective, Bentham’s writings 
on sexual irregularities provide a stronger statement than Kant does 
about other people’s pleasure. On the one hand, Kant produces a variety 
of observations on human conduct to show how we judge it – in a fashion 
that suggests how far he himself is from sorting the aesthetic from the 
understanding and the reason. On the other, he is driven to wry remarks 
about why we believe reports from others. ‘It is’, he says, ‘so certain that 
we cannot dispense with [newspapers as a] means of assuring ourselves 
of the truth of our judgement that this may be the most important 
reason why learned people cry out so urgently for freedom of the press.’33 
We value reports, particularly – and perhaps almost only – when they 
confirm us in the judgements we already have.
Such a statement – for all its distancing – tends to collapse the lines 
of distinction among different kinds of judgement: and it does so even 
as the Critique of the Power of Judgement has isolated them to suggest 
how aesthetic judgement imposes certain limits on itself. Ralf Meerbote 
has made an accurate and trenchant statement on Kantian reflective 
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judgement in the Critique in saying: ‘In the act sense, reflective judgement 
is mere reflecting.’34 This is as much as to say aesthetic judgements do 
not amount to acts because they do not do anything in the world. But 
confining aesthetics to reflection that never enters the field of action is 
a limitation that sits uneasily alongside Kant’s account of anthropol-
ogy, which sounds like a series of statements about the social world that 
individual observers might make. The Lectures on Anthropology, that is, 
resembles a conduct book with various urbane rules of thumb that might 
be used as a guide to living. Kant’s anthropology honours the attention 
we accord to the objects of our perception and the people we encounter, 
but it does not offer much in the way of what Luhmann calls second-order 
observation, a way of observing how individual observations interact 
with public social and legal systems. Kant’s way of avoiding excessive 
satisfaction with one’s own judgements is to change one’s understanding 
of the situation of the observer – to shift from one’s attachment to one’s 
own perceptions and evaluations to a consciousness of oneself in the role 
of ‘mere citizen of the world’.
3. On observation 
I have said as much as I have about Kant to prepare the way for further 
explicit and implicit distinctions between his aesthetics and Bentham’s. 
But I also want to underscore one crucial preoccupation that Kant and 
Bentham shared. What is often seen as a generalized movement toward 
democracy does not arise specifically in relation to discussions of 
government in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Accounts 
that emphasize the rise of democratic feeling can suggest that the right 
to express one’s opinion (by publishing one’s view or by voting) emerged 
through a series of abstract arguments about rights. What I want to 
propose instead is that such things as the extension of the franchise 
ultimately acknowledged the fact that a broader and broader segment of 
the population was being called upon to notice features of their world and 
the people in it. Writing in the wake of Locke’s appreciation of conscious-
ness and its ability to take hold of sensible ideas and to develop abstract 
ideas through reflection, Kant and Bentham, in their different ways, 
recognized that people, by virtue of taking their perceptions seriously, 
were claiming a right to acknowledgement. This was the fundamentally 
democratic gesture that they were continually honouring as they insisted 
that questions of civil society did not – could not – proceed merely as 
an elaboration of the will of the governors. More and more people were 
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authorized, encouraged and pressured to pay attention – to observe. To 
some extent I am describing the knock-on effects of the printing press 
as Bentham, William Godwin and Joseph Priestley all gesture towards 
it. But I also mean to point to the importance of the rise of intellectual 
domains such as anthropology (as a science of the observation of persons 
in society) and aesthetics (as a philosophy concerned with the modes 
of our observing). And those intellectual products, momentous as they 
are, are in their way slight by comparison with the importance of the rise 
of the newspaper and the rise of the novel. For daily newspapers and 
regular periodical publications do not just deliver information to us. In 
their variety, they both convince us of the rightness and the freedom 
of our views (as Kant wryly said) and also constitute a demand that we 
notice – that we pay attention to – the world and inform ourselves of the 
ways in which the circumstances it offers are continually being updated. 
Novels commit their characters so thoroughly to the project of observing 
others that they can, as in Jane Austen, make their plots out of the obser-
vations we rightly call gossip and the occasional observational correction 
that a novelistic plot can deliver. Catherine Morland of Northanger Abbey 
may be mistaken in thinking that General Tilney must have murdered 
his wife because her rooms are unvisited and Tilney no longer seems in 
mourning eight years after her death. But the novel insistently asserts 
that she may have been wrong in her observations but that she has not 
been wrong to observe. Everyone observes: ‘every man is surrounded by 
a neighbourhood of voluntary spies, and … roads and news papers lay 
everything open’.35 
Austen’s novel points a humorously accusatory finger at novels 
that have worked up Catherine’s imagination, but a wider target here 
is the pleasure people take in having opinions and sharing opinions, 
most often about other people – and especially in feeling that they know 
other people better than others do and even better than those other 
people know themselves. The distinctive fictional device known as free 
indirect style or free indirect discourse captures the dilemma. Persons in 
society are continually in the position of talking to one another, having 
something to say if only by way of rehearsing every news item they have 
read that day. And both gossip and novelistic free indirect style have a 
tendency to overwrite the thoughts and motives of the persons whom 
they ventriloquize. Free indirect style, in which a narrator seems to 
merge with the inner thoughts of the character, participates in an activity 
of over-knowing analogous to the way we over-know political figures or 
anyone else who counts for us as a public personage.
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This phenomenon of over-knowing – feeling certainty about things 
well past any remit provided by what one can plausibly claim to know – 
is, I think, the issue that Bentham is getting at when he insists, in what 
H.L.A. Hart describes as ‘a dangerously ambiguous phrase’, that ‘that 
to which expression is given [in language], that of which communica-
tion is made is always the man’s opinion nor anything more’. Hart may 
be right to say that ‘it may even be true that human discourse could not 
function as it does unless there is a generally, though not universally, 
respected convention that we do not say what we do not believe’.36 I 
think, however, that Bentham’s point is the one that Luhmann has fore-
grounded in saying that, ‘Whatever we know about our society, or indeed 
about the world in which we live, we know through the mass media’.37 
We have heard tell. The mass media here stand in for all communications 
that revolve around reports, the communications that we take as reliable 
even though we have not proved them for ourselves and the communi-
cations we make in our reports to others. These are communications – 
such as those of novels and of newspapers, law and literary works – that 
explicitly interpose themselves between persons and effectively disrupt 
the convention of face-to-face interaction that might lead us to believe 
that we usually say only what we believe and usually believe what 
others say to us. Luhmann’s analysis helps us see that even face-to-face 
interaction is not a guarantee of truthfulness but only a communication 
made as ‘always the man’s opinion nor anything more’.
Aesthetic judgement as Kant models it is a notably intense version of 
conviction in a report. When Kant imagines a check on the conviction of 
individual judgement, he appeals to an individual’s capacity to shift roles 
– to think of himself as a ‘mere citizen of the world’ who knows that there 
are other citizens in it. Yet one can easily imagine that the perspective 
that one takes as a citizen of the world is virtually no check at all and 
that it opens on suspicions like those that John Stuart Mill expressed 
about majority rule and its impulse towards tyranny. For one particu-
larly tyrannical aspect of individual egoistic judgement is its tendency to 
lapse into a conviction of its own minority status, and to intensify itself in 
the process of imagining itself as a moral stance because of its minority 
status. 
It is at this point that we can begin to see the advantage that 
Bentham derives from adopting the stance of an observer rather than a 
self-observer when he includes sexual pleasure, on the one hand, and 
governmental structures, on the other, in his account of pleasure. The task 
that Bentham imposes on himself in ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ is to argue 
in favour of the decriminalization of male-male sexuality – and to do so 
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by analysing the legal structure of punishments and submit it to rational-
ization. In the face of his awareness of social and dissocial judgements 
that attend anyone’s sexual choices, he does not pitch his argument as 
an appeal to a public audience. It is not an oratorical performance. Nor 
does ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ and the writing associated with it rally 
men who have sex with men to think of themselves as an identity group. 
Although Bentham seems to have imagined that William Beckford, who 
had been banished to the continent for his sexual congress with young 
men, might have been willing to edit the volume, the work is not a call 
to action on the part of men who have sex with other men.38 Nor does it 
suggest that persons should be allowed their sexual pleasures so long as 
they keep them out of view of the general public – and closet themselves 
or take themselves off to a more tolerant continent. Instead, in the face 
of a daunting consciousness of the opprobrium that his arguments will 
receive, Bentham argues that it is not male-male sexuality but the law 
that must justify itself.39 ‘It belongs to [any man in power who marks] out 
for punishment’ anyone who engages in non-normative sex ‘to shew cause 
why he has done so’ and to demonstrate ‘that the effect and tendency of 
… the practice is … productive not only of mischief, but of a net balance 
[on] the side of mischief’.40 While Kant’s citizenly judgement may seem 
merely like a magnification of his individual judgement, Bentham 
addresses individual sexual choices not just by rescuing them from 
opprobrium. He also situates individual choice within a legal structure 
that functions – or, rather, should function – as a public statement of the 
moral choices of the society, a comprehensive guide to behaviour that 
draws its various elements into a systematic whole so as to be able to 
judge penalties and assess their proportionality.
Bentham’s position here effects an astonishing reversal. He 
recognizes that male-male sexuality is so widely scorned and criminal-
ized in English society that popular judgements on it move with the 
kind of instantaneity that Kant associated with judgements of natural 
beauty. For him, ‘there is no disputing about taste’ does not translate 
into a statement of every individual’s freedom to maintain their aesthetic 
judgements in the absence of social confirmation. For him judgements 
of taste are merely evaluations that we happen not to dispute. He 
recognizes that the senses are legislative within an individual, in that one 
experience of pleasure recommends further experiences of that kind (in 
what Hume called habit and what later analysts would describe as sexual 
identity or sexual orientation). At the same time, however, they never 
develop the relative imperviousness to social opinion that Kant at least 
heuristically claims for aesthetic judgements. Judgements of taste are 
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for Bentham cumulative within the individual and socially cumulative as 
well, not merely communicable but communicated. 
In the effort to argue against judgements that seem to go without 
saying, Bentham describes the supports to the popular opprobrium 
attached to irregular sexuality. The legal code and the pronouncements of 
judges and news reports all encourage his contemporaries to calumniate 
male-male sexuality. Recognition of such cumulative judgements leads 
Bentham to adopt a striking way of depicting principles in argument. 
Contemporaries such as Joseph Priestley urged that orators inculcate 
belief and opinion in others by doing such things as putting their own 
beliefs on display and recommending them in manifest sincerity of 
affirmation.41 Bentham, however, does not lay out his own thinking 
as a direct address to an audience – either specific individuals such 
as particular legislators or members of the public at large. Instead, he 
depicts principles, stipulations and definitions as analogous to theorems 
in geometry. He invokes theorems instead of representing proofs in their 
lengthiest forms, as some writers use definitions to limit the scope of a 
discussion, and opposing parties in court can use stipulations to accept 
certain facts without fighting them out. Such principles or theorems 
are the shorthand – the expositional accelerants – that individual 
judgements derive from a historical survey of legal and religious 
opinions. In judgements of sex, the Principle of Antipathy, or the Principle 
of Asceticism, has, Bentham thinks, established itself so firmly that most 
people never pause to ask why they confidently pronounce anyone else’s 
sexual experience disgusting. What Mill called ‘Bentham’s method of 
detail’ takes the form of his unpacking the Principle of Antipathy, or 
the Principle of Asceticism, of his ‘elaborate demonstrations’ of their 
underpinnings.42
Bentham appeals to his own theorem, the Greatest Happiness 
(or Least Misery) Principle, or the Principle of Utility,43 to evaluate the 
Principle of Antipathy, of Asceticism. His insight is to see that one may 
not be able to talk anyone out of their tastes in art or sex but that one 
can treat the written cultural record as evidence of positive pleasures. 
On any occasion when one pronounces ‘the very idea’ of someone else’s 
way of taking pleasure ‘a cause for disgust’, one is underwriting a legal 
system that incorporates aesthetic judgements by making some tastes 
punishable. ‘The affection of antipathy,’ Bentham says, has ‘the property 
to seek its gratification in the pleasure of subjecting to pain the person 
by whose conduct the dissocial affection has been excited’.44 And, in 
alignment with his life-long practice, Bentham’s contribution to the 
discussion of the social behaviour of individuals is to insist that the law as 
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it stands should be put under obligation, should justify itself by something 
other than the claim to be natural. The repeated use of an inflammatory 
word such as ‘unnatural’ should not be allowed to stand for an unalterable 
cultural and legal edict. Instead, those who propose punishment should 
show that particular acts are crimes and therefore need to be censured.
‘Of Sexual Irregularities’, ‘Sextus’, and Not Paul, but Jesus present 
a particularly striking way of offering criticism of legal and popular 
sanctions against male-male sexuality. These writings do not attempt 
to counter prevailing opinion simply by affirming a different opinion or 
trying to win their way with satire. Occasional brilliant turns of phrase 
remind us that Bentham as the author of the Book of Fallacies could 
produce accounts as satirical as Flaubert’s in his Dictionary of Received 
Ideas, but Bentham in ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’, ‘Sextus’, and Not Paul, 
but Jesus offers long-form descriptions that analyse the position of those 
who hold opposed views, and he does so without satirizing them. He 
commits himself to understanding taste as judgements of pleasure and 
pain (or the absence of pleasure), and he similarly commits himself 
to observing the work that dyslogistic words such as ‘unnatural’ do in 
condensing a judgement and picking out sundry occasions for deploying 
it. Infanticide and rebellion may not have much in common – and indeed 
might seem opposed to one another – but the dyslogistic work of the 
epithet ‘unnatural’ pulls them together.
I will leave to the side Bentham’s elucidation of the work of the 
senses, except to observe the obvious importance of his decision to 
represent sex as the sixth sense, and to note its intensity by comparison 
with the five senses that are conventionally named.45 Bentham’s 
exploration of the testimony of the various senses and comprehensive 
iteration of the various possible combinations of sex acts, as important 
as they are, are chiefly important for setting up the question: why does 
anyone think that sex between men is ‘disgusting’? His analysis of the 
immediate and longer-term effects of male-male sexuality makes it hard 
to see why pleasure-giving acts should be censured – indeed, punished 
as capital crimes – when his analysis acquits them of doing damage to 
individuals. He takes up the possibility that women might be injured 
by male-male sexuality if it led to women’s being neglected and the 
possibility that society at large might be injured by non-procreative sex. 
In both cases, he acquits male-male sexuality of deleterious effects. He 
takes the former objection to male-male sexuality to be so vague as to be 
virtually meaningless, while also suggesting that it would not diminish 
women’s authority for there to be some men who were ‘unsusceptible’ to 
their influence.46 And he maintains that Thomas Malthus’s projections 
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of population – and his own analysis – have established that society has 
more to fear from redundant, or excessive, population than from a low 
birth rate.47
The centrepiece of Bentham’s discussion is what turns out to be a 
history of the Principle of Asceticism. And it is Bentham’s reliance on a 
historical record that most sharply distinguishes him from Kant. When 
Kant presents various kinds of aesthetic objects as pleasurable, he focuses 
on the possibilities that those objects offer for aesthetic judgements in 
the present. Attention falls so directly on the judgement being passed 
on the beauty of an object that its content becomes nearly irrelevant. A 
beautiful object – whether painting or poem – precisely because it is not 
treated under the terms of the understanding – does little to co-ordinate 
the judgements of the characters depicted within its precincts. (Hence, 
the persistent disagreements about what aesthetic objects are and mean.) 
Bentham, by contrast, consults a historical literary record – materials in 
writing that fall on both sides of the distinction we now draw between 
the historical and the literary. He names both actual and legendary 
characters, not to anatomize their writings and their exploits, but instead 
to capture evidence of their beliefs. When Kant in the Anthropology 
speaks of writings about sexual love, he notices its deceptiveness: writers 
use ‘obscure representations’, he maintains, in writing about ‘sexual love, 
in so far as its actual aim is not benevolence but rather enjoyment of its 
object’ and in the process waste ‘wit … in throwing a delicate veil over’ 
behaviour that announces its own animality.48 Bentham, however, takes 
classical poems and histories as evidence that a number of ancient writers 
believed that sex acts between men were pleasurable and desirable. And 
he also notes that classical literature did not take a man’s desire for sex 
with another man to disqualify him from admiration and heroic renown. 
Socrates was ‘represented, if not as a model of perfect virtue, as a model of 
the most perfect virtue that heathenism admitted of’.49 Virgil’s shepherd 
Corydon singing his love laments for Alexis and the Theban band 
celebrated for their courage all mark out ‘love operating in this irregular 
shape’, and mark it as ‘pius’ (a noble emotion). As Bentham observes, ‘In 
a case such as this, fiction in its nature affords more conclusive evidence 
than any particular realities: it shews the conclusion drawn by opinion 
from universal and continual experience.’50
Bentham’s compelling point here is that literature is evidence of 
judgements of taste that needed no apologies in their own time. It testifies 
to behaviour that is ‘not simply innoxious but positively beneficial’, and 
‘never performed’ ‘unless attended with pleasure’.51 The eulogistic aims 
of love poetry and tales of heroes bespeak a taste that never imagines that 
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it will be judged harshly by posterity. In that global sense, it expresses the 
convictions of the heart’s affections, and does so without self-censorship. 
In that regard, it provides an amendment to – and improvement on – 
John Stuart Mill’s distinction between oratory that is heard and poetry 
that is overheard. Literature testifies to feelings that need not seek for 
any further justification. They carry conviction within them. It was a 
thought that various writers had as they were trying to free literature 
from absorption in its own history and conventions, from simply being 
enmired in one poet’s conversation with other, previous poets. And it was 
a thought that Wordsworth had clearly had a couple of decades earlier 
when he pronounced that ‘Poetry is the history or science of feelings’ 
and that Anna Letitia Barbauld had had when she declared that novels 
testify to individual and social judgements in their time – and do so more 
accurately than laws and the opinions of posterity do.52
Bentham’s aim, then, in extending an account of judgement and 
taste to include the sexual sense is to draw attention to the issue of 
conviction. When Bentham observes that it is simply tautologous to 
say that ‘to every man that which is his own taste is the best taste’, he 
is restating Kant’s observation that everyone thinks that everyone else 
should share and second their aesthetic judgements. But he is extending 
judgements of taste to include the pleasures of the sixth sense, of sex, so 
as to secure them against derogation by others. ‘In the case of the fine 
arts, when the object is of a complex nature, by being made to observe 
this or that circumstance which he had not observed before – this or that 
feature of defect or excellence which till now had passed unobserved – a 
man may now and then be made to change his taste. But in the field of 
appetite – of physical appetite – so simple is the object, no place can be 
found for any such discovery.’53 People continue to have sex – albeit with 
greater and lesser frequency at different points in their lives – because 
sexual experience is so intensely pleasurable that they are willing to risk 
all manner of trouble and inconvenience in pursuit of it.
Sexual pleasure in its various forms – including the form of sex 
between men – counts for Bentham as an unambiguous pleasure. He 
takes sexual taste to be so unsusceptible to fashion and other people’s 
taste that he recounts a story from Lucian in which a young man is so 
enamoured of a statue of Venus that he has sex with it – not by following 
prescribed heterosexual practices but by having sex with ‘a part which 
is common to’ both sexes.54 People do not, in Bentham’s account, have 
regular or irregular sexual experiences because they have been educated 
by other people’s examples. The education of the senses – the education 
out of the senses – begins, however, when the priests of Bentham’s 
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conjectural history treat other people’s pleasures as a currency which 
they can traffic in. In a conjectural history of religion that will turn out 
to have specific bearing on sexuality, the idea of a god or gods creates 
priests, those who claim to be able to interpret the wishes of a super-
sensible being. Priests develop political authority and social precedence 
by claiming special knowledge of the divinity. And the most important 
strategy that the priesthood develop for maintaining and consolidating 
their authority is the Asceticism Principle: it confiscates the pleasures of 
others by offering those pleasures up in sacrifice, a sacrifice meaningful 
because painful (and painful because it involves forgoing pleasure). 
Normativity by priestly cabal.
In Bentham’s version of a discourse on the origin of inequality, 
conducted as a discussion of sexuality and pleasure, the ascetic principle 
exercised by priestly authority has its purchase because it functions 
as legislation: it recommends a pattern of ascetic behaviour among 
the faithful and makes conspicuous acknowledgement of the law of 
asceticism desirable. While Kant has made confidence in one’s own (non-
sexual) tastes central to aesthetic experience, and Bentham has argued 
that individuals can trust their own sexual tastes, Bentham asserts that 
priestly evangelism for asceticism has thrown individuals into self-doubt 
and, more importantly, suspicion of others. Social, political and religious 
precedence mystify in so far as they distract individuals into distrusting 
– and calumniating – other people’s judgements. In Bentham’s view, the 
doctrine of original sin itself feeds into this pattern of despotic asceticism. 
As continually ratified in the service of the Church of England, it traffics 
in a market of pleasures and pains by allowing individuals to purchase 
indulgences merely by uttering a few words to disparage others: ‘All 
men are sinners. Yet some are saved. Therefore, without prejudice to 
salvation, a certain quantity of sin may always be committed’, he writes 
in paraphrase of Anglican doctrine.55 ‘At so cheap a price as that of a few 
words’, one may acquire ‘the reputation of the love – the ardent love – 
of virtue’.56 This social transaction has its analogue in the supposedly 
soul-saving act of imagining that any potential sinfulness in one’s own 
pleasures may be washed away by making the pleasures of others look 
damnable. And Bentham underscores his observation by aptly quoting 
Samuel Butler’s Hudibras on the technique of ‘Compound[ing] for sins 
they are inclined to, / By damning those they have no mind to’.57
Now as Bentham lays out the various kinds of sexual behaviour 
that have been made punishable by death, he does not avail himself 
of the most direct challenge to the legitimacy of the laws. He does not 
say, ‘By whose authority?’ or, more simply, ‘Who says so?’ Nor does he 
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adopt Sade’s mockery of the Christian Gospels. Though he indicts the 
laws governing sexuality of absurdity, his most stunning argument is that 
Christian scriptural teaching is a plausible grounding for Christian belief, 
and that it only needs to be recovered from the texts that have grown 
up around it and obscured it in the process. The writings of the Hebrew 
Bible, the Christian Gospels and the letters of Saint Paul may all be bound 
together in the volume called the Bible, and they may thus make up one 
composite text. Together they make up a form of legislation – prompts to 
behaviour. But, as he fully recognizes, they enjoin all manner of different 
behaviours: one could gloss practically any action by saying, ‘The Bible 
tells me so.’ 
Bentham’s approach, in response to such a recognition, is to sift 
the Scriptures and perform a crucial act of philological criticism, much 
like that of Spinoza in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Bentham 
argues that the ascetic principle – enunciated, affirmed and reaffirmed 
by Moses, John the Baptist and Paul – has no legitimacy in the face of 
the statements that the Gospels attribute to Jesus and to the statements 
they make about him. Moses and Paul may have legislated minutely 
to condemn sex between men and varieties of sex between men and 
women, but, Bentham says, Jesus did not. Although a writer like Sade 
recounts the Gospel story with a sneer, Bentham treats Jesus’s words 
and deeds as worthy evidence of his ‘scheme of instruction’. Further, 
Bentham recommends that the Christians among whom he lives take 
that legislation as the basis of their conduct and their judgments on the 
conduct of others. Jesus framed his teachings as an explicit repudiation 
of Mosaic law, and the Gospels demonstrate that such repudiation 
extended to laws governing sexuality. The Gospels, Bentham points out, 
both show Jesus’s tolerance for male-male sexuality and also attest to his 
personal sexual relations with men and with women.
What seems to me most remarkable about Bentham’s line of 
argument here is how thoroughly he detaches it from his own religious 
beliefs – or, rather, his beliefs about religion (that there is no God and 
that the image of an omniscient and omnipotent judge that Christianity 
holds out is a pernicious one). Instead, he focuses on identifying the best 
version of other people’s beliefs – or, rather, the beliefs that they should 
lay claim to in identifying themselves as Christians. The legislation of 
Jesus – the legislation of the Gospels – is what British Christians should 
keep before them. Any backsliding into what Bentham takes to be the 
viciousness of Moses or the militant asceticism of Paul should be arrested 
simply by their recalling to themselves who they are, what their name is: 
Christians. Jesus may have replaced the law of Moses, but his succession 
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was more than merely chronological. Thus, though Paul wrote after 
Jesus’s death, the persistence of the name Christianity shows how little 
his teachings have a claim to succeed those of Jesus. (Paul’s writings 
are, as Joseph Priestley continually insisted, among the ‘corruptions of 
Christianity’.)
Bentham may see the congruence between Jesus’s teachings and the 
principle of utility, in so far as both centre on increasing human pleasure 
and decreasing human pain, but he is not asking his fellow Britons to 
subscribe to utilitarianism. He is saying, above all else, that the very 
name of their religion – Christianity – constitutes an ongoing affirmation 
of Jesus’s pre-eminence as a guide to their thought and behaviour. They 
are not Paulists but Christians. The principle of asceticism may have been 
honoured in long-standing practice, but the continuing embrace of the 
name of Christians should count as a principle of principles. Christianity 
is what Christians say they believe.
The significance of this line of argument is that Bentham never 
needs to rely on simple relativism: he need not admit every judgement 
on the grounds that someone has believed it at some point in time or in 
some place in the world. Nor does he ever need to claim that the ancients 
held the correct views, or that the moderns have eliminated errors as 
moral judgements have been transmitted and refined over time. Instead, 
he establishes a coherent picture of the laws as he knows them and a 
coherent picture of the laws as others should know them. These are two 
different routes toward arriving at what one might think of as organic 
form. In neither case is organic form a sign of immediacy or naturalness. 
In the case of law, the organic quality of the law derives not from the 
stories of natural cultural growth that someone like Edmund Burke put 
forward. In the case of the Scriptures, the organic quality of the law 
derives from submitting the body of texts to the pressure of the authority 
of Jesus. Both of these contrast sharply with the Kantian depiction of 
organic form, which introduces immediacy and perceived satisfaction. 
Benthamite form holds judgements to account, and produces what 
biblical scholars might have called a harmony of Christian Scripture so 
as to capture what he takes to be other people’s reasons – public law, 
Christian Gospels. Not Paul, but Jesus. Not Kant, but Bentham.
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Chapter 3
‘Envy accompanied with antipathy’: 




Jeremy Bentham’s recently published writings on sexuality (written 
between 1814 and 1818) are an important (and surprising) addition to 
the history of philosophical sexuality studies. In ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’, 
‘Sextus’, ‘General Idea’ and Volume III of Not Paul, but Jesus, Bentham 
argues that homosexual sexual pleasure is in general a good and argues 
for the ‘Proposed ultimate liberty – viz. all-comprehensive liberty for all 
modes of sexual gratification not predominantly noxious’.1 At numerous 
points in these writings, there are striking parallels with Freud’s 
writings on sexuality, particularly the latter’s Three Essays on the Theory 
of Sexuality (1905). Like Freud, Bentham finds no moral distinction 
between same-sex and heterosexual sexuality. Understanding sexuality 
primarily in terms of pleasure (rather than reproductive teleology) and 
presupposing sexual orientation to be a matter of taste, Bentham, like 
Freud, denies that same-sex desire is either pathological or unnatural 
and argues for a measure of sexual freedom against its deleterious 
suppression by ‘civilization’. This means that, unlike the psychopathia 
sexualis of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries it is the 
pathology of the ferocious condemnation of homosexuality, not the 
seeker of same-sex pleasure, that Bentham’s analysis tries to understand.
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However, this chapter aims to show that Bentham’s conception 
of sexuality is surprisingly radical, even in relation to Freud. It begins 
with a brief discussion of the common aspects of Bentham’s and Freud’s 
conceptions of sexuality, according to which Bentham can argue that 
it is not homosexuality, but, on the contrary, the violent persecution of 
homosexuality, that is an offence to morality and justice. The chapter 
then examines Bentham’s explanation for the unwarranted and vicious 
condemnation of same-sex sexuality, and the problem of the relation-
ship in this explanation between what Bentham calls the ‘principle 
of antipathy’ and the ‘principle of asceticism’. Arguing that the role of 
the principle of asceticism, which ostensibly has the main explanatory 
force, is in this instance underwritten by the principle of antipathy and 
the (often hidden) motive of pleasure in it, the chapter concludes that 
Bentham’s writings on sexuality reveal a more complicated picture of his 
psychology than is usually suggested by its reduction to the categories of 
‘psychological egoism’ or ‘psychological hedonism’.
Bentham and Freud: Sexuality and pleasure
In Bentham’s writings on sexuality two areas of agreement with Freud’s 
later writings stand out. First, both Bentham and Freud display a 
clear-eyed, non-moralistic acceptance of the fact of human sexuality in all 
its diversity and a basic understanding that the pleasures of sexuality are 
experientially separate from the function of reproduction, and thus that 
the phenomenon of sexuality itself, as an element of human existence, 
constitutes a topic of interest independent of discussion of reproductive 
function. If this is largely presupposed in Bentham’s writings on sexuality, 
Freud’s innovation in relation to his philosophical and sexological prede-
cessors is the determination of a non-reproductive, non-teleological 
concept of sexuality defined in terms of pleasure seeking.2 In Freud’s 
early theory of sexuality, adult, genitally-organized heterosexuality is 
one way in which the sexual drive may express itself. But the sexual drive 
is itself essentially perfectly indifferent to sexual difference; indeed, to 
all difference. There is no essential relation between the sexual drive 
and its object – that is, there is no essential or innate heterosexual-
ity, as was usually previously presumed. As the sexual object is merely 
soldered to the sexual drive, sexual preferences cannot be said to be 
either ‘natural’ or unnatural’. Freud uses the terms ‘normality’ and 
‘abnormality’, but almost always in inverted commas, either literally or 
metaphorically, and ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ come to mean something 
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like ‘usual’ or ‘common’ or ‘expected’ and their opposites; that is, they 
do not have a moral meaning. Bentham is similarly sensitive to the use 
of this kind of terminology (as will be discussed later) and it is his char-
acterization of sexuality as a sixth sense on a par with the other senses, 
subsuming sexual object-choice under the idea of taste, that, in his view 
too, severs sexuality from any ‘natural’ object and from reproduction. At 
the end of the nineteenth century, when the idea of a sixth sense was 
raised again by Paul Moreau de Tours – probably without any knowledge 
of Bentham’s work – it had reverted to the idea of a reproductive sense: 
the ‘sens génésique’, the ‘generative sense’.3 In this respect, Bentham was 
very far ahead of his time.
Armed, as it were, with these conceptions of sexuality, both 
Bentham and Freud display what we would now call a ‘liberal’ attitude 
to homosexuality, and both clearly argue, albeit in different ways and 
to differing degrees, for sexual liberty. In fact, Bentham is much the 
more radical here (except where ‘solitary pleasures’ are concerned). His 
writings go considerably beyond what would later be found in Freud’s 
writings, asserting non-mischievous homosexual acts to be ‘in themselves 
nothing but good – pure good’4 and arguing for the benefits of liberaliza-
tion, for the ‘addition expectable from it to the sum of happiness’, that 
is, from the ‘Proposed ultimate liberty – viz. all-comprehensive liberty 
for all modes of sexual gratification not predominantly noxious’.5 The 
writings of both Bentham and Freud clearly acknowledge the cost to the 
individual’s happiness of repressive social moralities forbidding sexual 
expression. Freud was perhaps less concerned with homosexual desire 
than with the cost of ‘“civilised” sexual morality’6 to women, who were 
subject to more and greater restriction than men, as Bentham of course 
also realized. But Bentham’s emphasis on male homosexuality stems 
from the legal context of his writings on sexuality and is a response to the 
fact that homosexuality was still punishable by death under English and 
Scottish law when he was writing.7 
Second, both Bentham and Freud locate the principal spring of 
human action, its greatest motivating force, in what Bentham calls the 
pursuit of pleasure and Freud calls the pleasure principle.8 From very early 
in Freud’s writings, from the 1890s, and increasingly through the years, 
Freud understood pleasure primarily in terms of excitation and satisfac-
tion, even though the idea of both remain undefined and ambiguous 
in his work. Arguably, all pleasure was, for Freud, ultimately related to 
sexuality, it being understood that what Freud means by ‘sexuality’ goes 
far beyond and encompasses much more than the popular conception.9 
Because of the ambiguous place of excitation in the psychic economy, 
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there is for Freud no straightforward distinction between pleasure and 
unpleasure. Both are a matter of excitation and tension and to that 
extent are effectively indistinguishable. If satisfaction means the end of 
excitation and tension (which is one of Freud’s definitions of pleasure), it 
also means the end of pleasure. 
Although Freud argued for increased sexual liberty, locating the 
origin of many neuroses in sexual repression, he was also clear that some 
measure of sexual repression was the sine qua non of human civilization, 
and thus that human beings are condemned to a certain discontent or 
unease (das Unbehagen). This is not to pit human nature (represented 
as the unfettered sexual drive) against human culture (repression), 
because the human being is, ontologically, a cultural being. Further, 
Freud’s discussions of sexuality do not refer to a contingent, episodic 
aspect of human experience; they deal with the being-sexual of human 
being. ‘Sexuality’ is not a separable quality predicated of human being; 
it is integral to the specificity of human being or human existence itself. 
Freud’s theory of sexuality is also therefore a philosophical anthropology 
that identifies our troubled relationship with pleasure, and specifically 
sexual pleasure, as the irritating grit that determines, both positively and 
negatively, the specificity of the form of human subjectivity.10
Bentham, on the other hand, has a generic conception of pleasure 
and deals with sexual pleasure as one of its species. In comparison with 
Freud, pleasure seems to be quite straightforward for Bentham. Indeed, 
the sense of the uncomplicated, not to say joyous, nature of sexual 
pleasure conveyed in Bentham’s writings is one of their chief attractions 
and surprises. Although Bentham frequently speaks of pleasure and 
the avoidance of pain in the same breath, his conception of pleasure 
is in general more positive than Freud’s (it is positively pleasure, not 
predominantly negatively avoidance of pain). In a brief mention of 
the ‘pleasure of the sexual sense’ in An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation, Bentham writes that it ‘seems to have no positive 
pain to correspond to it: it has only a pain of privation, or pain of the 
mental class, the pain of unsatisfied desire’.11 Bentham does not ask the 
philosophical question ‘what is pleasure?’, perhaps because pleasure is 
the kind of physical idea upon which other, non-physical ideas might 
be based; that is, reference to pleasure is for Bentham an explanans not 
an explanandum. Unlike Freud, sexuality appears to carry with it no 
existential charge for Bentham; his conception is more purely physiologi-
cal than Freud’s. In ‘Sextus’ he offers the following definitions:
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the sexual appetite is, in figurative language, the seat of the desire 
of that pleasure of which the organs by which the two sexes are 
distinguished from each other is, in plain language, the seat.
Any act having for its object the administering an immediate 
gratification to the sexual appetite may be termed an act of 
sexuality.12
In Not Paul, but Jesus, Vol. III, in Bentham’s division of the acts ‘whereby 
the senses are put to use or affected’, sexuality (which he calls the ‘sixth 
sense’)13 falls into the class of those acts in which the sense is ‘the seat 
as well as the inlet’ of pleasure or pain, and those ‘of which the most 
prominent effect is the production of positive pleasure’.14 He also writes 
that, ‘No condemnation can justly be passed on any pleasure on any 
such ground as to that of its shape, seat, source, or inlet’.15 That sexual 
pleasure, even in this blunt and predominantly physical conception, is 
in general a good seems to Bentham rather obvious. As with all other 
actions, it is necessary to determine the ‘general tendency’ of sexual acts, 
to assess the ways in which the individuals most directly concerned and 
their community are affected, in order to calculate whether the scales 
tip in favour of a yield of pleasure or pain. When we are talking – as 
Bentham most often is – about sexual acts between consenting adult 
parties in private, the tendency, as far as Bentham is concerned, is to 
increase happiness. Of course, not all expression or practice of sexuality 
is like this. Bentham is clear that rape, for example, is an evil, where any 
pleasure obtained by the aggressor is far outweighed by the pain caused 
to the victim. In ‘Sextus’, remarking on the ‘State of the public mind in 
England in relation to the irregularities of the sexual appetite’, he writes 
of adultery and rape as ‘noxious’ and notes the oddity of the fact that 
the anger excited in the ‘public mind’ by rape is ‘very inconsiderable’ 
compared with the anger excited by consensual sex between males.16 In 
general, however, the requisite calculations having been made, and all 
other things being equal, it is Bentham’s view that sexual pleasure is in 
general good. As far as Bentham is concerned, sexual pleasure is, further, 
like any other pleasure, largely a matter of taste. If one man’s taste differs 
from another’s, there is no a priori or empirical ground to class his 
pleasure as unnatural or abnormal. Thus, for Bentham, just as for Freud, 
same-sex sexual pleasure is no oddity to be explained or condemned 
and homosexuality is not a pathology.17 Because of this straightforward 
conception of sexuality as a sixth sense, Bentham’s writings on sexuality 
contain no analysis of sexuality itself. It is as if, for Bentham, there is 
nothing about sexuality that needs explaining.
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Bearing all this in mind, in the various writings on sexuality 
Bentham runs through the arguments raised against ‘irregular pleasures’ 
and offers reasoned refutations. This turns out to be a relatively easy task, 
because the objections themselves are hardly reasoned; they are, rather, 
often fairly flimsy expressions of prejudice.18 So given the weakness of the 
counter-position, and given that sexual pleasure is generally an obvious 
good, what does need to be explained, according to Bentham, is the 
ferocious condemnation of homosexuality.19 A great part of Bentham’s 
writings on sexuality are thus concerned with the causes of the severity 
of the disapprobation and punishment of homosexuality. This shift 
of focus from homosexuality itself and its acts to the phenomenon of 
the condemnation of the acts is evident in Bentham’s definition of the 
adjective ‘unnatural’ applied to homosexuality. In relation to the practice 
itself, ‘the use of the adjunct unnatural … is a very precarious indication 
of any quality as having place in the practice’; indeed ‘the only matter 
of which it affords any indication that can be depended upon is the 
existence of a sentiment of disapprobation, accompanied with passion, 
in the breast of the person by whom it is employed’.20
Bentham’s writings on sexuality reveal an awareness of the fact 
that, historically, a whole set of political, juridical, moral, social, cultural, 
aesthetic and psychological issues converge in the topic of the regulation 
of sexuality. (This may come as a surprise to some Foucauldians.) If 
we were to try to layer these issues and seek to determine the order of 
influence, if not quite of causality, among them, they come to rest, I 
suggest, on quite specific psychological considerations. This is not to say 
that this is essentially the case, but that this is Bentham’s analysis of the 
historical situation in and of which he writes.
In general, as Philip Schofield puts it, it is for Bentham the 
‘sovereign masters’ of pleasure and pain that ‘constitute … not only the 
foundation of human psychology, determining what individuals actually 
did, but also the foundation of ethics, pointing out what they ought to 
do’.21 Bentham’s psychological theory can then be characterized as 
egoistic or as ‘psychological hedonism’, according to which it is ‘a fact of 
human nature that we are motivated solely by a desire for pleasure and 
aversion to pain’.22 In A Table of the Springs of Action Bentham reduces 
all ‘psychological entities, mostly fictitious’ to the appellation ‘motive’, and 
the science of motives (or springs of action), which he calls ‘psychologi-
cal dynamics’, is based on ‘psychological pathology’, that is, on feelings, 
or, basically, on pleasures and pains.23
This ‘motivational psychology’, as McReynolds calls it,24 is, with all 
due respect to Bentham, ultimately rather simple. John Stuart Mill, in 
‘ Envy ACCoMpAniED witH Ant ipAtHy ’ 77
his essay on Bentham, famously criticized, both implicitly and explicitly, 
Bentham’s knowledge of human nature, accusing him of a lack of 
imagination and, because of this, an inability to enter into the mind of 
another.25 But while this may be true of the general basis of Bentham’s 
psychological hedonism, the particular analysis of the psychological 
determinants of the condemnation of homosexuality are, on the contrary, 
rather acute and point to a psychology of greater depth and nuance than 
Bentham’s explicit pronouncements on psychology in general tend to 
indicate.
Antipathy and asceticism
So what does Bentham say about this? It having been shown, as far as 
Bentham is concerned, and with reference, of course, to the principle 
of utility, that acts of consensual homosexual sex are not noxious or 
mischievous, that they rather contribute to the sum of happiness than 
detract from it, and that there have never been any serious arguments 
produced against this view, the question is: why are they punished with 
such ferocity? According to what principles, and with what cause? Do 
these principles legitimately warrant, and does this cause legitimately 
ground, the case for punishment?
In the most general terms, and to the extent that the causes of error 
in moral reasoning here are the same as they are elsewhere, Bentham 
identifies the principle of antipathy and the principle of asceticism as 
the de facto (but not justified) grounds of the virulent condemnation of 
homosexuality.26 These are ‘spurious principles with which the field of 
morals is infected’.27 But what exactly are they?
In An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
Bentham writes:
Among principles adverse to that of utility, that which at this day 
seems to have most influence in matters of government, is what 
may be called the principle of sympathy and antipathy. By the 
principle of sympathy and antipathy, I mean that principle which 
approves or disapproves of certain actions … merely because a man 
finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them: holding 
up that approbation or disapprobation as a sufficient reason for 
itself, and disclaiming the necessity of looking out for any extrinsic 
ground. … measuring out the quantum (as well as determining the 
ground) of punishment, by the degree of the disapprobation.28
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This, Bentham goes on say, is not really a principle at all, or is a principle 
only in name, being rather the negation of all principles.29
As is well known, the principle of utility, or the greatest happiness 
principle, is the rational principle according to which a right and proper 
action is determined and according to which legislation is formed, taking 
into account the fundamental motivations of the pursuit of pleasure and 
the avoidance of pain. The principle is separate from, but acknowledges 
the rule of, the ‘two sovereign masters’ of pleasure and pain. In contrast, 
the so-called principle of antipathy has achieved no separation from the 
feelings of the individual who acts according to it. If the principle of utility 
is the moral principle according to which the individual’s immediate 
motivation of pleasure seeking is judged in the context of the happiness 
of the greatest number, the motivations of the individual guided by the 
psychological, not moral, principle of antipathy seek only spurious justi-
fication for their immediate enactment. In A Table of the Springs of Action, 
‘Antipathy’ is the eleventh of the types of pleasures and pains. The list of 
its corresponding dyslogistic motives or ‘specially derived and directed 
affections’ and abstract moral qualities is the longest in the table.30 
Antipathy itself is of course a feeling, as the very word suggests, but it 
is also called ‘ill-will’ and gives rise to more specific pleasures, such as 
those of revenge. The specially derived and directed affections include 
hatred and spite, associated with the quality of ‘ill-nature’; abhorrence 
and execration, associated with the qualities of maliciousness and 
venomousness; rage and fury, associated with the qualities of cruelty 
and ferocity; and, in groups of their own, revenge and vengeance; and 
envy and jealously. All of these things are evoked in Bentham’s writings 
on sexuality in explaining the punishment of homosexuality.
Bentham accepts the fact that persons may feel physical disgust, 
physical antipathy, for homosexuality – indeed he expresses, or at least 
feigns to express, his own disgust at several points. But this can never 
be grounds for moral disapprobation. This may be the feeling behind 
condemnation, but it is not a warrant for it. There is no sense in asking, as 
far as Bentham is concerned, what causes physical antipathy; it is simply 
a fact of individual taste. The principle of asceticism, the explanatory 
importance of which seems to increase in Bentham’s later writings on 
sexuality, seems to be rather different. It is defined in Not Paul, but Jesus, 
Vol. III:
By asceticism I understand any system or article of doctrine in and 
by which endeavours are used to engage men to forego pleasure in 
any shape for any other cause than the procurement of still greater 
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pleasure in the same or some other shape, or the avoidance of pain 
to an amount more than equivalent: or to subject themselves [to] 
pain for any other cause than the avoidance of still greater pain, or 
the procurement of pleasure to an amount more than equivalent.31
Whereas antipathy is a feeling that acts as a motive that explains certain 
actions or determinations of the understanding, it is difficult, within 
the term of Bentham’s philosophy, to understand how the religious 
(Pauline) principle of asceticism could serve as a motive for action. In a 
sense, all motives resolve into one for Bentham: the desire for pleasure 
and for the avoidance of pain. If, as Philip Schofield says, this means that 
‘actions are motivated by the prospect of obtaining some pleasure or of 
averting some pain’,32 how can the principle of asceticism – that is, the 
principled condemnation and avoidance of pleasure – really be a motive? 
If antipathy is, effectively, one of the springs of action, what kind of a 
thing is the principle of asceticism? Or, what hidden springs of action lie 
behind it?
To answer these questions requires a more detailed account of 
Bentham’s analysis of the causes of the condemnation of homosexual-
ity where, in fact, various other causes, too, are identified. ‘Of Sexual 
Irregularities’, which approaches its subject from the point of view of 
the penal code, enumerates four causes: antipathy, envy, ‘Opportunity 
of affording a safe gratification to the passion of antipathy’ and ‘Desire 
of the praise of virtue – desire of reputation on the ground of love 
of virtue’. Religious objections and the principle of asceticism are 
discussed under the third of these heads, Mosaic religion (but not Jesus’s 
teachings) being taken to have provided a warrant for the unleashing 
of ‘unbridled vengeance’.33 Here religious prohibition and condemna-
tion has a subsidiary function, sanctioning the gratification of antipa-
thetic passions while satisfying the desire to ingratiate oneself with the 
‘almighty being’. ‘General Idea’ and Not Paul, but Jesus, Vol. III give seven 
and six causes respectively. In these texts, the framing of the discussion 
in terms of a more general critique of religion ostensibly brings religious 
causes to the fore. ‘General Idea’ includes as causes in their own right 
the principle of asceticism (from ‘a religious source’)34 and a religious 
conception of moral purity, while Not Paul, but Jesus, Vol. III: Doctrine 
cites Mosaic prohibition and the way in which abhorrence of a very great 
sin (homosexuality) is played off against indulgence in more pardonable 
sins.35 Thus Schofield and Pease-Watkin are right that the later writings 
‘placed much greater emphasis on religious asceticism as the source 
of traditional sexual morality, and hence as the target for criticism’.36 
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This is particularly evident in Not Paul, but Jesus, Vol. III, a great part 
of which comprises commentary on passages from scripture in which 
Bentham argues not only that there is no evidence at all that Jesus ever 
condemned sexual indulgence, but also that the scriptural evidence does 
not allow us to rule out the possibility that Jesus himself partook of the 
‘eccentric pleasures of the bed’.37
But granted that the religious principle of asceticism may well be 
the major quasi-ideological, socio-cultural explanation for the condem-
nation of homosexuality, Bentham’s writings on sexuality dig deeper, 
proposing a psychological explanation that accounts for the otherwise 
inexplicable (in his own terms) success of the principle of asceticism. At 
this psychological level the principle of antipathy, and one of its ‘specially 
derived and directed affections’ in A Table of the Springs of Action – envy 
– play the main role.
Envy (the second named cause in ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’) is, 
more specifically, envy of the enjoyment of the enjoying party, to the 
extent that the envying party does not share in it,38 or, as Bentham puts 
it in ‘General Idea’, envy ‘on the score of source and mode of gratifica-
tion, in which the Censor does not participate’.39 In his elaboration of this 
point in ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’, Bentham distinguishes between envy 
in cases of active competition (competition for an enjoyment which both 
parties seek but which the envying party is less successful in achieving), 
which he describes as ‘emulation accompanied with antipathy’, and envy 
of the procurement of a pleasure which the envying party does not seek 
and ‘enjoyment of a kind in which it is out of his power to participate’. 
This latter is, Bentham says, connected with a different kind of antipathy; 
that is, there is here an antipathy towards the very act itself as well as an 
antipathy towards the enjoying party, and the antipathy is greater in the 
case of envy of an enjoyment that one does not seek. Bentham ends this 
short section with what seems to be an unrelated remark to the effect 
that differences of opinion in politics and religion do not produce envy. 
The point, presumably, is that differences in taste or opinion do not give 
rise to envy except where a considerable yield of pleasure is involved, be 
it sexual pleasure, pleasure in possession, pleasure in power and so on.
The third cause of the severity of the disapprobation and 
punishment of homosexuality identified in ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ is 
‘Opportunity of affording a safe gratification to the passion of antipathy’, 
that is, revenge or vengeance, more specifically gratification of ill-will 
without fear of punishment.40 The fourth cause is ‘contemplation of the 
opportunity of encreasing a man’s own reputation … by the same means 
by which one of his passions, viz. the passion of malevolence, receives 
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its gratification’.41 These two causes are closely related to the extent that 
both involve the gratification of malevolent feeling under pretence of 
virtue.
In discussing revenge Bentham implicitly asks first, how does 
difference of taste give rise to ill-will? He says, in a contorted way, in a 
paragraph that is difficult to understand, that in that part of the field of 
taste that is sexuality, given the right circumstances, one will find many 
people with a disposition to homosexuality.42 This was the case in ancient 
Greece, for example. So how has it come about that homosexuality is 
condemned? Basically, the origin is in Mosaic religion. As elaborated at 
much greater length in Not Paul, but Jesus, Vol. III, this is no part of the 
teachings of Jesus, but the Mosaic prohibition found fertile ground in 
the teachings of Paul, whose asceticism was such that even that mode of 
sexual intercourse which is necessary for the continued existence of the 
species is only unwillingly tolerated and endured.43 Homosexual sexual 
acts, with no chance of procreation, would of course be all the more 
condemned. Later, summing up, Bentham says that if we are taught 
that homosexuals are the enemy of God, then ‘The Being infinite, such 
ought to be our love, such consequently our hatred for his enemies – such 
consequently, in determination and efficiency, the acts in and by which 
that hatred is exercised, manifested, gratified, demonstrated.’44
Although it is not explicit, we can see that this pious condemna-
tion of homosexuality is the occasion for the gratification of the passion 
of antipathy, in an act that simultaneously secures one’s moral, i.e. 
Christian, credentials. (According to Bentham, ‘it is the property [of 
antipathy] to seek its gratification in the pleasure of subjecting to pain 
the person by whose conduct the dissocial affection has been excited.’)45 
Virtuous conduct, Bentham says, cannot in general be maintained 
‘without more or less of self-denial’, but here is an occasion ‘to put in, 
without any expence in the shape of self-denial, the appearance of the 
love of virtue, and, thereby, the appearance of virtue itself’.46 Bentham’s 
argument is thus that the explanation for the condemnation of homo-
sexuality and its severity really lie in antipathy, or more particularly 
the opportunity to gratify antipathy in vengeance, and piety is only 
ever really a cover for this; it is not a real cause. All the emphasis in the 
argument is on antipathy and gratification of ill-will.
But if there is no self-denial here, how is it that Bentham connects 
all this up to asceticism? The argument concerning pious condemnation 
follows immediately upon a discussion of asceticism – but how are these 
related? What is the relation of asceticism to the pious condemnation? 
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From one perspective there is a gap in Bentham’s argument, 
because, granted Bentham’s claim that asceticism is the result of a misin-
terpretation of scripture, it still needs to be explained how a principle 
that does not seek to maximize pleasure or minimize pain could ever 
become part of human existence. Bentham famously claims that pleasure 
and pain ‘govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort 
we make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and 
confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in 
reality he will remain subject to it all the while.’47 This suggests that 
the operation of the principle of asceticism needs to be seen in terms 
of its secret yield of pleasure. To the extent that the operation of the 
principle of asceticism is of a piece with the virulent condemnation and 
punishment of homosexuality, the pleasure is considerable: the pleasure 
in the gratification of ill-will or in vengeance.
In ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ and ‘Sextus’, the analysis suggests 
that condemnation and punishment of homosexuality is, in Bentham’s 
society, one of the principal means, if not the principal mean, through 
which asceticism (denial of pleasure) is converted into pleasure (grati-
fication of ill-will or revenge). This is part of the dissocial appetite 
according to which a person (called malevolent) desires to see others 
foregoing pleasure or undergoing pain,48 or even subjecting persons to 
pain.49 The pleasures of the indulgence of these dissocial appetites are in 
general said to be akin to ‘the sort of enjoyment which an ill-taught boy 
gives himself by tail-piping a dog, or an ill-taught man by bull-baiting, 
or an English judge by consigning a man to the pillory for an offence 
which affords a hope of his having a jaw broken or an eye beat out by the 
surrounding populace’.50 But in the case of antipathy towards homosexu-
ality and the free reign given to the dissocial appetites in its prosecution, 
the thirst for violence is such that ‘nothing less than the heart’s blood of 
the intended victims marked out for slaughter by the dissocial appetite 
has hitherto been able to satisfy’.51 Thus there is a social and religious 
sanction (in the sense of official approval) for a particularly intense 
gratification of violent and bloodthirsty appetites in the punishment of 
homosexuality.
This is in fact even more explicit in the later Not Paul, but Jesus, 
Vol. III, where the principle of asceticism seems to play the larger role. 
Indeed there, the condemnation and punishment of homosexuality 
under religious sanction is seen as the unique instance in which the 
law colludes with the desire for the gratification of antipathy. Religious 
tolerance in England forbids (legally and through customary morality) 
the gratification of the ‘dissocial affection … to that degree of intensity 
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which is afforded by the death of the victim’ in cases of antipathies 
produced by difference of religious opinion. Neither the ‘men in power’ 
nor those who would share in the pleasures of power can obtain grati-
fication from persecuting religious dissenters to death. But in the case 
of homosexuality ‘the man in power has stept in and afforded to the 
wounded mind the relief which in almost every other part it is to be 
condemned to be ever hoping for without ever attaining it. Behold there, 
says he, your victim: behold here my arm which, if you can bring him 
within my reach, is ready for the sacrifice.’52 
But still, how is it connected to asceticism? It is connected to 
asceticism, I suggest, to the extent that asceticism is sacrifice and 
asceticism thus gives rise to antipathy via envy. In ‘Sextus’, where 
asceticism is defined as sacrifice,53 Bentham writes that, whereas not 
everyone could offer the ‘vulgar sacrifices’ of wine and meat, ‘The 
pleasures, these were things which every man had to offer: these were 
things by which every man might be sacrificed. Of all pleasures, the most 
exquisite were the pleasures of the sexual appetite.’54 Believing another 
to be enjoying pleasures that one has oneself sacrificed will give rise to 
envy. Bentham says that condemnation of, that is, the public announce-
ment of one’s antipathy to, homosexuality gives the appearance of virtue 
‘without any expence in the shape of self-denial’, but if asceticism holds 
sway there has been denial – denial of sexual pleasure, even if not denial 
of specifically homosexual pleasure. Bentham suggests that any natural 
antipathy to homosexuality needs to be ‘wound up to the highest pitch’55 
by piety, but envy really seems to play the crucial role in his analysis 
and provides the compelling psychological motive, just because of its 
complicated relation to pleasure.
Accordingly, it is in fact envy that is the primary motive in Bentham’s 
analysis, to the extent that the piety of religious condemnation is judged 
to be more or less fake and asceticism produces the conditions in which 
envy will flourish. Bentham speaks often of the way in which gratifica-
tion of ill-will is clothed in the appearance of virtue and this is one of the 
main arguments against the false piety of anti-homosexuality, as it stifles 
real virtue under the pretence of it. Pretence to virtue is what Bentham 
calls a ‘substituted motive’;56 in his discussion of substituted motives in A 
Table of the Springs of Action, antipathy covered by ‘public spirit’ or ‘love 
of justice’ forms a specific example. The covered ‘desires and motives’, 
Bentham says, ‘may accordingly be considered as the unseemly parts of 
the human mind’.57 
Note that Bentham says that it is not just motives but also desires 
that are covered by substituted motives. And as McReynolds remarks, 
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with these ideas ‘Bentham entered, however haltingly, into the realm of 
motivations existing beneath the surface of one’s awareness, an area to 
be conceptualized later by Freud in terms of that fictitious entity called 
the Unconscious.’58 Perhaps it is that the more unseemly the desire, the 
more vehement must be its denial, and the more severe must be the 
substitutive condemnation. What hidden spring, what unseemly desire, 
might then lie behind Robert Peel’s condemnation of homosexuality as, 
‘the crime of crimes – the crime against which, when put in the balance 
all other crimes put together weigh but as a feather’?59 Bentham says that 
he saw with his own eyes a judge, fresh from ‘consigning two wretches 
to the gallows’ for the offence of homosexuality: ‘Delight and exultation 
glistened on his countenance.’60 This suggests not just substitutive 
motives but also substitutive satisfactions and substitutive pleasures. 
As Bentham says in Not Paul, but Jesus, Vol. III: ‘In the sufferings of 
those who presume to disobey his prohibitions [on homosexuality], the 
malevolent affection in the ascetic beholds a sort of compensation or 
indemnity for the privations which he suffers himself.’61
Conclusion
In sum, the quick answer to the question ‘what is the cause of the severity 
of the condemnation of homosexuality?’ is this: it is the principle of 
antipathy and the principle of asceticism. But the principle of asceticism, 
being the complete reversal of the egoistic hedonism that apparently 
governs human life, cannot itself be a spring of action; it must be the 
cover of other springs. I have suggested that what it covers is, once again, 
the principle of antipathy, and this in its specific form of envy. At base, so 
Bentham’s psychological analysis suggests, the condemnation of homo-
sexuality is to be explained by the envy that the condemners feel for the 
pleasure that the homosexual gets and that they themselves do not get 
but which, we might have to add with Freud, they do desire. Envy is not 
itself a pleasurable feeling, but in envious condemnation of homosexual-
ity, the pain of envy is converted into the pleasures of the gratification of 
vengeance and – who knows? – the sadistic, i.e. possibly sexual pleasure, 
of seeing others suffer; certainly, Bentham’s analysis does not rule that 
out. Thus, I suggest, Bentham’s discussion of the phenomenon of the 
condemnation of homosexuality contains a subtle psychological analysis 
of possibly unconscious human motivation and substitutive pleasures, 
which is a little more complex than the popular idea of his psychological 
hedonism sometimes leads us to believe.
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Part II.  





Literature, morals and utility: 
Bentham, Dumont and de Staël
Emmanuelle de Champs
In the 1770s the French minister Turgot discussed the utilitarian doctrines 
of Helvétius in a series of letters with his friend Nicolas de Condorcet 
the mathematician and philosopher. After reminding his correspondent 
that calls to increase pleasure and minimize pains perverted morals, 
he added that the principle of utility was unable to create emotion or 
appeal to aesthetic sentiment. ‘The proof’, he concluded, ‘is that men 
are moved by novels and tragedies, and that a novel would not please 
if its characters conformed to the principles of Helvétius, or rather put 
them into practice.’1 In Turgot’s statement, as in most contemporary 
discussions of taste, moral values were strongly entwined with aesthetic 
judgment. Like morals, taste was shaped by society and allowed shared 
values to circulate. Peaceful manners, the rise of polite society, conver-
sation between the sexes and the refinement of taste were, therefore, 
marks of a high degree of civilization. Like many of his contemporaries 
on both sides of the Channel – including, as we shall see, Helvétius 
himself – Turgot believed that these values had reached a high point 
in Enlightenment sociability. But, according to him, the weight given 
to individual pleasures in utilitarianism threatened to subvert the 
consensus on which society rested.
As recent work by Malcolm Quinn and Philip Schofield has shown, 
the notion of taste as an aesthetic and moral value provides a good entry 
point into the issues raised by Benthamite utilitarianism. More specifi-
cally, it highlights the specific juncture between individual enjoyment 
and collective utility: against most of his contemporaries, Bentham 
contended that taste was strictly an individual matter; that it did not 
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depend on any collective standard.2 He was fond of repeating that ‘there 
[was] no good or bad taste’.3 For this reason, his view that ‘prejudice 
apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences 
of music and poetry’4 has long been taken as revealing the shallowness of 
his aesthetic thought and his refusal to take the arts seriously. 
Did the principle of utility as such challenge the conventions of 
taste, as Turgot believed, and as Bentham’s statement seems to confirm? 
In what sense can utility be substituted for taste as a ruling principle? 
This article contends that Bentham’s position may be better understood 
by locating it within late Enlightenment debates in France, with which 
Bentham was directly acquainted.5 This is by no means the only context 
in which Bentham’s views could or should be read, as Malcolm Quinn’s 
recent article on Bentham’s aesthetic views in relation to Hume’s makes 
clear, but the European dimensions of these debates deserve to be taken 
into account. Indeed, Bentham’s works of the 1780s were infused with 
references drawn from sources written in French as well as in English. 
They were, moreover, targeted both to anglophone and francophone 
readers. Revealingly, the manuscripts in which Bentham’s ideas on taste 
were presented were written in two versions, one in French and one in 
English.6
Shortly after completing An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation, Bentham went back to the question of pleasure in the 
context of a series of bilingual manuscripts on the topic of reward written 
around 1782. What he planned to do with these sheets is not entirely 
clear.7 It is there, however, that the most complete statements about 
aesthetic pleasures are to be found. None of this material was published 
before 1811, in French, under the editorship of Étienne Dumont, as part 
of Théorie des récompenses.8 It was in turn translated into English in 1825 
as The Rationale of Reward.9 Though discussions of aesthetic pursuits are 
relatively short, they cast meaningful light on Bentham’s position. The 
first part of this chapter looks at the place of morals and aesthetics in 
these manuscripts. It locates it in the complex field of aesthetic reflection 
in the French Enlightenment, especially among materialist thinkers 
frequently acknowledged by Bentham as his sources.
The complex connection between utility and beauty not only shaped 
Bentham’s own understanding of the moral value of taste in general and 
of literature in particular, but also early readers’ own reactions to the 
material. What is more, it also impacted on the reception of Bentham’s 
ideas in the 1810s and 1820s, a time when the foundations of moral and 
aesthetic judgment were being profoundly reshaped throughout Europe. 
The second part of this chapter relies on two case studies that trace the 
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early reception of Bentham’s views by two francophone Genevans, both 
active agents of cultural transfers in Europe. It explains first on which 
terms Étienne Dumont read and edited the material, and then how 
Bentham’s aesthetic ideas came to be known and discussed by Germaine 
de Staël in the 1810s.
1. Bentham’s aesthetic individualism
1.1 the arts in bentham’s morals and legislation
In Chapter V of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 
written in 1780, Bentham did not single out aesthetic sentiment as 
a source of pleasures or pains. Music received a mention, but the 
passage focused on the pleasure of performance rather than on that of 
the audience.10 Similarly, the description of the ‘pleasures of a country 
scene’, taken as an example of complex pleasures, was centred around 
the enjoyment afforded by the sights, smells and sounds of the natural 
world, not those of representation.11 With the Introduction being mostly 
concerned with laying the foundations for a utilitarian reform of penal 
law, the omission would not have been significant if Bentham had not 
himself, in other texts, drawn attention to the place of the arts and taste 
within a utilitarian system.
In the manuscripts on reward of the 1780s, Bentham examined 
the various ways in which the legislator could make use of the ‘matter 
or reward’ (or, in other words, money and honour) to procure services 
or encourage actions that were beneficial to general utility. The force of 
reward alongside that of punishment in influencing human actions, he 
argued, had been throughout neglected by legislators and moralists. In 
such statements, Bentham followed Helvétius, whose influence he consis-
tently acknowledged.12 If human actions were motivated by individual 
interest, that is, the search for pleasure and the avoidance of pain, then 
these were also the instruments the legislator and the moralist should use 
to shape individual behaviour. For Helvétius, ‘the purpose of moralists is 
nothing but to determine the use that these rewards and punishments 
must be put to, and the help they might afford in uniting personal and 
general interests. This union’, he concluded, was ‘the masterpiece which 
morals should have in view.’13
By using reward and punishment together, the legislator and the 
moralist would be able to shape behaviour and achieve the concilia-
tion of individual and collective interests. In the 1780s Bentham was 
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thus keenly aware of the fact that the ‘negative’ means in the hands 
of the legislator (legal sanctions) had to be supplemented by ‘positive’ 
incentives to change people’s behaviour. Helvétius’s close friend, Baron 
d’Holbach, whose extensive writings were widely acknowledged as a 
summary of materialist thought in the 1770s, insisted on the power of 
reward as a way of shaping behaviour. That Bentham might have read 
his books can be surmised, even if there is no direct reference to them. In 
his manuscripts on reward, he discussed one of d’Holbach’s examples on 
the power of reward to encourage virtue, borrowing an example quoted 
in Système Social (1773), namely the custom of awarding an honorary 
title to the most virtuous young woman in the French village of Salency.14
In the manuscripts on reward, Bentham used the field of the fine 
arts as a matrix to understand how official institutions could shape the 
public sphere in matters that did not fall under penal sanction. First, the 
arts furnished a means to reinforce the positive impact of actions that 
benefited both the individual and society without punishment and, 
conversely, bring out the disastrous consequences of actions that were 
detrimental to the individual and to society.15 Hence, Bentham praised 
Hogarth’s series Gin Lane as an effective means of illustrating the noxious 
effects of alcohol consumption – the engravings were praised not for 
their beauty, but for their expressiveness and didactic clarity.16
The state could also act in more indirect ways. As Bentham pointed 
out, the Royal Society of Arts established in London in 1754 provided a 
good example of how reward could be used to shape behaviour. On the 
one hand it bestowed rewards in the shape of prizes and medals to artists 
and inventors whose works were worthy of being commended, and on 
the other, through open competitions on specific themes, it invited the 
best minds to submit works on a given topic. Bentham suggested that 
his two-pronged approach could be put to different purposes beyond 
artistic achievement: for instance to invite discoveries and improvements 
in the sciences – he had in mind the rewards promised by the Board of 
Longitude – or honours and distinctions rewarding individual achieve-
ments in any branch of knowledge.17 Bentham also laid down rules for 
the judicious use of subsidies and to avoid prevarication and nepotism, 
two abuses of reward. This led him to consider whether public money 
should be devoted to the encouragement of the fine arts in general and, 
therefore, to address the issue of their utility.
Bentham defined the place of the fine arts within a broader 
typology of useful pursuits. Within ‘Arts and Sciences’ four broad 
categories could be delineated: ‘arts and sciences of agreement’, ‘arts 
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and sciences of curiosity’, ‘of immediate utility’ and of ‘remote utility’. As 
purely agreeable pursuits, the fine arts belonged to the first category: 
By arts and sciences of agreement, I mean those which are 
ordinarily called the fine arts; such as music, poetry – or at least 
most branches of poetry – painting, sculpture and the other arts 
which aim to imitate figures, architecture and gardening considered 
in their ornamental branches, &c. I must here use &c., for this is not 
the place to embark on metaphysical distinctions. One could also 
comprise games of all kinds under this head.18
In including games in the same category as the fine arts, Bentham 
followed Montesquieu, whose fragmentary ‘Essay on Taste’ had been 
posthumously included by Diderot and D’Alembert in the Encyclopédie.19 
Bentham similarly regarded their utility as limited: altogether, the fine 
arts occupied only one of the four categories of the Arts and Sciences: the 
other three were reserved for useful inventions and scientific discoveries.
But Bentham made it clear that as sources of pleasure, the fine arts 
had some utility and should be encouraged by the utilitarian legislator.20 
He insisted: ‘[o]ne must not feel justified in regarding them as devoid of 
all utility: on the contrary, no [other activities] have more claims to be 
called useful. For what is useful, if not that which gives pleasure?’21 He 
had already expressed similar views in manuscript notes a decade earlier, 
when he had examined Rousseau’s argument against the frivolousness of 
theatre-going. Rousseau – here paraphrased by Bentham – had argued 
against D’Alembert that ‘every amusement that is useless is an evil to a 
being to whom life is so short and time so pretious’. Bentham flatly set 
out to ‘deny the truth of [this]’ and insisted that no pleasure was to be 
considered evil.22 In singling out Rousseau in this instance, Bentham 
attacked one form of asceticism (the deliberate prohibition of one kind 
of pleasure).23
While allowing the legislator to acknowledge the role of the fine arts 
in procuring pleasure, Bentham also set strict limits to his intervention. 
Indeed, in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, he 
had reminded his readers that the faculty to derive pleasure from this or 
that pursuit depended on ‘circumstances influencing sensibility’, which 
varied from one individual to another.24 The role of the government was, 
therefore, not directly to provide pleasure to individuals, but to support 
contributions that had a beneficial impact on the public in general, and 
not those that procured pleasure to one patron or amateur, or to only one 
class of people.25 In including games in the category of ‘agreeable arts 
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and sciences’ alongside the fine arts, Bentham not only refused to carve 
a specific space for aesthetic sentiment, but also opened up the social 
sphere of enjoyments.
1.2 taste, interest and the people
Like Rousseau’s, Bentham’s approach to art was marked by a strong anti-
aristocratic concern, but, as will become apparent later, on very different 
grounds and with very different implications. First, the radicalism of 
Bentham’s refusal to admit a hierarchy between pleasures and to set apart 
aesthetic sentiment deserves to be explored. It is useful to compare his 
position with that of Helvétius. Starting from similar considerations that 
the fine arts procured pleasure to the senses, Helvétius believed that the 
refinement of taste provided evidence of progress in humanity’s ability 
to experience pleasure. Describing the pleasures of the ‘philosopher’ 
in a posthumously published poem entitled Le bonheur, he wrote that 
the philosopher ‘does not abandon the pleasures of the senses, but he 
masters them. Poetry, Music, Painting, Sculpture and Architecture are 
for him new sources of pleasures.’26 In Helvétius’s view, the object of any 
utilitarian legislator should thus be to increase sensibility to the fine arts 
in order to maximize pleasure. 
In De l’esprit, Helvétius explored the political implications of the 
idea. The junction between the aesthetic sphere and that of politics was 
effected seamlessly through the concept of ‘interest’, which, as Reinhard 
Koselleck points out, operated in both fields: in Helvétius’s words, a 
painting pleases us because it interests us.27 What is more, in a political 
system organized around the principle of interest, common tastes were 
a guarantee that the citizens shared similar interests or sources of 
pleasures. Enlarging the audience of the arts therefore served a political 
function. On the contrary, fragmented audiences revealed that no 
common ground existed between citizens: 
In governments [in which] citizens are not united by a common 
interest, the diversity of personal interests must necessarily go 
against universal applause. In such countries, one can only reach 
limited success, because the passions depicted appear more or less 
interesting to particular audiences.28
This argument could support a critique of aristocratic government: for 
instance, d’Holbach answered the common opinion that the arts had 
prospered under Louis XIV by insisting that nobody had cared to spread 
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artistic taste among the people, which had ultimately jeopardized the 
safety of government by dividing the rich and the poor.29 The implications 
of Helvétius and d’Holbach’s statements were that, to ensure a cohesive 
and politically stable society, artistic taste should be shared and open to 
as many people as possible. The role of the legislator was to promote a 
common interest, that is, a common appreciation of the beautiful.
In eighteenth-century terms, as the polite sphere was believed to 
be expanding, this translated into a debate on the usefulness of artistic 
criticism. Critics were important agents in creating a common taste and 
acted as intermediaries between the artists and the public. They played a 
central part in the artistic education of the people. But Bentham had only 
harsh words for those who sought to bestow praise or blame on specific 
art forms or art works: 
If these principles are correct, we shall know how to estimate 
those ingenious rather than useful critics who, under pretence 
of purifying the public taste, endeavour successively to deprive 
mankind of a larger or smaller part of the sources of their 
amusement. These modest judges of elegance and taste consider 
themselves as benefactors to the human race, whilst they are really 
only the interrupters of their pleasure – a sort of importunate hosts, 
who place themselves at the table to diminish, by their pretended 
delicacy, the appetite of their guests.30
Criticizing critics was a familiar argument within debates on taste in the 
period. In his Philosophical Dictionary, for instance, Voltaire lambasted 
such an influential figure as Boileau, who he accused of using the means 
of criticism to ridicule the work of his rivals.31 Voltaire did, however, 
believe that there was such a thing as good taste, whose prescriptions 
could be said to be universal and which could be spread by ‘connais-
seurs’. The taste of the public, even of the vulgar, could and should be 
improved – it marked the refinement of a society: ‘only connoisseurs can 
reclaim the favour of the public, and this is the only difference between 
the most enlightened and the most brutish nations’.32 In the same line, 
d’Holbach lambasted ‘those impudent critics, full of bad faith, armed by 
low jealousy, who seem to declare war on talent’, but he encouraged ‘fair, 
instructive and polite’ criticism.33 For Diderot, attacking critics served to 
reclaim taste for the people themselves, emphatically not to subvert the 
idea of a common taste. The public was the sole arbiter of taste; experts 
and critics only served to distract them from the expression of their 
preferences. The political implications of such a view became clear when 
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the French Revolution turned against the aristocratic patronage of the 
arts and closed down the academies in 1793.34
Bentham’s position ran along different lines: by imposing a given 
standard of taste, critics robbed everyone of their enjoyment. They 
ruined the pleasure of many and caused the financial ruin of authors 
thrown out of fashion by their dictates.35 His strong focus on individual 
appreciation and his refusal to admit the existence of one common 
standard of taste set him apart. Indeed, for him, the arts played no role 
in the structuring of a political public sphere, but merely illustrated the 
confiscation of power by an aristocracy, be it that of the nobility or that of 
self-proclaimed critics.36 In this specific case, Bentham implied, utility lay 
in the pursuit of individual pleasures, not of collective ones.
1.3 poetry, truth and morals
The specificity and radicalism of Bentham’s position both stand out in 
his treatment of poetry. It was the only artistic pursuit he examined in 
detail in the manuscripts, concluding not only that push-pin was in most 
cases as good as poetry, but that it was to be preferred to poetry: ‘[p]oetry 
is useful insofar as it amuses. But the game of push-pin, if it amused as 
much, would be preferable’.37 Such remarks were not confined to the 
section on the fine arts. More than other arts, poetry was presented as 
intrinsically corrupting, especially because of its closeness to political 
power. Indeed, through flattery and exaggeration, poets encouraged 
the lowest instincts in rulers, as Louis XIV’s bloody wars testified. 
Voltaire himself, whom Bentham otherwise admired, was made partly 
responsible for encouraging Frederick II of Prussia’s military conquest 
in Silesia through elegies and poems. Poetry was dangerous because it 
inflamed sentiments instead of appealing to reason and led sovereigns 
away from considerations of utility. What was more, the embellishments 
required by poetry were structurally contrary to truth: 
The felicity of life and the perfection of happiness and virtue 
depend upon the accuracy of our information and the rectitude of 
our judgements with relation to several topics we are interested in. 
But the tendency which poetry has to promote such accuracy and 
that rectitude is not very remarkable: on the contrary the tendency 
it has, at least in most branches, in all perhaps, but the dramatic, 
seems to be rather on the other side.38
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On poetry, Bentham’s usual references appear to be inverted: he sided 
with Plato, who famously ejected poets from the Republic and disagreed 
with Helvétius, who had pointed out that poetry and eloquence were 
beneficial when they reinforced the impressions made on the public and 
added moral value and efficiency to discourse.39 D’Holbach was more 
cautious and underlined the fact that eloquence was a double-edged 
sword that could be used to further false principles as well as good 
ones.40 Bentham went much further and claimed that poetry was intrin-
sically synonymous with falsehood and distortion. 
Bentham’s insistence on the close link between poetry and falsehood 
can be connected to his epistemology. Indeed, the analysis of poetry, as 
a mode of discourse, played a pivotal function in eighteenth-century 
aesthetics. As Hans Aarsleff has recently explained, after the work of 
Étienne de Condillac it was widely believed that primitive language was 
the direct product of emotion and sensation, not of reflection. What we 
perceive we perceive at once. According to Condillac, early languages 
reflected this simultaneity. Unlike contemporary languages that 
depend on analysis and reflect logical relations in complex grammatical 
sentences, the first language of humanity directly mirrored immediate 
perceptions and conveyed several ideas and sentiments simultaneously. 
This pseudo-historical hypothesis translated into an epistemological 
theory which contended that ancient languages like Greek and, to a lesser 
extent Latin, relied more than contemporary ones on the grammatical 
‘inversion’ of parts of speech and were, therefore, more expressive and 
closer to poetry.41 
In contrast, when Bentham wrote on the origins of language, he 
suggested another narrative. For him the true unit of meaning was not 
emotion or sensation, but a thought process that associated analysis 
and synthesis and resulted in the production of a proposition. The basic 
unit of meaning was, therefore, a logical thought process. Instead of 
praising Latin and Greek for their direct appeal to emotions, Bentham 
commended the English language, which fulfilled ‘all the purposes 
of discourse taken together’.42 Beauty in a language, which he did not 
exclude altogether, had to do not with conciseness but with the existence 
of numerous parts of speech expressing accurate logical relations.43 
Poetry was, therefore, remote from the original working of the mind 
and prone to distort reality. In singling out poetry as the locus of lies and 
exaggeration, Bentham denied it could have any positive moral value. 
Bentham’s refusal to ascribe more than a minimal moral value to 
the arts went beyond his indictment of the mendacity of poetry. More 
generally, he believed that love for the fine arts was harmless and 
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beneficial only to the extent that it drove people away from boredom 
and, therefore, from violence.44 This opinion consistently ran against the 
idea that the fine arts had a civilizing effect on the morals of a nation by 
shaping common taste between the people. The force of this argument 
was regularly reasserted in the eighteenth century as narratives about 
the formation of taste followed those of the formation of morals: in both 
cases, philosophers needed to account for the way in which individual 
appreciation gradually came to espouse common standards or common 
views. This issue was especially pressing for empiricists who started 
methodologically from individual perception: if everything proceeded 
from sensation, how could one reach beyond one’s own feelings? In 
morals, Bentham consistently opposed appeals to a ‘common sense’ 
or a ‘moral sense’ and grounded moral appreciation in the estimation 
of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.45 In aesthetics – and 
probably also in sexual morality – he refused to make such a move and 
only accepted individual pleasure as a standard.
Again, this refusal set him apart from Helvétius and d’Holbach who 
tried to reconcile calls to utility with artistic appreciation. D’Holbach 
claimed, for instance, that ‘a beautiful action of Antiquity pleases 
us because we feel its utility, because we put ourselves in the place of 
the person who did it and of those who witnessed it, and because we 
wish those we live with would do the same’. His explicit conclusion 
was that ‘good taste in morals does not differ from good taste in the 
arts’.46 In saying this he was doing little more than repeating a common 
eighteenth-century trope which can also be illustrated by Rousseau’s 
statement that ‘the good is nothing else than the beautiful put into 
action’.47 This was a standard pillar of the debate on the moral role of 
novels that was prominent in the second half of the eighteenth century 
both in France and in Britain and provided the background to Turgot’s 
position discussed in the introduction to this chapter.
The vocabulary of ‘moral taste’ allowed d’Holbach to examine 
the origins of moral ideas through a comparison with aesthetic ones. 
Natural sensibility differed from one person to the other: the diversity of 
original tastes was related to differences in the organs of perception, be 
they external (good or bad eyesight, or an ear for music) or internal (the 
configuration of our brain). It followed that ‘men disagree as much on 
their assessment of physical beauty as on that of moral beauty’. However, 
education and custom trained and shaped individual organs, making it 
possible gradually to reach agreement in aesthetic and in moral matters 
with our contemporaries. In other words, we become ‘connoisseurs 
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in morals, just as we become connoisseurs in painting, sculpture, archi-
tecture and so on’.48 Bentham consistently rejected such a parallel.
In considering the fine arts Bentham was throughout intent on 
keeping taste at the level of the individual, refusing to consider it as a 
social, or collective form of appreciation and, therefore, refusing to 
establish any hierarchy between them – the criterion of ‘the greatest 
happiness’ came here to be applied strictly to one individual. In the 
field of artistic taste, the principle that everyone was the best judge of 
his or her interest was rigorously applied. In asserting this, Bentham 
derived radical implications from a strictly individualistic understand-
ing of pleasure and pain. His theory of taste was, however, subordinate 
to a theory of social and political organization, which limited the 
anarchical consequences of such a strictly individualistic perspective. It 
seems plausible to contend that a complete individualism predominates 
in Bentham’s aesthetic thought and that its materialistic implications 
deserve to be further studied.
2. The early reception of Bentham’s aesthetics: 
Rousseau, Dumont and Madame de Staël
2.1 bentham and rousseau: Étienne Dumont’s attempt at synthesis
Dumont received Bentham’s manuscripts on reward (probably both in 
French and in English) in July 1794.49 These sheets were not included in 
the first batch of writings he published in 1802 but came out nine years 
later in Théorie des peines et des récompenses (1811). Dumont conducted 
most of the work on this material in the summer of 1807.50 He came back 
again to the manuscripts for the third French edition that appeared in 
1826, but without making any substantive change to the sections on the 
fine arts.51
Despite Dumont’s usual disclaimer in the preface that he had 
partly rewritten Bentham’s words, a comparison with the manuscripts 
reveals that he remained faithful to the original for his chapters on the 
fine arts. He reproduced passages in which Bentham warned against the 
lure of poetry as an instrument of falsehood. He included the fragments 
on the civilizing tendency of games as well as Bentham’s criticism of 
literary critics in general and Addison in particular. Dumont’s version 
even expanded Bentham’s attack on satirists.52 In an editorial footnote 
he hinted, however, at a possible disagreement with Bentham’s position. 
‘I could not’, he wrote, ‘follow the author’s position that as far as 
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literary tastes are concerned there is no right or wrong.’ But he did not 
develop his own views there, and in the rest of the footnote he in fact 
supported Bentham’s views and adapted them to the cultural references 
of his francophone readers. Was it not true, he wrote, that ‘plays by 
Hardi and Garnier’ gave audiences as much pleasure as those by the 
great Corneille?53 This contrasts with Dumont’s private reaction to the 
passages, as he recalled in his notebooks: 
In his treatise on Rewards, B[entham] severely attacks literary 
critics, especially Addison’s Spectator, who under pretence of 
reforming taste destroyed a variety of harmless muses: under his 
mace, he crushed the small literary family of doggerel rhymes, 
acrostics, poems cast into the figures of eggs or wings, of witticisms, 
&c. What has he done? asks Bentham, what has it led to? He has 
deprived those who enjoyed these witticisms of innocent pleasures, 
he has treated them as idiots and men of depraved and bizarre 
taste, he has ridiculed them and abandoned them to the contempt 
of society.54
After thus acknowledging Bentham’s position, Dumont insisted on 
the usefulness of literary criticism as a genre. Indeed, while Bentham 
believed that critics inflicted pain on the authors they attacked, Dumont 
argued that bad publicity was better than no publicity: authors ‘should 
not’, he wrote, ‘fear criticism, but [fear]  being forgotten’. Critiques 
prompted refutations and counter-critiques, while bad reviews ‘brought 
larger audiences to the theatre houses’. Such a view of the literary 
field, where reputations were being fought over, is interesting because 
Dumont’s argument was not primarily about literary merit in itself, but 
solely about the excitement and animation brought by literary quarrels 
that had agitated the literary sphere in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.55 By looking at the effects of controversies on sales, Dumont 
took Bentham’s utilitarian reasoning in a new direction. He also 
legitimated the idea that the literary field was central to understanding 
the formation of public opinion, an idea that, as we have seen, Bentham 
rejected.56
But Dumont also explored other avenues. He examined Bentham’s 
view that ‘good taste’ was synonymous with ‘prejudice’, and that ‘there is 
no good or bad taste, or rather that they are all good provided they are 
not contrary to utility’.57 This rephrasing of Bentham’s position was only 
partially correct, for Bentham refused to connect public utility and taste 
systematically, as we have seen. To trace the origin of Dumont’s ideas, 
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we need to turn to the second most important intellectual influence on 
his thought: Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In Letter to D’Alembert, as we have 
seen, Rousseau had famously argued against the frivolousness of the 
theatre that perverted the moral and political character of citizens. In 
his notebooks, Dumont attacked, like Rousseau, the moral debasement 
brought about by games and entertainment: 
Imagine two equally talented men, the first having been raised in a 
society in which these [literary] frivolities were in vogue, and the 
second in a society in which only serious and philosophical works 
were valued. Twenty years on, how different from one another will 
they be! The first will have turned into a Pantalone-Phoebus, a 
frivolous speaker, the second will be generally useful, or prepared 
to be useful.
Throughout, Dumont attacked petty literature in terms that would be 
entirely alien to Bentham and were reminiscent of Rousseau’s contempt. 
Both believed that the pleasure of frivolous amusement was intrinsically 
corrupting: society needed ‘labourers’, not ‘rope-dancers’ and ‘conjurers’, 
Dumont argued. Where Bentham praised the harmless pleasures of 
push-pin, Dumont lambasted games that ‘prolong childhood into the 
mature age’.
Dumont did not, any more than Rousseau, believe that artistic 
pleasures were intrinsically corrupting. There were good and bad 
poems, good and bad novels, and taste was the crucial discriminating 
principle at work. Bad poetry was simply formal; it set out to triumph 
over self-imposed constraints; it was nothing but a show of cleverness. 
But true poetry, however, had a strong moral dimension: ‘when its object 
is to bring the harmony of style to perfection, to present ideas with 
more details, to decorate them with deeper images, to help memory 
by regularly returning sounds or rhythmical measures, it deserves an 
honourable place among the works of the human mind’.58 As we have 
seen, there was nothing new about those arguments that praised poetry 
as the perfection of the use of language to persuade, to memorize and, 
above all, to feel. On this point too, Dumont’s manuscripts prove simul-
taneously how much he imbibed from Bentham and how far he still 
remained from wholeheartedly accepting the moral implications of 
utilitarianism. 
In another notebook (undated like the first but also evidently 
written while or shortly after he was working on Bentham’s manuscripts 
on reward), he proposed an original synthesis. On the one hand, he 
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followed Bentham in attacking writers who made use of literary flourishes 
to present their own feelings and opinions as ‘eternal, unshakeable, 
immortal truths like God and nature’ and acted like ‘despots’.59 Such 
mercenary writers corrupted the morals of the people. Dumont provided 
several examples of how literature could confirm prejudices and blind 
reason: Voltaire’s antisemitism and anticlericalism, Rousseau’s hatred 
of the rich and Sieyès’s attack on the nobility. Like Bentham, Dumont 
believed that acting according to utility meant renouncing prejudice in 
order to appeal to reason and facts. At the same time, Dumont held that 
style could be sublime when it was ‘devoid of all allegiance to the two 
false principles’ of asceticism and sympathy/antipathy. Some works, 
indeed ‘can pass as beautiful in very different times’. Style was good when 
it reinforced good ideas.60 His own remarks on what constituted good 
style reinforced this view: it avoided superfluous words and phrases, it 
did not add gratuitous ornaments, and it did not indulge in unnecessary 
repetition. 
Brought up in Geneva, Dumont had imbibed Rousseau’s writings 
and held them as a standard as far as style was concerned. After his death 
in 1829, the Bibliothèque de Genève published two short articles drawn 
from his manuscripts on Rousseau.61 In these pages Dumont drew a sharp 
distinction between Rousseau as political philosopher and Rousseau as 
writer and moralist. As Richard Whatmore explains, like many Genevan 
reformers of his generation, Dumont rejected Rousseau’s radical political 
views.62 His embrace of Bentham’s ideas in the mid-1790s furnished him 
with new arguments to attack Rousseau’s political philosophy. Borrowing 
Bentham’s vocabulary, he argued that Rousseau had been enslaved by 
the ‘sentimental principle, the principle of sympathy and antipathy, a 
dogmatic and cutting principle demanding blind acceptance, while it 
itself refuses to bow to the standards of common reason’. Refusing to 
define his words, Rousseau remained, Dumont argued, ‘ill-at-ease in 
abstract writing’, unable to prove his assertions, preferring sentiment to 
analysis. Following passion and not reason had direct consequences on 
Rousseau’s politics: this led him to ‘prefer savagery over civilization’ and 
to claim hastily that ‘all governments on earth are based on usurpation’.63 
Dumont’s trajectory has been described as a move ‘from 
Rousseauism to Bentham’.64 If we follow Richard Whatmore, in politics, 
Dumont’s estrangement from Rousseau’s ideas became clear in the 
aftermath of the Terror in the mid-1790s, though he was frequently 
‘drawn back’65 to his works and engaged with them throughout his life, 
as countless references in his manuscripts testify. What has not been 
noticed, however, is how long Dumont maintained his admiration for 
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Rousseau’s literary achievements. This, as we have seen, could not be 
separated from a moral evaluation of his philosophy. In fact, Dumont 
argued that, in literary and moral matters, Rousseau’s weaknesses turned 
into strengths as his stylistic genius approached perfection. Rousseau 
knew how to bring situations to life, how to ‘rise from ideas to images 
and from images to feelings’.66 Dumont pitted the dry and subversive 
style of the Social Contract against the charming scenes of Julie, or the 
New Heloise, which placed its characters in the midst of moral quandaries 
and described their reactions. In praising the moral examples found 
in the novel, Dumont embraced Rousseau’s view that morals could be 
acquired by imitating virtuous models (be they fictitious or real) rather 
than by applying systematic reasoning: ‘[l]et us take for ourselves great 
examples to imitate rather than vain systems to follow’, Rousseau had 
written.67 By ‘presenting’ his characters ‘as if one knew them’, Dumont 
continued, Rousseau struck the right chord. This method, by which 
scenes were presented to the readers, served to ‘imprint moral truths 
into their memories’ because ‘a dry maxim will not penetrate the heart, 
it cannot be received unless it is united to an action in which we feel 
an interest’.68 Rousseau himself had described this process through an 
analogy between the field of morals and that of aesthetics:
One practices seeing as well as sensing, or rather exquisite vision 
is but a delicate and refined sentiment. So it is that a painter 
beholding a beautiful landscape or standing before a beautiful 
tableau is enraptured by objects that are not even noticed by the 
common Observer. How many things are there which one perceives 
only through sentiment and which one cannot account for?69
Surprisingly for an admirer of Bentham, Dumont praised Rousseau’s 
morals at length, describing them as an alliance of ‘Spartan’ inflexibility 
and of human fallibility. In The New Heloise, Rousseau had indeed shown 
how even the most virtuous soul, that of Julie, could sometimes lapse, 
which made her virtue all the more admirable. But separating Rousseau’s 
morals from his politics, as Dumont did, went against the avowed 
intention of the author who believed that fiction was a proper vehicle to 
illustrate not only morals, but also the origins of political society, or the 
role of luxury in national economy, to give but a few examples.70 It is to 
be noted that Dumont’s private papers reveal a similar disjunction in the 
case of Bentham’s morals, which he rejected while continuing to praise 
his model of social science. 
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Whether Dumont’s understanding of the political and moral impli-
cations of Rousseau’s and Bentham’s works was correct or not is not 
in question here. His own writings on the subject, however, confirm 
the difficulty of understanding Bentham’s aesthetics, even for one of 
his closest readers, and fitting it within the shared culture of the late 
Enlightenment. Dumont’s own attempt at synthesis is interesting because 
it shows how increasingly difficult it became to make sense of Bentham’s 
position after Rousseau and in the early Romantic period. This comes 
further to light when we examine the evolution of Germaine de Staël’s 
ideas on utilitarianism and the arts. Her views were considerably more 
influential than Dumont’s because they were widely publicized, unlike 
his, which were kept private. Much more openly than Dumont, she 
claimed that the moral and aesthetic flaws of utilitarianism directly 
undermined its political and methodological prescriptions.
2.2 Madame de staël: style against utility 
Madame de Staël’s writings, which spanned the period from 1788 to 
1817, represented another step in the changing articulation of aesthetics 
and politics. The daughter of Jacques Necker (a Genevan banker and 
twice finance minister to Louis XVI), Germaine de Staël embraced a 
literary career and soon became one of the most influential French-
language writers of her generation. Her first published work, Letters on 
the Writings and the Character of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1788), provided 
in more ways than one a model for Dumont’s own essays on Rousseau. 
Like Dumont, she considered Rousseau’s politics impracticable, but 
she abundantly praised his style in close connection with his moral 
thought.71 The New Heloise, for instance, was admirable because it was 
‘a great moral idea put into action and made dramatic’.72 As Dumont did 
later, she subscribed to the idea that morals came to life in Rousseau’s 
novels and were served by a style that appealed to sentiment rather than 
to reason. But she went further and argued that, in morals, eloquence 
and sentiment provided a safeguard against the slow calculations of 
the mind on the one hand, and from the hasty and dangerous passions 
of the heart on the other. Rhetoric she therefore saw in a good light, 
as a necessary social adjunct to virtue.73 For her, eloquence developed 
the sentiments that then allowed individuals to ‘tap the resources they 
find in themselves’, those of friendship, family love and the intellectual 
pleasures.74 Literary fiction, in this respect, played a central role – a 
theory that Mme de Staël put into practice in her own novels Delphine 
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(1802) and Corinne (1807). For her, as for Rousseau, literature was the 
proper vehicle of morals:
One may extract from good novels a purer, higher morals than from 
any didactic work on virtue. The latter genre is dryer, and therefore 
necessarily more indulgent. Maxims made to be applied generally 
never reach the delicate heroism which may be held as model [in a 
novel], but which one cannot reasonably turn into a duty.75
In On Literature, published in 1800, she insisted on the powers of literary 
style that triggered moral and aesthetic sentiment and, ‘moving the mind 
and the body together, produced a shudder of admiration which incited 
us to generous actions’.76 Reading good literature also developed moral 
sensibility by fortifying sentiment. This entailed more than a simple 
parallel between two different spheres of judgment: Madame de Staël 
insisted that, by placing characters in specific circumstances and illus-
trating their moral deliberations, novels put the reader in the characters’ 
shoes and thereby acted as a training ground for moral decision-making. 
Moreover, this was true of words as well as of actions: ‘every time they are 
called to choose between different phrases, writers and orators select the 
one which calls up the most delicate idea – their minds choose between 
phrases, just as their souls should decide between different actions in 
life. And the habit of doing one may lead to the other.’77 In this way, style 
regained, in Madame de Staël’s work, a central moral function.
Her encounter with Benthamite utilitarianism coincided with her 
own philosophical and political development. Through Genevan circles, 
she was acquainted with Dumont with whom she also corresponded. In 
1802, when Traités de législation civile et pénale was published in Paris, 
extracts had been read and discussed at Coppet, her house in the vicinity 
of Geneva.78 In the summer of 1807, as he was working on Bentham’s 
manuscripts on reward, he received from her a copy of Corinne, ou l’Italie, 
her latest novel.79 They met again in London in 1813.
Bentham’s ideas interested her because they addressed a question 
that went to the heart of her reflections on contemporary politics after 
the Revolution, at a time when ‘one is led to reflect deeply on the nature 
of happiness in morals and in politics, on its direction, on its goals, on 
the hurdles which still separate us from this goal’.80 In the late 1790s she 
briefly toyed with the idea that utilitarianism could provide a solution 
to this problem because it gave legislators a method to reach general 
happiness. At that stage, she did not altogether reject calculation and 
political engineering from the sphere of politics. But already she believed 
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that what was true for the people as a whole was inherently incorrect in 
the case of individuals, a paradox that she formulated in this way:
The legislator takes men as a whole, the moralist one by one; the 
legislator must deal with the nature of things, the moralist with 
the diversity of sensations; finally, the legislator must always 
examine men from the point of view of their mutual relations 
and the moralist, considering each individual as a moral entity, a 
compound of pleasures and pains, of passions and reason, sees man 
under various angles, but always in relation to himself.81
In drawing a clear line between the moral and the political subject, 
she went against one of the postulates of many of her contemporaries. 
This was not unconnected with her increasing belief that literature, not 
legislation, could transcend the opposition of individual and collective 
interest because it appealed to humanity as such.
Reading Kant in the early 1800s had a profound impact on Madame 
de Staël, not least because it allowed her to take her views of the 
connection between aesthetic and moral judgment further. But in those 
years, as her public position became increasingly precarious because of 
her growing opposition to Napoleon, she came increasingly to reject util-
itarianism as a philosophical system because she associated it with the 
opportunism of many of her French contemporaries who had adapted 
to the increasing violations of liberty under the Terror and the Empire. 
Kant’s works allowed her to propose an alternative aesthetic, moral and 
political theory and went together with her rejection of Enlightenment 
rationalism.82 In On Germany, published in 1813, she set her recent 
reading of Kant against both English empiricism and French materialism, 
whose common roots she found in Hobbes’s and Locke’s writings. Without 
closing the door to experience or maintaining an indefensible innatism, 
she believed that Kant’s system achieved ‘a synthesis of experimental 
philosophy with the idealist doctrine’. Tellingly it was Kant’s definition of 
the sublime that provided the key to individual liberty against all forms 
of political coercion, thus allowing the gap between morals (rooted as 
it was in aesthetic appreciation) and politics to be bridged. This led her 
to see ‘enthusiasm’ as the root of all moral qualities and as evidence of a 
common humanity: unlike pleasant sensations that remained individual, 
admiration for the beautiful, in the arts or in morals, was universal.
The enthusiasm triggered by the beautiful does not have anything 
to do with either sensations or judgement; it is an innate disposition 
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akin to the sentiment of duty and the necessary primitive notions 
of the mind. We recognise truth when we see it, because it is the 
external image of an ideal whose type resides in our intelligence. 
Tastes might be diverse in all things that are agreeable, for such 
pleasures are rooted in sensation, but admiration for the beautiful 
in the arts or in nature must be universal, because all men’s souls 
contain sentiments of divine origin which beauty awakens and 
makes them enjoy.83
Tellingly, the praise of enthusiasm was conducted alongside a sustained 
criticism of Bentham’s principle of utility as presented by Dumont.
This confrontation was played out in London in 1813, shortly after 
the book came out. Banned from France and under threat in Geneva, 
Madame de Staël reached London after a long journey through Germany 
and northern Europe. During her stay, she was received in Whig salons, 
especially at Bowood, now the seat of the third marquess of Lansdowne. 
Her visit was documented in some detail by Étienne Dumont, a familiar 
of Bowood and Whig circles since the late 1780s and therefore a perfect 
host for his Genevan friend.84 In these conversations, Dumont unam-
biguously defended Bentham’s utilitarianism – on moral and political 
grounds rather than on aesthetic ones. As he recalled in his letters to 
Maria Edgeworth (whose attempts to put utilitarian experience into 
novels also deserves further study), he soon refused to argue with her 
in public: 
I shall only tell you that she has nothing but utmost contempt 
for poor utilitarian philosophy, that she reduces it to a miserable 
calculus of personal interest. I threw a four-or-five-page protest 
at her and was furiously attacked in return. I do not want to have 
anything more to do with this – I am too heavy for aerostatic 
balloons. To define, according to her, is to kill. Moral classifications 
are nothing but anatomy: one builds a skeleton and when one says 
‘rise up and walk’, it remains still. This is the point she will not be 
brought to depart from.85
By 1813, as Dumont bitterly remarked, two distinct positions were deeply 
entrenched and Dumont’s own attempt at synthesis remained buried in 
his manuscripts.
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Conclusion
The impossible dialogue between Madame de Staël and Dumont was an 
important step in the radicalization of positions that had been closely 
intertwined since the second half of the eighteenth century. Madame de 
Staël’s arguments against utilitarianism, both in print and in person, had 
a deep influence, especially in England. One can, for instance, turn to 
Carlyle’s 1827 essay for the Edinburgh Review entitled ‘State of German 
Literature’, which explicitly drew on de Staël’s On Germany. Though he 
did not mention Bentham directly, he evidently had English utilitarians 
in mind when he further dramatized the opposition between utility and 
poetry. In the late eighteenth century, he wrote, ‘[utility] was set up for 
the universal measure of mental as well as material value; poetry, except 
of an economical and preceptorial character, was found to be the product 
of a rude age; and religious enthusiasm was but derangement in the 
biliary organs’. ‘[I]ts partisans’, he concluded, ‘in subsequent satirical 
controversies, received the nickname of Philistern (Philistines).’86 This 
characterization became immensely popular as it was taken up by John 
Ruskin and Matthew Arnold and continued to be influential throughout 
the nineteenth century.87
In contrast, one purpose of this chapter has been to show that such 
a radical presentation does not do justice to the challenge utilitarianism 
posed to eighteenth-century aesthetics and morals. In the half-century 
that separated Turgot’s statement from Madame de Staël’s, utilitarian 
writers such as Helvétius, Bentham and Dumont each explored different 
ways in which utility and aesthetic sentiment could be articulated. 
Bentham’s position appears to be the most radical – a conclusion that 
a comparison in the following years with John Stuart Mill’s position 
seemed to confirm.
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Jeremy Bentham’s imagination and 
the ethics of prose style: Paraphrase, 
substitution, translation
Jan-Melissa schramm
In the course of the eighteenth century, English political thought became 
increasingly transhistorical and transnational in character. To begin with, 
commentators weighed contemporary experience against the standards 
of the Greco-Roman classical past: by the 1790s, England’s leading 
exponents of constitutional reform were also regularly comparing their 
own designs with two very different experiments in social organiza-
tion – the fledgling democracy of the newly independent America and 
the republic of revolutionary France.1 These two laboratories, in which 
competing ideas of governance were being tested, formed triangular 
points of reference for Jeremy Bentham and his contemporaries Edmund 
Burke, William Godwin, Thomas Paine and Mary Wollstonecraft.2 Burke, 
for example, had supported American independence, while he critiqued 
developments in France; Paine, on the other hand, supported both 
nations in their pursuit of ‘liberty’ in The Rights of Man, the first volume 
of which he composed while living in Paris between 1787 and 1789 and 
which he dedicated to George Washington. In Paine’s terms, ‘the cause of 
America is in great measure the cause of all mankind’: in France, too, the 
principles at stake – popular government, secularism and the rejection 
of tradition and the duties owed to the dead – all likewise affected 
‘the standard of liberty for all nations’.3 Yet the movement towards the 
adoption of such universal values came at great cost, particularly in the 
case of the French Revolution, which descended into the brutal violence 
of the Reign of Terror between 1792 and 1794, consigning English 
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radicals to despair and persuading many to defend existing social insti-
tutions if the only likely alternative was civil war. For while the political 
rhetoric of the period was that of ‘experiment’, outcomes were far from 
abstract and results were registered on the suffering bodies of the living.
As Emmanuelle de Champs has observed, Bentham was a 
Francophile, visiting the country on five occasions and acquiring 
considerable proficiency in the language. She writes that ‘the principle 
of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”, the foundation of 
Benthamite utilitarianism, was the product of an on-going philosophi-
cal dialogue between France and Britain, illustrating the wealth and 
depth of cultural transfers between the two nations’,4 and in particular 
she reveals Bentham’s intellectual indebtedness to Voltaire, Helvétius, 
and D’Alembert. In turn, Étienne Dumont’s magisterial translation of 
Bentham’s writings, published as Traités de législation civile et pénale in 
1802, enabled Bentham’s work to reach a wide European readership at 
a time when many nations were debating codification and the form of 
their laws. Bentham’s writing – both its achievements and its renowned 
difficulty – can only be properly understood within the context of this 
bilingual sphere. In this chapter, I will use the techniques of translation 
to ask questions about Bentham’s own reliance on the art of ‘paraphrase’ 
as a foundational tool of his logic, and then to open up broader questions 
about the relationship between the work of substitution (on which 
translation depends) and ethics in the period.
On translation
In this arena of cosmopolitan and transatlantic exchange, the cultural 
work of translation on which comparative studies relied received 
vigorous and sustained scrutiny. Clearly the work of the Church and of 
civil courts had long involved sophisticated strategies of interpretation of 
the Bible and of Roman Law from various Greek and Latin sources – and 
indeed, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term ‘paraphrase’ 
(as a form of translation) seems to have been used for the first time in 
1548 in the title of Erasmus’s The First Tome … of the Paraphrase upon 
the New Testament – but the political developments of the eighteenth 
century posed new challenges. The writings of the poet and literary critic 
John Dryden (1631–1700) initially framed the terms of Enlightenment 
debate. Translation, he observed in 1680, could be broken down into 
three constituent parts:
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First, that of Metaphrase, or turning an Author Word by Word, and 
Line by Line, from one Language into another: Thus, or near this 
manner, was Horace his Art of Poetry translated by Ben Jonson. The 
second way is that of Paraphrase, or Translation with Latitude, 
where the Author is kept in view by the Translator, so as never to be 
lost, but his words are not so strictly follow’d as his sense; and that 
too is admitted to be amplified, but not alter’d. Such is Mr. Waller’s 
Translation of Virgil’s Fourth Æneid. The Third way is that of 
Imitation, where the Translator (if now he has not lost that Name) 
assumes the liberty, not only to vary from the words and sense, but 
to forsake them both as he sees occasion; and taking only some 
general hints from the Original, to run division on the Ground-
work, as he pleases. Such is Mr. Cowley’s practice in turning two 
Odes of Pindar, and one of Horace, into English.5
In this schema, the ‘ideas’ of the original author, the substance of the 
passage, are separated out from, and privileged above, the vehicle or 
style in which they are communicated. But Dryden continues:
The sense of an Author, generally speaking, is to be Sacred and 
Inviolable. If the Fancy of Ovid be luxuriant, ‘tis his character to be 
so; and if I retrench it, he is no longer Ovid. It will be replied, that he 
receives advantage by this lopping of his superfluous Branches; but 
I rejoyn, that a Translator has no such Right: when a Painter Copies 
from the life, I suppose he has no priviledge to alter Features, 
and Lineaments, under pretence that his Picture will look better: 
perhaps the Face, which he has drawn, would be more Exact, if the 
Eyes, or Nose were alter’d; but ’tis his business to make it resemble 
the Original.6
Dryden’s teasing out of the ‘sense of an Author’ from the rhetorical 
‘luxuriance’ with which such ‘sense’ may be expressed gestures towards 
tensions that gathered force in the years to come as the discipline of 
literary criticism was increasingly institutionalized and professional-
ized (and indeed valorized as the replacement for the national religion) 
– that is, whether translation ranks ‘among the most useful branches 
of literary education’, essential for understanding the place of English 
in the wider community of global literatures, or whether the form and 
style of a passage can never be separated from the ideas it is seeking to 
communicate, and thus, if a translator ‘retrench[es a work], he is no 
longer Ovid’. The argument that the style of William Shakespeare or 
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Charles Dickens or Alfred Tennyson is distinctive and uniquely his own 
– in Dryden’s terms, that no ‘advantage’ can be attained by the ‘lopping 
of [their] superfluous Branches’ – underpinned belletristic assessments 
of the original works as inevitably superior to any ‘paraphrased’ or 
translated versions. 
In Annmarie Drury’s reading, Dryden’s ‘codification of the 
categories of metaphrase, paraphrase, and imitation comprises his 
most influential … contribution to thought about translation’, and his 
successors did not fundamentally alter this taxonomy.7 Writing in 1795, 
in his Essay on the Principles of Translation, Lord Alexander Fraser Tytler 
observed: 
If the genius and character of all languages were the same, it would 
be an easy task to translate from one into another; nor would 
anything more be requisite on the part of the translator, than 
fidelity and attention. But as the genius and character of languages 
is confessedly very different, it has hence become a common 
opinion, that it is the duty of a translator to attend only to the sense 
and spirit of his original, to make himself perfectly master of his 
author’s ideas, and to communicate them in those expressions 
which he judges to be best suited to convey them. It has, on the 
other hand, been maintained, that, in order to constitute a perfect 
translation, it is not only requisite that the ideas and sentiments of 
the original author should be conveyed, but likewise his style and 
manner of writing, which, it is supposed, cannot be done without 
a strict attention to the arrangement of his sentences, and even 
to their order and construction. According to the former idea of 
translation, it is allowable to improve and to embellish; according 
to the latter, it is necessary to preserve even blemishes and defects; 
and to these must likewise be superadded the harshness that must 
attend every copy in which the artist scrupulously studies to imitate 
the minutest lines or traces of his original.8
Tytler attempts to articulate rules for effective translation, but his 
definition of paraphrase remains much the same as Dryden’s – while a 
‘moderate liberty of amplifying and retrenching the ideas of the original 
has been granted to the translator of prose’,9 too great a licence, which 
preserves the sense of the original while supplanting its style, is often 
more accurately described as a ‘free commentary’ or a loose ‘imitation’ 
rather than a translation. At its most mechanical, then, the practice of 
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translation can be ‘a mere question of substitution; a = x, b = y’,10 but as 
Thomas Warren noted, in a review of Tytler’s work in 1895: 
The individual man is the feeling and the thinking unit. And no 
two units feel or think exactly alike … if we looked closely enough 
into the matter, we should find that there is an intransferable, 
untranslateable individuality about our thoughts themselves.11
This reveals for us the two ends of the translation spectrum – at the 
one end, literal word-for-word substitution which emphasizes utility 
and an instrumental approach to communication, and at the other, an 
inimitable style that is the expression of an untranslatable individuality. 
It is little wonder that the status and value of art itself seemed to be at 
stake in such debates.
Revolution and the politics of prose style and form
But by the late eighteenth century, with the declaration of the American 
War of Independence and the subsequent collapse of the French 
Revolution into the Reign of Terror, the significance of rhetorical style 
was far more than a question of aesthetics. Numerous critics have 
noted the extent to which frank, sincere, first-person narration was 
implicated in an enthusiasm for Revolutionary ideals: Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s Confessions, published in two parts in 1782 and 1788, used 
the direct immediacy of first-person voice to generate a distinctively 
radical sensibility. Revealing both his intimate personal strengths and 
his sometimes terrible flaws, Rousseau argued for complete textual 
transparency – the idea that speech may be a window into a man’s 
soul, which, if it were pure enough, would eradicate the need for social 
control by the state. As Gregory Dart has observed, as a consequence, 
‘fully-wrought autobiography was, at least during the early years of 
the nineteenth century, a dangerously radical form in both England 
and France, not least because of its continuing potential to challenge 
existing notions of the relationship between private reflection and public 
politics, the individual personality and history’.12 The oratorical style 
of other radicals was seen as equally direct and confrontational, and 
in England the great rhetorical exemplars of the 1790s were Burke and 
Paine, who represented not just contrasting political positions but very 
different formal practices as well. Burke’s conservative Reflections on 
the Revolution in France (1790) was widely critiqued as depending on a 
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virtual rather than an actual representation of the people in a reformed 
House of Commons but it was attacked as much in terms of its style as 
its political affiliation. Burke’s writings were widely denounced as over-
wrought, hysterical, sentimental, theatrical – designed to appeal to the 
passions over and above reason and the faculty of judgment. Paine in 
response insisted on self-representation as the basis of parliamentary 
government and, in terms of style, positioned himself within the artless 
and sincere tradition of unrehearsed Protestant speech much lauded by 
the Royal Society. Questions of content could not be separated from the 
style in which they were conveyed: the disclosure that a man read Burke 
rather than Paine was regarded as an accurate and immediate indicator 
of his wider political affiliation.
Many radical sympathizers in England greeted the outbreak of the 
French Revolution with enthusiasm. William Wordsworth, for example, 
anticipated the long awaited realization of human utopia: ‘Bliss was 
it in that dawn to be alive,/ But to be young was very Heaven!’13 For a 
moment the canvas of history seemed a tabula rasa on which a sketch 
of a fairer and more equitable society might be drawn. But Burke could 
only counsel restraint until the outcome of such liberation was known: 
‘The effect of liberty to individuals is, that they may do what they please: 
We ought to see what it will please them to do, before we risk congratu-
lations.’14 Burke’s warning was prescient, and with the descent into the 
violence of the Reign of Terror, the climate in England changed signifi-
cantly: political theorists who had supported revolutionary principles 
in England were at risk of being charged with treason or sedition. As 
John Barrell has shown, after the execution of Louis XVI in 1793, any 
attempt to reform the unwritten English constitution in democratic 
directions was taken to assume a willingness to ‘imagine the king’s 
death’ – and this mens rea, which aligns imagining reform with intending 
regicide, ensured that several members of the London Corresponding 
Society (who campaigned for constitutional change) were charged with 
constructive treason in 1794.15 The work of ‘imagination’ so crucial to art 
was now considered criminally suspect. Paine in turn was charged with 
sedition and fled to America, leaving lawyers and writers behind in the 
old country to ponder the effects of state oppression and surveillance: the 
press was monitored closely, plays for the stage were directly censored by 
the Lord Chamberlain, and authors took to fiction and poetry to explore 
their responses to the Revolution in an attempt to avoid such prosecution 
themselves. There was some protection in the deployment of strategic 
ambiguity – but as William Godwin observed in the ‘Preface’ to his most 
famous novel Caleb Williams, penned in 1794 at precisely the time of the 
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treason trials, when ‘terror’ was ‘the order of the day’, ‘even the humble 
novelist might be shown to be constructively a traitor’.16 
Radical and conservative forces were struggling to understand 
and communicate the precondition for any meaningful reform – could 
facts ever speak for themselves, or were representation and interpreta-
tion always required to make sense of events in the legal and political 
spheres? By the mid-eighteenth century, a confluence of factors ensured 
that the national English imagination was strongly forensic in character 
– the by now well-established institution of the trial jury depended on 
the assumption that the average lay-person was capable of determining 
questions of fact, the birth of the Royal Society committed natural 
scientists to the study of experiment, evidence and proof, and English 
theology became preoccupied with the truth of the ‘evidences’ of the 
Gospels as a record of historical events.17 To gain assent from its readers, 
every text had to make claims for its own evidentiary realism, and the 
adversarial pull of prosecution and defence increasingly featured as 
an organizational principle of argument. For every case, there was an 
accuser and a respondent, and each had its own rhetorical style. The claim 
to sincerity and the language of plain fact was increasingly valorized in 
Protestant legal culture. As Sergeant William Hawkins insisted in his 
Pleas of the Crown (1721), men accused of crime required no assistance 
from lawyers in court, because
generally every one of Common Understanding may as properly 
speak to a Matter of Fact, as if he were the best Lawyer; … it requires 
no manner of Skill to make a plain and honest Defence, which in 
cases of this Kind is always the best, the Simplicity and Innocence, 
artless and ingenuous Behaviour of one whose Conscience acquits 
him, having something in it more moving and convincing than the 
highest Eloquence of Persons speaking in a Cause not their own.18
This description of the ideal defendant places honest, artless narrative 
(which seemingly maintains a close relationship with the ‘reality’ it 
purports to describe) in competition with inventive rhetoric that may 
distort the relationship between fact and representation. In this highly 
influential model, the increasing professionalization of the criminal trial 
over the course of the next century brought the ethics as well as the efficacy 
of representation to the fore – what tactics were too low, too suspect, too 
emotional, to be trusted in this effort to test the limits of narrative repre-
sentational efficacy? Was eloquence always untrustworthy, and sincerity 
bEntHAM AnD tHE Arts122
always ‘truthful’? Was it more or less impartial to speak in a cause not 
your own?
In Barrell’s analysis, ‘[t]he path of reason is straight, direct; 
imagination leads us into error because it has a propensity to err, to 
wander’:19 Paine and Protestantism were seen to occupy the moral high 
ground here as imaginative error was positioned as the weakness of 
Catholics, the Irish and, when barristers were first allowed to work at the 
Old Bailey, criminal defence lawyers. The redoubtable Old Bailey pleader 
Charles Phillips – a great adversary of Charles Dickens in the 1830s and 
1840s – was often dismissed by the writer as trebly unreliable on account 
of his nationality, his religion and his profession.20 After 1836, when the 
passage of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act finally extended full legal repre-
sentation to those accused of felony, defence counsel were even more 
widely described as masters of fiction, as story-tellers whose fantastic 
tales of innocence bore no relation to the facts that spoke for themselves 
of the defendant’s guilt.21 These were the rhetorical co-ordinates that 
determined the production and reception of Bentham’s own contribu-
tion to the agenda of Enlightenment reform. 
Bentham’s style
Bentham’s place in this rhetorical arena was hard for his contempo-
raries to assess. According to John Stuart Mill, Bentham had played a 
foundational role in stimulating late eighteenth-century agendas of 
reform: ‘to Bentham more than to any other source might be traced the 
questioning spirit, the disposition to demand the why of everything, 
which had gained so much ground and was producing such important 
consequences in these times … Bentham broke the spell’.22 In this way, 
the prose style of his earliest works was seen to share many points of 
contact with Paine’s profession of simplicity, forthrightness and clarity 
in speech, and Bentham, too, seems to have contributed to critiques 
of conservative elegance and ornament in rhetorical style if they were 
achieved at the expense of intellectual substance. For example, in A 
Fragment on Government (1776), Bentham registered the gulf between 
the admirable style and the ignominious content of William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Law of England, the chosen antagonist whose blind 
adherence to authority and tradition enabled Bentham to articulate his 
own rationale for reform (much as Burke’s Reflections was to do for Paine 
a decade later). Bentham accuses Blackstone of intellectual servility 
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and mendacity, but he concludes by noting his merits of elegance and 
propriety:
[Blackstone] it is, in short, who first of all institutional writers, has 
taught Jurisprudence to speak the language of the Scholar and the 
Gentleman: put a polish upon that rugged science: cleansed her 
from the dust and cobwebs of the office: and if he has not enriched 
her with that precision that is drawn only from the sterling treasury 
of the sciences, has decked her out, however, to advantage, from 
the toilette of classic erudition: enlivened her with metaphors and 
allusions: and sent her abroad in some measure to instruct, and in 
still greater measure to entertain, the most miscellaneous and even 
the most fastidious societies.
The merit to which, as much perhaps as to any, the work 
stands indebted for its reputation, is the enchanting harmony of 
its numbers [and numbers here means its conformity to a certain 
regular beat, its seductive rhythm]: a kind of merit that of itself is 
sufficient to give a certain degree of celebrity to a work devoid of 
every other. So much is man governed by the ear.23
Accepting the controversial division between style and content, 
Bentham proceeds to critique Blackstone’s style as a charming encrus-
tation that belies or even conceals the intellectual speciousness and 
vacuity of his substantive arguments. Yet overall, Bentham’s treatment 
of the Commentaries is profound in its interrogation, suggesting the 
superficial appeal of style: Bentham rejects Blackstone’s portrait of the 
law as necessarily labyrinthine and gothic in its architecture, with all 
the functional utility of an old inherited stately home; he repudiates 
any appeal to authorities outside the text for the creation of meaning 
(notably a Supreme Being); he is sceptical of any recourse to Law Latin, 
which he sees as communicating little and disguising much; and above 
all, he proposes the technique of paraphrasis to translate figurative or 
metaphysical sentences into ever more literal or ‘real’ units of meaning.
Bentham then sets out the formal essentials of utilitarian style. 
Taking as his unit of meaning the sentence, Bentham maintained that the 
closest correspondence between linguistic representation and the real 
could be achieved by the techniques of phraseoplerosis and paraphrasis. 
These require that firstly, the sentence should be expanded to reveal and 
fill out any encryption in its meaning, and then it should be stripped back 
to its most austere form, shedding any figurative or metaphysical terms 
that may tend to ‘complicate’ the conveyance of its essential message: 
bEntHAM AnD tHE Arts124
A word may be said to be expounded by paraphrasis, when not that 
word alone is translated into other words, but some whole sentence 
of which it forms a part is translated into another sentence, the 
words of which latter are expressive of such ideas as are simple, 
or are more immediately resolvable into simple ones than those 
of the former. … This, in short, is the only method in which any 
abstract terms can, at the long run, be expounded to any instructive 
purpose: that is in terms calculated to raise images either of 
substances perceived, or of emotions; sources, one or other of 
which every idea must be drawn from, to be a clear one.24
In Dryden’s influential schema, ‘Paraphrase’ was defined as ‘Translation 
with Latitude’, which allows for ‘amplification’ as well as ‘reduction’ 
in the words used to describe the ‘original’ idea. Fiction could thus 
be understood as an elaborate ‘paraphrase’ of a Biblical parable for 
example – retaining the Scriptural message but ‘amplifying’ the narrative 
thickness with which the moral transaction is recounted: this is particu-
larly true of the episodes of the Good Samaritan and the Prodigal Son, 
which undergird so many examples of imaginative literature in the early- 
to mid-nineteenth century.25 Fiction, especially, thrived on this crucial 
formula of paraphrase as amplification and on the mental work a reader 
might be required to perform in response to any narrative expansion 
that generated a productive or fruitful ambiguity. But for Bentham, all 
‘translation’ of ideas must thus move from the complex to the simple, 
from the poetic to the prosaic, from the spiritual to the emphatically 
rational and empirical – which seemed to result in the impoverishment of 
the lexicons, emotions and tonal registers available to those who worked 
with the competing public discourses of literature and theology. 
Bentham’s attacks on the liturgy of the Church, on the use of 
legal fictions to maintain an impression of continuity between the past 
and present, and the declaratory language of inalienable rights and 
obligations, were thus expressed as questions of form and style as well 
as of intellectual substance. In Church-of-Englandism and its Catechism 
Examined (1818), Bentham argued that the Church was a repository of 
restrictive trade-practices and empty ceremonial repetition: its survival 
depended on fraud and consequently it should be ‘euthanazed’.26 In his 
essay ‘Nonsense upon Stilts’, he famously asserted that foreclosing any 
argument with reference to ‘rights’ as some kind of metaphysical trump 
card is the equivalent of ‘raising [your] voice to the people’, a type of 
‘bawling upon paper: it proceeds from the same temper and the same 
sort of distress as produces bawling with the voice’ – an exaggeration 
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caused by yielding to passion and over-confidence rather than reason. 
He describes rights-talk as a form of ‘Terrorist language’.27 For Bentham, 
the only appeals should be to reason and utility, and this has stylistic 
causes and effects. Change the language, he counsels his readers – the 
choice to deploy ‘ought not’ instead of ‘can not’ will bring us back to 
utility.28 
Bentham’s unpopularity with Victorian authors arose from the ways 
in which his theory of phraseoplerosis and paraphrasis worked against 
the richnesses of metaphysical and liturgical language (which delighted 
in suggestive ambiguity and the possibility of multiple interpretations) to 
insist instead on a bare and unadorned instrumentalism. The assumption 
that a unit of meaning was formally substitutable in this way without any 
loss of value put Bentham at odds with the literary critics and historians 
from the late eighteenth century onwards who insisted on the essential 
inextricability of ideas, content and form in any written work – an organic 
synthesis that resisted systematic and reductive exposition. From the 
work of Romantic writers who venerated individual expressiveness as a 
mark of distinctive and singular genius, through to the writings of public 
moralists like Matthew Arnold who saw style as an essential feature of 
the national literary culture, the discipline of literary criticism evolved in 
association with the practice of close reading, underpinned by the belief 
that, as form changes, so too did the message it seeks to communicate. 
As Daniel Tyler has noted, while it might be assumed that ‘style is an 
aspect of writing that is superadded to the plain sense of a passage … 
it is far from clear that these two things can ever be separated’: instead, 
creativity ‘does not exist apart from the style that renders it’.29 Certainly 
the aesthetic and religious controversies that dominated the mid-Victo-
rian period were to turn on the crucial role played by form in the creation 
of meaning – the belief that technê and praxis were the very means by 
which art contributed to the stock of human knowledge. And this placed 
thickness of narrative texture, rather than paraphrasis, at the heart of 
the Victorian ethical enterprise. If the law was positioned by its critics as 
concerned with the many rather than the one, with the general rather 
than the particular, with the maxim rather than any hard case that did 
not easily fit the rules, then this allowed literature to claim some space 
for itself as a tool of moral instruction infused with the spirit of equitable 
correction. According to Mill, Bentham felt ‘all poetry was misrepresen-
tation’:30 this overlooked the different sorts of effect that different art 
forms sought to generate in those who gave them sustained attention.
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Criticisms of Bentham’s style
Even as Bentham expressed a dual commitment to utility as the measure 
of reasonable conduct and instrumentalism in language as the gold 
standard of communication, this rhetorical clarity was something he 
failed to achieve over time. The perceptive review of Bentham’s Papers 
Relative to Codification in the Edinburgh Review of 1817 acclaimed his 
genius, yet acknowledged his circumscribed effect on the practical world 
to date. Despite his generosity and his fifty years of patient labour, ‘the 
beneficial effects which might have been expected from these masterly 
compositions, have not … as yet been produced’. After a sustained 
celebration of his clear-sighted criticisms of the common law, the 
reviewer concluded with an acknowledgement of Bentham’s defects: 
We are fully sensible of [his defects]; and we have observed them 
with deep regret; for we can regard in no other light than that of 
a public misfortune whatever prevents his writings from being 
known, and their utility and importance from being universally 
acknowledged. What principally obstructs their circulation, 
is the style in which they are composed. Unlike most authors, 
Mr Bentham’s first publications are, in point of writing, the most 
perfect; and long habit and frequent exercise, instead of improving 
his language, seem only to have rendered it perplexed, obscure and 
uncouth. English literature hardly affords any specimens of a more 
correct, concise and perspicuous style than that of the Fragment 
on Government which was the first of Mr Bentham’s works, or the 
Protest against Law Taxes, and a great part of the Defence of Usury, 
which were early productions of his mind. Since those publications, 
he seems, by great effort and study, to have rendered his style 
intricate, and his language obscure. His frequent inversions, his 
long parentheses, the novelty and harshness of many of the terms 
which he has so often, and, we must say, on many occasions, so 
unnecessarily invented, and the length and complication of his 
periods, have rendered some of his compositions illegible to all who 
will not, in spite of their repulsive forms, persevere in the difficult 
task of studying rather than reading them.31
William Hazlitt expressed this concern in even stronger terms a few years 
later in his essay on Bentham for The Spirit of the Age (1825):
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There is a technicality of manner, which renders his writings of 
more value to the professional inquirer than to the general reader. 
Again, [Bentham’s] style is unpopular, not to say unintelligible. He 
writes a language of his own that darkens knowledge. His works 
have been translated into French – they ought to be translated into 
English. People wonder that Mr. Bentham has not been prosecuted 
for the boldness and severity of some of his invectives. He might 
wrap up high treason in one of his inextricable periods, and it 
would never find its way into Westminster Hall. He is a kind of 
Manuscript author – he writes a cypher-hand, which the vulgar 
have no key to. The construction of his sentences is a curious frame-
work with pegs and hooks to hang his thoughts upon, for his own 
use and guidance, but almost out of the reach of everybody else. 
It is a barbarous philosophical jargon, with all the repetitions, 
parentheses, formalities, uncouth nomenclature and verbiage of 
law-Latin; and what makes it worse, it is not mere verbiage but has 
a great deal of acuteness and meaning in it, which you would be 
glad to pick out if you could.32
Hazlitt’s jocular observation – that, having been made so widely available 
in French, Bentham’s work would now benefit from translation into 
English – stimulates more than a cheap laugh: it takes readers to the heart 
of Bentham’s stylistic paradox – that his clear-sighted and far-ranging 
attacks on legal obfuscation and shams could only be expressed in 
prose so tortured that it required a double translation into French and 
then back into English in order to gain access to a wider audience. The 
Edinburgh Review article also acknowledges this curious phenomenon:
It is indeed when [Bentham] speaks by another’s lips, that he 
appears to most advantage; and it is to the graces of style which 
Mr Dumont has given him that he owes the reputation which he has 
acquired, and which is, from that cause, much greater in foreign 
countries than his own.33
What does it mean to speak by another’s lips? What ethical constraints 
are imposed on the choice of replacement words and phrases? What sorts 
of fidelity to the original are demanded? These are important questions 
in the context of Bentham’s own insistence that language, particularly 
legislative language, should be self-interpreting, perfectly unambiguous 
and transparent. In his model, all glosses should be unnecessary, 
hermeneutic art would be redundant and meaning would reside at 
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face value in the statute, the ur-text, the words printed on the page. 
Yet the Edinburgh Review suggests that Bentham, rather like Socrates 
of the ancient world or the Christ of the New Testament, can only be 
approached through the more accessible words of his chroniclers: 
As the merits of the greatest philosopher of antiquity would have 
been little known to posterity, but for the sublime writings of his 
eloquent disciple, so it is possible that, but for Dumont, Bentham’s 
reputation might never have emerged from obscurity.34
For A.V. Dicey, assessing Bentham’s achievements in his Lectures on Law 
and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century (1905), 
between 1800 and 1830 Bentham’s work began to exert a marked 
influence in public life, but the decade of the Reform Bill belonged to 
Bentham alone.35 Yet what textual sources were Victorians reading when 
they sought to digest or implement Bentham’s ideas? As J.M. Robson 
has noted, this was a complicated matter – there were many options 
available, including Bowring’s posthumous edition which appeared from 
1838–43 – but Robson concludes that Mill’s Bentham was primarily that 
of Dumont, and through Mill, Dumont shaped Bentham’s reception in 
the mid- and late-nineteenth-century.36 
Dumont’s translations of Bentham’s work
In The French Revolution and the Creation of Benthamism, Cyprian 
Blamires explores the complicated route by which Bentham’s work was 
received in the wider Anglophone sphere. He quotes a contemporary 
source who observed in 1815: 
The history of these works is perhaps unique in the annals of 
Literature. Mr Bentham either too fastidious to be satisfied with 
his own performances, or too impatient to submit to the labour of 
giving his works that degree of order and arrangement requisite 
for publication, confided his Manuscript to his friend M. Dumont. 
… Thus have these profound reflections on the Philosophy of 
Jurisprudence been rescued from that oblivion to which the 
carelessness of the author had probably doomed them; and the 
works of a man of whom England may well be proud, are known 
to his countrymen principally through the medium of a foreign 
language.37
J ErEMy bEntHAM’s iMAginAt ion AnD tHE EtH iCs of prosE styLE 129
Blamires notes that the occasion of this outburst was an inability to locate 
Bentham’s work on the panopticon in English, with readers compelled to 
rely on Dumont’s abstracts of them in Traités and in Théorie des peines et 
des récompenses, published in 1811. In David Leiberman’s reading, this is 
‘a sobering reminder of just how absent Bentham was from the process 
by which Benthamism came to be invented’.38 
As Blamires notes, it was the re-translation of one of Dumont’s 
Traités back into English that enabled Bentham’s thought to reach a 
wider audience, primarily in The Theory of Legislation, published initially 
in the United States in 1840 (and subsequently in London in 1864). The 
(re)translator of this work, Richard Hildreth, noted in his ‘Preface’ to the 
volume:
[Bentham] published many treatises in English, but for the 
generality of readers they have very few attractions. He was not 
skilful in the art of composition; he did not possess the gift of 
eloquence. Though endowed with a great genius for investigation, 
he lacked the talent of communicating his ideas. During a long 
life, devoted solely and assiduously to the study of jurisprudence, 
besides his occasional publications, he produced an immense 
mass of manuscripts, containing a fund of most valuable ideas, but 
unshaped, unarranged, and in a state quite unfit for publication. 
Fortunately for the cause of science, these materials were not left 
to perish; an interpreter, a compiler, a spokesman was found, every 
way worthy of the task he assumed.39
In his capacity as a fellow translator, Hildreth considered Dumont’s 
contribution to the dissemination of Benthamite thought. He quoted 
Dumont’s disavowal that he in any way co-wrote Bentham’s works: ‘amid 
all the diversity of these writings, [they bear] the impress of one mind – a 
unity of plan, an original genius, as analytic and profound in the general 
design as in the execution of the parts’. Hildreth’s inclusion of Dumont’s 
lengthy account of the nature of his intellectual partnership with 
Bentham affords compelling insights into the project. Dumont noted:
My labor, subaltern in its kind, has been limited to details. It was 
necessary to make a choice among various observations upon 
the same subject; to suppress repetitions; to throw light upon 
obscurities; to bring together all that appertained to the same 
subject; and to fill up those gaps which in the hurry of composition 
the author had left. I have had more to retrench than to add; more 
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to abridge than to expand. The mass of manuscripts, put into 
my hands, was considerable. I have had much to do in attaining 
correctness, and preserving uniformity of style; little or nothing 
as respects the fundamental ideas. A profusion of riches left me 
only the care of economy. As manager of this great fortune, I have 
spared no pains to realize it, and put it into circulation.
The changes I have made, have varied with the manuscripts. 
When I have found many treatises relevant to the same subject, but 
composed at different times and with different views, it has been 
necessary to reconcile them, and to incorporate them together, so 
as to form a perfect whole. The author perhaps had thrown aside 
some occasional composition, which now would not be interesting, 
nor even intelligible. Unwilling that the whole should perish, I 
have stripped it, like an abandoned house, of everything worth 
preserving. When he has delivered himself up to abstractions too 
profound, to metaphysics, I do not say too subtle, but too dry, I have 
endeavored to give more development to his ideas, to illustrate 
them by application, by facts, by examples; and I have allowed 
myself to scatter, with discretion, some ornaments. I have been 
obliged to write out some entire chapters, but always after hints 
and notes of the author.40
Dumont’s list of the qualities that rendered Bentham’s own prose virtually 
inaccessible to the general reader runs parallel to the devastating stylistic 
critique offered up by Hazlitt – a tendency towards ‘dryness’, abstraction 
and austerity. Hildreth concurred (1840, vi), offering his own very 
similar explanation for Bentham’s failure to find his own audience in 
England before his death:
The author’s Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 
regarded by a small number of enlightened judges as one of those 
original productions which form an epoch and a revolution in 
science, in spite of its philosophical merit, and perhaps on account 
of that merit, produced no sensation, and remained almost 
unknown to the public – though in England, more than elsewhere, 
a useful book may come into notice, though it does not happen to 
be easy and agreeable. In using many chapters of that work to form 
the General Principles of Legislation, I have endeavored to avoid 
what prevented its success – terms too scientific, sub-divisions too 
much multiplied, analysis too abstract. I have translated not the 
words, but the ideas; I have sometimes made an abridgement, and 
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at others a commentary, I have been guided by the advice and the 
hints of the author, contained in a preface, written many years after 
the work itself; and I have found among his papers all the additions 
of any consequence.
The same criticism recurs here – ‘subdivisions too much multiplied, 
analysis too abstract’. But again Hildreth insisted on the controver-
sial assertion that one can ‘translate … not the words but the ideas’, 
as if the two are somehow easily separable. Can his prose really be 
‘stripped’ of everything worth preserving ‘like an abandoned house’ 
without losing the qualities that make it, irreducibly, Bentham’s work? 
In Dryden’s terms, has Bentham’s writing benefited from the ‘lopping 
of superfluous branches’, or once ‘retrenched’, is his work no longer his 
own? Unsurprisingly, Hildreth insisted on the integrity of his own edition 
and its authenticity in relation to the English and French ‘originals’, but 
his assessment of Bentham’s achievements ended on a note of caution. 
He concluded that Bentham’s ‘preparatory labour … is immense. No one 
can form an idea of it except by seeing the manuscripts, the catalogues, 
the synoptical tables in which it is contained.’ But
[i]t must be confessed that the care of arrangement and correction 
has few attractions for the genius of Bentham. While pushed 
on by a creative force, he feels only the pleasure of composition; 
when it becomes necessary to shape, to put in order, to finish, he 
experiences nothing but fatigue. If a work is interrupted, the evil 
becomes irreparable; the charm vanishes; disgust succeeds; and 
passion once quenched, can only be rekindled by a new object.41
Bentham’s contemporaries – even those dedicated to the transmission of 
his work – concluded that his theories required paraphrase, translation 
and re-translation for successful reception, insisting on the substitu-
tion of elegance, ornament and principles of structural organization in 
place of Bentham’s own austerity and metaphysical abstraction. In the 
final section of this chapter, I want to consider the ethical implications 
of the work of substitution, and what it means for one thing to stand for 
another in an age when ‘representation’ – whether aesthetic, legal or 
political – occupied centre stage of the national imagination.
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Bentham, Coleridge and the ethics of imaginative 
writing
If the great intellectual contestation of the 1790s had been that of Burke 
and Paine, according to Mill, by the 1830s and onwards into the Victorian 
period it was that of Bentham and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, each a 
necessary foil to the other in terms of their linguistic and theological 
beliefs. In Mill’s famous essays, ‘On Bentham’ and ‘On Coleridge’, 
published in the Westminster Review in 1838, he deployed each figure 
to serve as representatives of very different approaches to ethical delib-
eration and political reform. And yet, before probing such differences, 
it is also important to acknowledge that Bentham was admired as 
well as critiqued by Victorian poets and novelists who preferred 
Coleridge’s defence of the value of literary and theological discourse. 
The magisterial parody of utilitarian language undertaken by Charles 
Dickens in Hard Times (1854) is well known, and I will return to it in a 
moment, but the novel published immediately prior to Hard Times, Bleak 
House (1852–3) – arguably Dickens’s masterpiece – owes a vast debt to 
Bentham’s programme of reform. In Bleak House, Dickens’s attack on the 
labyrinthine, Gothic complexity of Chancery, the sinister self-interest 
of legal practitioners, and the rejection of children’s testimony when 
these potential witnesses were not of an age to swear an oath, all testify 
to Bentham’s influence on Dickens’s work, and Dickens proposes public 
solutions very much in line with Bentham’s own: improved literacy, 
better sanitation and a rejection of empty religious ceremonial in favour 
of wider school provision. As Kathleen Blake has explored at length in 
her study The Pleasures of Benthamism, the Dickens of Bleak House is as 
much a disciple of Bentham as Mill was.42 The fault-lines exposed by 
Hard Times turn on Bentham’s and Dickens’s mutual commitments to 
the equal value of all in society alongside their total disagreement as to 
the best means by which existing inequality should be eliminated. In an 
age of democratization, are the individual and society to be treated as 
units of equal ethical value? And, if yes, what are the implications of one 
individual always being substitutable with another, that is, seemingly of 
no special value in and of themselves? 
In John Bowen’s analysis, ‘there is a close relationship between 
what is called modernity and enumeration’.43 As he worried away at 
the implications of this new preoccupation with counting citizens in his 
essays On Liberty and Utilitarianism, Mill observed:
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[Bentham’s Greatest Happiness Principle] is a mere form of words 
without rational signification, unless one person’s happiness, 
supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for 
kind), is counted for exactly as much as another’s. Those conditions 
being supplied, Bentham’s dictum, ‘everybody to count for one, 
nobody for more than one’, might be written under the principle of 
utility as an explanatory commentary.44
According to this model, subjectivity is substitutable: one unit of life is 
as valuable as (but no more valuable than) any other. The philosopher 
Jacques Derrida defines this anxiety as what he calls the ‘wound’ of 
democracy: ‘democracy counts, it counts votes and subjects, but it does 
not count, should not count ordinary singularities’, and hence:
[t]here is no democracy without respect for individual singularity 
or alterity, but there is no democracy without the community of 
friends, without the calculation of majorities, without identifiable, 
stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal. These two laws are 
irreducible to one another.45
Various strategies were designed to address this problem of incommen-
surability: religious communities formulated different theologies of 
substitutionary sacrifice, which might in some way justify the subjection 
of individual interest to the greater good, while law and politics both 
developed sophisticated theories of representation, in which one 
person ‘stood for’ another, in the court room or in the reformed House 
of Commons, thus allowing for an aggregation of individual interests, 
hopefully without too great a reliance on the rhetoric of sacrifice. Mill, 
on the other hand, uses the logic of induction to serve as what Nathan 
Hensley identifies as a ‘mediating step between low and high’: ‘[t]hus we 
see the tendency of general conceptions, as soon as formed, to substitute 
themselves as types, for whatever individual objects previously answered 
that purpose in our comparisons’.46 Hensley concludes that the idea of 
the type performs the function of what Marx called exchange: 
On the level of logical process, the mode of departicularization Mill 
charts in the Logic, and that Marx critiques in Capital, subordinates 
particularity and makes alterity fungible … [M]onetary logic 
transforms difference into sameness, flattening qualitative 
distinctions in order to produce repeatable, exchangeable units 
– equal parts that work, like money or citizens, as the chits 
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of a political-economic system now operating according to a 
metaphysics of counting.47
Mass democracy thus ‘promise[s] impartiality’ but depends on 
anonymity: as Marco Guidi has noted, the necessary value of impartial-
ity implies in turn ‘impersonality’, for ‘in evaluating the happiness of 
different individuals, it is not morally significant whose this happiness 
is: in other words, if it belongs to this individual, or that individual’.48 
In the utilitarian economy, subjectivity is homogenous, substitutable: 
one unit of life is as valuable as (but no more valuable than) any other. 
This was anathema to all the critics of industrialized capitalism, from 
Thomas Carlyle’s anxiety that history no longer afforded a theatre for 
the education and leadership of ‘great men’ of character to John Ruskin’s 
and William Morris’s attacks on labour that depended on dehumanizing 
levels of mechanical repetition.49
Dickens’s attack on utilitarian thought in Hard Times (1854) was 
given force by its compelling fusion of form and content – as the great 
critic F.R. Leavis recognized when he described it as Dickens’s only 
wholly successful literary work, the novel enacts the very message it is 
seeking to communicate. Hard Times depends on richly metaphorical 
language to savage the scientific education of ‘facts, and facts alone’ 
that had reduced Mill himself to despair in his late adolescence, and it 
also alludes throughout to parables and scriptural teaching in order to 
counter utilitarianism’s dependence on actuarial calculations. To give 
but one example, conflict in the community is resolved by the vicarious 
sacrifice of the virtuous working-man Stephen (the proto-martyr) 
in the Old Hell Shaft Mine, who sees the Christmas star and preaches 
forgiveness for all before his death. Christianity may have depended on 
its own scheme of vicarious punishment (professing that Christ in his 
innocence died to save mankind), but it provided a rich vocabulary for 
the recognition of the value of each individual sinner, unique in God’s 
sight (see, for example, the parable of the lost sheep in the gospel of 
Luke). While Dickens’s own faith wavered, he well knew its role in his 
popular commercial success, and he consequently positioned utilitari-
anism as the enemy he would otherwise have had to invent in order to 
promote the ethical importance of literary production.50 
Dickens, like so many of his Victorian contemporaries, insisted 
that readerly sympathy was a crucial ingredient of any ethical 
education: according to Adam Smith in his highly influential Theory 
of Moral Sentiments (1757), an individual learnt to ‘change places in 
fancy’ with others as he/she read, thus extending the human capacity 
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for compassion.51 In this model, imaginative identification reveals to 
readers the extent of their ethical interdependence, a process reliant 
on the mental work of substitution. While Mill praised the precision of 
Bentham’s logic, which could break units of meaning into ever more 
prescriptive formulas, he was equally sure as to the sorts of substitution 
that were imaginatively beyond him: 
In many of the most natural and strongest feelings of human nature 
[Bentham] had no sympathy; from many of its graver experiences 
he was altogether cut off; and the faculty by which one mind 
understands a mind different from itself, and throws itself into the 
feelings of that other mind, was denied him by his deficiency of 
Imagination.
With Imagination in the popular sense, command of imagery 
and metaphorical expression, Bentham was to a certain degree 
endowed. For want, indeed, of poetical culture, the images with 
which his fancy supplied him were seldom beautiful, but they 
were quaint and humorous, or bold, forcible, and intense: passages 
might be quoted from him both of playful irony, and of declamatory 
eloquence, seldom surpassed in the writings of philosophers. The 
Imagination which he had not, was that to which the name is 
generally appropriated by the best writers of the present day; that 
which enables us, by a voluntary effort, to conceive the absent as 
if it were present, the imaginary as if it were real, and to clothe it 
in the feelings which, if it were indeed real, it would bring along 
with it. This is the power by which one human being enters into 
the mind and circumstances of another. … Without it nobody even 
knows his own nature, further than circumstances have actually 
tried it and called it out; nor the nature of his fellow-creatures, 
beyond such generalizations as he may have been enabled to make 
from his observation of their outward conduct.52
Dickens, on the other hand, made his name as the prophet of sympathy 
in an age of democracy – as the advocate or representative of the outcast 
who might be offered up as a sacrifice or scapegoat to bring about the 
reconciliation of the one and the many in a polity modelled on Malthusian 
lines. His teaching was designed to stimulate the emotions, to move a 
reader to action, through affective examples and case studies that used 
sentimental personification to tug at the heart strings. For example, when 
his heroine, Sissy the circus girl, is urged by her utilitarian schoolmaster 
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to repeat that twenty-five deaths per year from starvation is acceptable, 
she reports:
This schoolroom is an immense town, and in it there are millions 
of inhabitants, and only five-and-twenty are starved to death in 
the streets, in the course of a year. What is your remark on that 
proportion? And my remark was – for I couldn’t think of a better 
one – that I thought it must be just as hard upon those who were 
starved, whether the others were a million, or a million million.53
Both Bentham and Dickens looked forward to the day when no one 
starved in the streets, but the strategies that both men hoped would 
enable society to reach that outcome were very different. For Dickens, 
the individual remained the responsible agent of action, and Hard Times 
famously concluded with his invocation to an implied singular ‘one’ of his 
actual mass readership: ‘Dear reader, it rests with you and me whether 
such things shall be or not be.’54
Sympathy has subsequently fallen out of favour as a rather pater-
nalistic mechanism for ethical education, which works at best slowly and 
with considerable partiality towards fairer opportunities for all, and at 
worst achieves nothing for any one.55 Bentham’s insistence on impartial-
ity and on the reform of institutions to implement just outcomes among 
strangers as well as friends has better stood the test of time. Yet the 
questions posed by the definition of individuality as that which cannot 
easily be substituted, paraphrased or translated, remain important 
to us in our quest for the reconciliation of fairness for all and personal 
fulfilment for each uniquely valuable human being.
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Chapter 6
‘Is it true? … what is the meaning of 




The founding document for any understanding of Bentham’s relation to 
British Romanticism is John Stuart Mill’s essay on Coleridge, published 
in The London and Westminster Review in March 1840. Mill draws what 
would become an influential distinction between the ways in which the 
two thinkers approached human belief:
By Bentham, beyond all others, men have been led to ask 
themselves, in regard to any ancient or received opinion, Is it true? 
and by Coleridge, What is the meaning of it? … Bentham judged 
a proposition true or false as it accorded or not with the result of 
his own inquiries. … With Coleridge, on the contrary, the very 
fact that any doctrine had been believed by thoughtful men, and 
received by whole nations or generations of mankind, was … one 
of the phenomena to be accounted for.1
Mill’s remarks are framed by his concerns about the relationship 
between Church and social progress, or more broadly, between tradition 
and custom on the one hand and social justice and reason on the other. 
England, he claims, had reached an impasse, a point at which the middle 
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ground between radical reform and conservative consolidation could no 
longer hold. By neither embracing new, radical ideas nor quite managing 
to shut them out, by muddling along: 
England had neither the benefits, such as they were, of the new 
ideas nor of the old. We were just sufficiently under the influences 
of each, to render the other powerless. … This was not a state of 
things which could recommend itself to any earnest mind. It was 
sure in no great length of time to call forth two sorts of men … 
the one pressing the new doctrines to their utmost consequences; 
the other reasserting the best meaning and purposes of the old. 
The first type attained its greatest height in Bentham; the last in 
Coleridge.2
As Mill sees it, Bentham collects the torch of radicalism from his eigh-
teenth-century Enlightenment precursors and shines it upon present-day 
institutions and the language that underpins them. The test he applies to 
such institutions is one of correspondence to fact: does our current polity, 
he asks, have a basis in truth? Coleridge, in contrast, resists this impulse. 
Where the fundamental imperative in Bentham’s thought is epistemo-
logical and empirical, according to Mill, in Coleridge it is hermeneutic 
and aesthetic. Instead of testing the empirical validity of the traditions, 
customs and attachments of the people, Coleridge interprets them 
as expressions of the spirit of the age. For Coleridge, interpreting this 
expression, discovering its meaning, precedes the act of understanding 
itself. Mill, of course, has little time for Coleridge’s more fundamental 
claim that the empirical understanding itself was inadequate for 
the purpose of comprehending historical change. Unlike Coleridge’s 
followers (Carlyle, Emerson and the American Transcendentalists, most 
notably), Mill sides firmly with Locke and Bentham on questions of meta-
physical principle. ‘We see no ground for believing that anything can be 
the object of our knowledge except our experience,’ he insists: ‘We are 
therefore at issue with Coleridge on the central idea of his philosophy.’3 
Nonetheless, Mill’s essay attempts to mediate between the polarized 
Benthamites and Coleridgeans by suggesting that, despite its flawed 
metaphysics, Coleridge’s conservative, hermeneutic approach to history 
and politics was not without its merits.
In dividing early nineteenth-century thought into a reformist, fact-
obsessed utilitarianism on the one hand, and a conservative, aestheticized 
Romanticism on the other, Mill introduces a binary into modern intellec-
tual history that has remained surprisingly durable. What, after all, could 
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be more contrary than Benthamite utility and Romantic feeling? I want 
to complicate this picture of Bentham’s relation to his Romantic contem-
poraries. Indeed, even before it is brought under scrutiny, it is apparent 
that the great intellectual stand-off Mill describes between hard-nosed, 
forward-looking utilitarians and tender-hearted, homesick Romantics 
does not run on all fours, not least because Romantic writers do not 
always line up in ways one might expect. For example, although the poet 
Percy Bysshe Shelley sides with Coleridge by basing his defence of the 
autonomy of poetry upon a transcendent language of imagination, unlike 
Coleridge he explicitly endorses Bentham in redirecting this imaginative 
energy towards the goal of radical political change. The essayist William 
Hazlitt, meanwhile, attacks both Bentham and Coleridge: the first for his 
misbegotten attempt to achieve a perfect transparency in language by 
purging it of feeling and metaphor; the second for developing a poetics 
of metaphysical obscurity that was by instinct (and here Hazlitt would 
have agreed with Mill) politically reactionary. I will return to Hazlitt in 
the final section of this chapter.
I am not just arguing that Mill’s binary is too simple adequately to 
describe the complicated philosophical and political alignments of many 
of the writers we think of as Romantic; nor do I want to turn it into a 
straw man by assuming that Mill would have pressed it too far. What I 
am interested in is the way in which questions of ‘truth’ and ‘meaning’ 
become entangled in a period in which the reform of language and 
the language of reform are incandescent topics. To understand how 
this happens, we need to examine the way in which the scepticism of 
David Hume ultimately lays the foundations for Bentham’s theory of 
real and fictitious entities by destabilizing the relationship between 
truth and meaning. My argument is that the influence upon Bentham of 
Hume’s account of the ‘fictions’ of reason leads the former to abandon 
the kind of positivist empiricism Mill defends and instead prioritize 
matters of meaning over matters of ‘fact’. Conversely, the aestheticiza-
tion of language in Romantic writers signifies not the abandonment of an 
Enlightenment model of ‘truth’, but its elegiac idealization. 
Hume’s conventionalism
The polarization Mill perceived in contemporary thought between those 
who prioritize questions of ‘truth’ and those who emphasize issues of 
‘meaning’ has its roots in Hume’s conventionalist treatment of language. 
Although Hume did not produce a fully developed theory of language, 
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he made a number of remarks and observations on the subject, and his 
interest in the way that customs shape human nature drew him towards 
an account of language as social and conventional. One of the more 
celebrated of his comments arrives at the end of Section 2 of An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding (1748). Here, Hume notes that one of 
the reasons why people are often hoodwinked by philosophical jargon 
is that they too readily assume that well-established and familiar terms 
have definite meanings attached to them in the form of determinate 
ideas. However, since all ideas are, by their very nature, faint and languid, 
and impressions and sensations are strong and vivid, Hume proposes 
that ‘[w]hen we entertain … any suspicion that a philosophical term is 
employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need 
but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it 
be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion.’4 The 
semantic thesis implied by this statement is what M.A. Box, borrowing a 
term from Jonathan Bennett, classes as ‘meaning-empiricism’, that is, the 
thesis ‘that meaning can be determined by demanding the birth certifi-
cation in experience of an idea’.5 Hume’s suggestion that the meanings 
of terms must be cashed out into the currency of sense-experience, and 
that by ‘bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to 
remove all dispute’, would have far-reaching repercussions. It would 
ultimately inspire attempts by logical positivists in the early twentieth 
century to establish sensation (through various forms of verification 
principle) as the semantic index of scientific and philosophical discourse, 
an ambition crystallized in A.J. Ayer’s declaration that ‘[i]t is the philos-
opher’s business to give a correct definition of material things in terms 
of sensations.’6 Despite this legacy, Hume himself remained doubtful 
about the possibility of providing ‘correct’ definitions of things purely in 
terms of sense-experience. Indeed, he finally denies that meaning must 
ultimately rest upon non-linguistic entities, regardless of whether these 
entities are understood to be intellectual essences or the raw data of 
sensation. For Hume, language is best understood as a set of conventions 
determined by and within social contexts. 
To support this claim, Hume appeals to Berkeley’s argument 
regarding the formation of abstract ideas. One of the paradoxes thrown 
up by Locke’s corpuscularian epistemology was the notion of an idea that 
was simultaneously particular and general, encompassing the qualities 
of the members of the class it represented while being, in Locke’s words, 
‘all and none of these at once’. Since general ideas lack corresponding 
particular objects, they remain ‘Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind’, 
and, therefore, Locke acknowledges, ‘marks of our Imperfection’.7 
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Berkeley had attempted to overcome the empirical problem of how a 
single abstract idea could contain within itself all possible variants and 
instances of the thing conceived. For Berkeley, Locke’s paradox exposes 
the fact that all knowledge is of particulars alone. The error that leads 
Locke to view general ideas as epistemologically suspect is that of 
supposing that the world can be divided into ‘primary’ (inherent) and 
‘secondary’ (mind-dependent) qualities. This dualism can be seen to be 
both unnecessary and unhelpful, Berkeley maintains, once one grasps 
the full implications of the principle that to conceive of something is to 
have a sensation of that thing. If the esse of objects is percepi, then there 
is no fundamental difference, epistemologically, between ideas of general 
things and ideas of particular things.8 Particular ideas become general 
ideas simply through a process of nomination; in other words, ‘an idea, 
which considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made 
to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort’.9
Hume considers this claim, as he puts it, ‘that all general ideas 
are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term’ to be ‘one of 
the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late 
years in the republic of letters’.10 Less palatable, however, was Berkeley’s 
idealism, underpinned as it was by the assumption that all human 
perception is providentially supported by a ‘spirit infinitely wise, good and 
powerful’.11 Uncoupling Berkeley’s theory of abstraction from theology, 
Hume argues instead that abstract ideas are constructed through commu-
nicative contexts. By being attached to a word, individual ideas acquire 
a new signification, whereby a ‘particular idea becomes general by being 
annex’d to a general term; that is, to a term, which from a customary 
conjunction has a relation to many other particular ideas, and readily 
recalls them in the imagination’.12 By forging a close connection between 
reference and custom, Hume offers a naturalistic account of the meaning 
of general terms that extends the nascent pragmatism of Berkeley’s 
nominalism: now it is habit and convention, rather than raw sensation, 
that determines the meaningfulness or otherwise of general terms. 
Linguistic customs become for Hume what Annette Baier describes as the 
‘social roots of reason, roots from which it draws its nourishment and its 
powers’.13 In this way, Hume effectively recalibrates the basic relation-
ship between language, thought and reality, abandoning the Lockean 
view of language as a system of signs arbitrarily assigned to individual 
ideas in favour of one in which the conventions of language constitute 
part of the fabric of social contexts that determine rational thought.
Viewing language as a convention can easily provoke doubt over 
the assumption that language represents thought. Accordingly, following 
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the linguistic turn instigated by Locke and extended by Condillac, eigh-
teenth-century empiricism undergoes a further, pragmatic turn, which 
itself draws upon insights from classical rhetorical theory as well as 
more recent philosophy. Of these, the most pertinent for the present 
purpose is an emerging awareness of the ‘non-correspondence between 
form and function or language and thought’.14 As Brigitte Nerlich and 
David D. Clarke have documented, these developments were in turn 
‘fed by a slow trickle-down of novel ideas’, suggesting that language had 
functions other than the representation of thought; for example, the 
expression of emotion and the persuasion of other people.15 Such ideas 
would eventually culminate in ‘the rejection of a reductionist notion of 
the sentence as statement, affirmation, judgement, representation of 
thought or proposition’ by Thomas Reid and others.16 Indeed, this shift 
in paradigms becomes one of the main currents of ‘protopragmatics’ that 
would eventually lead to the emergence of pragmatics itself as a clearly 
defined sub-discipline of linguistics in the twentieth century.17 
The importance of Hume to this development lies not just in his 
linguistic conventionalism, but also in the way in which he highlights 
the referential poverty of certain sentences, a move that enables later 
thinkers such as Reid to construct a more comprehensively performa-
tive theory of language. The locus classicus for this shift in outlook is 
Hume’s analysis of the obligation of promises in the Treatise, in which 
he argues that only the necessity of custom and convention can explain 
the moral authority of something that is itself ontologically and episte-
mologically ‘unintelligible’, namely, an obligation that is created by a 
verbal utterance.18 By treating promises as the issuing of ‘a certain form of 
words … by which we bind ourselves to the performance of any action’, 
Hume identifies the promise with a communicative act that, while philo-
sophically dubious, is nonetheless ‘requisite to beget mutual trust and 
confidence in the common offices of life’.19 He repeats this claim in the 
second Enquiry by arguing that linguistic customs and the conventions 
of language are entangled with human customs and habits. Tellingly, this 
issue arises for Hume not in the context of discussing language per se, 
but amid his considerations concerning ‘the social virtue of benevolence’ 
in the Appendix. What Hume seeks to underline here is the tacitly inter-
subjective basis of moral norms, which, he notes, ‘may be compared to 
the building of a vault, where each individual stone would, of itself, 
fall to the ground; nor is the whole fabric supported but by the mutual 
assistance and combination of its corresponding parts’.20 Using the 
analogy of rowing, Hume maintains that not all conventions depend 
upon the explicit performance upon which promises are based. The 
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sense of justice, Hume explains, is a convention that ‘each man feels in 
his own breast, which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, 
in concurrence with others, into a general plan or system of actions, 
which tends to public utility’. In the same way that pace and rhythm are 
essential to the functioning of oarsmen in a boat, he continues, ‘speech 
and words are fixed by human convention and agreement’.21
The virtues that keep morality afloat, then, depend upon the very 
same implicit conventions that make human communication possible. 
Above all, Hume emphasizes that it is the performance of these virtues 
that sustains both benevolence and meaning in the absence of an 
objective moral law and determining referents for words or sentences. 
Here, Hume’s position on language is broadly in line with his epistemol-
ogy and his moral theory, insofar as he claims that the inadequacy of our 
sensory input for the purposes of validating our cognitive, ethical and 
communicative lives indicates the constitutive nature of human habits, 
customs and behaviour in each of these spheres. What his Appendix to 
the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals makes clear is that human 
conventions do not form the foundation of these spheres, but exist in a 
circular relation of mutual dependence with them: only ‘if all perform 
their part’ do they persist. Nicholas Phillipson expresses the virtuously 
circular relationship envisaged by Hume in the following way: ‘the more 
stable a system of language was, the more reliable our understanding of 
the world would be and the better would be our power of judgement. But 
linguistic stability presupposed social stability.’22 Essential to maintaining 
the balance of this delicate ecosystem, once again, is trust. As Baier notes, 
for Hume ‘[s]peech is our co-operative and trust-facilitated activity par 
excellence’.23 From this standpoint, the interdependent relationships that 
exist between implicit conventions, the performance of social roles, and 
the maintenance of mutual trust form the conditions of possibility for 
human language and reason. 
Hume’s account of the finely balanced economy maintained by 
trust, language and custom in sustaining the fictions of belief necessary 
for civilized human life would have powerful repercussions for late eigh-
teenth-century empiricism. In different ways, Thomas Reid and Jeremy 
Bentham would be led by its implications towards theories of language 
that prioritized social action rather than representations or mental states 
as their leading terms. Common sense thinkers such as Reid and Dugald 
Stewart would seek to cement Hume’s pragmatic linking of truth and 
the (social) conventions behind language into apodictic philosophical 
first principles, while linguistic materialists such as John Horne Tooke 
and utilitarians such as Bentham seized on the opportunity that Hume’s 
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account appeared to offer to detach meaning from mental contents and 
to understand the fictions of human belief as linguistically and socially 
constructed. This involved taking seriously the proposition, as Leslie 
Stephen put it, that ‘if reason is fiction, then fiction is reason’.24 It’s this 
idea that Bentham’s theory of real and fictitious entities eventually 
internalizes.
Bentham: What is the meaning of it?
Bentham turns to address some of the problems of knowledge and 
language relatively late in his career, and he approaches them with 
some reluctance. His impatience with metaphysical questions, however, 
is not simply a manifestation of the intolerance of the legal reformer 
for ‘theory’. Instead, it is rooted in the conviction that any attempt to 
separate the ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ of human life is an error. Bentham 
assessed philosophical questions in relation to utility. This in turn 
means that, for Bentham, the epistemologist’s mission to abolish error 
from the grounds of knowledge must ultimately be subordinated to 
eudæmonics, or an understanding of proper human functioning and the 
good life. Accordingly, as he indicates in the Appendix to his 1815 work, 
Chrestomathia: ‘Eudæmonics … may be said to be the object of every 
branch of art, and the subject of every branch of science.’25
While Bentham’s tone sounds confident here, by the time he 
wrote Chrestomathia he had already spent several decades attempting 
to overcome the philosophical problems that he had recognized early 
in his career and which are apparent in his great work on jurispru-
dence, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.26 In the 
Introduction’s important chapter ‘Of Motives’, Bentham’s discussion of the 
notion of ‘motivation’ swiftly encounters difficulties due to his realization 
that the word ‘motive’ has two meanings: one literal and legitimate, 
the other figurative and fictitious. The first denotes ‘any of those really 
existing incidents from whence the act in question is supposed to take 
its rise’; the second, ‘a certain fictitious entity, a passion, an affectation 
of the mind, an ideal being’.27 Bentham realizes that the Introduction is 
not the best place to work through these problems. Indeed, it is not until 
the early 1810s that he finally turns to address the issues in which he 
had become entangled. He does so in a series of essays, which include ‘A 
Fragment on Ontology’, the ‘Essay on Logic’, the ‘Essay on Language’ and 
‘Fragments on Universal Grammar’.28 Logical fictions such as ‘motive’ 
differ importantly from poetical fictions like centaurs in that they cannot 
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be extirpated from thought. As Bentham observes in ‘Fragment on 
Ontology’, ‘[i]n the mind of all, fiction, in the logical sense, has been the 
coin of necessity; – in that of poets of amusement – in that of the priest 
and the lawyer of mischievous immorality’.29 Nonetheless, he ultimately 
perceives that fictitious entities in law are linked to a web of figuration 
that stretches much further into human thought and language than he 
had previously imagined. The language of reform and the reform of 
language could not, in the end, be separated:
Confining himself to the language most in use, a man can scarce 
avoid running, in appearance, into perpetual contradictions. … 
To obviate this inconvenience, completely, he has but this one 
unpleasant remedy; to lay aside the old phraseology and invent a 
new one.30
To Bentham, it appeared that utilitarianism, could not, after all, simply 
muddle through without a thoroughly worked-out ontology, an epis-
temology and a theory of logic or language. The first two of these 
would jointly distinguish between real entities like physical bodies and 
‘individual perceptions’ on the one hand and fictitious entities such as 
‘[f]aculties, powers of the mind, dispositions’ on the other.31 The task of 
the theory of logic and language, meanwhile, was to ‘give direction and 
assistance’ to human thought by converting the discourse of fictitious 
entities (as far as possible) into that of real entities. For Bentham, this 
in turn meant translating highly figurative language into a less figurative 
language that was based in sensations of pleasure and pain. By doing 
this, Bentham reinforced his eudæmonics with the epistemologi-
cal argument, as stated in A Table of the Springs of Action (1817), that 
‘[p]leasures and pains [are] the basis of all other entities’. Furthermore, 
the same utilitarian principle leads Bentham to deny that any psycho-
logical phenomenon is epistemically privileged: all human awareness, 
he maintains, regardless of immediacy, is mediated via the ‘receptacles’ 
of pleasure and pain.32 This denial that sensation is ‘pure’ or value-
neutral in turn supports Bentham’s pragmatic insistence in the ‘Essay 
on Logic’ that ‘in no place is anything to be known, but in the same place 
there is something to be done’.33 It also forms the immediate context 
for his development of a new ‘phraseology’, which, based upon the 
translation of abstract statements into a lexicon of pleasure and pain, 
was indifferent to the Cartesian problem of whether, and to what extent, 
the ‘mind’ corresponded to the ‘world’.
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At this point, however, another problem confronted Bentham: that 
of the method of analysis by which such a translation could take place. In 
a footnote to A Fragment on Government (1776), he had already dismissed 
the traditional method of definition per genus et differentiam favoured by 
D’Alembert and the encyclopédistes. Fictitious entities or abstractions, he 
argues, cannot have examples or instances, and so cannot be defined in 
terms of a superior genus. Accordingly, when Bentham asks, rhetorically, 
‘what is a disposition?’ He imagines the reply: ‘“A disposition is a … :” and 
there we stop. The fact is, a disposition has no superior genus: a disposition 
is not a … , any thing’.34 Conventional analysis is inadequate for inter-
preting fictitious entities because the meaning of fictitious entities is 
always over-determined. As Bentham puts it in the ‘Essay on Logic,’ 
unlike physical aggregates, such as a bushel of apples, logical aggregates 
are indeterminate, in that they remain open to ‘the unlimited powers, of 
decomposition and recomposition possessed by the human mind’. For 
Bentham, the standard view of analysis and synthesis as ‘counterpart’ 
processes is a myth: it is not possible to ‘unpack’ an abstract idea in the 
same way that one would unpack a suitcase.35
Similarly, the Lockean method of explicating individual terms by 
tracing such units back to simple ideas or primitive perceptions assumes 
the presence of an accessible field of neutral data (ideas or impressions), 
the existence of which Bentham does not accept. Instead, his theory of 
real and fictitious entities, which pragmatically presupposes the always-
already evaluative status of sensation, allows that language itself endows 
ideas with a kind of ‘verbal reality, so to speak, … without which the 
matter of language could never have been formed’.36 By accepting that 
linguistic figuration descends even to the referent, Bentham draws 
the sting from the claim that reason and metaphor cannot be distin-
guished. As Esterhammer observes, in this way ‘Bentham’s theory … 
embraces the principle … that language does in fact succeed in creating 
immaterial objects and endowing them with at least a form of reality’.37 
By conceiving meaning as holistic and relational rather than psychologi-
cal and causal, Bentham is able to allow that it is possible for a word to 
be used correctly and successfully by individuals who might associate it 
with different ideas (or even with no ideas). The meaning of a term is 
ultimately determined not by its causation, but by its context.
For Bentham, this position has two significant consequences. First, 
the fundamental basic units of meaning are now seen not as single terms, 
but as whole statements, speech acts or propositions. As he argues in the 
‘Essay on Language’: ‘Every man who speaks, speaks in propositions, the 
rudest savage, not less than the most polished orator, – terms taken by 
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themselves are the work of abstraction, the produce of a refined analysis: 
– ages after ages must have elapsed before any such analysis was ever 
made.’38 Second, in order to create his ‘new phraseology’, Bentham now 
develops a method of contextual definition, which he terms ‘paraphrasis’. 
He gave many different accounts of this method, but one of the clearest 
can be found in the ‘Essay on Logic’: ‘By the word paraphrasis may be 
designated that sort of exposition which may be afforded by transmuting 
into a proposition, having for its subject some real entity, a proposition 
which has not for its subject any other than a fictitious entity.’39 Crucially, 
paraphrasis exhausts the metaphysical field of enquiry. As the non-foun-
dational search for meaning, it is to be distinguished from ‘Archetypation’, 
or the tracing of an idea to its psychological origin.40 For Bentham, this 
new method obviates the ontological embarrassment encountered by 
empiricists such as Locke and even John Horne Tooke: the very point of 
paraphrasis is that what counts as a ‘real entity’ is ultimately a matter 
of coherence within a linguistic community, not one of correspon-
dence between word and object. As W.V. Quine notes of Bentham; ‘[h]e 
recognized that to explain a term we do not need to specify an object for 
it to refer to’. Paraphrasis enables one ‘to explain talk of bodies in terms 
of talk of impressions by translating one’s whole sentences about bodies 
into whole sentences about impressions, without equating the bodies 
themselves to anything at all’.41 Viewed from this perspective, Bentham’s 
theory of fictitious entities signals a reorientation in language theory and 
epistemology towards recasting the ‘problem’ of truth as a sub-category 
of the question of meaning.
Hume’s conventionalist account of the primacy of the social 
function of language in the formation of general ideas had granted 
constitutive status to logical fictions or metaphors – in other words, to 
customary and habitual figures of speech that could not be distinguished 
in principle from the supposedly more ‘literal’ words and statements 
through which common-sense principles and the elements of reason were 
articulated. Even those who accepted Hume’s conventionalist linguistics 
were troubled by this apparent outcome. Nonetheless, Bentham’s 
refusal to put epistemology before ethics, and his thoroughly utilitarian 
approach to the contextual definition of logical fictions, enables him to 
adopt a more pragmatic view of the constitutive role played by figurative 
language in human speech acts. Ultimately, he does so by subordinating 
the question ‘is it true?’ to the question ‘what does it mean?’
‘ i s  i t  truE? … wHAt is  tHE MEAning of i t? ’ 151
Hazlitt: Is it true?
This essentially pragmatic approach of Bentham to questions of truth 
can be contrasted with that of one of his antagonists, the quarrelsome 
Romantic essayist, William Hazlitt. Hazlitt was Bentham’s tenant at 
19 York Street, Westminster, between 1813 and 1819. During this time 
Hazlitt never encountered his famous landlord, who lived close by. For 
his part, Bentham seems to have been aware of the essayist only as a 
source of rent, for the non-payment of which Hazlitt was duly evicted in 
the winter of 1819. However, in his biting pen portrait of Bentham five 
years later, Hazlitt recounts Bentham’s original plan to pull down number 
19, which had once been the home of John Milton, to make ‘a thorough-
fare, like a three-stalled stable, for the idle rabble of Westminster’.42 In 
Hazlitt’s profile, later the leading essay in his collection of portraits The 
Spirit of the Age (1825), Bentham’s indifference to the fate of the ‘cradle 
of Paradise Lost’ is presented as symptomatic of an age dominated by 
abstraction, which, by seeking to ground all human life in factual truth, 
loses sight of the non-rational powers of the human mind:43
[Bentham has] reduced the theory and practice of human life to a 
caput mortuum of reason, and dull, plodding, technical calculation. 
… If the mind of man were competent to comprehend the whole of 
truth and good, and act upon it at once, and independently of all 
other considerations, Mr. Bentham’s plan would be a feasible one, 
and the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, would be 
the best possible ground to place morality upon. But it is not so.44
The great irony of Bentham’s work, Hazlitt suggests, is that its obsession 
with acquiring clear-sighted and comprehensive knowledge of life is 
the very thing that blinds it to truth. Abstracted, ‘like an anchoret in his 
cell’, Bentham’s eye ‘glances not from object to object, but from thought 
to thought’.45 Nowhere is this more evident than in his use of language, 
which, in insisting on neutrality, betrays its own rationalistic bias; by 
striving for transparency, it achieves only technocratic opacity: 
Mr. Bentham’s method of reasoning, though comprehensive and 
exact … is rather like an inventory, than a valuation of different 
arguments. … The construction of his sentences is a curious frame-
work with pegs and hooks to hang his thoughts upon, for his own 
use and guidance, but almost out of the reach of every body else. 
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It is a barbarous philosophical jargon, with all the repetitions, 
parentheses, formalities, uncouth nomenclature and verbiage of 
law-Latin … . In short, Mr. Bentham writes as if he was allowed 
but a single sentence to express his whole view of a subject in … .46
For Hazlitt, Bentham’s thinking reflects some of the great philosophical 
blights of the age: empiricism in epistemology, materialism in ontology 
and egoism and utilitarianism in moral theory. That the last of these 
ills stemmed from the first two (which he saw as mutually sustaining) 
he spells out clearly in his Prospectus of a History of English Philosophy 
(1809). According to the ruling philosophy in Britain, he complains, ‘the 
mind itself is nothing, and external impressions everything. All thought 
is to be resolved into sensation, all morality into the love of pleasure, 
and all action into mechanical impulse.’47 In opposition to this tradition, 
Hazlitt makes it a cornerstone of his philosophy that ‘[t]he mind has 
laws, powers, and principles of its own, and is not the mere puppet of 
matter’.48 
Hazlitt maintains that the error of ‘people of sense’, such as 
Bentham and Shelley, is that by mistaking the abstract, rational forms 
that quantify experience for the ‘pith and marrow’ of the thing itself, 
they come to know only ‘the form, not the power of truth’.49 Against this 
perspective, Hazlitt pits his moral idealism, his belief that the mind forms 
experience, and hence its own moral objectives (self-interested and disin-
terested alike). He accepts Hume’s conclusion that the exhaustive deter-
mination of belief by sense-experience (the perfect correspondence of 
idea and world) is not a viable model for knowledge. But while for Hume 
this meant jettisoning the language of representation and deflating 
individual consciousness into an epistemology based upon custom and 
the social sentiments, Hazlitt responds to the same crisis of represen-
tation by inflating the cognitive function of consciousness still further. 
Consequently, knowledge for Hazlitt comes to consist in the projection 
of concepts or ideas upon the world by a powerful mind. For instance, 
in the Plain Speaker essay ‘On Reason and Imagination’, he defends 
‘natural feeling’ against Benthamite considerations of the ‘pros and cons 
… of utility and inutility’. He also introduces a range of quasi-epistemic 
concepts, including ‘sympathy’, ‘moral sense’ and ‘instinctive perception’, 
all of which are deployed to mediate between the estranged realms of 
bloodless calculation and passionate feeling.50 Expressing a hatred 
for ‘people who have no notion of any thing but generalities’, Hazlitt 
argues that ‘Logic should enrich and invigorate its decisions by the use 
of imagination.’51 He insists that mental powers like common sense and 
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genius, by operating at the border between abstract comprehension and 
an incommensurable world of infinitely plural truths, have the capacity 
to transcend abstraction through feeling and intuition. Accordingly, 
Hazlitt introduces a quasi-cognitive level of ‘experience’ that functions 
at the bounds of the knowable. In the ‘Preface’ to his Abridgement of the 
Light of Nature Pursued (1807) by Abraham Tucker, he mocks ‘the grave 
professors of abstract reasoning’ for ‘attending only to one aspect of 
things’ and ‘leaving out always those minute differences and perplexing 
irregularities which disturb the sluggish uniformity of our ideas, and 
give life and motion to our being’. Fundamentally, he avers, abstraction 
is a mental adaptation to environment, ‘a trick to supply the defect of 
comprehension’, since the ‘moulds of the understanding may be said not 
to be large enough to contain the gross concrete objects of nature’. Given 
this condition, anyone ‘who disdains the use of common sense … is like 
a person who should deprive himself of the use of his eye-sight, in order 
that he might be able to grope his way better in the dark!’52 This analogy 
forms, in turn, the basis for Hazlitt’s distinction between: 
two sorts of philosophy; that of those who believe what they feel, 
and endeavour to account for it, and that of those who only believe 
what they understand, and have already accounted for. The one 
is the philosophy of consciousness, the other that of experiment; 
the one may be called the intellectual, the other the material 
philosophy … . The first of these is the only philosophy that is fit for 
men of sense, the other should be left to chymists and logicians.53
And yet, Hazlitt also attacks the tendency to romanticize nature and 
humanity. He worries that the Romantic aestheticization of the episte-
mological might produce an intellectual culture in which the boundary 
between reason and imagination, fact and fiction, blur into a form of 
indifference. Indeed, it is this very elision of poetic imagination and 
prosaic fact that he decries in Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who has, ‘by an 
ambition to be every thing, become nothing. His metaphysics have been a 
dead weight on the wings of his imagination – while his imagination has 
run away with his reason and common sense.’ Thus, he muses, although 
‘[r]eason and imagination are both excellent things … perhaps their 
provinces ought to be kept more distinct than they have lately been’.54 
This determination not to collapse the boundary between 
imagination and reason, fiction and truth, highlights the parallels 
between Hazlitt’s epistemology, with its concern for twilight knowledge, 
and his aesthetics of the sublime. In the essay, ‘Why Distant Objects 
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Please’, for instance, the gap between the two drives of human nature 
is invoked to explain the enchanting effects of spatial and temporal 
distance. Thus, as Hazlitt notes: 
[i]t is not the little, glimmering, almost annihilated speck in the 
distance that rivets our attention and ‘hangs upon the beatings of 
our hearts’: it is the interval that separates us from it, and of which 
it is the trembling boundary. … Into that great gap in our being 
‘come thronging soft desires’ and infinite regrets.55
Indeed, sublimity has a more general function in Hazlitt’s thought. By 
arguing that knowledge rests upon mind-formed fictions of abstraction 
and imagination, Hazlitt metaphysically inflates the status of Hume’s 
fictions by relocating them from the sphere of tacit social conventions 
to that of mental constructions. In Hazlitt’s hands, empirical intuition is 
privatized and sublimed into the noumenal, indeterminate territory of 
a hypostatized ‘common sense’.56 Thus, the aesthetics of the ‘trembling 
boundary’ are not merely the product of his philosophy of knowledge 
and identity, but are also an integral part of his metaphysics. 
Many will recognize this aestheticization of knowledge, whereby 
the para-epistemological agencies of creative imagination and ineffable 
common sense are established as the moderators of reason, as a char-
acteristically Romantic response to the epistemological challenge of 
Hume. Accordingly, Uttara Natarajan observes that ‘[f]ollowing Hume, 
Hazlitt recognizes the sensory constraint upon imaginative capacity. 
But this theory, unlike Hume’s, allows for such constraints to be 
altogether surpassed by the cultivation of the imagination.’57 Natarajan 
is right to contrast Hume’s deflationary account of the ‘faint and languid’ 
perceptions of imagination (as thought recedes from sensation and 
memory) with the dynamic faculty, which, in Hazlitt’s Essay, ‘creates 
the object’ of perception and ‘pushes … ideas beyond the bounds of … 
memory and sense’.58 Seen this way, Hazlitt’s argument follows a familiar 
pattern of Romantic logic, whereby, as imagination is elevated and 
reason subordinated, philosophy’s loss becomes art’s gain. While Hume 
had sought merely to counterbalance the philosophical perspective of 
the anatomist with the civilizing, aesthetic skills of the painter, Hazlitt 
elevates the latter to a new level of precedence. Accordingly, ‘the poet 
and painter of imagination are superior to the mere philosopher or man 
of science, because they exercise the powers of reason and intellect 
combined with nature and passion’.59 
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And yet, what is lost from Hume’s picture in Hazlitt’s new 
arrangement of philosophy and art is a constitutive role for intersub-
jectivity in human intellectual life. The ‘internal principle’ of Hazlitt’s 
immanent idealism secures for the imagination a projective power that 
is won at the cost of sociability.60 As Hazlitt describes it in his Examiner 
article ‘Coriolanus’ (1816), the poetic imagination, by reversing the 
process of abstraction, ‘presents no immediate or distinct images to the 
mind’. Instead, insofar as it ‘puts the individual for the species, the one 
above the infinite many, might before right’, the ‘language of poetry 
naturally falls in with the language of power’.61 At the same time, the 
indeterminacy of experience, which for Hume is the result of the social 
intellect’s dependence upon dialogue and conversation, is reinterpreted 
by Hazlitt as the sublime horizon of knowledge produced by the power 
of abstraction, a ‘trembling boundary’, navigable only by the quasi-
cognitive faculty of common sense. This exchange of the pragmatics of 
conversation for aesthetic enchantment reflects a fundamental shift from 
communication to power, and from ‘meaning’ to ‘truth’, as the precondi-
tion of thought.
Conclusion
Behind the efforts of Bentham and the Romantics to address the rela-
tionship between meaning and truth lies what Ian Duncan has described 
as the Humean drama of a life doubled between ‘a sceptical disillusion-
ment from reality and a sentimental attachment to reality as illusion’.62 
Recognizing the constitutive role played by fictions of reason in thought 
and life leads, in turn, to the acceptance that ‘[t]ruth arises neither in 
alienated reflection nor in forgetful habituation, nor in some cognitive 
synthesis of the two, but in the temporal oscillation between them’.63 
The boundary between ‘cognitive synthesis’ and ‘temporal oscillation’ 
identified by Duncan is often subtle and difficult to determine, but 
it remains crucial. To distinguish between the two is to differentiate 
between the endeavour to lay new foundations for thought and the 
pragmatic acknowledgement of dividedness as a condition of human 
life. For this reason, as Duncan observes, it is important to distinguish 
between the pragmatic imagination of Hume’s empiricism, which 
maintains an ironic oscillation between belief and the consciousness of 
necessary fictions, and ‘the Kantian-Coleridgean “lyric” model … which 
casts the imagination as trace of an alienated transcendental cognition’.64 
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Bentham’s theory of logical fictions takes its cue from Hume 
by reducing epistemological problems to hedonic considerations of 
human well-being: on this analysis, those fictions that are least likely 
to promote happiness are those that we are under the strongest moral 
obligation to discard. Similarly, Hazlitt’s ‘trembling boundary’ reflects 
the complexity of his response to a growing awareness, post-Hume, of 
the constitutive role played by epistemological fictions in thought. And 
yet, while Bentham’s management of fictitious entities was progressive 
in the way that it anticipated the removal of residual fictions from 
social life through the systematic proliferation of information, Hazlitt’s 
Romantic imagination explores the liminal ground between truth and 
fiction, evoking the shadows of lost certainties. In their different ways, 
both thinkers acknowledge that there is no way of answering Hume’s 
scepticism on its own epistemological terms. Bentham’s strategy is 
inherently pragmatic, subordinating final verification to paraphrasis. 
Hazlitt’s response, in contrast, is to idealize truth by subliming it into an 
indeterminate ground between reason and imaginative fiction. Like the 
transcendental metaphysics of his youthful mentor Coleridge, Hazlitt’s 
philosophy insists upon the overriding importance of truth by memorial-
izing its absence.
In this essay I have tried to outline some ways in which the rela-
tionships between utilitarianism and Romanticism need to be rethought. 
Mill’s ‘truth/meaning’ binary, though intuitively appealing, is less 
convincing once one begins to read Bentham as a proto-pragmatist and 
the Romantics as thwarted objectivists. What W.V. Quine, among others, 
has demonstrated is that Bentham always treats the question, ‘is it true?’ 
as subordinate to the question, ‘what does it mean?’ – that is, ‘how does it 
translate in paraphrase?’ For Bentham, the literal and the figurative, the 
factual and the fictional, shade into each other. As he writes in the ‘Essay 
on Language’: ‘The discourse that … is not figurative is the discourse 
in which … no other fictions, – no other figures are employed than are 
absolutely necessary.’65 The final words in this statement are crucial: they 
suggest that Bentham sees his task as ameliorating the effects of logical 
fictions in discourse, not removing them. Indeed, as Angela Esterhammer 
observes, Bentham’s acknowledgement of the priority of the figurative 
over the psychological means that he embraces the performativity of 
language, with all its contingencies and breakdowns, precisely because 
he sees fiction as inescapable.66 Conversely, for Hazlitt and many other 
Romantic writers, the fictions of reason are hypostatized as an ineffable 
territory that only art and feeling can access. In Hazlitt, the sublime 
‘power of truth’ comes to reside at the ‘trembling boundary’ between 
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reason and imagination. In the final analysis, then, Mill’s characteriza-
tion is only half right: Bentham’s vision of truth is certainly progressive 
and reforming, while that of Hazlitt and his fellow Romantics is, more 
often than not, fundamentally nostalgic; and yet, it is the latter who asks, 
‘is it true?’ and Bentham who demands, ‘what is the meaning of it?’
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Chapter 7
More Bentham, less Mill
Anthony Julius
Preliminary
Literature and the visual arts, the focus of so much censoring energy 
these days, have been somewhat neglected in liberal thinking about 
free speech. Though this neglect is hardly the fault of one liberal thinker 
alone, Mill bears the greatest responsibility, in part because of the terms 
of his defence of free speech, in part because of the immense influence 
of that defence and in part because of his deprecations regarding Jeremy 
Bentham. If liberals are to develop better defences of free speech, giving 
literature and the visual arts an honoured place in the family of protected 
discourses, they need to distance themselves from Mill, and get closer 
to Bentham. This essay is a first attempt in trying to do that. If it has a 
polemical edge, it is because I have the sense that I am pushing against 
a consensus regarding Bentham. But no inference should be drawn of 
anything other than respect for Mill – still less, any doubt that it is only 
within the liberal tradition that a decent theory of free speech is possible. 
Mill
1. In the matter of literary free speech, Mill has a high 
reputation
Mill’s reputation stands on two pillars: first, in his various acknowl-
edgments of poetry’s immense value, a position that finds theoretical 
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expression in his essays written between 1833–40, and its most complete 
personal expression in his Autobiography, published in 1873, the year 
of his death; second, the arguments made for free speech in the second 
chapter of On Liberty (1859). It is a reputation strong among creative 
writers and literary critics.
Let me take, among Mill’s writings, the essays on Bentham (1838) 
and Coleridge (1840),1 and let me take, among literary critics, F.R. 
Leavis, the most significant figure in English literary studies between 
the 1930s and 1970s. His introduction to Mill on Bentham and Coleridge 
was published in 1950. Mill’s two essays, Leavis writes, ‘deserve to 
be called classical for their intrinsic quality’. Mill’s Autobiography is 
also ‘a classic’. He is to be admired for ‘his development out of pure 
Benthamism’. Leavis confesses to a ‘propagandist’ intention. Mill’s essays 
must become ‘current classics for the literary student’, part of a ‘liberal 
education’ in which ‘the critical study of literature’ must play a ‘central 
part’. The justice of Mill’s assessments of Bentham and Coleridge is not 
questioned.2 The essays are instead assimilated to Leavis’s own cultural 
politics, in which literature, esteemed as the supreme discovery-inven-
tion of a supreme kind of thinking,3 must be defended against the forces 
of ‘technologico-Benthamism’.4 
Major literary personalities welcomed On Liberty.5 Walt Whitman 
commended Mill’s ‘profound essay’ as setting out the conditions for 
‘a truly great nationality’.6 Thomas Hardy was a devoted reader of On 
Liberty; his copy is more heavily annotated, underlined and underscored 
than any other surviving book in his library. It was the volume, he wrote, 
‘we students of that date knew almost by heart’.7 In the late 1870s, his 
teachings were held responsible for a new art that exhibited ‘the languor 
of exhausted animalism’.8 Over a century later, On Liberty, and the 
values it endorsed, was blamed for what were regarded as the public art 
excesses of the 1960s, including masturbation on a public stage.9
2. Mill does not merit his high reputation
Mill was in fact rather feeble in his aesthetic positions and On Liberty is 
hostile to literary free speech. 
2.1. feeble aesthetic positions
In sum: Mill’s literary sensibility was unadventurous, and conditioned 
disablingly by his personal crisis; he had modern literature-disqualifying 
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views; he denied all originality to women’s literary writing, in the face of 
compelling contrary evidence. 
In his first adult years, Mill was a Benthamite tyro. He and his fellow 
Benthamites sought to persuade the public of the superior excellence of 
unselfish benevolence. The members of the Utilitarian Society did not 
expect the regeneration of mankind from any ‘direct action’ on ‘selfish 
feelings’. The strategy was instead to get people to alter their opinions 
according to evidence. The utilitarians, Mill relates, took no account 
of the ‘cultivation of feeling’, and this led to a broader undervaluing of 
poetry and of imagination in general. He himself was, he tells us in the 
Autobiography, speculatively indifferent to poetry, though not hostile to 
it. He disliked any sentiments in poetry that he would have disliked in 
prose. He was blind to its place in human culture as a means of educating 
the feelings. 
Perhaps Mill had in mind his essay ‘Periodical Literature: Edinburgh 
Review’, published in the Westminster Review in April 1824. Mill quotes 
Johnson: ‘Shakespeare is so much more careful to please than to instruct, 
that he seems to write without any moral purpose. … This fault the 
barbarity of his age cannot extenuate; for it is always a writer’s duty to 
make the world better, and justice is a virtue independent on time and 
place.’ Mill comments: 
We should be sorry to be suspected of affecting prudery. It is one 
thing to be a moralist, another thing to be a poet; and a high degree 
of excellence in the one capacity is not incompatible with great 
deficiency in the other. But we assert that in a species of writing 
[i.e. literature] which admits so easily of being made subservient 
to morality, to be without a moral object is one of the greatest of 
defects.
He then turns to Scott: 
If to write without a moral purpose be a fault which the barbarity 
even of Shakespeare’s age cannot extenuate, we presume it will 
be held to be still less excusable in Sir Walter Scott. He too shows 
no decided leaning between virtue and vice. There is no one of his 
productions from which, unless it be by chance, any one useful 
lesson can be derived. It is impossible to peruse them without 
being convinced that amusement, and amusement only, is there 
studied.10
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Or perhaps he had in mind his essay in October of the same year, ‘Brodie’s 
History of the British Empire’. Literature, Mill finds, can mislead and 
corrupt even the most distinguished minds. ‘Hume possessed powers of a 
very high order; but regard for truth formed no part of his character. He 
reasoned with surprising acuteness; but the object of his reasonings was, 
not to attain truth, but to shew that it is unattainable.’ Mill then identifies 
the cause. ‘His mind … was completely enslaved by a taste for literature; 
not those kinds of literature which teach mankind to know the causes 
of their happiness and misery, that they may seek the one and avoid the 
other; but that literature which without regard for truth or utility, seeks 
only to excite emotion.’ Not just any literature, however. It is ‘pernicious’ 
‘Romance’, that ‘infallibly allies itself with the sinister interests of the 
few’. They encourage the contemplation of events ‘as they bear upon the 
pleasures and pains of an individual’ rather than ‘as they affect the great 
interests of mankind’. If damaging to Hume, how much more so to the 
generality of mankind? 
The pleasures and pains most interesting to an ill-cultivated mind 
are those of the one and of the few; of the men in exalted stations, 
whose lot is most conspicuous, whose felicity, to the ignorant, 
appears something almost divine, and whose misfortunes, from 
their previous elevation, most powerfully affect the imagination. 
The sufferings of the many, though multiplied almost beyond 
calculation from their indefinite extent, are thought nothing 
of: they seem born to suffer; their fall is from a less height; their 
miseries lie hidden, and do not meet the eye.11
We reach the crisis of 1827–8. Mill asked himself: would joy come to me 
in the realization of all my plans for reform of institutions and opinions? 
No, it would not, he answered. And his heart sank within him, and the 
foundations of his life fell down. We may identify two moments in the 
resolution of this crisis: the Marmontel moment, when the reading of 
some memoirs moved him to tears (a father dies, a son replaces him); 
and the Wordsworth moment, when he came under the influence of 
Wordsworth’s poetry, a ‘medicine’ for his ‘state of mind’. This second 
moment was the more important of the two. In Wordsworth, Mill found 
a source of inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginative pleasure, which 
could be shared in by all human beings. Though he considered himself 
cured, the cure had unhappy consequences, disabling him from thinking 
about poetry in any of its non-therapeutic aspects and reading sympa-
thetically post-Romantic poetry (or fiction). 
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We find this dislike of contemporary literature expressed in several 
places in the 1830s. ‘The time was, when it was thought that the best 
and most appropriate office of fictitious narrative was to awaken high 
aspirations, by the representation, in interesting circumstances, of 
characters … whose actions and sentiments were of a more generous and 
loftier cast than are … met with … in every-day life.’ But, Mill continues, 
‘now-a-days, nature and probability are thought to be violated, if there 
be shown to the reader … characters on a larger scale than himself’. Mill 
despairs: ‘The chivalrous spirit has almost disappeared from books of 
education; the popular novels of the day teach nothing but … lessons 
of worldliness, with at most the huckstering virtues which conduce to 
getting on in the world; and, for the first time perhaps in history, the 
youth of both sexes of the educated classes are universally growing up 
unromantic.’12 The tone is the same in the essay ‘Civilisation’, published 
three years earlier: ‘literature is becoming more and more ephemeral: 
books, of any solidity, are almost gone by’.13 Mill passed from deprecation 
to perplexity when confronted by Browning’s poem ‘Pauline’, which 
he read as autobiographical: ‘this writer seems to me possessed with a 
more intense and morbid self-consciousness than I ever knew in any sane 
human being. I should think it a  sincere confession,  though of a most 
unlovable state, if the “Pauline” were not evidently a mere phantom.’14 
In the late essay ‘Theism’, published posthumously, Mill asks: ‘To 
what purpose should we feed our imagination with the unlovely aspect 
of persons and things?’ To little purpose, is his answer. All unnecessary 
dwelling upon ‘the evils of life’ is ‘at best a useless expenditure of nervous 
force’. It is worse than useless to dwell upon life’s ‘meannesses and 
basenesses’. We should be aware of them; but we must not live in their 
contemplation. If we do, then we will be unable to maintain ‘a high tone 
of mind’; our ‘imagination and feelings’ become ‘tuned to a lower pitch’; 
‘degrading instead of elevating associations become connected with the 
daily objects and incidents of life, and give their colour to the thoughts’; 
‘associations of sensuality’ become habitual for those ‘who indulge freely’ 
in the contemplation of the mean and the base. Mill concludes: ‘the 
poetry is taken out of the things fullest of it, by mean associations’. And 
then, the final step, the question of ‘regulation’: ‘in the regulation of the 
imagination literal truth of facts is not the only thing to be considered’. 
He elaborates, somewhat obscurely: 
Truth is the province of reason, and it is by the cultivation of the 
rational faculty that provision is made for its being known always, 
and thought of as often as is required by duty and the circumstances 
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of human life. But when the reason is strongly cultivated, the 
imagination may safely follow its own end, and do its best to 
make life pleasant and lovely inside the castle, in reliance on the 
fortifications raised and maintained by Reason round the outward 
bounds.15
The Novel did not represent an aesthetic project to Mill. It was a feeble 
thing: ‘the infinite distance, as to power of influencing the mind, between 
the best contrived and most probable fiction, and the smallest fact’.16 
F. Parvin Sharpless writes of ‘Mill’s rejection of the novel, since, in an 
age which reads novels for information rather than amusement, the 
novel comes to usurp a proper function of the analytic faculties’.17 This is 
disastrous, because it offers ignominious pleasures only: ‘The minds and 
hearts of greatest depth and elevation are commonly those which take 
greatest delight in poetry; the shallowest and emptiest, on the contrary, 
are, at all events, not those least addicted to novel-reading. … The most 
idle and frivolous persons take a natural delight in fictitious narrative.’18 
Mill could not take the novel seriously. In an October 1859 review of 
his friend Alexander Bain’s The Emotions and the Will, he noted with 
approval Bain’s absurd judgment that the pleasure in novel-reading is 
akin to the pleasure in watching horse-racing.19 ‘This grouping together 
of the emotions of hunting, of games, of intrigue of all sorts, and of novel-
reading, with those of an active career in life, seems to us … original and 
philosophical.’20
Though poetry was typically the foil for his disparagements of 
the novel, it did not prompt him to write anything of any interest on 
the form. His praise was no more illuminating than his censure. Mill’s 
two-part essay, ‘Thoughts on Poetry and Its Varieties’ (1833), splits and 
lumps to no valuable effect. The splitting is relentless. He distinguishes, 
for example, between the poet of culture and the poet of nature. In 
Wordsworth, the poetry is almost always the mere setting of a thought. 
He is essentially unlyrical – which is regrettable, because ‘lyric poetry [is] 
more eminently and peculiarly poetry than any other: it is the poetry most 
natural to a really poetic temperament’. Shelley had this temperament 
‘to the greatest extent’. In Shelley, ‘systematic intellectual culture … was 
wanting’. The splitting coexists with an egregious lumping. Mill is unable 
to grasp the critical distinction of form. One may write genuine poetry, 
and not be a poet, writes Mill. For whosoever writes out truly any human 
feeling, writes poetry. Whom, then, shall we call poets? ‘Those who are 
so constituted, that emotions are the links of association by which their 
ideas, both sensuous and spiritual, are connected together.’ ‘Poetry’ 
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becomes a term to characterize writing oriented towards ‘emotion’. 
The effect is to render invisible to Mill’s argument poetry’s structural 
complexities and distinct internal history.21 
Last (though greater space would allow a more comprehensively 
adverse account), let me turn to Mill’s The Subjection of Women (1869), 
and his account of literature written by women: ‘If we turn from pure 
speculation to literature in the narrow sense of the term, and the fine 
arts, there is a very obvious reason why women’s literature is, in its 
general conception and in its main features, an imitation of men’s.’22 
The reasons he offers in support of this judgment are of no interest, 
because the judgment itself is so embarrassingly wrong. There was 
a women’s literature – a ‘literary feminism’23 – well established by the 
mid-nineteenth century.24 To G.H. Lewes, the ‘subject’ was ‘momentous’ 
and demanded considerable attention: ‘The advent of female literature 
promises woman’s view of life … . Hitherto … the literature of women 
… has been too much a literature of imitation.’25 Note the ‘hitherto’. Even 
if true in 1852 (which is questionable),26 when Lewes made this claim 
(in the essay ‘The Lady Novelists’), it was plainly false in 1869, when 
Mill repeated it. Among novelists, think of the three Brontë sisters, of 
Elizabeth Gaskell and of George Eliot. Among poets, think of Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning’s Aurora Leigh, which precisely addresses the question 
of women’s writing, and was praised by George Eliot for ‘exhibit[ing] all 
the peculiar powers, without the negation, of [EBB’s] sex’.27 The consid-
erable fact of a woman’s literature was widely acknowledged, its features 
and likely trajectory widely discussed. In a review of Elizabeth Gaskell’s 
Life of Charlotte Brontë (1857), the literary critic E.S. Dallas acknowl-
edged it as ‘the most singular literary phenomenon of the day – the 
feminine aspect of our fictitious literature’.28
2.2. Dangerous On Liberty
On Liberty is muddled, illiberal and anti-literature. It is the third 
objection that concerns me here. On Liberty is culpably silent on major 
literary censorship events in 1857; literature is extruded from the ambit 
of protected speech; censorship possibilities are admitted.
On Liberty was conceived in 1854. Mill finished the essay across 
the year in which, in London, the Obscene Publications Act was passed, 
and, in Paris, Flaubert was prosecuted for his novel Madame Bovary and 
Baudelaire was prosecuted for his poems Les Fleurs du Mal. Yet On Liberty 
contains no reflection on the threat to liberty posed by an obscenity 
law or any statement of solidarity with the prosecuted writers across 
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the Channel. Indeed, Mill has practically nothing to say expressly about 
restrictions on literary or artistic expression, with the exception of the 
theatre (and then only historically, in connection with the Puritans, and 
not to the oppressive theatre censorship of his own time). What Mill 
says by implication, however, is somewhat endorsing of restrictions. 
When Mill champions ‘absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on 
all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral or theological’, we 
wonder, what of literature? Bertrand Russell thought that Mill’s silence 
on the question was because it was not a current topic of concern.29 But 
Russell was wrong about this. Literary free speech needed defending in 
1857.
Mill finds no creative writers or artists among ‘the multitude of 
promising intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not 
follow out any bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it 
should land them in something which would admit of being considered 
irreligious or immoral’. It did not seem to have occurred to him that ‘fear’ 
might silence novelists, even though he had sufficient evidence before 
him to draw that conclusion. He gives us no reason to suppose that 
literary works could be the products of minds engaged in ‘free and daring 
speculation’, ‘bold, vigorous, independent trains of thought’, in ‘Socratic 
dialectics’ – the search for truth, as Mill understands it. Creative writers, 
we may concede, are not engaged in ‘contradicting and disproving’, or 
‘correcting and completing’; they are not typically ‘on the alert either to 
defend themselves against the world, or to bring the world over to them’. 
They are not aligned with the hero of the chapter, Socrates, ‘the head and 
prototype of all subsequent teachers of virtue, the source equally of the 
lofty inspiration of Plato and the judicious utilitarianism of Aristotle’. On 
the contrary – he was their adversary. But does that mean that creative 
writers should not be defended?
In Chapter IV, ‘Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the 
Individual’, Mill explains that, ‘[i]t would be a great misunderstanding’ 
of On Liberty to suppose that it promotes a ‘selfish indifference’ to ‘the 
well-doing or well-being of others’. Quite the contrary: it is to be read as 
promoting ‘a great increase of disinterested exertion’ of effort for the good 
of others. Though such ‘disinterested benevolence’ is not typically best 
undertaken with ‘whips and scourges’, certain behaviours may properly 
be met with something akin to such instruments: ‘There is a degree of 
folly, and a degree of … lowness or depravation of taste, which, though 
it cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests it, renders him 
necessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in extreme cases, even 
of contempt.’ Those who feel contempt may display it, in expression of 
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their own finer individuality. ‘Those who pursue animal pleasures’, Mill 
explains, may quite properly be shunned, and discriminated against, by 
people of ‘feeling and intellect’. Who could object to being exposed as ‘a 
fool or being of an inferior order’, especially if also warned of the further 
disagreeable consequences that might follow? The gratification of low, 
depraved tastes is to be deplored; those who indulge them have ‘no right 
to complain’ if steps are taken by others against them.
Mill returned in Utilitarianism (1863) to this distinction (in his 
view, a qualitative one) between beings of an inferior order and people 
of feeling and intellect: ‘Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their 
intellectual tastes. … It may be questioned whether anyone who has 
remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly 
and calmly preferred the lower; though many … have broken down 
in an ineffectual attempt to combine both.’30 The sentiment implicit in 
‘combine’ goes deep in the culture. It explains the puzzled delight that 
greets reports that some profound thinker favoured ostensibly trivial 
pastimes – say, Wittgenstein with detective novels and Hollywood 
musicals.31 But I sense a more specific discomfort in this passage of Mill’s, 
one with the creative literature of his own time – among many possible 
texts, we may instance Baudelaire’s ‘Femmes damnées’ and ‘Lesbos’ 
among the poems condemned by the Paris court, and Madame Bovary, 
a novel populated with characters whose ‘actions and sentiments’ are 
neither ‘generous’ nor ‘lofty’, and who are altogether lacking in ‘genuine 
unforced nobleness’.32 
Mill anticipates an objection: 
If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or 
what makes one pleasure more valuable than another … except its 
being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. … if there 
be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a 
decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation 
to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two 
is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so 
far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to 
be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not 
resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is 
capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment 
a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, 
in comparison, of small account. Now it is an unquestionable fact 
that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of 
appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference 
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to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. … 
From [the] verdict of the only competent judges … there can be no 
appeal. … the judgments of those who are qualified by knowledge 
of both, or if they differ, that of the majority, must be admitted as 
final.33
There are many difficulties here, but let us allow Mill his argument. I take 
it, in the intensity of its moral charge and the practicality of its terms 
(majority decision, no appeal), as laying the theoretical groundwork for a 
censorship board. I do not think this reading is fanciful. The jurispruden-
tial criteria designed to separate art works from works of pornography 
– that is, works that appeal, respectively, to ‘the intellect, the feelings, 
the imagination’, and works that appeal to ‘mere sensation’34 – fit Mill’s 
reasoning, which has a judicial tone.35 Certainly, experts in obscenity 
cases tend to speak in Millian terms.36
Mill describes the path of the ascetic. This way of imagining human 
nature is conducive to censorship and self-censorship. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, it ties in with the progressivism of the mid-nineteenth century. 
That a progressive person would be hostile to forms of sexual expression, 
and especially literary sexual expression, is something we would not now 
anticipate. But in that time, such a position would have been taken for 
granted. The disparaged sexual moralism of the Victorian years grows 
directly from the boldest, most progressive and refreshing features of 
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century culture, Michael Mason 
has explained.37 A connection was made between sexual continence and 
human improvement. Anti-sensualism was the creed of the forward-
looking. That literature might draw from such sexual material, that this 
material might serve a literary or more broadly aesthetic end, seems 
never to have been entertained by Mill. Sex and sensual pleasures 
generally were to be ranked among the lower pleasures. Mill’s qualitative 
utilitarianism is the gateway to literary censorship.
To return to On Liberty – consider Chapter V, ‘Applications’. Mill 
writes: 
There are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the 
agents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but which, 
if done publicly, are a violation of good manners, and coming thus 
within the category of offences against others, may rightfully 
be prohibited. Of this kind are offences against decency; on which 
it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they are only connected 
indirectly with our subject, the objection to publicity being equally 
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strong in the case of many actions not in themselves condemnable, 
nor supposed to be so. [Italics added.]
Mill is uncomfortable here, this is clear. He is keen to move on. But we 
surely wonder: what are these acts that, if done in private, are injurious 
only to the agents themselves, but if done in public, are a violation 
of good manners and come within the category of offences against 
others? Jonathan Wolff offers the example of public masturbation. 
Masturbation would have been taken, he writes, precisely to be in that 
class of acts ‘directly harmful only to the agents themselves’. But what 
about the pedagogic implications of such an act? By masturbating in 
public, the philosopher Diogenes taught certain truths: the naturalness 
of sexual instincts; masturbation’s utility in relieving sexual tension; the 
irrelevance in any rational morality of the private/public distinction; 
and the indefensibility of ‘shame’ as a moral category.38 This cannot be 
dismissed as mere exhibitionism. And, to maintain the focus on the arts, 
we should also note the artist Vito Acconci’s 1972 performance piece, 
Seedbed, in which he masturbated in a confined space under a ramp in 
an art gallery, stimulated by the sound of the gallery visitors walking 
overhead, his auto-erotic fantasising about them broadcast through the 
gallery space.39 The piece could be retitled, to make explicit the terms of 
its aesthetic intervention, The Art Work’s Revenge. 
Many general objections can be made to Mill’s exception. It is 
over-broad: much can be dragged into the category of ‘violations of good 
manners’; and much of that, into the sub-category of ‘offences against 
decency’. It is implicated in a whole system of social and political (and 
indeed, imperial) domination. It supposes a category distinction both 
between the civilized and the brutish, and between civilized nations 
and barbarians. It objects to the ill-bred, the vulgar, the boorish, the 
‘common’; it contributes justifications for their rule. It has its place 
in a whole vocabulary of class deprecation and condescension.40 In its 
most socially coercive forms, it is associated with repressive forces. It 
is implicitly gendered, the phrase ‘good manners’, intimating an objec-
tionable gallantry: ‘There are ladies present!’ Moreover, it collides with 
On Liberty’s largest argument against the stifling effects of social norms, 
including those enforced by tacit rules of politeness. The ‘formidable evil’ 
in ‘collisions of opinions’ is not ‘violent conflict’ but the ‘quiet suppression’ 
of the truth or part of it.41
In addition, it has adverse implications for literary free speech. First, 
because, since Aristophanes, it has been among literature’s purposes 
precisely to insist upon those gross things from which the fastidious 
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inhabitants of Mill’s ‘thinking world’ recoil. Literature addresses the 
body; it concerns passion; it has erotic properties. Second, because an 
aesthetic of unsettling received social practices and understandings, 
including good manners, came to define literary writing in the mid-nine-
teenth century (Realism) and beyond (Modernism). Third, because it 
was precisely in decency’s name that morality leagues and other agents 
of moral repression, animated by the spirit of Puritanism, moved against 
literature. They attacked it as ‘indecent’ – just as ‘decent’ was the word 
that that same literature ironized. 
Bentham
3. In the matter of literary free speech, Bentham has a 
low reputation
Bentham has a low reputation, in a general sort of way. The reputation is 
of an exemplary philistinism, one that conceptually annihilates literature, 
or ‘cuts the throats of the Graces’.42 People of a literary disposition take 
their cue from Dickens. Marxists take their cue from Marx. Liberals take 
their cue from Mill. Dickens’s objections are contained in a novel, and are 
thus elusive; Marx’s objections are abusive, made in passing, confined 
to a few sentences, and contingent to his argument;43 Mill’s objections, 
in their judicious finality, constitute directions to future generations of 
liberals. He develops his objections most fully in the essay ‘Bentham’, 
written ‘during a period of relative antipathy’.44 Among these objections, 
two have special, self-incriminating force. In a brief discussion of 
‘Bentham’s peculiar opinions on poetry’, Mill writes: 
towards poetry in the narrower sense, that which employs the 
language of words, he entertained no favour. Words, he thought, 
were perverted from their proper office when they were employed 
in uttering anything but precise logical truth. He says, somewhere 
in his works, that, “quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as 
good as poetry” [‘the First Aphorism’]: but this is only a paradoxical 
way of stating what he would equally have said of the things which 
he most valued and admired. Another aphorism is attributed to 
him, which is much more characteristic of his view of this subject: 
“All poetry is misrepresentation” [‘the Second Aphorism’]. Poetry, 
he thought, consisted essentially in exaggeration for effect: in 
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proclaiming some one view of a thing very emphatically, and 
suppressing all the limitations and qualifications.45
In this one devastating paragraph, Mill ensured that in the liberal 
imagination Bentham would thereafter be a figure of Mill’s own devising. 
It is the ‘false stock picture’ that ‘most people copy’, wrote Mary Mack. 
‘Yet’, she adds, ‘few were in a better position to give a true one.’46 
4. Bentham merits a higher reputation
We might make this case by reference to the use to that Bentham was 
put in literary criticism. We could instance the early nineteenth-century 
Benthamite review criticism – Isobel Armstrong has considered this 
material at length in her Victorian Poetry: Poetry, Poetics and Politics 
(1993).47 We could also instance mid-twentieth-century Cambridge 
literary criticism. Empson’s provocation to twentieth-century literary 
critics was as great as, and in the same spirit as, Bentham’s provocations 
to eighteenth-century aestheticians. Critics, as barking dogs, are of two 
sorts: ‘those who merely relieve themselves against the flower of beauty, 
and those, less continent, who afterwards scratch it up’. Empson then 
elaborates: he is of the second class. Unexplained beauty arouses an itch 
in him, a sense that this would be a good place to scratch.48 
But I want to consider Bentham, not his disciples. 
4.1. interpretive modes
Let us distinguish three interpretive modes: the accusatory, the 
apologetic and the charitable. 
In one version of the accusatory mode, the text or texts under review 
stand as if in a posture of defence before the interpreter’s indictment. 
In another, even tougher version, the texts are barely to be seen; the 
interpreter proceeds on the assumption of their demerit. Mill’s essay on 
Bentham is an exercise in the accusatory mode – a disguised exercise. 
F.R. Leavis was taken in (better: wanted to be taken in). Mill spent his life 
in a strenuous endeavour, pursued with magnificent integrity, to justify 
his contention that the Benthams and the Coleridges, ‘these two sorts 
of men, who seem to be, and believe themselves to be, enemies, are in 
reality allies’. No attack, then. But Leavis was wrong. While it may be 
true that nowhere can more malicious commentaries on utilitarianism 
be found than in Marx and Engels,49 it is certainly the case that nowhere 
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can more destructive commentaries on Bentham be found than in Mill. 
He dresses up in a rhetoric of balance and judiciousness a repudiation, 
made all the more decisive by the note of personal witness that sounds 
in his prose. 
One version of the apologetic mode is to offer the defence, ‘He 
had other, more significant things on his mind.’ Iris Murdoch’s remarks 
comprise a generous (perhaps, the most generous possible) instance of 
this version: 
There is also, and has been, only now it is stronger than ever, a 
decent and comprehensible kind of utilitarian reaction against art. 
Philistines, of course, we have always with us, but I am thinking 
here not of Mr Gradgrind but of sincere people who feel that in a 
world reeling with misery it is frivolous to enjoy art, which is after 
all a kind of play. There is a familiar puritanical and Protestant 
ancestry to this thinking, which expresses itself in the philosophy of 
Jeremy Bentham, who refused to allow poetry a dignity which was 
higher than that of pushpin.50
Another version of the apologetic mode is to attack Mill by exposing 
the gap between his account of what Bentham said, and what Bentham 
actually said, about poetry. The relevant texts are Rationale of Reward 
and ‘Nonsense upon Stilts’. Rationale was written in French in the 
1780s, edited by Étienne Dumont and published in France in 1811, and 
then translated into English by Richard Smith and published in 1825. 
‘Nonsense’ was written in English, translated into French by Dumont and 
published in 1816, under a different name. An English version, prepared 
by Richard Smith from Bentham’s manuscripts, did not appear until the 
publication of the Bowring edition of Bentham’s Works. 
In Book III, Chapter I of Rationale, Bentham is concerned with 
‘Reward Applied to Art and Science’. By ‘art’, Bentham means ‘practice;’ by 
‘science’, he means ‘knowledge’. By ‘the arts and sciences of amusement’ 
Bentham means ‘those which are ordinarily called the fine arts’. Within 
‘fine arts’ he includes ‘music, poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, 
ornamental gardening, etc.’ He declines a more complete enumeration; 
such ‘metaphysical discussions’ would lead him too far from his present 
subject. And then: 
The utility of all these arts and sciences … the value which they 
possess, is exactly in proportion to the pleasure they yield. Every 
other species of pre-eminence which may be attempted to be 
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established among them is altogether fanciful. Prejudice apart, 
the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of 
music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, 
it is more valuable than either. Everybody can play at push-pin: 
poetry and music are relished only by a few. The game of push-pin 
is always innocent: it were well could the same be always asserted 
of poetry. Indeed, between poetry and truth there is a natural 
opposition: false morals, fictitious nature: the poet always stands in 
need of something false. When he pretends to leave his foundations 
in truth, the ornaments of his superstructure are fictions; his 
business consists in stimulating our passions, and exciting our 
prejudices. The poet must see everything through coloured media, 
and strive to make everyone else to do the same. It is true, there 
have been noble spirits, to whom poetry and philosophy have 
been equally indebted, but these exceptions do not remove the 
mischiefs which have resulted from this magic art. If poetry and 
music deserve to be preferred before a game of push-pin, it must 
be because they are calculated to gratify those individuals who are 
most difficult to be pleased.
All the arts and sciences, without exception, inasmuch as they 
constitute innocent employments, at least of time, possess a species 
of moral utility, neither the less real or important, because it is 
frequently unobserved. They compete with, and occupy the place 
of those mischievous and dangerous passions and employments, to 
which want of occupation and ennui give birth. They are excellent 
substitutes for drunkenness, slander, and the love of gaming. …
It is to the cultivation of the arts and sciences that we must … 
ascribe the existence of that party which is now opposed to war: it 
has received its birth amid the occupations and pleasures furnished 
by the fine arts. These arts … have enrolled under their peaceful 
banners that army of idlers which would have otherwise possessed 
no amusement but in the hazardous and the bloody game of war.51
In ‘Nonsense’, Bentham writes of the ‘Declaration of pretended Rights’: 
The logic of it is of a piece with the morality of it: a perpetual 
vein of nonsense flowing from a perpetual abuse of words. Words 
having a variety of meanings where words with single meanings 
were equally at hand: the same word used in a variety of meanings 
in the same page: words used in meanings not their own where 
proper words were equally at hand: words and propositions of 
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the most unbounded signification turned loose without any of 
those exceptions or modifications which are so necessary on every 
occasion to reduce their import within the compass not only of 
right reason, but even of the design in hand, of whatever nature it 
may be. The same inaccuracy, the same inattention, in the penning 
of this cluster of oracles on which the fate of nations was to hang, 
as if it had been an oriental tale or an allegory for a magazine: 
stale conceits instead of necessary distinctions: figurative language 
preferred to simple: sentimental conceits as trite as they are 
unmeaning preferred to apt and precise expressions: frippery 
ornament preferred to the majestic simplicity of sound sense: the 
acts of the senate loaded and disfigured by the tinsel of the play-
house.
In a play or a novel, an improper word is but a word: and 
the impropriety, whether noticed or not, is attended with no 
consequences. In a body of laws an improper word may be a 
national calamity.
Bentham concludes with his own flourish: ‘Out of one foolish word may 
start a thousand daggers.’52 In Rationale, he passes from Aphorism One 
to Aphorism Two at ‘The game of push-pin is always innocent’, and then 
returns to Aphorism One at ‘If poetry and music deserve to be preferred’. 
‘Nonsense’ somewhat cools the heat of the Aphorism Two passage in 
Rationale.
Mill has not done justice to these passages. The works from 
which they are taken are not instances of the same form. The one is a 
treatise, classificatory in its essential drive, while the other is a polemic, 
the language driven by a strong wish to attack. What is more, in each 
work, the instantiated literary text (in Rationale, a poem, in ‘Nonsense’, 
a play or a novel) is paired with another text or activity in order to make 
quite distinct points. In Rationale, the point of the pairing is to open the 
possibility of an identity; in ‘Nonsense’, it is the reverse – to point out an 
essential difference. There is more to say here. But let us break off instead 
to return to Mill’s treatment. 
We might complain: Mill misquotes the first aphorism; he invents 
the second. But that does not take us very far. One can imagine Bentham 
saying both – as a provocation, or in rejoinder to some high-flown 
claim for poetry made in his presence. The objections to Mill’s account 
lie elsewhere – in an argument about his intentions (of which he was 
perhaps not wholly aware). They are the product, in major part, of a 
certain denial on his part of a predicament he shared with Bentham as 
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a fellow utilitarian, but from which he wished to extricate himself. They 
are also a product – which one intuits from that note of false insouciance 
in his prose – of his desire to separate himself from his father-proxy, and 
perhaps from his actual father too. 
The predicament in respect of the first aphorism is the worry that 
by refusing to grant poetry’s superiority to a child’s game the utilitar-
ians make themselves vulnerable to attack by their enemies, who object 
that they reduce all values to the single lowest common denominator of 
pleasure – call it the ‘Pig Philosophy predicament’ (to borrow Carlyle’s 
colourful formulation).53 The worry is so mind-flooding that Mill ignores 
the passages in Rationale that provide the resources for an effective 
rejoinder:
(a) The conditional language point: Bentham invites us to put 
prejudice to one side when considering the value of the arts 
and sciences of amusement and curiosity. We should assess 
each by reference to the common standard of the pleasure 
they yield. This in turn opens out onto the question of what 
needs to be done to access the pleasure. With push-pin, one 
must learn the rules, get the pins, acquire competence in the 
game by assiduous practice, earn the money for the wager, 
find a person to play with (and beat), etc. A question arises: 
for how long will the game give pleasure? With poetry, access 
raises different questions. It is to Bentham’s merit that he 
raises these questions; it is to Mill’s discredit that he shuts 
them down.
(b) The music point: Mill omits Bentham’s reference to music: 
‘the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and 
sciences of music and poetry’. The suppression of the words 
‘of music’ makes a stronger case against Bentham in respect 
of poetry than Bentham’s own words mandate. That is to 
say: contrary to Mill, Bentham does not single out poetry for 
special disparagement in the first aphorism. 
(c) The gambling point: In his condemnation of that ‘mischievous 
and dangerous passion’, ‘the love of gaming’, Bentham 
decisively sides with poetry against push-pin, played for 
economic advantage, the winnings comprising the pins 
themselves, which thereafter could be sold.54
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These are not the only arguments that can be made.55
The predicament in respect of the second aphorism is the worry 
that a shared understanding of language leaves no space for poetry – 
call it ‘the positivist predicament’. In brief, it is to the effect that both 
Bentham and Mill were caught up in the toils of a positivist account of 
language, which relegates literature to a miscellaneous, despised second 
category of statement, in which the condemnation of the especially 
despised instance, the ‘metaphysical’, catches other instances, including 
works of literature. Bentham is thus no more to be condemned than 
any other philosopher in this position – essentially, all those who stand 
in that line that runs from Hume through to the Vienna Circle. Leszek 
Kołakowski identifies the key tenets: positivism maintains the essential 
unity of the scientific method; it endeavours to eliminate all metaphysi-
cal assumptions; metaphysics should be treated like poetry: purely 
expressive or lyrical utterances; language must be analysed and, where 
necessary, reformed.56
M.H. Abrams connects this general position to Bentham and Mill 
in The Mirror and the Lamp (1953). In eighteenth-century discussions, 
poetry is taken to be truth, ornamented by fiction and figures in order 
to delight and move the reader. In Romantic discussions, poetry is the 
overflow or expression of feeling in an integral and naturally figurative 
language. In eighteenth-century discussions, the non-poetic discourse 
most frequently set up as the logical opposite of poetry is history. In 
Romantic discussions, the non-poetic discourse set up as the logical 
opposite of poetry is science. Wordsworth, for example, proposed 
an opposition between ‘Poetry and matter-of-fact, or science’. These 
statements were intended only as logical devices for isolating and 
defining the nature of poetic discourse. However, in the Romantic period 
and thereafter, the prevalence of philosophic positivism, which held 
that the methods of the natural sciences constituted the sole access to 
truth, tended to convert this logical opposition into a competition of one. 
Poetry and science were not only antithetical, they were incompatible. 
If science is true, poetry must be false, or at any rate trivial. Abrams was 
dismissive of Bentham and generous to Mill. In later writings on the topic, 
he treated Mill as continuing Bentham’s argument, not breaking with 
it – attempting to find a more honoured position for poetry, but still in 
the same second term of the same positivist binarism. Abrams concludes 
that Mill merely succeeded in demonstrating ‘the gross unaptness of a 
positivistic theory of language, with its simple criterion of “either true or 
false”’. Unapt, among other reasons, because of its ‘odd assumption that 
all discourse that is not science must be of a single kind’.57 In summary: 
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Mill shares Bentham’s philosophical position, but is troubled by it. Rather 
than confronting it, he searches for critical differences amid the details of 
mere biography. 
In respect of both aphorisms there is this same note on Mill’s part 
of false insouciance. He writes, ‘somewhere in his works’ and ‘attributed 
to him’. Our first impression is of a puzzling indifference to getting the 
quotations exactly right – not for Mill, the dutiful, assiduous citation 
of volume and page, the careful writing out of the exact passage. 
Approximations are good enough. The question arises, of such a 
judicious, careful writer, why this descent into insouciance? It is indicative 
of a deliberate, even strained, distancing from Bentham, a disciple’s 
repudiation of his master, a godson of his godfather, and thereby also 
a son of his father, the precursor disciple. It is a false insouciance, then. 
It indicates anxiety, not freedom from care. To argue for the inadequacy 
of Bentham’s philosophy was to argue for the inadequacy of his father’s 
parenting. How could we possibly deny the complicating pressure in 
Mill’s prose as he works out, while disavowing, his divided feelings about 
his own origins and allegiances?
I do not reject this reasoning – it is certainly an improvement on 
those received accounts, which conceive of the precipitating crisis as 
having the finality, and elevation, of a ‘conversion’,58 with everything 
written thereafter reflecting a settled, equilibriate position – supposedly 
confirmed in the ‘Bentham’ essay itself.59 But defending Bentham by such 
a route takes us away from him – in the end, it is a diversion. And so 
we turn to the charitable mode. I take my understanding of this mode 
from Donald Davidson. The purpose of an act of interpretation is to 
maximize the rationality of what is being interpreted. There are several 
versions of Davidson’s principle – including several offered by Davidson 
himself.60 The version I adopt reconstructs a combined ‘philosophical’ 
and ‘historical’ Bentham.61 
Here is an example of a charitable interpretation. Dinwiddy offers 
in confirmation of Bentham’s reputation as an ‘arch-philistine’ these 
remarks (from a letter of Bentham’s to Lord Holland): ‘Everything that in 
the shape of poetry has ever issued from any press in Mexico … shall be 
faithfully collected and transmitted to Holland House … But Sir? … Oh 
yes, my Lord, I know the difference. Prose is where all the lines but the 
last go on to the margin: – Poetry is where some of them fall short of it.’62 
There is a teasing quality to this – Bentham is no doubt parodying himself. 
Stephen, missing the point, mocks him for it.63 But consider Christopher 
Ricks: poetry creates and transmits information through line-endings; 
prose does not. In poetry, a line-ending is a word-processor’s hard 
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return; in prose, it is a soft return. We have to be educated into principled 
ignoring, which is sometimes an ignoring of what might look like 
information but is not.64 The distinction Bentham makes matters, and 
continues to receive attention.65 This is a small example. My next one 
takes up the rest of this essay. It proposes a charitable reconstruction of 
Bentham’s aesthetics in his several engagements with Romanticism. 
4.2. romanticism
Bentham had an aesthetic.66 We have to find it in work published in 
his lifetime, and work published almost two centuries later. It is to be 
understood principally by references to Bentham’s various engagements 
with Romanticism. Bart Schulz says that Bentham cannot be disentangled 
from the Romantic movement.67 But disentangling is needed, if we are to 
find the aesthetic potential in his thinking. I name these engagements: 
Fellow-Romantic, Anti-Romantic, Radical Romantic and Post-Romantic. 
I use the term ‘Romanticism’ as an ‘expository convenience’ to ‘specify 
some striking parallels’;68 I am ready to regard it as a European cultural 
movement, or set of kindred movements.69 I elide, as I must here, critical 
differences between German and English Romanticism. 
4.3. fellow-romantic
Bentham is as much a creature of Romanticism as of the Enlightenment 
(we do not need to choose).70 The easiest, quickest way to make the case 
for Bentham as a ‘Fellow Romantic’ is by pointing to certain concurrences 
or distinct points of correspondence between his positions and received 
Romantic positions. Take, first, the matter of ‘fragments’, a well-estab-
lished topos in discussions of both Romanticism71 and Bentham – where 
(typically) the sense of parts, fragments, uncompleted projects, visible in 
the early Bentham, is taken to comprise a constant in his life.72 We find 
more consequential themes in a common sense of political disappoint-
ment and a common commitment to language-reform (poetic diction for 
the Romantics, legal language for Bentham). 
The ‘fellowship’ can be developed further by reference to a 
common intensity and extent of ambition; a certain conviction of destiny 
(place Shelley’s ‘Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world’73 
alongside José del Valle’s encomium to Bentham, ‘Your works give you 
the glorious title of legislator of the world’);74 a common indifference to 
received ideas (place Stendhal’s ‘Il faut du courage pour être romantique, 
car il faut hazarder’75 alongside Bentham’s unyielding refusal to accept 
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the authority of customary practice); a common ‘againstness’ (place the 
Romantic rejection of neo-classical aesthetics76 alongside Bentham’s 
rejection of Blackstonian legal hermeneutics). 
And then there is the question of Shelley, where we can contend for 
something like an inner affinity. There is their political radicalism, their 
anti-clericalism, their regard for Jesus as against ‘the superstition that 
has disguised itself’ under his name,77 their common engagement with 
homosexuality as a topic for sympathetic investigation (though here, as 
elsewhere, Bentham proved himself the greater radical),78 their stalwart 
defence of political and religious free speech, their contempt for the 
given state of the law and their demands for law reform,79 the quantity 
of unpublishable work they wrote, and so on. And consider Shelley’s 
unpublished, fragmentary A Treatise on Morals: ‘A virtuous or moral 
action is that action which, when considered in all its accessories and 
consequences, is fitted to produce the highest pleasure to the greatest 
number of sensitive beings.’80 
4.4. the Anti-romantic
Distinguish, in respect of a discourse or movement, between the antag-
onistic and the oppositional or adversarial. The antagonistic situates 
itself outside the discourse or movement, to attack it. It constitutes the 
discourse or movement as a target; it is external to it. The oppositional, 
or adversarial, remains inside the discourse or movement, and develops, 
out of its positive or affirmative positions, countering positions. This 
is Bentham. We can be quick here – there are only a few surprises. 
Bentham mostly took positions against the standard Romantic ones on 
poetry’s elevatedness; on the poet’s elevatedness; on the centrality of 
the aesthetic; on poetry’s cognitive value; on ‘unbounded’ meaning in 
language. Here, Bentham is working as something akin to a ‘counter-
spirit’81 – though even this term somewhat simplifies the complexity of 
these adversarial engagements. 
Against the Romantic celebration of genius, and of works of genius, 
we may place the deflationary language of Rationale of Reward. Against 
Coleridge’s ‘[Poetry] is the language of heaven, and in the exquisite 
delight we derive from [it], we have … a type, a foretaste, and a prophecy 
of the joys of heaven’,82 we may place Bentham’s ironic reference to legal 
obfuscations as ‘poetry’ in Rationale of Judicial Evidence.83
There is the greatest distance between pre-Romantic and 
Romantic understandings of the character of the poet. In the former, 
the poet is to be judged rhetorically, by his skill in ornamenting or 
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embellishing a certain kind of content. The poem is an instrument in 
the moral education of the reader. In the latter, the poet is altogether a 
different kind of person – self-interrogating, adversarial, autonomous, a 
creator, a vates or prophet-priest.84 There are also collective aspects of this 
new poetic identity, in a number of registers. There is, for example, an 
elevated notion of a succession of artists and writers – Ingres’s notion of 
the apostolic succession of great artists, the ‘apostolates’.85 
This new normative in turn generated a counter-normative. 
One finds both normative and counter-normative in Keats. Here is the 
normative: ‘I have asked myself so often why I should be a Poet more 
than other Men – seeing how great a thing it is – how great things are 
to be gained by it’ (10 May 1817); ‘I find that I cannot exist without 
poetry’ (18 May 1817); ‘I am ambitious of doing the world some good’ 
(27 October 1818); ‘I could not live without the love of my friends’ 
(9 April 1818); ‘fellowship divine’, ‘the crown … of love and friendship’ 
(Endymion, ll. 777, 800–1). And here is the counter-normative: ‘I am 
quite disgusted with literary men and will never know another except 
Wordsworth’ (8 October 1817); ‘I am sometimes so very sceptical as 
to think Poetry itself a mere Jack-a-lantern to amuse whoever may be 
struck with its brilliance’ (13 March 1818).86
Bentham’s counter-normative, which was ferocious,87 sits in his 
conception of the artist as a member of the ‘fine arts aristocracy’. We 
find this in ‘Codification Proposal, Addressed by Jeremy Bentham to 
All Nations Professing Liberal Opinions’ (1822). His challenge is to the 
totality of the normative collective aspects, against which he posits 
‘the Literary Aristocracy’ and ‘the Fine-Arts Aristocracy’.88 Dinwiddy 
summarizes: 
Bentham saw Britain as governed by a partnership or confederation 
of ‘all the members of the government together with the opulent 
members of the different classes of the community in the character 
of persons unduly favoured by the laws and habits of government.’ 
He sometimes referred to this elite as … the ‘aristocracy,’ using 
that term in an extended sense to include not only the peerage and 
landowners but also various sub-groups. … These confederated 
groups had a common interest in the protection of abuses and 
privileges. These comprised ‘sinister interests,’ and Bentham 
conceived of society in terms of a struggle between the ruling few 
and the subject many.89
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This is Bentham at his most deflationary, of course. But his formulation 
also opens out onto a whole sociology of art. It also echoes Hazlitt’s 
remarks in his 1816 essay on Coriolanus (published in the Examiner, and 
sure to have been read by Bentham): ‘The language of poetry naturally 
falls in with the language of power. The imagination is an exaggerating 
and exclusive faculty; the understanding is a dividing and measuring 
faculty. The one is an aristocratical, the other a republican faculty.’90
Regarding the centrality of the aesthetic, let me take this statement 
of Friedrich Schlegel’s to stand for the Romantic position: I consider art to 
be the heart of humanity.91 Against this, surely we can put a Benthamite 
counter-conception of poetry as marginal, at best? Perhaps. Yet Bentham 
surprises us, even here. He writes in Rationale of Reward of the ‘arts of 
amusement’, which include the literary arts: 
It is not … proper to regard [them] as destitute of utility: on the 
contrary, there is nothing, the utility of which is more incontestable. 
To what shall the character of utility be ascribed, if not to that 
which is a source of pleasure? All that can be alleged in diminution 
of their utility is, that it is limited to the excitement of pleasure: 
they cannot disperse the clouds of grief or of misfortune. They are 
useless to those who are not pleased with them: they are useful 
only to those who take pleasure in them, and only in proportion as 
they are pleased.92 [Italics added.]
That is to say: if you are a hedonist, the arts will have a rather special 
value for you, since their very reason for existence is to give pleasure. 
The anti-Romantic stance here is less an affair of contradiction, more one 
of the alternative conceptualizing of a comparable esteem.
And poetry as cognitively valuable? This is an argument within 
Romantic aesthetics (for example, between Kant’s Critique of Judgment 
(1790) and Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts (1835)) about 
whether art is cognitive. There is a related argument (for example, 
between the Schelling of the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) 
and the Schelling of the Philosophy of Art (1802–3)) about art’s priority 
over philosophy.93 Keats makes his own wonderful intervention on this 
question in a letter (19 March 1819): 
Though a quarrel in the Streets is a thing to be hated, the energies 
displayed in it are fine; the commonest Man shows a grace in his 
quarrel. By a superior Being our reasonings may take the same 
tone – though erroneous they may be fine. This is the very thing in 
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which consists Poetry, and if so it is not so fine a thing as philosophy 
– For the same reason that an eagle is not so fine a thing as a truth.94
The point here is that there is no determinate Romantic position; there is 
instead a field of argument, with many positions being taken. Bentham’s 
own position seems to land him somewhere between the non-cognitive 
and the anti-cognitive – in Rationale of Reward, at least.95
Last, as to ‘unbounded’ meaning in language – here, roughly, is 
the Romantic position. The art work does not engage us in argument; it 
expands and deepens our understanding beyond the power of words to 
express. We recognize this in the doctrine that literary works cannot be 
paraphrased. They cannot be reduced to propositions; literary language 
does not submit to concepts. It is never possible for us to say in some 
final, dispositive way what a work of art is about.
Again, there are many variations on this position. Anita Brookner 
finds in the Romantics a refusal of the principle of finitude – an ‘infinite 
longing’; a passing-up of lucid exposition in favour of language freighted 
with intimation.96 She might have had Coleridge’s remark in mind: ‘Poetry 
gives most pleasure when only generally and not perfectly understood.’97 
Kant’s notion of the ‘aesthetic idea’ is a very developed version of this 
remark. In the Critique of Judgment, he praises the artist of genius for 
his ability to express ‘aesthetic ideas’ in his work. These are ‘represen-
tations of the imagination which induce much thought, yet without the 
possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. concept, being adequate 
to it, and which language, consequently, can never quite get on level 
terms with or render completely intelligible’. When a concept – for 
example, ‘justice’ – is ‘attached’ to a representation of the imagination – 
let us say, Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure – the concept submits to ‘an 
unbounded expansion’. The artist’s creative imagination provokes in his 
readers thought that, ‘while germane, no doubt, to the concept, exceeds 
what can be laid hold of in that representation or clearly expressed’.98
Bentham stands at the furthest possible distance, of course, from 
all this – the proof text here being ‘Nonsense upon Stilts’. But before 
we leave it at that, with the sense that we have at last found a simple 
opposition between a Romantic position and a Benthamic position, 
consider the following from Rationale of Punishment: for ‘the legislators 
of ancient days, men who spoke the significant and enchanting language 
of Ancient Greece, poetry was invited to the aid of law. No man had ever 
yet thought of addressing the people in the barbarous language that 
disgraces our statute-book, where the will of the legislator is drowned in 
a sea of words.’99
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4.5. radical romantic
In a study of somewhat greater length than the present, this character of 
Bentham as a radical or avant-garde Romantic would need to be studied 
in four aspects: as democrat, as provocateur, as hedonist and as advocate 
of literary free speech. I must put to one side the first. As for the second, 
I merely cite the Auto-Icon project,100 and acknowledge Kathleen Blake’s 
reading of Rationale of Reward: ‘Push-pin – what a figure! And what could 
sound sillier to praise? Except to give the reader a “push” to “set prejudice 
apart”. I say, think again about the passage, and enjoy it.’101 I want instead 
to return to the Romantic aesthetic implications of Bentham’s hedonism, 
and then relate his free speech position to Romantic values. Essentially, 
the point in respect of each is the same: Bentham found common ground 
with his fellow Romantics, but then pushed beyond them. 
4.5.1. Hedonism 
Bentham extends and develops a central principle of Romanticism, its 
‘hedonism of the imagination’,102 wherever he writes by reference to 
these principles: (a) for Pleasure, therefore Utility; (b) for Pleasure, 
against Taste (c) for Pleasure, therefore Literature. We might designate 
these formulations as the slogans of Bentham’s aesthetics. 
For Pleasure, therefore Utility. – There is a received sense that 
the Romantic is hostile to the demand that art be useful. When asked, 
‘What’s the use of art?’ the Romantic will reply, defensively, exasper-
atedly, ‘All art is quite useless.’103 But if we step back from Wilde to 
Coleridge, we read this, in a letter he wrote to John Thelwall, expressing 
a preference for Schiller and Shakespeare over Collins, because they 
‘give more general pleasure, and I judge of all things by their utility’.104 The 
Romantics were quite alive to the aesthetic possibilities in a generously 
conceived hedonism. 
For Pleasure, against Taste. – To Bentham the criterion of taste is 
pernicious, though championed in the realm of the arts by critics, philos-
ophers and satirists. It is an affair of prejudice, promoted by sinister 
interests, destructive of the pleasures of the many.105 I defer to Malcolm 
Quinn’s investigation of this aspect of Bentham’s aesthetics.106 He 
formulates the question of principle between Hume and Bentham thus: 
both Bentham and Hume espoused a view of taste as a social practice, but 
Bentham was concerned with the socially divisive effects of ‘taste speech’, 
while Hume was keen to promote the beneficial socializing force of 
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specialized habits and practices of taste.107 I only add to Quinn by making 
a connection with Romantic aesthetics. The Romantics did not defend 
‘taste’ – not in any tepid, conformist sense, anyway. Hegel commented: 
‘What is called good taste takes fright at all the more profound effects of 
art. When great passions are unveiled, we are no longer concerned with 
the finer distinctions of taste and its pettifogging particularities. Genius 
strides contemptuously over such ground.’108 Hegel, on genius’s behalf, 
demands an encounter between spectator and work unhampered by 
received taste; Bentham, on pleasure’s behalf, makes the same demand. 
It is a stronger demand. 
For Pleasure, therefore Literature. – Here is Coleridge: ‘[Poetry] is 
the art of communicating whatever we wish to communicate, so as both 
to express and produce excitement, but for the purpose of immediate 
pleasure; and each part is fitted to afford as much pleasure, as is 
compatible with the largest sum in the whole.’ He continues: ‘In Poetry, 
the general good is to be given through the Pleasure, and if the Poet does 
not do that he ceases to be a Poet.’ And then, to drive the point home: 
‘Pleasurable excitement is [poetry’s] origin and object; pleasure is the 
magic circle out of which the Poet must not dare to tread.’109 Bentham’s 
pleasure principle is an especially appropriate criterion in relation to 
the fine arts, then (as he acknowledges). Their very purpose is to give 
pleasure. 
But at this point Kant intervenes. Not any kind of pleasure will do. 
Aesthetic pleasure has specific properties. The ‘pure judgment of taste’, 
he explains in the Critique of Judgment, is ‘independent of charm or 
emotion’. Indeed, ‘taste that requires an added element of either for its 
delight has not yet emerged from barbarism’.110 This attracted Nietzsche’s 
mockery: 
We get from our philosophers … definitions in which the absence 
of more personal experience squats like a fat worm of crass error, as 
it does in Kant’s famous definition of the beautiful. “Something is 
beautiful,” says Kant, “if it gives pleasure without interest.” Without 
interest! Our æstheticians never tire of weighing in on Kant’s side, 
saying that under the magic of beauty men can look at even naked 
female statues “without interest”. We can certainly laugh at their 
expense – the experiences of  artists  are more “interesting”, with 
regard to this tricky point and Pygmalion, at any rate, was not 
necessarily an “unæsthetic man”. Let us think all the better of the 
innocence of our æstheticians, reflected as it is in such arguments; 
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let us pay tribute to Kant for expounding the … sense of touch with 
the naïveté of a country-parson!111
Mill’s account in his ‘Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of 
St. Andrews’ (1867) of aesthetic experience had this same quality of the 
parsonical: 
We learn to respect ourselves only so far as we feel capable of nobler 
objects. … Now, of this elevated tone of mind the great source of 
inspiration is poetry, and all literature so far as it is poetical and 
artistic. … Nor is it only loftiness,  only the heroic feelings, that 
are bred by poetic cultivation. Its power is as great in calming the 
soul as in elevating it in fostering the milder emotions, as the more 
exalted. It brings home to us all those aspects of life which take 
hold of our nature on its unselfish side, and lead us to identify our 
joy and grief with the good or ill of the system of which we form 
a part. … Even apart from any specific emotional expression, the 
mere contemplation of beauty of a high order produces in no small 
degree this elevating effect on the character.112
This high-flown waffle was in keeping with the times.113 
Bentham is to be situated in a line of dissenters from even the best 
instances of such reasoning114 – a line of which Nietzsche is merely the 
most distinguished representative. In his unpublished writings on ‘sexual 
irregularities’, the unparsonical Bentham treated the pleasures of the 
sexual appetite as ‘more conducive to happiness than any other’.115 It is 
a special provocation to the ascetic, who makes war on it in the name of 
refinement. ‘Of all pleasures, the most exquisite were the pleasures of the 
sexual appetite. Of all objects of sacrifice, these were best adapted to the 
nature of a God of the most refined class – of a God taken at the highest 
pitch of refinement and civilisation. The pleasure would indeed have 
been sensual: but the sacrifice of it was the reverse of sensual … nothing 
imaginable could be more refined.’116 The Benthamite, anti-Millian 
William Empson, the finest literary critic of the twentieth century, with 
an extraordinary intuitiveness, uses the same language as Bentham in 
his own thrust against the ascetic: ‘The most refined desires are inherent 
in the plainest, and would be false if they weren’t.’117
This refusal to separate the corporeal from the spiritual, the lower 
from the higher, which was characteristic of the Romantics, Bentham 
just took a bit further than most – but by no means all. Here is Blake: 
‘Energy is the only life, and is from the body; and reason is the bound or 
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outward circumference of energy’ (Marriage of Heaven and Hell). Here is 
Wordsworth, in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads: 
If I had undertaken a systematic defence of the theory upon which 
these poems are written, it would have been my duty to develop 
the various causes upon which the pleasure received from metrical 
language depends. Among the chief of these causes is … the 
pleasure which the mind derives from the perception of similitude 
in dissimilitude. This principle is the great spring of the activity of 
our minds, and the chief feeder. From this principle the direction 
of the sexual appetite, and all the passions connected with it take 
their origin.118
And on posing the question, in Endymion, ‘Wherein lies happiness’, Keats 
explains, in his letter to John Taylor (30 January 1818): ‘My having 
written that argument will perhaps be of the greatest service to me of 
anything I ever did. It set before me the gradations of happiness, even like 
a kind of pleasure thermometer.’ [Italics added.]119 
4.5.2. Literary free speech 
We may take for granted here the commitment of the Romantics to free 
speech. It was a particular concern of Shelley’s, of course: ‘Persecution 
for opinion is unjust. Persecution is the only name applicable to 
punishment inflicted on an individual in consequence of his opinions.’120 
Bentham at each point, at the very least, matched this commitment: 
‘Under a government of Laws, what is the motto of a good citizen? To 
obey punctually; to censure freely.’121
Bentham was alive to the damage that literature can do: 
As the amusement of a minister of state it must be confessed that a 
more suitable one might be found than a game at solitaire. [Yet it 
is] a pure and simple amusement, stripped of everything injurious, 
free from passion, avarice, loss, and regret. How much better was 
this minister occupied, than if, with the Iliad in his hand, he had 
stirred up within his heart the seeds of those ferocious passions 
which can only be gratified with tears and blood.122
In ‘Sextus’, and then in Not Paul, but Jesus, Bentham censures the 
many ‘novels, and other works having amusement for their object’ that 
introduce the topic of homosexuality in order to condemn homosexual 
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practices. In doing so, they give ‘vent and increase’ to the ‘popular 
antipathy’ towards those practices (as well as stimulating the curiosity 
of the young among their readers). Bentham cites Smollett’s Roderick 
Random and Fielding’s Joseph Andrews. Such works do much damage, 
Bentham writes, by ‘inflaming’ this antipathy – though newspapers are 
even worse offenders in this regard, Bentham adds.123
Where does this leave the question of literary free speech? In good 
shape, I think. We can find in Bentham a defence of literary speech made 
up of these propositions: liberty of literary representation is to be implied 
from liberty of taste; literature is a unique resource, containing valuable 
truths of experience; state support of the arts should be encouraged; 
an aesthetics of mass art cannot be proscriptive; literary censors are 
among the ‘sinister interests’; the acquisition of knowledge must not be 
hindered; censorship is both corrupting and ineffectual. Bentham was 
not, pace M.H. Abrams (see below), a Platonist. Again, I can only address 
in any detail one or two of these propositions. 
We can begin with an implication. The long title of a proposed work 
reads: ‘General Idea of a Work, Having For One of Its Objects the Defence 
of the Principle of Utility, so far as concerns the Liberty of Taste, against 
the Conjunct Hostility of the Principle of Asceticism and the Principle 
of Antipathy: and for its Proposed Title, proposed on the Ground of 
Expected Popularity, or at least Protection against Popular Rage – Not 
Paul, but Jesus.’124 The work is a defence of liberty of sexual preference, 
and celebrates the ‘pleasure of scratching where it itches’. It anticipates 
the opposition of ‘religionists’ and expressions of ‘popular anger’. It 
rejects all prohibitions or acts of censorship on grounds of religion or 
superstitious attachment to notions of ‘moral purity’. It speculates that 
censors are often motivated by envy, wishing themselves to perform the 
acts of the censored that they punish, or by fear, hoping themselves to 
avoid a like charge (‘precautionary self-defence’, Bentham calls it).125 
It contains an express defence of homosexuality. And it deplores the 
driving out of office and into exile of an admired politician, Sir William 
Meredith, on the grounds of his alleged homosexuality, and the driving 
into exile of an admired novelist, William Beckford, on the same grounds. 
The implication? That liberty of literary representation must follow from 
liberty of taste – what may be practised may also be written about. 
Bentham finds resources in literature not found elsewhere. In 
‘Of Sexual Irregularities’, he touches on the topic of homosexuality 
in the classical world. He relates a story from Virgil’s Aeneid, in which 
two young men, who are plainly lovers, show conspicuous courage 
in an attack on the enemy’s camp. Virgil’s account, he notes, is full of 
MorE bEntHAM, LEss MiLL 189
admiration for them. He goes on to mention other instances of well-
regarded homosexual ‘heroes of classical lore’. And then he observes that 
‘fiction in its nature affords more conclusive evidence than any particular 
realities: it shews the conclusion drawn by opinion from universal and 
continual experience’.126
We can formulate Bentham’s position (in contrast to Mill’s) thus: 
literary speech should be free. This is not the common view. I refer to 
M.H. Abrams’s assessment: ‘So, after many centuries we find Jeremy 
Bentham following Plato’s lead by banishing the lying poets from his 
society, which, like that of Plato, was to be planned and administered 
by philosophers. Bentham even recalls Plato’s indictment of Homer for 
degrading the gods.’127 This is absurd – though it prompts the thought 
that there is perhaps one respect in which Bentham might fairly be 
termed a Platonist – that is, in the provisionality of judgments about, 
inter alia, push-pin and poetry. Judgments need to be made ‘prejudice 
apart’. Reasons must be adduced; conclusions must be open to revision. 
Recall Book X of The Republic. Socrates, in conversation with Glaucon, 
defending his notional banishing of the poets, then says the following: 
Shall I propose, then, that [poetry] be allowed to return from exile, 
but upon this condition only – that she make a defence of herself in 
lyrical or some other metre? Certainly. And we may further grant 
to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets 
the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not 
only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life, 
and we will listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we shall 
surely be the gainers – I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a 
delight? Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers.
Bentham would have been open to that challenge, and could have made 
those arguments. 
4.6. post-romantic
We can also praise Bentham for his intimations of an alternative 
aesthetics. His thinking casts an aesthetic shadow. There is an anticipa-
tion of Duchamp: ‘Taste is an experience that I try not to let come into my 
life.’128 There is an anticipation of Susan Sontag’s ‘Camp’: ‘The man who 
insists on high and serious pleasures is depriving himself of pleasure; he 
continually restricts what he can enjoy; in the constant exercise of his 
good taste he will eventually price himself out of the market, so to speak. 
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Here Camp taste supervenes upon good taste as a daring and witty 
hedonism.’129
There is also a congruence with Modernism – to be worked out. But 
just consider Ezra Pound. The ‘swindling classes’ use a ‘fogged language’, 
he wrote, like an exemplary Benthamite. ‘Good writers are those who 
keep the language efficient. That is to say, keep it accurate, keep it clear.’ 
‘A people that grows accustomed to sloppy writing is a people in process 
of losing grip on its empire and on itself.’ ‘The statesman cannot govern 
and men cannot agree on wise action without language, and all their 
deeds and conditions are affected by the defects or virtues of idiom.’ 
Pound proposed the following exercise in a comparison of Milton and 
Swinburne: ‘See how many useless words each uses, how many which 
contribute nothing, how many which contribute nothing very definite.’130 
4.7. Low romantic?
Fellow Romantic, Anti-Romantic, Radical Romantic, Post-Romantic 
… Is there one kind of Romantic that might capture all four of these 
characters? Perhaps, ‘Low Romantic’. The thought is prompted by 
the example of the French writer Georges Bataille. We might think of 
Bentham’s position in relation to Romanticism as comparable to Bataille’s 
relation to Surrealism.131 Each was an internal subversive. Each went 
‘low’ in response to the other’s ‘high’. Can we say then, Bentham was 
the Bataille of the Romantic movement? This might go slightly too far, 
though – because the ‘low’ version requires the exploitation of resources 
within Romanticism to reach contrary conclusions; and the declaration 
of a certain allegiance to Romanticism. We cannot sensibly maintain that 
Bentham met either of these conditions – certainly not the second one. 
For further examination.
5. Towards an art-friendly liberalism
From time to time, events occur that raise the question: is liberalism equal 
to the challenge of its times? Among the challenges of the present times: 
to redefine freedom of speech to give an honoured, and not a marginal, 
place to aesthetic expression. This requires liberals to take literature and 
the arts seriously – which in turn requires them to distance themselves 
from Mill, and get closer to Bentham. I agree with Schultz: we (especially 
we liberals) need to shake ourselves free of Mill’s reading of Bentham.132 
Mill’s attack on Bentham has blinded liberals to what is valuable in 
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Bentham, in the matter of a liberal aesthetics, and in reasoned defences 
of literary free speech. We can work with Bentham. We have to work 
around Mill.
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Part III.  




Enlightenment unrefined: Bentham’s 
realism and the analysis of beauty
Malcolm Quinn
Introduction
Jeremy Bentham was born at a time when civil discourse on aesthetics 
and taste in Britain had begun to shift from the idea of beauty as a 
harmonious order that is perceived by an ‘inner sense’ of taste towards 
a more practical aesthetics appropriate to commercial society. This 
practical aesthetics exchanged fixed rules of art and taste for an analytical 
power that was attributed to the ‘verdicts of sentiment’ of critics of taste. 
Definitions of beauty began to focus on the possibility of achieving an 
unbiased and objective analysis of pleasurable sentiments.1 Bentham’s 
challenge to aesthetics, which was aligned with his utilitarian ethics, 
was to reject both rules of taste and the powers of judgment accorded to 
the person of taste, and replace them with a predilection or disposition 
towards pleasure. For Bentham, pleasure is what explains human 
behaviour, not what needs to be explained. This approach took no 
account of critical judgments on what was ugly and what was beautiful, 
of the kind that could be used to construct general ‘agreements on the 
agreeable’. This makes Bentham difficult to include in narratives of British 
aesthetics – in Timothy M. Costelloe’s survey of British aesthetics ‘from 
Shaftesbury to Wittgenstein’, Bentham only rates a couple of mentions as 
the background to a discussion of the aesthetics of John Stuart Mill.2 We 
are more familiar, however, with attacks on Bentham’s hedonic utilitari-
anism as a form of cultural barbarism, ranging from criticism by Thomas 
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Macaulay,3 Karl Marx and Matthew Arnold4 in the nineteenth century, to 
Roger Scruton5 in more recent times. In this chapter, I will argue that we 
should not rest content with Marx’s assertion that ‘the arch-philistine, 
Jeremy Bentham’ was the ‘heavy-footed oracle of the “common sense” 
of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie’.6 Instead, I will define Bentham 
as someone who saw that a typically bourgeois, practical, empirical and 
experimental approach to the analysis of beauty would become mired in 
contradictions if it attempted to impose social norms that could separate 
the beautiful from the ugly. 
In Bentham’s view, there was no reason whatsoever why a predi-
lection towards pleasure would be guided by distinctions between the 
ugly and the beautiful. Moreover, he also favoured a social order that 
could make use of socially beneficial predilections and proclivities, 
which had always been regarded as inimical to impartial judgments 
of taste. Bentham took up the cudgels for empiricism by defining the 
social norms imposed by taste as a form of harmful blindness. As I 
have argued elsewhere,7 Bentham’s theory of language indicates that 
the turn towards the refined judgments of the critic of taste was not an 
embrace of empiricism but a rejection of it. In this chapter, I will show 
how Bentham’s The Rationale of Reward offers a counter-strategy that 
returns us to the empirical by allowing us to choose between refinement 
and utility, while also offering the chance for an enlightened exit from 
aristocratic modes of social life. 
In what follows, I will begin by defining what my title refers 
to as ‘Bentham’s Realism’ as a means to establish his contribution to 
debates on aesthetics. I will show how Bentham’s criticisms of Claude 
Adrien Helvétius, Joseph Addison and David Hume, along with the 
analysis of taste and predilection in his manuscripts on sexuality, offer 
a thorough critique of those forms of practical aesthetics that advocated 
realism about the connections between beauty and human desire and 
emphasized the cultural power of the ordinary observer. I will then 
discuss Bentham’s own definition of cultural barbarism, through an 
analysis of his comments on what I define as the ‘centrally managed’ 
practical aesthetics of Helvétius. This is followed by an account of 
Bentham’s attack on Joseph Addison’s proposals for ‘self-management’ 
through the practice of taste. I will then turn to the question of how 
the emphasis on cultural observation in practical aesthetics placed the 
artist in a subordinate position to the spectator and the critic. In this 
regard, I will suggest that Bentham’s praise for William Hogarth opens 
up the possibility for a distinction between the ‘Addisonian’ Hogarth 
that is presented in his treatise on The Analysis of Beauty (1753) and 
EnL igHtEnMEnt unrEf inED 203
the ‘Benthamite’ Hogarth of the prints Beer Street and Gin Lane (1751) 
(Figures 8.1, 8.2). 
Figure 8.1: William Hogarth (1697–1764), Beer Street, 1751.
Wiki/Commons.
Figure 8.2: William Hogarth (1697–1764), Gin Lane, 1751.
Wiki/Commons.
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In these two prints, Hogarth anticipates Bentham’s position on aesthetics 
by ‘doubling down’ on realism, presenting a practical ethics that takes 
account of taste as inclination and predilection rather than self-manage-
ment. In conclusion, I will comment on the display of Bentham’s 
auto-icon in the exhibition ‘Like Life’ at the Met Breuer Museum in New 
York in 2018, in order to suggest some lessons that the unrefined enlight-
enment of Bentham might have to offer for contemporary practices of 
cultural management and self-management. 
Bentham’s realism
An otherwise favourable review of Jeremy Bentham’s book The Rationale 
of Reward in the Political Examiner of 30 May 1825 noted that the book 
had caused ‘a havock … in our predilections’ with its assertion that 
‘Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts 
and sciences of music and poetry.’8 In that same year, the journalist John 
Neal referred to the received opinion that Bentham’s followers were ‘a 
body of youthful conspirators against government, order and morality, 
the fine arts, and all the charities and sympathies and elegancies of life.’9 
The Rationale of Reward is the text most often cited by those who have 
accused Bentham of cultural barbarism, philistinism and a rejection of 
the finer things in life. It is, therefore, worth noting that The Rationale 
of Reward contains its own criticisms of utilitarian cultural barbarism. 
Bentham directs this criticism at Claude Adrien Helvétius’s assumptions 
concerning a form of utilitarian legislation in which beauty is offered 
as a reward for service to the state and through which the legislator is 
given power over the social distribution of pleasure. Bentham’s criticism 
of Helvétius is entirely consistent with his comments on push-pin and 
poetry in The Rationale of Reward, as well as his criticisms elsewhere in 
this text of the promotion of refinement of taste by Joseph Addison and 
David Hume. Bentham’s answer to Helvétius, Addison and Hume does not 
advocate a return to fixed rules of taste, but instead emphasizes a greater 
degree of realism, specifically the kind of realism about sexuality that 
Bentham sets out in detail in his manuscripts on ‘Sexual Irregularities’ 
of 1814–17.10 In these manuscripts, Bentham rejects any natural or 
assumed link between sexual pleasure and reproductive activity. Refusing 
to define sexuality by referring to a normal set of behaviours, aims and 
objects, means that Bentham at once includes sexual behaviour within 
a variety of human tastes and propensities and rejects the association of 
taste with refinement, claiming that ‘Taste for any object is an aptitude 
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or disposition to derive pleasure [from] that object.’11 In a note added 
to this sentence in the manuscripts, Bentham added: ‘Here give illustra-
tions from other objects of taste – ex. gr. subjects of the fine arts.’12
The ‘havock … in our predilections’ brought about by Bentham’s 
rejection of favoured objects of culture in his comments on push-pin 
and poetry should, therefore, be understood in relation to the realism 
about sexuality that is offered in ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’. In addition, 
Bentham’s views on sexuality and culture must be seen in relation to 
his condemnation of the potential for cultural barbarism in aesthetic 
realism. In The Rationale of Reward, this potential for barbarism is 
located in socially normative definitions of beauty, which are ‘centrally 
managed’ by Helvétius’s utilitarian legislator and ‘self-managed’ in the 
cultural choices of the refined spectator favoured by Addison and Hume. 
For Bentham, the central management of beauty described by Helvétius 
would be barbaric because it assumes that there can be state control over 
the allocation and social distribution of individual pleasure. The self-
management of beauty advocated by Addison was also barbaric, because 
it asserted the authority of the person of refined taste to dismiss what 
was extravagant or absurd in the arts and to crush a variety of propensi-
ties and inclinations towards pleasure ‘under the strokes of his club’.13 
The connection that Bentham makes in ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ 
between sexuality and taste also indicates why the need for the 
management of beauty arises within aesthetic realism. Once fixed rules 
of taste are abandoned in favour of the position of the ordinary observer, 
it is hubristic to assume that this observer will be the ideal conduit for 
a socially normative definition of beauty and the general ‘agreements 
on the agreeable’ that can provide the basis of a legislative science of 
taste. The potential for cultural barbarism that is inherent in the idea 
of the favoured observer of a socially normative idea of beauty finds 
its opposition in the idea of sexuality as a ‘sixth sense’ in ‘Of Sexual 
Irregularities’, where Bentham notes that, ‘Till of late years, the number 
of senses had by usage been fixt at five: of late years, a sense correspond-
ing to and put in exercise by the act of sexuality14 has been added to the 
number.’15 Bentham’s assertion that there is ‘a sense corresponding to 
and put in exercise by the act of sexuality’ implies that the gratification 
of sexual desire relies for its fulfilment on a specific type of observation 
that receives and responds to information about possible sources of 
sexual pleasure. The sociologist Niklas Luhmann has reminded us 
that we have forgotten the importance of sexuality as a form of social 
observation, through which the body ‘makes its own distinctions and 
decides whether or not to be sexually attracted. Observing this observer 
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leads us to ask whether or not it dutifully follows cultural imperatives, 
or whether there is unavoidable akrasia (lack of self-control), as the 
Greeks would have said, a lack of potestas in se ipsum (self-control) in 
humans and social systems.’16 The argument that Luhmann makes here 
about sexual desire as an unruly observer of cultural imperatives was 
anticipated by Bentham’s inclusion of both ‘subjects of the fine arts’ 
and sexual acts under the general heading of taste as disposition and 
inclination. Bentham went further and argued that this ‘unruly’ observer 
of culture could, nonetheless, counteract the blindness of prejudices 
of taste and provide insights into social problems. An example of this 
is provided in ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’, when Bentham suggests that 
a suppressed aspect of Thomas Robert Malthus’s reasoning proves the 
propriety and ethical value of homosexuality as a check on over-popu-
lation, ‘though his situation, in the double character of a Clergyman of 
the Established Church and an instructor of youth, does not admitt of 
his proposing it, or directly advocating it’.17 When read together, The 
Rationale of Reward and ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ disclose the fallibility 
of the idea that the analysis of pleasurable sentiments can be used to 
propose socially normative definitions of beauty. Rather than imposing 
a practical aesthetics based on reproductive sexuality, The Rationale of 
Reward and ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ advocate utilitarian social practices 
that embrace a multitude of dispositions to derive pleasure. 
Bentham on Helvétius
The Rationale of Reward emerged from manuscripts written between 
1786 and 1787 when Bentham was staying with his brother Samuel 
in Russia. Bentham described it in a letter to George Wilson in 1787 
as a work that ‘touches upon all the possible applications of the matter 
of reward, ordinary and extraordinary’.18 These manuscripts were 
later edited and published in French by Étienne Dumont in 1811 and 
translated into English by Richard Smith in 1825. Nonetheless, as Ross 
Harrison has pointed out, the long genesis of The Rationale of Reward 
gives it the character of a message from the eighteenth-century enlight-
enment that is received in the Britain of the Industrial Revolution.19 
Part of this message is about barbarism, and is directed at Helvétius’s 
assumptions about the possibilities for utilitarian legislation. Bentham’s 
statement is worth quoting at length: 
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One word on the last article of reward – Pleasures. Punishment may 
be applied in all shapes to all persons. Pleasure, however, in the 
hands of the legislator, is not equally manageable: pleasure can be 
given only by giving the means by which it is purchased: that is to 
say, the matter of wealth which every one may employ in his own 
way. Among certain barbarous or half civilized nations, the services 
of their warriors have been rewarded by the favours of women. 
Helvetius appears to smile with approbation at this mode of exciting 
bravery. It was perhaps Montesquieù that led him into this error. In 
speaking of the Samnites, among whom the young man declared the 
most worthy selected whomsoever he pleased for his wife, he adds 
that this custom was calculated to produce most beneficial effects. 
Philosophers distinguished for their humanity; both of them good 
husbands and good fathers, both of them eloquent against slavery, 
how could they speak in praise of a law which supposes the slavery 
of the best half of the human species? How could they have forgotten 
that favours not preceded by an uncontrolled choice, and which the 
heart perhaps repelled with disgust, afforded the spectacle rather of 
the degradation of woman than the rewarding a hero? The warrior 
surrounded by palms of honour, could he descend to act the part 
of a ravisher? And if he disdained this barbarous right, was not his 
generosity a satire on the law?20
Miriam Williford has argued that this passage shows that ‘Bentham 
in his enthusiasm for women’s rights even goes so far as to reprimand 
his mentor, Helvetius, and the customs Helvetius supported.’21 While 
Bentham’s support for equality between the sexes is beyond doubt, what 
should be emphasized is that Bentham is also arguing against Helvétius’s 
idea of a utilitarian state, in which, for example, there could be a science 
of public taste that could be used to discover ‘the particular knowledge of 
what pleases the public in a certain nation’.22 The passage in Helvétius’s 
De l’esprit to which Bentham refers claims that, in general, virtues 
attended by the promise of sensual pleasure are those that are the most 
sought after. Helvétius offers martial virtue rewarded by female beauty 
as an example of this, using Montesquieu’s reference, in his De l’esprit des 
lois, to the ‘excellent’ custom of the Samnites, who begin by choosing a 
young man who embodies the fine qualities and services rendered to his 
country. This young man ‘took for his wife the daughter he desired … 
Love, beauty, chastity, virtue, birth, even wealth, all this was, so to speak, 
the dowry of virtue.’23 There is debate as to whether Helvétius agreed 
with Montesquieu in this instance,24 but what is certain is that Helvétius’s 
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version of a practical aesthetics of state-managed taste depends on a 
social science of beauty. This science of beauty is not based on the rules 
of art, or even on the powers of the critic of taste, but on the efficacy 
of a manager/observer whose power is never revealed, but who can 
define what will be sought after in a particular cultural situation.25 What 
Helvétius’s utilitarianism cannot relinquish is the possibility of gaining 
access to knowledge concerning a normative definition of the beautiful. 
Bentham’s interest, in contrast, is in why the possibility of defining 
social standards of beauty vanishes when we examine our predilections. 
His response to Helvétius is to argue that pleasure, in the hands of the 
legislator, is not manageable and depends on an ‘uncontrolled choice’ in 
which what is desired is not determined by social identities and cultural 
mores but instead by stubborn dispositions and propensities to derive 
pleasure from a variety of objects and activities. In Bentham’s view, the 
assumption that reproductive sexuality can underpin cultural definitions 
of beauty and social mechanisms of reward is not tenable. The practical 
aesthetics of Helvétius gives power to a manager/observer who can 
discern the ways in which social standards of beauty determine norms of 
behaviour. As I have said, Bentham rejects the idea of such a privileged 
observer and puts a predilection or disposition in its place. Accordingly, 
Bentham’s idea of social observation, as it is expressed in the panopticon, 
links human predilections to an architectural mechanism, one in which 
power over others can only be established by using an apparatus for 
monitoring empirical differences. In his manuscripts on the panopticon, 
Bentham contrasts his inspection house with the Sicilian prison of ‘The 
Ear of Dionysus’, a cave whose structure, it was said, allowed the warder 
to hear what the prisoners were saying to each other and ‘pry into the 
secret recesses of the heart’.26 The structure of the panopticon prison, 
on the other hand, is designed solely for the monitoring of overt acts, 
a task that can be performed by anyone who has a predilection for it. 
Bentham asserts that the panopticon ‘will supply … the place of that 
great and constant fund of entertainment to the sedentary and vacant in 
towns – the looking out of the window’.27 Putting curiosity to use within 
the social apparatus of the panopticon is a very different matter from 
assuming that a normative idea of beauty can be used as a mechanism 
of social coercion. In fact, Bentham opposed a utilitarian ethics of social 
observation to normative ideas of beauty. In a discussion of the personal 
taste of legislators in his manuscripts on ‘On the Influence of Time and 
Place in Matters of Legislation’, Bentham introduces the anecdote of a 
surgeon who cuts off the one remaining healthy finger on a patient’s 
damaged hand for aesthetic reasons, ‘because it would have looked 
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ridiculous’.28 In this example, aesthetics is used as the means to exert 
power over others but proves to be a very poor guide to ethical action. The 
utilitarian alternative is to be found in the panopticon hospital, where 
the surgeons ‘might with the least trouble possible watch as much as 
they chose to watch, the progress of the disease, and the influence of the 
remedy’.29 The apparatus of the panopticon hospital locates social power 
within the activity of inspection, but only insofar as this contributes to 
utility. This is why Michel Foucault’s description of the panopticon as 
a disciplinary mechanism is tendentious: it makes Bentham’s hedonic 
utilitarianism identical with the disciplining of bodies,30 an assumption 
that is contradicted by Bentham’s comments on warriors rewarded by 
the favours of women. The panopticon is not built around the power of 
an individual subject to classify what it observes, as Foucault suggests.31 
Instead, the structure of this ‘simple idea in Architecture’32 means that 
the actions of both the observing subject and the subject who is being 
observed are subsumed within a particular social task of inspection 
(penal, medical, pedagogic, etc.) that can contribute to general utility. 
A present-day equivalent of the actual distribution of social power in 
the structure of the panopticon hospital can be found in the detection of 
eye diseases, where monitoring by artificial intelligence is now superior 
to the scrutiny of human specialists.33 If we can understand how, in 
principle, the apparatus of the panopticon hospital might correct the 
point of view of the surgeon who cut off the healthy finger and thus alter 
his conception of ‘the good’, we can also understand why Bentham used a 
demand for utility to raise the stakes to the point where the possibility of 
cultural barbarism is revealed. 
Bentham on Addison
In his manuscripts on the panopticon, Bentham recommends his 
inspection house to Joseph Addison as a means for monitoring the 
virginity of young ladies and to Claude Adrien Helvétius as a means of 
testing his theory that ‘anybody may be taught anything, one person 
as well as another’.34 Bentham’s intention is partly satirical and partly 
serious. It is satirical because these offers to Addison and Helvétius 
are among several suggested applications of the panopticon apparatus 
that also include a solution to a fictional situation that is encountered 
in Cervantes’ Don Quixote. His intention is also serious, because the 
purpose of Bentham’s satire is to point out the precision and ‘sharpness’ 
of the panopticon as an apparatus for monitoring overt behaviour. 
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Bentham’s offer of his inspection-house to ‘the grave and moral 
Addison’ relates to Bentham’s half-remembered reference to ‘a 
contrivance for trying virginity by means of lions’ that was discussed by 
Addison in The Spectator.35 The important distinction here is between 
Addison’s idea of morality and Bentham’s. As I have mentioned, where 
Helvétius offers a utilitarian, ‘centrally managed’ practical aesthetics, 
Addison proposes a means for ‘self-management’ through the practice 
of taste. In Bentham’s view, both Helvétius and Addison are at fault for 
promoting socially normative definitions of the beautiful that cause 
harm to others. This was not how Addison saw it; for him, the power of 
being able to discover one’s own reasons for finding something pleasing 
or beautiful carried moral force, because it meant that the subjects of 
commercial society became the guarantors of their own happiness, 
rather than locating this happiness within the seductions of the external 
world. In Addison’s writing on taste in The Spectator between 1711 and 
1714, we can see the articulation of a specific ethical problem – how is 
a person with weak social connections to make their way in the world 
without losing their integrity by doing so? Addison’s practical aesthetic 
solution was to exchange the contingent and therefore dangerous 
pleasures of the world for the structured and controlled pleasures of 
good taste and good judgment. What is distinctive about this solution 
is that, on the one hand, it unites all mankind on the ground of ordinary 
perception and, on the other, it divides mankind into those who can 
learn to rely on the pleasures of taste and those who are content with 
the pleasures of the world. It also gives a very specific social role to the 
arts. For Addison, his new conception of taste could be used to oppose 
sectarian rules of art; in his words, ‘A man of an ordinary Ear is a judge 
whether a Passion is express’d in Proper sounds, and whether the Melody 
of those Sounds be more or less pleasing.’36 This sets up an opposition 
between the true social standard of judgment offered by a ‘man of an 
ordinary Ear’ and the false social standard offered by the public appetite 
for certain kinds of music. It also offered a means to distinguish bad taste 
from good taste. Bad taste was demonstrated in the cultural choices of 
those who, for example, were not actively developing their ‘ordinary 
Ear’ to judge ‘whether a Passion is express’d in Proper sounds’ and who 
were therefore passively content with all that was extravagant, childish 
and absurd in the performing arts. In this way, the connoisseur who 
trains himself to recognize the particular qualities of an object of art is 
challenged by the Addisonian person of taste who uses objects of art to 
train his own perception. Good taste would triumph, Addison thought, if 
public taste stopped bowing to the arbitrary rules of art and art started 
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accommodating itself to the rationale provided by ‘the general Sense and 
Taste of Mankind’:
Musick, Architecture, and Painting, as well as Poetry, and Oratory, 
are to deduce their Laws and Rules from the general Sense and Taste 
of Mankind, and not from the Principles of those Arts themselves; 
or, in other Words, the Taste is not to conform to the Art, but the Art 
to the Taste.37
In opposing Addison, Bentham’s focus was on the social consequences 
that followed from the employment of an evaluation of pleasurable 
sentiments as the preferred means to distinguish good taste from bad 
taste. For Bentham, this way of establishing standards of taste meant that 
something that was previously an object of amusement and enjoyment 
for oneself or someone else could become an object of ridicule and 
contempt. While Addison’s version of enlightenment seems to open up a 
new horizon of liberty that places the sensibility of the ordinary spectator 
at the centre of events within the chaos of commercial society, Bentham 
shows how this reproduces the arbitrary violence of aristocratic privilege 
in new ways. Bentham’s alternative, which proceeds through utility, 
offers an unrefined enlightenment through which the social violence of 
refinement can be overcome. In The Rationale of Reward, Bentham first 
isolates the problems of Addison’s refined enlightenment in a discussion 
of the relationship of the fine arts to refined taste. He then frames the 
alternative of an unrefined enlightenment, by separating Addison’s 
aesthetic solution from his ethical problem and offering the possibility 
of a choice between Addisonian refinement and Benthamite utility. 
Bentham’s unrefined enlightenment does not follow Addison’s logic of 
rejecting the rules of art and replacing them with a refined sensibility. 
Instead, it seeks a point of refuge from that same refined sensibility, a 
position from which we can examine how the cultural value of refinement 
determines the social role of the arts. The problem is, to use Bentham’s 
words, how can we choose ‘A pure and simple amusement’? When ‘to be 
hard to please, and to have our happiness dependant on what is costly 
and complicated, shall be found to be advantageous’?38 The difficulty 
that Bentham faces in his endeavour to establish the terms of a utilitarian 
choice for a simple amusement, is that Addison’s elevation of a refined 
sensibility as the basis of the standard of taste claims to annex the very 
possibility of choice and judgment to itself. This ‘checkmate’ on alter-
natives to refinement is re-affirmed in Mill’s criticisms of Bentham’s 
apparent blindness to the opportunities of reading moral character 
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through judgments of taste, and Mill’s famous remarks on Socrates and 
the satisfied fool in his essay on ‘Utilitarianism’ of 1861, in which Socrates 
is given the power to evaluate whatever it is that the fool is satisfied with, 
while the fool is not accorded the same privilege.39 
Bentham’s solution to the ‘checkmate’ of good taste in The Rationale 
of Reward begins with his analysis of the relationship of the practice of 
art to the practice of taste. Bentham begins by describing an inseparable 
connection between ‘science’ which is defined as the knowledge of how 
to achieve certain goals within a field of human endeavour and ‘art’ 
which is defined as the process of acquiring this knowledge. Utility, then, 
enters the picture as the basis on which to divide the arts and sciences 
according to how they contribute to the happiness of society. One half of 
the divide is occupied by the arts and sciences of utility, such as medicine 
and legislation, and the other half by the arts and sciences of amusement 
and curiosity. Here we need to focus on the manner in which an initial 
alignment of theory with practice is followed by a division of the arts and 
sciences according to how they contribute to the happiness of society. 
Bentham assembles the fine arts under a single category of ‘arts and 
sciences of amusement’ in which he includes music, poetry, painting, 
sculpture, architecture and ornamental gardening. He also draws 
attention to a paradox by pointing out that the fine arts are sources of 
amusement which also have the potential to deprive others of the sources 
of their amusement. He argues that on the terms set by critics of taste 
such as Joseph Addison and David Hume, the fine arts please only those 
refined individuals who are difficult to please and who can only obtain 
their pleasure through cultivating antipathy towards the pleasures of 
others, thus effecting a social separation between the pleasures of taste 
and the pleasures of the world. 
Bentham then shows us an exit from the horizon of judgment set 
by Addison’s ‘general Sense and Taste of mankind’. To do this, Bentham 
has to demonstrate that we can make an enlightened, empirical choice 
between refinement and utility that steers clear of social and cultural 
norms, in the face of Addison’s claim that ‘the general Sense and Taste 
of Mankind’ is the best foundation for a valid judgment. Addison’s view 
is that good taste can protect us from bad choices, but Bentham argues 
instead that what may look like a ‘bad choice’ can protect us from social 
mischief. To achieve this goal, Bentham alters the relationship between 
ethics and aesthetics within an Addisonian idea of cultural value. He 
begins by isolating a social problem of choice, by observing that, insofar 
as the fine arts have become the vehicles of a refined sensibility, they 
please those that are hard to please. Bentham then shows us how we can 
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mark out the route to an enlightened choice between refinement and 
utility, in the face of the claim that refinement is the only route to a valid 
judgment. He achieves this by reframing a choice between a ‘high status’ 
pleasure (The Iliad) and a ‘low status’ pleasure (solitaire) as a choice 
between refinement and utility. Bentham begins by outlining a utilitarian 
position on whether a statesman should play solitaire or play cards in 
company. He notes that while the statesman can play cards in company 
all night, playing solitaire is frowned upon, even though, as Bentham 
says, ‘how incomparably superior is this solitary game to many social 
games, so often anti-social in their consequences!’40 Having identified 
an immediate problem of social isolation that accompanies the choice 
of a pure and simple amusement, he then introduces a further difficulty 
by saying, ‘How much better was this minister occupied, [at solitaire] 
than if, with the Iliad in his hand, he had stirred up within his heart the 
seeds of those ferocious passions which can only be gratified with tears 
and blood.’41 What makes the choice of a pure or simple amusement 
so difficult to make is not just the stigma of social isolation, but the 
gratification afforded by the use of culture as a means of self-aggran-
dizement and self-justification. To surmount this difficulty, Bentham 
supplements this aesthetically determined choice between ‘high’ and 
‘low’ culture (the Iliad or solitaire), with the third option of playing 
cards in company, which transforms it into a decision about utility versus 
refinement. When this third element is in place, it becomes clear that 
for the statesman to choose solitaire is simultaneously to choose the 
best option from the point of view of utility and the worst option from 
the point of view of a refined sensibility. For him to choose the Iliad is 
to occupy the opposite position; here we might refer to David Hume’s 
explanation, in his essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ of 1757, of how the 
Iliad can be used to demonstrate the niceties of a refined sensibility. It 
is one thing to claim, as Bentham frequently did, that we should accept 
that no form of gratification is placed higher than any other; it is quite 
another to dismantle the Addisonian distinction between the pleasures 
of taste and the pleasures of the world, which is what Bentham sets out 
to do in The Rationale of Reward. To achieve this goal, Bentham’s task 
is not to tell us to prefer push-pin to poetry, because that would simply 
replace one person’s privilege with another’s. Instead, he must first 
show us why choosing poetry over push-pin gives us access to the social 
power conferred by distinctions between good taste and bad taste, and 
then show us why employing these distinctions, within which gratifi-
cation is present but disguised as refinement, is likely to be contrary to 
public utility. To challenge aesthetics, the very form of criticism had to 
bEntHAM AnD tHE Arts214
change, as is evident in Bentham’s comment that David Hume, despite 
‘his proud and independent philosophy’,42 yielded to literary prejudice 
on the grounds of taste when he praised the Duke of Buckingham for 
satirizing the popular theatrical entertainments of his day. Bentham’s 
new utilitarian form of criticism would have to disturb the privileges of 
the observer on which practical aesthetics depended. It would be able 
to identify Addisonian aesthetics as a means of self-gratification that 
was not justified by its claims on analytical power or moral autonomy, 
but rather should be condemned for the manner in which it negated the 
simple pleasures of others. 
The concept of an unrefined enlightenment relates to a key question 
that emerges in The Rationale of Reward, namely, how ‘without violence 
or injustice, hereditary nobility … [could be] … deprived of the greater 
part of its injurious prerogatives’.43 This sentence is part of a discussion of 
Catherine the Great’s use of meritocracy as a way to reform the Russian 
Civil Service. It is not a reference to the possibility of a violent overthrow 
of the nobility, but rather to the possibility of creating a meritocracy 
that does not reproduce the injurious prerogative of claiming to have 
been born to rule. The nearly forty-year gap between the origins of 
the text in Bentham’s visit to Russia and its English publication meant 
that Bentham had learnt something in the interim, as is demonstrated 
in his self-enlightening ‘Remarks by Mr Bentham’ in the preface to the 
1825 edition, in which he qualifies his earlier favourable comments on 
Catherine the Great in the light of his new commitment to representa-
tive democracy. Nonetheless, the key question at stake is not the question 
of nobility itself but how to think about social value in an enlightened 
way. The opposition between refinement and utility in The Rationale of 
Reward describes an enlightenment project whose exit from aristocratic 
prerogatives could be accomplished either by the refined enlightenment 
of Addison, with its emphasis on culture and taste, or the unrefined 
enlightenment of Bentham, with its emphasis on utility as a means to 
identify a variety of routes to pleasure. From Addison’s point of view, on 
the other hand, there is only one exit – good taste is what allows us to 
separate the esteem we give someone because of their refined sensibility 
from the deference that might be due to a hereditary title. 
Bentham on Hogarth
Bentham’s direct attack on Addison in The Rationale of Reward takes 
place on the terms set by an Addisonian worldview, in which the arts have 
EnL igHtEnMEnt unrEf inED 215
been co-opted to a project of refinement; however, I have also suggested 
that the manner in which Bentham frames a choice between refinement 
and utility showed that it was possible to develop a counter-strategy. In 
this part of the chapter, I will suggest what this counter-strategy implied 
for artists, by referring to Bentham’s praise for William Hogarth, whose 
illustrations to Samuel Butler’s Hudibras were displayed on the walls of 
Bentham’s home.44 Michael Quinn has noted that Bentham identifies 
Hogarth as someone who could promote healthy alternatives to socially 
mischievous desires that might otherwise warrant prohibition and 
punishment.45 Bentham wrote that, in Hogarth’s print Beer Street of 1751, 
everything has the aspect of health and jollity, while its companion print 
Gin Lane showed misery and disease, concluding, ‘That admirable artist 
was one of the best of moralists.’46 Bentham’s suggestion that Hogarth 
was on a par with the best of moralists suggests a very different social 
role for the arts than the one he outlines in The Rationale of Reward. It is 
worth noting, however, that David Bindman has argued that, ‘It seems 
beyond argument that Hogarth’s enterprise was Addisonian, in that his 
moral series implicitly advocate a middle way between vice and excessive 
virtue.’47 Other Hogarth scholars such as Ronald Paulson and David 
Solkin have given support to this idea of Hogarth as an Addisonian artist. 
Addison’s Spectator actually makes an appearance at the centre of one of 
Hogarth’s paintings, The Edwards Hamilton Family of 1734 (Figure 8.3). 
Figure 8.3: William Hogarth (1697–1764), The Edwards Hamilton 
Family on a Terrace, 1734. 
Private collection, printed by kind permission 
of Patrick Goetelen.
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At the request of his patron Mary Edwards, Hogarth painted her holding 
The Spectator, no. 580 of 13 August 1714, in which Addison discusses 
the omnipresence of the deity. The Spectator, no. 22 of 26 March 1711, 
which condemns ‘the false Taste of the Town’, may also have been one of 
the sources for Hogarth’s early print The Bad Taste of the Town of 1723 
(Figure 8.4). 
Figure 8.4: William Hogarth (1697–1764), The Bad Taste of the Town, 
1723–4.
Wiki/Commons
This print features an imaginary ‘Accademy of Art’ which is modelled 
on Burlington House, Piccadilly, the home of Richard Boyle, third earl 
of Burlington. This fantasy academy, whose doors are firmly shut, 
is shown to be failing to stem the general decay of public taste that is 
illustrated in the foreground, in the form of crowds being led towards 
the facile and shallow amusements of masquerades and Italian operas. 
In the middle of the image, plays written by Addison and other English 
dramatists such as Shakespeare, Congreve and Dryden, are being carted 
off in a wheelbarrow to be sold as wastepaper. Here Hogarth stays true 
to Addison’s injunction that ‘Taste is not to conform to the Art, but the 
Art to the Taste’ and the viewpoint of ‘Mr Spectator’ that separates the 
true pleasures of refined taste from the false pleasures of popular enter-
tainment. Hogarth’s Addisonianism is carried to its furthest extent in 
his treatise The Analysis of Beauty,48 published in 1753, where Hogarth 
attempts a rational, impartial analysis of the truth of beauty, in order to 
assist the ordinary observer and defeat the artificial rules of art promoted 
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by connoisseurs of art. In this text, Hogarth followed Addison’s emphasis 
on the power of being able to discover one’s own reasons for finding 
something pleasing, as well as a concomitant rejection of arbitrary 
rules of art and a subsequent embrace of ‘the general Sense and Taste 
of mankind’. Hogarth’s wish to lend the privileges of the Addisonian 
critic of taste to anyone who would like to have them founders because 
his ‘Analysis of Beauty’ does not establish a universal definition of beauty 
so much as rehearse the social and cultural privileges associated with 
reproductive sexuality that British men already enjoyed. Hogarth tells us 
that, ‘if I have acquired anything in my way it has been wholy obtain’d 
by Observation’,49 which counteracts a ‘perversion of the sight’ in which 
‘the eye may be subdued and forced into forming and disposing of 
objects even quite contrary to what it would naturally see them’.50 This 
allows him to declare that the elegant curved lines in the body of a living 
woman are more beautiful than a statue of Venus,51 and that the form of a 
woman’s body surpasses that of a man. The art historian Ronald Paulson 
saw Hogarth as pursuing a radical project in The Analysis of Beauty: 
Hogarth is attempting to create an aesthetics that acknowledges 
that if we place a beautiful woman on a pedestal we will inevitably 
and appropriately desire her and may discover, moreover, that 
she is not strictly virtuous. This is an anti-aesthetics, or a practical 
aesthetics, in relation to the theoretically pure aesthetics of 
Shaftesbury, where the human body can only be beautiful if 
divorced from function, fitness and utility.52
It can also be argued, however, that Hogarth’s attempt to ‘fix the 
fluctuating ideas of Taste’ by means of direct observation works against 
his own ambition for a rational and formal analysis. This is because it 
installs a preferred definition of beauty based on reproductive sexuality 
at the heart of that analysis. The effect of this is coercive – as Jenny Uglow 
has argued, Hogarth’s ‘real mistake … was to defy the tyranny of rules 
by inventing a new rule himself, and insisting that it was an absolute 
truth’.53 It can also be argued that Hogarth’s mistake in this instance is 
actually Addison’s mistake, insofar as the persuasive and liberal notion 
of the general sense and taste of mankind leads Hogarth to adopt not so 
much an anti-aesthetic but rather an anti-artistic position in Analysis of 
Beauty, which begins, somewhat paradoxically, by arguing vehemently 
against the notion that ‘painters and connoisseurs are the only competent 
judges’.54 Adam Komisaruk has argued that ‘Hogarth replaces one fetish 
(the classical simulacrum) with another (the living woman)’ while 
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emphasizing ‘how risky a strategy this inflated masculinism can be’.55 
We can go further, and say how risky a strategy empiricism can be – the 
ambition for clear and unprejudiced vision leads from the classical statue 
to the living woman, but, in Bentham’s terms, a definition of beauty 
based on reproductive sexuality was not tenable, because sexuality was 
an inclination without a fixed object that ignored the distinction between 
the beautiful and the ugly. 
In Beer Street and Gin Lane, on the other hand, we see Hogarth 
approaching empiricism in a different way, by outlining the harms that 
result from a predilection for gin, and the benefits that derive from substi-
tuting this predilection for the consumption of beer. The knowledge that 
is made available by comparing these two images does not require an 
analysis of beauty.56 The distinction between Gin Lane and Beer Street is 
not guided by a difference between the ugly and the beautiful, but rather 
by the difference between the pleasure of a predilection and the social 
harm it causes. Bentham also reminds us that a fixation on a specific 
object of desire is a work of the imagination, which must be understood in 
its particularity as an inclination towards pleasure, rather than reasoned 
out through an analysis of beauty:
A value of affection is rarely appreciated by third persons; it 
requires highly enlightened benevolence, a philosophy quite out of 
the common, to sympathize with tastes that we do not share. The 
Dutch florist, who exchanges a tulip bulb for its weight in gold, 
scoffs at the antiquary who gives a great price for a rusty lamp.57
In his writing ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’, Bentham also makes the following 
observation: 
In the case of the fine arts, when the object is of a complex nature, 
by being made to observe this or that circumstance that he had 
not observed before – this or that feature of defect or excellence 
which till now had passed unobserved – a man may now and then 
be made to change his taste. But in the field of appetite – of physical 
appetite – so simple is the object, no place can be found for any 
such discovery. The man to whom habit has rendered the use of 
tobacco a source of gratification, whether in the way of snuffing, 
smoking or mastication, by nothing that any one can say to him will 
he be convinced that that taste of his is a bad taste. Let him see that 
by taking it he inflicts annoyance on those in whose presence he 
is taking it, you may make him abstain from it, but never can you 
make him in his own mind acknowledge it to be a bad taste.58
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Hogarth’s The Analysis of Beauty asserts that it is the artificial rules of art 
and the verbiage of the connoisseur that prevents the ordinary spectator 
from seeing something ‘he had not observed before’, namely that the 
living woman is more beautiful than the statue. Bentham argues that 
this way of seeing things as they really are is self-defeating, because 
it narrows the field of vision to what we are ‘made to observe’ by the 
person of taste. The field of vision described by a search for things as they 
actually are can instead be occupied by any object that is a source of grat-
ification, whether that is a tulip bulb, a rusty lamp or a tobacco pouch. In 
Gin Lane and Beer Street, Hogarth made these kinds of objects the subject 
of his art. The distinction between the Addisonian and the Benthamite 
Hogarth that I have made in this chapter also shows us how we can begin 
to map out a conceptual distance between the role of art in affirming the 
social power of normative judgments on the beautiful, and a contrasting 
aim to define the social power of art by marking out its position in the 
world. Bentham does the latter when he defines Hogarth as an admirable 
artist who was also ‘one of the best of moralists’.
Conclusion: An unrefined enlightenment 
If enlightenment, broadly speaking, means freedom from tutelage, 
from being told what to think or how to behave by someone else and 
gaining freedom from prejudice and superstition, what is an ‘unrefined’ 
enlightenment? It is enlightenment won in a battle against refinement, 
a battle that Jeremy Bentham conducted throughout his life. In this 
chapter, I have argued that, taken together, The Rationale of Reward 
and ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ show us that, once we have embraced an 
empirical attitude to aesthetics, the agreements on the agreeable that 
are required by refined taste are unstable. We have to name what is 
actually barbaric, such as rewarding warriors with women, rather than 
concerning ourselves with a dubious bid for civilization by naming what 
is in ‘bad taste’. I have also given an account of the enlightened exit from 
aristocratic forms of social life that Bentham describes in The Rationale of 
Reward, and contrasted Bentham’s approach with the practical aesthetics 
of Addison and Hume, who see the esteem we give someone because of 
their refined sensibility as the enlightened alternative to the deference 
that might be due to a hereditary title. The time that has elapsed from the 
end of the ‘long eighteenth century’ to the beginning of the twenty-first 
century has sidelined Bentham’s challenge to aesthetics, while retaining 
an Addisonian emphasis on the privileges accorded to the ordinary 
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observer of culture, as well as versions of Helvétius’s ambition to obtain 
a controlling interest in socially normative definitions of the beautiful. 
When the award of the Nobel Prize in Literature to Bob Dylan in 2016 
challenged elitist cultural distinctions of the kind that would separate 
Bob Dylan from John Keats, it thereby affirmed the cultural status of 
the ordinary observer within judgements of taste, over and above the 
interests of literary cliques. However, as was the case with Hogarth’s The 
Analysis of Beauty, the cultural status accorded to the ordinary observer 
could be more precisely defined as the restatement of existing privileges 
accorded to a particular social group. As one journalist put it, giving 
the Nobel Prize to Bob Dylan was actually an indication of ‘prevailing 
educated taste among Swedish Baby Boomers’.59 It is also worth noting 
that when cultural institutions do question the logic of taste, they do 
this on the ground Joseph Addison chose for his new conception of the 
social role of the arts, namely the importance of everyday experience 
to the definition of cultural value. To give an example, Alistair Hudson, 
during his tenure as director of Middlesbrough Institute of Modern 
Art (2014–17), declared it his intention to make the museum the sum 
of the activity of all of its users.60 However, this attempt to substitute 
community values and civic value for aesthetic value is not what Jeremy 
Bentham was concerned with. He was not interested in the question 
of what counts as cultural value, but rather in the more fundamental 
question of whether culture has any value at all to a project of enlighten-
ment. For Bentham, the answer to this question turned on the issue of 
a change in the social meaning of taste from enjoyment to refinement. 
He opposed this turn from enjoyment to refinement by showing that the 
ambition to obtain knowledge about the beautiful becomes irrelevant 
when we examine our predilections.
An opportunity to observe a contrast between Bentham’s 
unrefined enlightenment and current relationships between the 
‘central management’ and ‘self-management’ of culture was provided 
by the display of Bentham’s auto-icon in a major art exhibition Like Life: 
Sculpture, Color and the Body (1300–Now), curated by Luke Syson and 
Sheena Wagstaff, which ran from 21 March to 22 July 2018 at the Met 
Breuer museum in New York. While Bentham’s auto-icon has been the 
subject of artworks by Marcel Broodthaers and Luc Tuymans, in this 
exhibition it was being used as part of an exercise in practical aesthetics 
that defined realism in sculpture, using objects from different eras that 
were more or less ‘Like Life’, ranging from Duane Hanson’s sculpture 
‘Housepainter I’ (1984) that might easily be mistaken for a living person, 
to Charles Ray’s ‘Aluminum Girl’ (2003), an all-white three-quarters 
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sized female nude that juxtaposes extreme representational detail 
with classical conventions of sculpture. Comments on the auto-icon 
in the exhibition catalogue placed it in the cross-hairs of a debate on 
the relationship between art and verisimilitude, noting that the wax 
head of Bentham (by Jacques Talrich, a French military surgeon, later 
anatomical wax modeller for the Faculté de Médecine in Paris) ‘combines 
the conventions of portraiture and the acute realism available through 
wax modelling’.61 
In her essay in the catalogue for ‘Like Life’, the exhibition’s co-curator 
Sheena Wagstaff referred to the ‘aesthetic shock’ that was brought about 
by the discovery of the polychrome characteristics of classical sculpture, 
which signalled the literal presence of the body in the realm of art. If the 
intention of the curators of ‘Like Life’ had been to challenge our under-
standing of sculpture by including Bentham’s auto-icon alongside Duane 
Hanson, Charles Ray and a copy of Philippe Curtius’s mechanical waxwork 
Sleeping Beauty (1765, remade 1989) loaned from Madame Tussauds, it 
seems to have worked. In The New York Review of Books, James Fenton 
argued that the exhibition had succeeded in drawing our attention to ‘a 
kind of perceptual trick played on us by the history of taste’62 in which any 
sculpture that is coloured is perceived to have lower cultural value. This 
did not, however, make everyone entirely comfortable with what was on 
display – in a review for The New Yorker, Peter Schjeldahl said that he was 
‘torn between praising it [the exhibition] as visionary … and reporting it 
as a mugging to the taste police’.63 Another review by Ben Davis on Artnet 
went so far as to suggest that the exhibition was courting a new kind of 
taste based on a much older model of the ‘Wunderkammer’ or cabinet 
of curiosities: ‘The sensibility proposed by “Like Life” is a taste for the 
Curious – or whatever you call the thrill you get from seeing philosopher 
Jeremy Bentham’s preserved corpse, propped up in a glass box.’64 This 
last comment on the ‘Like Life’ exhibition indicates the necessity of more 
clearly identifying Bentham’s challenge to aesthetics, the nature of his 
commitment to realism and his opposition to distinctions of taste. This 
challenge is not about broadening our cultural outlook, so that the 
thrill of seeing Bentham propped up in a glass box can bring us from the 
specialized aesthetic realms of the terror of the sublime or the refined 
sensibility of taste to arrive at mere goggle-eyed curiosity. We have to 
go one step further and put curiosity in the service of utility. Within 
the panopticon, as Bentham remarks, curiosity can be put to good use, 
because the structure of the apparatus means that an inclination towards 
looking out of the window is necessarily transformed into the business of 
inspection. Outside the panopticon, however, if you are feeling curious 
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about Bentham’s preserved corpse in an exhibition, what you are seeing 
is Bentham as he appears within your personal cultural itinerary. Within 
this self-managed cultural itinerary, your commitment to the value of 
seeing things in your own way is very clear, and, moreover, is supported 
by the central management and the curatorial agency of an exhibition 
such as ‘Like Life’.65 Your relationship to utility, however, is obscure. 
Staring at Bentham’s auto-icon in an exhibition would tell you very little 
about Bentham’s challenge to the arts. On the other hand, noticing how, 
in Gin Lane and Beer Street, Hogarth makes predilection both the subject 
of his art and an anchor for the social role of art in general tells you what 
this challenge is all about. 
Notes
 1 One place from which to chart this shift of emphasis in British aesthetics is through the 
influence of the Abbé Dubos, whose ‘Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture’, first 
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Jeremy Bentham’s principle of utility 
and taste: An alternative approach to 
aesthetics in two stages
benjamin bourcier
In the first part of this chapter, I explain how Bentham places the 
liberty of taste among the fundamental political liberties that all good 
government should guarantee. His argument relies upon an extensive 
critique of the principle of asceticism. In the second part, I explain that 
the political defence of the liberty of taste raises the question of its 
relation to private ethics. Since Bentham’s principle of utility assumes a 
continuity between public and private ethics, how should we understand 
the place of the liberty of taste in Bentham’s private ethics? Since private 
ethics aims to explain how an individual can contribute to the greatest 
happiness when not subjected to coercion, I demonstrate that liberty of 
taste is moderated by the educational role of the private deontologist. 
1. Why taste matters to politics: The liberty of taste as a 
political liberty
Bentham is intimately associated with the principle of utility. All sentient 
beings are motivated by a desire for pleasure and an aversion to pain, and 
this fact is recognized by Bentham’s principle of utility or the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number. In An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation (hereafter IPML), Bentham famously states:
bEntHAM AnD tHE Arts228
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what 
we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the 
one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain 
of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us 
in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make 
to throw off their subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and 
confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but 
in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of 
utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation 
of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by 
the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question 
it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in 
darkness instead of light.1
For Bentham, the principle of utility is the only principle that grounds 
moral thinking on an objective assessment of pleasures and pains and 
at the same time provides guidance for reforming legal codes and public 
institutions for the sake of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 
In contrast, Bentham unifies in one phrase – ‘making war upon 
pleasures’2 – the opposite idea that characterizes misrule and bad 
government. ‘Making war upon pleasures’ means that some groups or 
governments prevent, forbid, punish and attempt to abolish common 
and innocent pleasures and, therefore, set aside the liberty of taste. 
‘Making war upon pleasures’ can take different political forms, each 
of them implying different kinds and degrees of pains and negative 
experiences, from individual mischiefs to social domination, violence 
and fear for the preservation of one’s life. Yet they all have in common a 
violation of a political liberty, that is of each individual’s ‘equal right to 
happiness’.3 Hence, Bentham’s approach to aesthetics and tastes initiates 
a radical political turn. Liberty of taste is an issue of entitlement and 
the government must ensure respect for, and equal treatment of, each 
individual’s tastes, that is the ‘aptitude or disposition to derive pleasure’ 
from some state of affairs.4 Liberty of taste is political; it means that the 
government should never impose one particular conception of happiness 
on all, and that the liberty of taste is necessary for achieving the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number. Bentham’s alternative approach to 
aesthetics and taste is conceptualized as a political problem and rejects, 
therefore, the autonomy of aesthetics. 
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1.1. what is ‘making war upon pleasures’?
In order to trace the origin of Bentham’s opposition to the autonomy of 
aesthetics, it is necessary to start with his understanding of pleasure. He 
considers all pleasures to be good, whatever their source, nature, extent 
and social implications (even if they counteract social norms, traditions, 
religious beliefs or customs). Indeed, regarding moral evaluation, he 
argues that the quantity of pleasure is the only criterion that matters. 
This is evident from the fourth chapter of IPML where he explains that:
To a person considered by himself, the value of a pleasure or pain 




3. Its certainty or uncertainty.
4. Its propinquity or remoteness.5
These circumstances constitute the value of a pleasure or a pain. The 
degree of intensity in the experience, the quantity of time (duration), 
the epistemic quality (certainty or uncertainty), and the point in time 
(propinquity or remoteness) together indicate the value of a pleasure 
or a pain. They form the essential components through which one can 
evaluate the tendency of an act. Bentham’s primary objective is to affirm 
that quantity is the only legitimate rational criteria by which to assess 
the moral value of pleasure. All that matters is the quantity of pleasure, 
which means that no other criterion carries any normative value. This is 
precisely the point that Bentham reaffirms in Not Paul, but Jesus:
According to the principle of utility, taking in its entirety the whole 
mass of pleasure in question – presence or, in case of absence, 
propinquity and certainty, i.e. probability, being given or out of 
the question – quantity is the sole measure of value: considered 
in themselves all other circumstances and incidents, shape and 
source, for example are regarded as matters of indifference.6
Since the only legitimate moral criterion is the quantity of pleasure, 
there are no bad pleasures – all pleasures are good. Dismissing certain 
tastes as illegitimate has the effect of reducing the quantity of pleasure 
and hence is, by definition, wrong. In his writings on sexual morality and 
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religious asceticism, Bentham criticizes limitations placed on the liberty 
of taste. He notes that sexual pleasures and the common pleasures of 
drinking and eating are the first pleasures to be banned by the religious 
ascetic: ‘The pleasures against which the most unrelenting war has thus 
been kept up – the pleasures which have borne the principal marks 
of this hostility – have been the pleasures of the table and the pleasures 
of the bed.’7 Bentham devotes many pages to analysing the different 
sorts of pleasures of eating, drinking and sex. For example, in his essay 
‘Sextus’, he describes two modes of sexual conduct, terming one ‘regular’ 
in reference to what is normal under prevailing social conventions, and 
the other ‘irregular’ insofar as it violates these social rules. He then lists 
eight different cases of sexual irregularities.8
In describing these different types of pleasures, Bentham is saying 
that they all count in a positive way, and is highlighting the wrongness 
of discounting them, such as when some social groups or government 
in general forbids the exercise of them.9 The immediate consequence 
of the prohibition of these pleasures is the creation of mischief through 
the loss of pleasure. To deprive people of pleasure is to act in an anti-
utilitarian way because, at best, it is lowering the quantity of pleasure 
and, at worst, it is creating pain. Bentham connects ‘mischief’ to a loss 
of pleasure as much as to the actual creation of pain: ‘Danger for losing 
Happiness arises: 1st. From events at large: or 2dly. From Actions. 
Unhappiness from events is stiled Calamity. Unhappiness from action is 
stiled Mischief.’10 The epithet of ‘mischief’ describes the actions, policies 
and decisions of a government that forbids certain pleasures based on 
a particular moral, political and religious ideology. A government that 
creates mischief ruins the expectations of individuals, which often leads 
to pain and ends by ‘making war upon pleasures’. A bad government 
systematically violates the equal consideration of each individual’s right 
to happiness and the fundamental liberty of taste in the name of one 
particular idea of happiness. The wrongness of this ‘war upon pleasures’ 
is the trademark of tyrannical or despotic government.
1.2. the politics of taste: How and why?
Bentham’s defence of the liberty of taste appears in its political dimension 
when he critically analyses discourses and theories (religions, philoso-
phies, art critics and so on) that value pleasures on the basis of non-
utilitarian criteria (such as purity/impurity; good taste/bad taste; fine 
arts/popular arts; intellectual pleasures/pleasures of the body and so 
on). Bentham’s recently published texts on sexual morality and religious 
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asceticism11 show his proactive criticism of all ideologies that, for 
different political, moral or religious reasons, establish a politics of taste 
that forbids some tastes and pleasures, lowers the quantity of happiness 
in a society and imposes specific tastes on all. In these writings, the 
social function of the politics of taste is the central concern of Bentham’s 
criticism. 
Indeed, Bentham thinks that the ideological role of such politics 
of taste is to support the interests of the dominant class, in particular 
to strengthen their privileges and other social advantages. Behind the 
prohibition of pleasure imposed by the ruling few always lies some form 
of hypocrisy.12 The first dimension of this hypocrisy is the pretence of 
acting virtuously, which is an essential component of the discourse of the 
ruling few. The hypocrite expresses his unconditional love and respect 
for the objective moral standard that guides his virtuous conduct. The 
claim of virtue plays an important function in justifying the prohibition 
of certain pleasures. The second dimension of this hypocrisy is that the 
‘love of virtue’ benefits the political ambition of the ruling few, that is, 
the promotion of the interests of their own class based on the sacrifice 
of the interests of the subject many. The politics of taste always aims to 
serve the interests of the privileged class, and not the moral and political 
ends ostensibly declared. To address the liberty of taste as a political issue 
implies, for Bentham, the exposure of the hypocrisy of the privileged and 
its evil consequences. 
Bentham identifies the principle of asceticism as the main source 
of the hypocrisy of the ruling few. Recent scholarship has demonstrated 
the key role played by advocates of the principle of asceticism in the 
prohibition of pleasure, that is, in prohibiting actions that others (and 
possibly themselves) find pleasurable and yet harm no one.13 Bentham 
attacks the moral and political implications of the prohibition of pleasure 
based on the principle of asceticism. In IPML, he defines the principle of 
asceticism as follows:
By the principle of asceticism I mean that principle, which, like 
the principle of utility, approves or disapproves of any action, 
according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or 
diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question; 
but in an inverse manner: approving of actions in as far as they tend 
to diminish his happiness; disapproving of them in as far as they 
tend to augment it.14 
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Bentham describes two sorts of proponents of asceticism: the philosophi-
cal ascetics (the Stoics) and the religious ascetics.15 Both praise virtue 
and have a strong commitment to the love of virtue. Ascetics make ‘war 
upon pleasures’ because they evaluate common pleasure according to 
anti-utilitarian criteria (purity/impurity, intellectual/physical, good 
taste/bad taste and so on). These criteria introduce confusion in the 
way people conceive of pleasure. More precisely, Bentham thinks that 
ascetics erect their personal tastes (disgusts, aversions and preferences) 
into an objective standard of taste. In this process, Bentham identifies 
the  ‘love of virtue’ as a motive that plays a crucial role in building the 
standard of good taste and hence the pretended standard of morality. 
He explains that the ‘love of virtue’ is not a condition of real virtue; it is 
nothing less than an attachment to one particular motive and source of 
pleasure, namely the ‘love of reputation’.16 The attachment to the ‘love 
of virtue’ leads the ruling few to value what they conceive to be in their 
interest as intrinsically good and as the expression of the standard of right 
and wrong itself. In a discussion of the nature of antipathy, but just as 
relevant to the nature of asceticism, Bentham argues that, by displaying 
a hatred of what they consider to be vice, they demonstrate their love for 
the opposite and correspondent virtue’. Hence, the ‘love of virtue’ is a 
means by which the ruling few promote their particular interest.17
The motive of ‘love of virtue’ leads some privileged persons to 
implement the ‘war upon pleasures’. Bentham looks more closely at 
the social status of these persons, namely members of the aristocratic 
or dominant class, religious authorities, poets, philosophers, and art 
critics. Their ‘love of virtue’ pushes them to develop criticisms against 
what they consider the crude pleasures of the poor. The authority of 
their social position combines with the ambition and particular interest 
of their own class and thereby produces a conflict with the interest of 
the subject many. They deploy aesthetical, metaphysical, religious and 
ethical considerations in their discourses in order to legitimate their 
vocabulary about taste (‘pure’, ‘sublime’, ‘delicacy’ and so on). Catholic 
authorities, for instance, consider that the love of God demands the 
rejection of the pleasures of the flesh, while art critics and poets claim 
that the ‘purity’ of ‘higher’ pleasures demands the avoidance of ‘lower’ 
pleasures. Ultimately, for Bentham, these forms of hypocrisy translate 
into an abuse of power, namely when rules and laws enforce the politics 
of taste.18 
Bentham’s alternative approach to taste and aesthetics moves in 
a different direction from most of the moral and political theorists of 
his time.19 I will now explain how Bentham’s opposition to Rousseau 
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further demonstrates how the liberty of taste as a political liberty is a 
radical thesis that aims to avoid all temptation to moralize aesthetics, 
taste and art. Rousseau wrote a famously strong criticism of the theatre 
in his letter to D’Alembert,20 commenting on the vices and political 
danger that are promoted by the pleasures of amusement. Rousseau 
condemns the establishment of a theatre in Geneva and expresses 
worries about the deleterious moral effects produced by the fine arts. 
For Rousseau, the theatre, like other fine arts, necessarily leads to the 
corruption of the moral sense and the hearts of the people. Following a 
theme largely developed in his First Discourse on the Arts and Sciences,21 
he argues that amusement will lead to the corruption of morals and will 
condemn Geneva to the same tragic destiny that Egypt, Greece and Rome 
had experienced in ancient history. The progress of the arts contributes 
to the loss of the authentic morality of human nature. Rousseau considers 
aesthetic pleasures to be a symptom of the civic and moral regress of the 
citizen and the people and, therefore, that amusement is not an innocent 
pleasure, but the symptom of a much more acute danger for the political 
community. Hence, he opposes the liberty of taste. In Preparatory 
Principles, Bentham criticizes Rousseau’s view:
Every amusement, says Mr Rousseau, that is useless is an evil to a 
being to whom life is so short and time so pretious. 
For the word Amusement, I suppose, we may, without 
imputing any signification to his words different from what he 
intended they should have, render into pleasure. By the word 
unprofitable, or, as it is in the original, useless, we may render 
unproductive of other pleasures. According to this interpretation, 
then, what Mr Rousseau wishes us to understand is that every 
pleasure that is not productive of other pleasures is an evil.
If this be the meaning of the proposition, one may venture, 
I think, boldly to deny the truth of it. We may venture to say, on 
the contrary, that every pleasure, although unproductive of other 
pleasures, so as it be not productive of any pains that are more than 
equivalent to it, is good. 
That a sophism like this, a sophism that carries on it the 
point of austere virtue, should have passed upon Mr Rousseau is 
not very extraordinary. What surprizes one is that a philosopher 
of such cool discernment as Mr Marmontel, a critic who has taken 
it into consideration for the express purpose of combating the 
conclusions drawn from it, should not have ventured to contest 
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it. Such is sometimes the power of popular prejudice over the 
strongest minds.
Instead of denying the truth of the general proposition that an 
amusement that is useless is in itself an evil, he endeavours to elude 
the force of it. He alledges that, though the particular amusement 
in question, admitting it to be an evil, should be excluded from the 
place in question, another amusement equally an evil would fill 
its place. 2dly. That the amusement in question is not useless. 3dly. 
That if it were, it would be difficult to bring men to give it up. 4thly. 
That allowing it to be an evil, that is to the community: yet if the 
community allows of it, there is no harm done.22
In this passage, Bentham not only explains the extent to which Rousseau 
is wrong to consider amusement as an evil, but also demonstrates how 
he perfectly illustrates the hypocrisy of the modern opponent to pleasure 
and the theorist who is ‘making war upon pleasures’. Contrary to what 
Rousseau states, amusement is not an evil, but a good, which takes its 
source in a subjective preference for a particular taste (perhaps the 
theatre or music) and should be respected and considered as equal to 
any other taste producing the same quantity of pleasure. The love of 
amusement, like all pleasures related to the fine arts, are enjoyed by 
privileged people who are more difficult to satisfy than people from 
other classes. However, amusement is not a ‘higher’ and better taste. 
All tastes are equal insofar as they tend to produce the same quantity 
of pleasure. For Bentham, each individual should be left free to enjoy 
whatever taste gives him pleasure. If some individual’s taste leads him 
to enjoy ‘push-pin’ while another prefers music by Handel (like Bentham 
himself), then so be it and government should not place any limitation 
on such a choice. The equal consideration of each person’s taste is at 
the heart of Bentham’s defence of liberty of taste as a political liberty. 
Governments, therefore, should not impose constraints on the tastes of 
the people.
The pleasures of sex should not form an object of consideration for 
government. All pleasures matter and should not be repressed except 
insofar as they produce greater pain. According to Bentham’s defence of 
the liberty of taste, there is no pleasure derived from taste that, quantity 
aside, is right or good, while another is wrong or evil. Moreover, there 
is no other legitimate source of moral praise or blame than the balance 
of pleasure or pain produced. In this sense, each individual is free to 
pursue the sort of pleasure he likes. An implication of Bentham’s defence 
of liberty of taste is that the state respects the tastes and pleasures of 
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all individuals. The happiness of society consists in the aggregate 
happiness of each of its members. Consequently, the liberty of taste 
gives rise to an important political truth. There is no possible justifica-
tion for a government enforcing or prescribing one particular conception 
of happiness on its members. Conceived as such, the liberty of taste 
is a key-stone in Bentham’s political thought and is necessary to the 
promotion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 
2. How Bentham treats aesthetics and taste in private 
ethics
Given that Bentham’s principle of utility assumes a continuity between 
public and private ethics, his defence of liberty of taste in the political 
sphere must have implications for the individual acting privately. 
Bentham’s defence of the liberty of taste, as I have shown, demands that 
a utilitarian government respect and secure each individual’s choice in 
matters of taste where, to do so, does not result in preponderant harm.23 
What, then, is the role of the private deontologist – the moralist – in 
relation to such matters? Consideration of utilitarian private ethics raises 
the question of the relation between utility and taste from a different 
perspective. For Bentham, the best utilitarian outcome results from the 
perfect correspondence between an individual’s interest and his duty. 
How, then, can the junction between interests and duty occur in relation 
to taste? The answer is that, while Bentham rejects any form of coercion 
on the grounds of aesthetics and taste as a means of promoting virtue, 
he gives the role of advising and educating individuals as to how they 
might reap the greatest pleasure from their own choices to the private 
deontologist.
2.1. why private ethics is concerned with the liberty of taste
Bentham’s ‘private ethics’ or ‘private deontology’ aims to show how an 
individual can reap the most happiness at the least cost. Before examining 
the relation between aesthetics and private deontology in Bentham’s 
thought, it is worth recalling that by ‘deontology’ Bentham means ethics 
or morality, in other words the study of the manner by which happiness 
is promoted or maximized.24 He then develops a distinction between 
‘public deontology’ and ‘private deontology’ where ‘private deontology’ 
refers to individual ethics, that is the means by which an individual can, 
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through his own judgment and knowledge, act and live as a utilitarian, in 
other words create a junction between his interest and his duty.25
Bentham scholars have debated the place of ‘private deontology’ 
in Bentham’s philosophy. Scholars have unanimously condemned 
the version of Deontology produced by John Bowring shortly after 
Bentham’s death. Mack thinks that the book is ‘an oversimplified 
moralist textbook’,26 Baumgardt discards Deontology from his analysis 
of Bentham’s ethics27 and Burns judges it ‘the worst book ever written 
on an important subject’.28 The more recent Collected Works edition of 
Deontology, which attempts to be faithful to Bentham’s manuscripts, has 
permitted a more accurate interpretation of Bentham’s views on private 
ethics. Emmanuelle de Champs argues for a perfect match between 
private and public deontology,29 and Ross Harrison and Philip Schofield 
agree that there is a compatibility between Bentham’s general utilitarian 
thought and his private ethics, even if the latter is less developed.30 I will 
follow this reading of Bentham’s private ethics. While Bentham develops 
an original defence of liberty of taste as a political liberty, the aim of 
‘private ethics’ is to address the issue of morality for the individual. 
Conceived as such, in his ‘private deontology’ Bentham addresses the 
relationship between aesthetics and ethics in a different way from that 
presented in his legislative theory. 
2.2. subjectivism and taste
Bentham’s approach to ‘private ethics’ is grounded in the individual’s 
judgment and the subjective tastes that determine his interests. I begin 
by explaining Bentham’s commitment to subjectivism and its relativist 
implications. In doing so, I demonstrate how taste is related to ‘private 
ethics’. Bentham recognizes that the individual is the best judge of his 
own interest: ‘Every person is not only the most proper judge, but the 
only proper judge of what with reference to himself is pleasure: and so 
in regard to pain.’31 The individual remains the best authority to judge 
his own pleasure, and it will be difficult to persuade anyone otherwise, 
even if experiencing some particular pleasure turns out to be obnoxious 
in some way.
The man to whom habit has rendered the use of tobacco a source 
of gratification, whether in the way of snuffing, smoking or 
mastication, by nothing that any one can say to him will he be 
convinced that that taste of his is a bad taste. Let him see that by 
taking it he inflicts annoyance on those in whose presence he is 
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taking it, you may make him abstain from it, but never can you 
make him in his own mind acknowledge it to be a bad taste.32
It is worth emphasizing the point that Bentham is making here. Each 
individual, according to Bentham, values his interest according to the 
subjective feelings of pleasure and pain he is experiencing at any given 
time. If he finds the use of tobacco pleasurable, it makes no sense to tell 
him that he does not. The individual may abstain, for the sake of not 
causing annoyance to others, but he will resent the sacrifice of what he 
considers to be a pleasure. Nevertheless, the possibility for the individual 
to promote successfully his own happiness relies on a choice of pleasures 
that will not, in the long run, create greater pain for himself. Bentham’s 
approach to happiness is subjectivist in this sense: if an individual cares 
for something, then it is because he values positively this pleasure, no 
matter what others think or no matter what science (or any rational 
discourse) says about the mischievous consequences likely to ensue after 
the initial enjoyment of the pleasure. Subjective judgment is the highest 
authority for each individual’s pleasures. This subjectivist approach to 
well-being and happiness allows Bentham to explain that an individual’s 
taste may change, when he stops deriving pleasure from one source and 
begins to reap it from another. More precisely, Bentham explains that 
such changes appear in different situations and involve different aspects. 
An individual can change his taste, for example, in relation to the fine 
arts:
In the case of fine arts, when the object is of a complex nature, by 
being made to observe this or that circumstance which he had not 
observed before – this or that feature of defect or excellence which 
till now had passed unobserved – a man may now and then be 
made to change his taste.33
His taste changes because he has been shown a new dimension that 
modifies the disposition from which an individual derives pleasure from 
the experience in question. Bentham describes a second situation. The 
individual changes his taste because the pleasure he once experienced 
from an object or act has evaporated and it now causes him pain. 
Bentham develops this idea in Deontology with the example of wine or 
food:
At an early part of his life, for instance, a man had a taste for wine 
in general, or for a particular species of food. Finding it disagree 
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with his constitution, little by little the uneasiness attendant on the 
gratification of the desire has become so frequent in experience, 
and so continually present in idea, that the idea of the future but 
near and certain pain has gained such strength as to overpower the 
impression of the present pleasure – or, what comes to the same 
thing, the idea of it at the moment preceding that at which, but for 
the idea of the attendant pain, it would have been reaped. In fine, 
the idea of the consequent and greater though more distant pain 
has operated as an extinguisher upon the idea of the lesser though 
immediate pleasure.34
In this example, the balance between a present pleasure and a distant pain 
provokes a change in the individual’s taste. His ‘aptitude or disposition to 
derive pleasure from an object’ or taste changes.35 His revised assessment 
of the likely balance of pain over pleasure, evaluated from the point of 
view of the distant future, has provided him with a reason to change his 
taste. 
In both cases, we have an example of how an individual’s taste can 
change over time. Given that individual tastes are contingent, Bentham’s 
subjectivist account of value here encounters the problem of moral 
relativism. If individual tastes are not permanent and can be subject to 
change, even radical change, it may be objected, how can the very project 
of deontology – the development of a private morality based on the 
principle of utility – be possible? How can Bentham advocate the liberty 
of taste and at the same time avoid some sort of private moral anarchy, 
where the individual escapes all utilitarian moral duty bar that imposed 
by the legislature? As I will explain in response, Bentham adopts an 
educationalist strategy to solve the problem and to escape the relativist 
threat. Bentham’s approach to individual ethics relies on the ability of 
the private ‘deontologist’ or moralist to guide and educate the individual 
in his efforts to live a happy life.
2.3. ‘private ethics’ and the role of the deontologist
‘Private deontology’ is not concerned with the question about how an 
individual can maximize his own happiness through his own efforts alone. 
This is because his tastes are unstable, the social influences to which he 
is subjected so strong, and his ignorance of individual circumstances so 
great, that he can never on his own achieve his own greatest happiness. 
Doing so on one’s own is illusory because an individual’s interests cannot 
be separated from the wider interests prevalent in society. This insight 
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requires the inclusion of considerations relative to taste, understood in 
Bentham’s sense as the choice of pleasures, in the general conception of 
individual ethics itself. For Bentham, in ‘private deontology’, the advice 
of the moralist is necessary to support the individual in understanding 
how to join his interest with his duty. The moralist’s role demonstrates 
that Bentham has an educationalist conception of individual ethics.
Moralist – his function, proper and actual. In regard to ends: 1. So 
far as man’s self-regarding interest alone is concerned, to strive to 
engage him to prefer greater remote to less present interest. 2. So 
far as the interest of the community is concerned, to engage each 
man in his pursuit of self-regarding interest, to pay as much regard 
as possible to the social interest.36
Hence, ‘private deontology’ requires an individual to consider his interest 
overall. An individual, however, is vulnerable to many influences that 
emanate from society. What does this mean for the deontologist’s role 
if society is always, in some sense, participating in the formation of an 
individual’s interest?
What then is the business of the Deontologist? In every instance 
to bring out of their obscurity, out of the neglect in which they 
have hitherto in so large a proportion been buried, the points of 
coincidence to the extent of which extra-regarding interest is 
connected and has by the hands of nature been identified with self-
regarding interest: and this in such sort and with such effect that by 
the alliance thus formed, by this conjunct kind of interest, the force 
of self-regarding in those shapes in which it is purely self-regarding 
is commonly already in use, to be outweighed and overpowered. In 
this way it will, it is believed, be found that for this species of artist 
there is no want of work. Nature has provided no inconsiderable 
quantity of useful work which as yet remains unattempted, and 
thus it will be his own fault if this office be a sinecure.37
The deontologist works by refocusing the individual’s self-regarding 
interest so that it allies with his social situation and duty. The deontolo-
gist is not a despotic commander who obliges the individual to do his 
duty, but more an auxiliary or a companion that helps him refocus his 
conception of his own interest. Having a better understanding of his own 
interest matters for the individual because thinking more deeply about 
his pleasures and their conformity to his duty will lead him to revise his 
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pleasures and hence his conduct. The moralist can only play his role as 
an educator by pointing out the relevant consequences in terms of pain 
and pleasure that will ensue to the individual from the various choices 
that he is in a position to make:
Means the deontologist can have no other to work with but 
pleasures and pains. In so far as they are not of his creation, they 
will be suggested as likely of themselves to result from the supposed 
act in question: viz. applying to his self-regarding or social interest, 
as above.38
‘Private ethics’ aims to assist the individual to do what he ought to do, 
without anything else but advice from the moralist, who turns out to be 
any person who can influence the individual because of his authority or 
social position. The role of the deontologist and the possibility of ‘private 
deontology’ are related. Bentham, therefore, advocates a positive role 
for ‘private deontology’ in teaching and promoting the utilitarian virtues 
of probity and beneficence. The principle of utility is the source of the 
moral advice, guidance or instruction that the deontologist gives.
The office and use of the extra-regarding branch of deontology – 
meaning private deontology – is to engage men in the practice of 
probity and beneficence by shewing, as far as this is the case, the 
coincidence of the dictates of probity and beneficence with those of 
self-regarding prudence.39
For Bentham, ‘private ethics’ is designed to educate the individual to 
calculate the value of different pleasures and pains.40 Bentham considers 
three uses of ‘private deontology’:
One is, among the several consequences, good or evil or both, with 
which human action or forbearance in the several situations in 
question is apt to be attended, the bringing to view, in a greater or 
lesser proportion, some which, if not thus brought to view, might 
have failed to present themselves to the mind: in this way, no new 
motives are created.
Another is the giving birth, as it were, to an ordinance of 
the popular or moral sanction bearing upon the point in question, 
the Deontologist as such being, as it were, the member on whose 
motion the ordinance to the effect in question is established.
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Third and last is the operating in [such a] way upon the 
minds of those in the country in question in whose hands reside the 
powers of legislation and other powers of government as to engage 
them to add to the force of the popular or moral sanction the [force] 
of the political including the legal sanction: the political sanction 
displaying its force on this occasion by giving birth and expression 
to such ordinances as afford a promise of giving practical effect to 
the ordinances supposed to be established by the popular or moral 
sanction as above.41
The role of the deontologist is to overcome the difficulties and tensions 
within individual ethics.42 Indeed, the role of the deontologist and the 
point of ‘private deontology’ is to educate the individual to make the 
correct utilitarian choices and in that sense, where appropriate, to 
modify his tastes, in other words his choice of pleasures. What may be 
described as Bentham’s paternalistic approach in this respect shows that 
he does not view the liberty of taste, in the sphere of individual ethics, as 
absolute. To this extent, neither a principle of aesthetics nor a free-for-all 
solves the problem of private ethics.
3. Conclusion
Bentham confronts the arguments in favour of aesthetics in an original, 
critical and powerful way. In the first part of this chapter I argued that, 
in the public sphere, Bentham defends the liberty of taste as a negative 
liberty. This radical commitment to the liberty of taste has political 
implications in that it secures government against the slippery slope 
arguments of a conservative politics of taste. In the second part, I 
explained that the liberty of taste does not play an unrestricted role in 
Bentham’s conception of private ethics. Indeed, the purpose of private 
ethics is to reconcile interest and duty and this leads to a rejection of a 
radical, individualist liberty of taste.
Notes
 1 Bentham, ed. Burns and Hart, 1970, 11 [hereafter IPML].
 2 Bentham, 2013, 19 [hereafter NPBJ]. 
 3 Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2002, 68. Bentham’s formulation appears in French as ‘Chacun 
a un droit égal à tout le bonheur dont sa nature est susceptible.’
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 4 Bentham’s definition of taste is founded on its relationship to pleasure: ‘Taste for any object is 
an aptitude or disposition to derive pleasure [from] that object.’ See Bentham, ed. Schofield 
et al., 2014, 4.
 5 IPML, 38.
 6 NPBJ, 18.
 7 NPBJ, 25.
 8 Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2014, 53–7.
 9 In contrast to some proponents of present-day utilitarianism, Bentham’s views on the liberty 
of taste led him to adopt a moderate position in relation to food ethics and the virtues of 
vegetarianism.
 10 Bentham, ed. Schofield and Long, 2016, 117. 
 11 i.e. Not Paul, But Jesus, Vol. III, and ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’.
 12 See Bourcier, 2019.
 13 Schofield, ed. Quinn and Zhai, 2014, 90–119; Quinn, 2017; T.Y. Koh, 2019.
 14 IPML, 17–18.
 15 Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2014, 18–19; NPBJ, 66, 96. 
 16 IPML, 105–8.
 17 Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2014, 20.
 18 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983b, 230: ‘One element upon which the magnitude of the 
mischief depends is consequently the quantity of power belonging to the situation of him by 
whom the notions thus disseminated are imbibed. For abuse of power, or to speak still more 
largely, abuse of influence, is the immediate source of the mischief which it is their tendency to 
produce.’
 19 For Bentham’s opposition to Hume see Quinn, 2016.
 20 Rousseau, ed. Gagnebin and Raymond, 1995, 1–125, in answer to D’Alembert’s article 
‘Genève’, first published in 1757, Encyclopédie, Vol. VII, éd. Diderot et D’Alembert.
 21 Rousseau’s First Discourse begins: ‘Has the restoration of the sciences and the arts contributed 
to the purification or to the corruption of morality?’
 22 Bentham, ed. Schofield and Long, 2016, 351–2.
 23 Bentham outlines the limits to legislative interference more generally in his chapter on ‘Cases 
unmeet for Punishment’ in IPML (CW), 156–64.
 24 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983b, 124–5: ‘Deontology, or Ethics (taken in the largest sense of 
the word), is that branch of art and science which has for its object the learning and shewing 
for the information of each individual, by what means the net amount of his happiness may 
be made as large as possible; of each in so far as it is dependent on his own conduct: the 
happiness of each individual separately being considered, and thereby that of every individual 
among those whose happiness is on this occasion object of regard.’
 25 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983b, 249: ‘For distinction sake, in so far as it takes for its subject 
matter that part of the field to which Government applies itself, Public Deontology is the name 
that may be employed: in so far as the application of it is considered as confined to those parts 
of the field of thought and action which Government has left free, Private Deontology is the 
name that may be employed. … By Private Deontology considered as an art, understand the 
art of maximizing the net amount of happiness in that part of the field of thought and action 
which is left free by the power of law and government. To the words “proper” and “propriety”, 
by this definition, the only end which is either intelligible or useful is assigned.’
 26 Mack, 1962, 249.
 27 Baumgardt, 1966.
 28 Burns, 1978, 24.
 29 De Champs, 2008, 92–3.
 30 Harrison, 1983, 267; Schofield, 2006, 49.
 31 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983b, 150. See also 131, 175.
 32 Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2014, 77.
 33 Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2014, 77.
 34 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983b, 155–6.
 35 Bentham, ed. Schofield et al., 2014, 4.
 36 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983a, 67.
 37 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983b, 193.
 38 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983b, 69–70.
 39 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983b, 196–7.
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 40 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983b, 199–200.
 41 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983b, 205.
 42 Bentham, ed. Goldworth, 1983b, 151: ‘it is incumbent on such censor to show and render it 
preponderantly probable – not only that in this or that determinate shape evil will be the result 
of it, but that the sum of that evil at the end of the account will be preponderant over the sum 
of the good produced by the same cause’.
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Chapter 10
From pain to pleasure: Panopticon 
dreams and Pentagon Petal
fran Cottell and Marianne Mueller
Art, architecture and social space
As an artist and an architect, we are approaching ‘Jeremy Bentham and 
the Arts’ from the perspective of practice. We are presenting a narrative 
of our experience of practical research and developing work connected 
to Bentham’s project for an inspection house and its proposed site in 
Millbank. As an interdisciplinary team we have been collaborating 
on projects where we have been using site-related architectural plans 
in order to subvert or open up the uses and interpretations of found 
spaces and to create socially active/alive/democratic spaces. These 
projects explore the relationship between architectural form and social 
behaviour – a dependency that Bentham built upon with his plans for 
the inspection house or panopticon. In contrast to his utilitarian ideas, 
our work aims at opening up a discursive and undetermined relationship 
between the articulation of a place and its potential social effects. The 
process of editing and reinterpreting architectural plans in this context 
is central to our ambition of redefining found spaces and reconditioning 
any normative behaviour to which they might be linked. This use of local 
plans has the added value of providing recognition of the memories and 
understanding of site-related communities. 
One of the spaces we have been working with is the Rootstein 
Hopkins Parade Ground in Millbank, central London. This large open 
public square is situated at the heart of the Chelsea College of Arts and 
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adjacent to Tate Britain. The site was part of the land originally purchased 
by Jeremy Bentham in 1799 to realize his visionary panopticon prison, a 
plan that would never materialize. It subsequently became the site of the 
infamous Millbank Prison, the largest prison in the UK of its time, and 
characterized by its isolation cells. After the demolition of the prison, the 
site accommodated a military hospital with a parade ground and is now 
home to the Chelsea College of Arts and Tate Britain (Figure 10.1).
Figure 10.1: Ordnance Survey. London, Sheet XI. 3., 1895.
Reproduced with the permission of the 
National Library of Scotland.
Physically all four structures – panopticon, prison, parade ground and 
art school – occupied the site at different times and have left their traces. 
In an overlay (Figure 10.2, overleaf), we traced the vast expanse of 
Millbank Prison against the present urban layout of the Chelsea College 
of Arts, Tate Britain and the Millbank Estate, thereby demonstrating how 
the shape of the prison remains inscribed into the urban fabric of today. 
The construction material of the prison never really left the site; it 
too remained and is very much still part of the physical make-up of the 
site. For instance, the ground floors of the Millbank Estate are constructed 
from the original bricks of the prison after its demolition, with part of its 
perimeter ditch presently used for drying clothes. Behind Tate Britain, 
which still houses some of the prison’s underground structures, is a 
section of the original perimeter wall. 
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Figure 10.2: Overlay of Millbank Prison onto the present site.
The Rootstein Hopkins Parade Ground thus represents a cross-section 
through different social modes and architecture’s power to orchestrate 
them: from the social confinement of the isolation cell of Bentham’s 
earliest imagined panopticon (he later rejected solitary confinement in 
favour of cells holding two inmates) and the real Millbank Prison, to the 
military organization of a group as ‘one’ in a parade ground, to today’s 
neo-liberal forms of socializing and gathering in the context of the arts. 
We decided to build on these different strata and the site’s social history 
of controlling and (dis)empowering the individual and the crowd, 
focusing on the floor plan of Millbank Prison.
The two very different structures of the panopticon and Millbank 
Prison are widely conflated in the public mind. The panopticon was 
brought to the public’s attention by Foucault, who added considerably to 
the interest in Bentham’s plan for an inspection house/panopticon while 
underplaying the fact that it was never built. 
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The imagined panopticon: The physical structure
Although Jeremy Bentham’s ideas for a panopticon would never be 
realized at Millbank, his plans for the penitentiary inspection-house 
remain an ongoing source of inspiration and point of reference. We begin 
by examining several aspects of this plan: first, the proposed physical 
structure; second, Bentham’s influences and references; third, the 
legacy; and fourth, the dreams and utopias that were related to it. 
Bentham’s inspection-house was a circular building with a radial 
layout. The circular shape and radial organization is one of the key char-
acteristics for Bentham, offering a number of important advantages. 
The accommodation for the prisoners, or the ‘cells’, are situated on 
the perimeter of the building with the apartment of the inspector, 
or the ‘lodge’, located at its centre. The empty space between the ‘cells’ 
and the ‘lodge’ is called the ‘intermediate’ or the ‘annular area’,1 and 
separates the two realms – the realm of the prisoner from the realm of 
the inspector (Figure 10.3). 
Figure 10.3: Willey Reveley (1760–99), Plan of the panopticon peniten-
tiary, UC cxix. 120v (c. 1791).
University College London Special Collections.
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It is this particular spatial arrangement, with the ‘lodge’ at the centre of 
the building and the ‘cells’ arranged in a circle at a distance around it, 
that formulates the key relationship Bentham seeks to organize with his 
plan: the relationship between the inspector and the prisoner, between 
the observer and the observed. All other moves that follow are set by 
this fundamental arrangement and articulate it further. Principles of 
perceptibility (conditions of light) and the detailed organization of the 
relationship based on visibility (spatial geometry) are at the core of this 
arrangement. Through the distribution of physical structures and light, 
the inspector surveys the prisoner while the prisoner is not able to see 
him. The inspector is ‘seeing without being seen’2 and he does that at 
a distance. This is a one-to-one relationship, inspector to prisoner, 
individual to individual, as everything is done to keep the prisoner in 
isolation and from being able to communicate with his fellow inmates. 
Spatially the ‘cells’ are divided from one another by the means of 
partitions, radial walls running from the circumference of the building 
towards its centre, extending beyond the cell’s enclosure so that the 
prisoner cannot look around them, his visual field constrained. These 
‘protracted partitions’,3 as Bentham called them, were also extremely 
thin, a fact that Bentham liked to underline as it exemplified the 
superiority of his system of surveillance and visual containment. He 
writes: ‘the thickest walls have been found occasionally unavailing: upon 
this plan, the thinnest would be sufficient’.4 
Towards the lodge, the cells were enclosed by iron grating. The 
combination of the thin walls laid out in a radial fashion, the transparent 
iron grating, and the position of the inspector at the centre of the house, 
meant that the inspector would have the ‘perfect view’.5 This ideal view of 
seeing everything at once, this instant panoramic gaze over the entirety of 
the cell and indeed the whole house, would allow just one man to observe 
many by barely moving himself: an extremely efficient set up. The circular 
form plays an important role, offering an ideal shape in plan that no other 
geometry can rival. The circular layout also provides the shortest travel 
distance between ‘lodge’ and ‘cell’, meaning that the circle renders the 
relationship between the inspector and any prisoner equally close. 
The extreme proximity between inspector and prisoner is 
important to note here. Bentham explains that, in his inspection house, 
prisoners would not need to be chained because their every move or 
facial expression could easily be seen. If we look at the actual distance 
between the lodge and the cells in Bentham’s plans, this only measures 
14 feet or 4.26 metres. This is a surprisingly short distance and means 
that the relationship between inspector and prisoner would indeed have 
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been quite intimate. Bentham’s inspection house as a whole was small, 
measuring only 100 feet or 30.48 metres in diameter. 
The inspection house was also surprisingly transparent. Another 
efficiency that the circular building shape offered was the maximum 
penetration of light into and through the building, based on the principle 
of the shortest distance. Every cell contained a large window – as large as 
technically possible – to allow light to penetrate deep into it, fully illumi-
nating it, and all the way into the lodge at the centre. The outer circum-
ference wall in Bentham’s plan shows more windows than wall sections, 
resulting in a perforated prison building. Later, Bentham considered 
using materials other than stone to make the inspection house even more 
transparent. At night, the idea of a see-through and well illuminated 
building was extended through the use of lamps with reflectors.
The section drawings of the panopticon clearly demonstrate the 
penetration of light and the idea of an illuminated building (Figure 10.4). 
Figure 10.4: Willey Reveley (1760–99), Section of the panopticon peni-
tentiary, UC cxix. 122v (c. 1791).
University College London Special Collections.
Bentham’s inspection house was to be bright, light, healthy and clean; 
well heated and well ventilated; it had sanitation and there was running 
water to all the cells. Bentham’s cells measured 6 feet in width and 
13 feet in length, which equates to about 7 square metres of space for 
two prisoners. Contemporary American jail cells often provide only 
4.4m2 of space. The Red Cross  currently recommends 5.4m2 and the 
bEntHAM AnD tHE Arts250
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment recommends 6m2 of living space 
for a single-occupancy cell, rendering Bentham’s cells less than generous 
by today’s standards. There were 48 cells on one floor. One lodge could 
serve two floors. This arrangement could then be repeated by vertical 
stacking or horizontal repetition. Bentham drew up different variations, 
including some inspection houses with a central lantern that would bring 
additional light to the centre of the building. 
Figure 10.5: Willey Reveley (1760–99), Sketch of the panopticon peni-
tentiary and its airing yards, UC cxix. 129 (c. 1791).
University College London Special Collections.
Bentham did not only consider the interior of the prison but also made 
plans for possible external spaces surrounding the inspection house. He 
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sketched out plans for integrating airing yards, work yards and gardens. 
Some of these return to the idea of a circular layout for the surroundings 
but some work with a square plan around a circular building at its centre 
(Figure 10.5).
Bentham and Foucault
When we started working on the Rootstein Hopkins Parade Ground, we 
noticed that Millbank Prison was widely conflated with, and referred to 
as, Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. In common with many people, we 
first read about, and initially saw the panopticon, through the prism 
of Foucault’s employment of it in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison (1977) as ‘an emblem of modern power’.6 We then reconsidered 
this in light of the work of the historian Janet Semple in her article 
‘A Defence of Panopticism’ (1992) in which she considers the complexity 
of the relationship between Foucault and Bentham. She observes that 
Foucault brings his own 1960s Parisian historical perspective to his 
work, is ill-informed on the subject of eighteenth-century English penal 
history and has a negative interpretation of the aims and intentions of 
the Enlightenment reformer’s motives. She concedes that Bentham 
made many problematic statements, which appear to support Foucault’s 
thinking, but argues that Foucault, when talking about the panopticon, 
did not consider it in light of Bentham’s later constitutional writings and 
tolerance of individual diversity. She concludes that ‘Foucault extrapo-
lates from the particular device of the panopticon inspection tower to 
generalize that “Bentham laid down the principle that power should be 
visible and unverifiable. … The Panopticon is a machine for dissociat-
ing the see/being seen dyad … in the central tower, one sees everything 
without being seen”.’7 However the ‘panoptic qualities of [Bentham’s] 
Constitutional Code were designed to allow the subject to observe the 
ruling few’8 and this is what Foucault should have taken into account. 
Bentham insisted that his prison must be accessible, and this would 
control the power of the governor, or the inspector, in the centre of the 
prison. ‘Bentham believed that democracy was essentially fragile’, notes 
Semple, ‘and could be upheld only by the light of freedom of information 
and discussion.’9 Bentham wanted to create a humane prison. ‘His three 
principles of management were lenity, severity and economy’,10 ‘but the 
overriding principle was lenity that the prisoner should be deprived only 
of liberty not of health or life.’ But, according to Semple, Foucault had 
a negative interpretation of reformers’ motives. He believed that ‘they 
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were being deceived or rather were part of a process that masked their 
real intentions’.11
Bentham compared criminals to children. He considered that 
‘criminals were a work in progress and the problem was with drink 
and idleness’, that ‘criminals, like other men, were potentially rational 
beings responsible for their own actions. … Bentham’s central belief was 
the rational mechanism of human morality could be refashioned, the 
criminal mind literally reformed’ by sobriety and work.12 
Figure 10.6: Samuel Bentham (1757–1831), Plan, elevation and two 
sections, 1807.
Reproduced by kind permission of the Rossiiskii 
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota, 
St Petersburg, fond 326, opis’ 1, delo 10043.
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The reach of the panopticon
For Bentham, the panopticon was more than effective prison design. 
He believed that the panopticon principle could be beneficial in other 
contexts where surveillance was important. He therefore considered it 
for use in schools, hospitals and workhouses. His brother Samuel, with 
whom the idea of the panopticon originated,13 adapted the panopticon 
principle for an art school project in St Petersburg as well as for a house 
of industry (Figure 10.6, opposite). 
Other industrial estates of the time started to borrow Bentham’s 
principles of efficient and well-surveyed buildings, such as the now 
demolished Round Mill at Belper, Derbyshire, constructed in 1811, 
following the plans of architect William Strutt.
Figure 10.7: Guillaume-Abel Blouet (1795–1853), Plan du Rez-de-
chaussée Prison Départementale, 1841.
Brown University.
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Although Bentham’s panopticon was never built, his plans were widely 
known and have remained highly influential for prison design until today. 
French architect Guillaume-Abel Blouet’s design for a Department Prison 
in 1841, included in ‘Instruction et programme pour la construction des 
maisons d’arrêt et de justice: atlas de plans de prisons cellulaires’, bears 
a strong resemblance to Bentham’s panopticon both in terms of internal 
layouts as well as its setting in the site (Figure 10.7, previous page). 
Blouet saw himself as a reformer in his country, attempting to 
redefine prison design. Like Bentham, he believed in architecture as a 
tool for implementing social reform and understood the prison as a 
reformatory institution that acted through work and education. 
In twentieth-century prison design, moreover, there are a number 
of built examples that make reference to Bentham’s plans. The Presidio 
Modelo, a model prison on the Isla de la Juventud in Cuba built in 1926 
and consisting of five circular buildings, displays many of the character-
istics of Bentham’s panopticon, such as the radial plan with the central 
watchtower topped by a lantern. Five floors of inmates were surveyed 
from one single tower. A photograph of the prison cells from 1926 
demonstrates most dramatically the transparency of the building, with 
the prisoner’s silhouettes lined up in rows and lit starkly from behind, as 
Bentham intended (Figure 10.8).
Figure 10.8: Presidio Modelo, Cuba, 1926.
Arnhem Penitentiary, designed in 1884 by architect Johan Frederik 
Metzlaar, is one of three panopticon-style prisons in the Netherlands 
that were built for solitary confinement and used a central watchtower. 
Similar in size to Bentham’s inspection house, Arnhem measures 
56 metres in diameter, and has the same number of cells per floor. 
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Interestingly, Arnhem prison became popular with inmates once prison 
rules were relaxed and inmates were allowed to wander around in the 
central area, which was used for playing football and other games. 
The watchtower was subsequently converted into the guard’s canteen, 
thereby reversing the relationship of the observer and the observed. In 
1980 the Office for Metropolitan Architecture proposed an architectural 
project for the adaptation of the by then iconic prison, which was already 
operating almost like a public space with work, recreation and meetings 
ongoing in its central yard. OMA took this idea further and proposed to 
cut two sunken streets into it. This would have taken away the eye of 
the panopticon and created communal and entertainment spaces for the 
prisoners out of sight, but was never implemented (Figure 10.9).
Figure 10.9: Koepel Panopticon Prison, Arnhem, 1980.
Image courtesy of the Office for Metropolitan Architecture (OMA).
Another prison influenced by Bentham’s panopticon is the Stateville 
Penitentiary in Illinois designed by architect C. Harrick Hammond, built 
in 1919 and operating until 2016. This high security prison had an armed 
central watchtower and four storeys of cells, and is the only surviving 
panopticon-style prison building in the United States. It was famously 
photographed by Andreas Gursky in 2002.
bEntHAM AnD tHE Arts256
Dreams and utopia
For Foucault, the panopticon ‘presents a cruel, ingenious cage. The 
fact that it should have given rise, even in our own time, to so many 
variations, projected or realized, is evidence of the imaginary intensity 
that it has possessed for two hundred years. But the panopticon must not 
be understood as a dream building: it is a diagram of a mechanism of 
power.’14 But Foucault acknowledges the lightness of the panopticon and 
how it would replace the old prisons with ‘their fortress-like architec-
ture’.15 Bentham’s wish was for the panopticon to be ‘a lantern’, a thing 
of beauty, ‘a glass beehive’.16 There were particular cultural influences 
on Bentham’s panopticon plan. ‘Bentham’s vision was of a beautiful 
building’, notes Semple, ‘a stately pleasure dome … comparable he 
said to the Rotundas at Ranelagh and Dublin, or the circus at Bath’.17 
Ranelagh Gardens were a public pleasure garden in Chelsea, outside 
London. The Rotunda there was designed by William Jones and could 
indeed have served as an inspiration for Bentham. As the Rotunda was 
already complete in 1742, one could assume that Bentham might have 
visited this prominent venue, which Canaletto had famously painted in 
1754 (Figure 10.10). 
Figure 10.10: Canaletto (1697–1768), Interior of the Rotunda at 
Ranelagh, London, 1754.
National Gallery, Wiki/Commons.
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Built entirely for the purpose of pleasure, the Rotunda displays surprising 
similarities to Bentham’s later plan for the panopticon prison. It, too, 
was a circular building with a lodge and a lantern at its centre. The 
division of walls was radial. Even the diameter of the Rotunda at 120 feet 
(37 metres) was close to Bentham’s projected building. Most strikingly, 
the Rotunda’s façade and gallery design were of an unusual transparency 
for its time – one could almost see through its filigree structure (Figure 
10.11).
Figure 10.11: After William Jones (d. 1747), Ranelagh, 1742.
Royal Collection Trust, RCIN 702471.
As stated previously, Bentham was considering using the very latest 
materials and manufacturing innovations for his panopticon; for 
example cast iron for the pillars, the arches, staircases and galleries. 
The first iron bridge at Coalbrookdale had been built in 1779, only 12 
years before Bentham printed ‘Panopticon; or, The Inspection-House’. 
Techniques had recently been invented for manufacturing glass on a 
larger scale. Bentham wanted plaster floors instead of wood, because he 
thought they would be more hygienic and fire-proof. As Semple suggests, 
‘Architecturally, the panopticon foreshadows Paxton’s Crystal Palace 
rather than Pentonville’.18 
Bentham not only referenced architecture, but also found 
inspiration for the panopticon in novels. He acknowledged Bishop 
Fénelon’s pastoral Arcadian novel The Adventures of Telemachus as 
the inspiration for utilitarianism. This was an instructive French novel 
originally published in 1699 that proved very popular, being republished 
many times in the course of the eighteenth century. Inventing a sub-plot 
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to Homer’s Odyssey, the story recounts the educational travels of 
Telemachus, son of Odysseus. The heroine in this story has a glass palace 
that Bentham considered to be the archetype for the panopticon.19 This 
may explain why the panopticon looks so pink and pretty in the architec-
tural section drawings. 
Bentham made private notes and had secret visions for the 
panopticon. Semple describes him as ‘a man with a vision, a vision 
that had its origins in the English utopian tradition and in the Arcadian 
romance of the pastoral idyll. The panopticon was an enclave of reason, 
isolated from the temptations and disorders of the ordinary world.’20 
She makes the argument that Bentham was influenced by utopian ideas; 
although he described Thomas More’s Utopia as anti-rational, there are 
noticeable similarities between More’s ideas and Bentham’s. More’s 
fictitious capital Amaurot was to be built on a gentle slope of a tidal river, 
not unlike the Thames, and similar to Bentham’s detailed plans for the 
panopticon. It had piped water, spacious housing, gardens and music at 
meal times. In More’s Utopia, there was a strong emphasis on labour, of 
which Bentham would have approved. As in the panopticon, idleness was 
the worst sin. Bentham also admired the work of seventeenth-century 
philosopher and statesman Francis Bacon, who harnessed scientific 
inventions for the benefit of his new society in his fictional utopia New 
Atlantis.21 Reflecting Bentham’s own wide-ranging interests, Bacon’s 
plans for his new society included breeding silkworms, keeping bees, 
curing diseases, inventing flying machines and submarines, harnessing 
and reflecting light and inventing ‘conversation tubes to convey sounds 
through pipes’. Conversation tubes, of course, were incorporated in the 
design of panopticon.
George Bentham, the son of Bentham’s only surviving sibling 
Samuel and his wife Mary Sophia Fordyce, became a prominent botanist, 
inspired no doubt by his mother’s interest in the subject. Mirroring 
Bentham’s own early ambitions, George travelled the world and 
published books on the classification of plants, with several being named 
after him.22 Jeremy Bentham maintained a keen interest in botany and 
in discovering new plants; in his private thoughts and ambitions for 
the panopticon he talks about it being a centre for collecting plants, 
even sending out explorer expeditions from the panopticon to collect 
seeds that would then be propagated in special panopticon nurseries. 
His planning went as far as drafting an advertisement for a panopticon 
physician in which he states that it would be useful if the applicant had 
an interest in plants. 
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Figure 10.12: Charles Fourier (1772–1837), City with Guarantees (ville 
garantiste), 1820s: a panoptic utopia?.
Bentham had plans for creating an extensive infrastructure around the 
prison: he envisaged a complete panopticon town. Building houses into 
the walls of the prison, he proposed a tavern with a terrace where visitors 
could watch firework displays and promenade along a covered walkway 
to the river. He had fantastical structural ideas for how he would like his 
new town to be developed. There would, for example, be aerial garden 
walkways inter-connecting the balconies of his shops and buildings.
The real Millbank Prison
Bentham’s panopticon on London’s Millbank site remained a dream. The 
site was hugely problematic and after many obstacles the government 
abandoned the plans in 1803, much to Bentham’s dismay. In 1812 a 
new competition was announced to find an architect for the National 
Penitentiary at Millbank. It was a troublesome project from the start and 
involved a succession of architects: William Williams, Thomas Hardwick, 
John Harvey and finally Robert Smirke, who completed the building. 
The task to build on swampy and unstable ground meant that design 
and construction processes were riddled with problems and excessively 
expensive. In 1816 the Millbank Penitentiary opened as the largest 
prison in Britain of its time (Figure 10.13, overleaf). 
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Figure 10.13: Aerial photograph of Millbank Prison taken from a 
balloon, London from Aloft, Strand Magazine, 9 May 1891.
Millbank Prison is often confused with a panopticon structure. William 
Williams’s design, however, owes little to the idea of the panopticon 
except for some formal motifs, such as the placement of the chapel in 
the centre of the building, while isolation cells and watch towers are 
used entirely differently. As a whole, the structure did not function as 
a panopticon, since it lacked clarity of conception and layout. Semple 
describes it as ‘a labyrinth of a building, full of dark corridors and 
passages, winding staircases and innumerable doors and gates. So 
confusing it was that wardens would blaze their trails with chalk marks 
on the walls.’23 In many ways, this vast labyrinthine structure was the 
exact opposite of what Bentham had imagined. 
The overall layout of Millbank Prison was configured as a series 
of hexagonal shapes, or petal shaped wings, each of them three storeys 
tall with a central watchtower. Each of these petals was further divided 
into five separate courtyards. It was a massive fortress-like structure with 
very small windows, little visibility and a significant distance between 
watchtower and cells. One wonders how the watchtower/inspector 
actually functioned without the immediate access that Bentham would 
have provided between the tower/inspector and the cell/prisoner. The 
intimate relationship he envisaged was not at all possible here. From the 
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tower the guard could observe only parts of the cells at great distance, 
and gaining access was a difficult and time-consuming undertaking. 
Moreover, the access corridor to the cells was located on the outer wall 
of the building, so that it was not possible to observe wardens interacting 
with prisoners. For Bentham, the visibility of this interaction was an 
important part of his plan. The fact that the inspector was able to inspect 
the wardens and their contact with the inmates, just as he might inspect 
the prisoners themselves, was another layer of transparency within 
Bentham’s well thought-out system. 
Only when one compares the physical dimensions and numbers of 
cells in Millbank Prison to Bentham’s panopticon does one really start to 
grasp the sheer excess of Millbank’s slack structure opposed to the neat 
efficiency of Bentham’s lean inspection house (Figure 10.14). 
Figure 10.14: Scale comparison: Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon and 
Millbank Prison.
While Bentham’s inspection house was visually transparent and produc-
tively so, Millbank’s transparency was acoustic and problematic: its 
ventilation system was so bad that it would carry sounds across the 
facility, allowing prisoners to communicate with each other, even though 
kept in isolation. Poor sanitation and lack of ventilation meant that the 
prison was soon riddled with disease. While Bentham’s panopticon was 
heated, healthy and well lit, Millbank was dark and unhygienic. As one 
Victorian author noted:
If the ground plan of the building at Millbank is a geometric puzzle, 
the interior is surely an eccentric maze, long dark and narrow 
corridors, twisting passages in which the visitor unaccustomed 
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to the dubious twilight has to feel his way. Double locked doors, 
opening at all sorts of queer angles and leading sometimes into 
blind entries and frequently into stone staircases so steep and 
narrow, are not unlike the devious steps by which the traveller 
reaches the towers of Strasbourg or some other cathedrals except 
that they are even more gloomy.24
The prison’s ultimate failure was due to a combination of facts, but partic-
ularly the unhealthy environment and the lax rules and regulations that 
led to mutiny. After a major epidemic, the prison had to be evacuated and 
became a depot for convicts awaiting transportation, before reverting 
back in 1853 to an ordinary prison. In 1892 the prison was closed down 
and the site started to be redeveloped into its present shape. 
Pentagon Petal, architectural (un)determinism or 
pleasure: Bentham and Herzberger
In his work on the panopticon, Bentham uses architecture as a device to 
control and organize human behaviour and to promote social discipline. 
Architecture, or more specifically the physical structure of a building, 
is utilized to forge particular relationships and to formalize certain 
structures, hierarchies or orders. Architecture, in this context becomes 
an important tool in the process of establishing order and executing 
discipline and, with it, punishment. Pain in the context of Bentham’s 
panopticon is not inflicted through maltreatment, hunger, cold or 
disease, as in the case of Millbank Prison, but through the means of 
architecture. The panopticon is well lit, has large windows, is heated and 
clean, but yet it is still a cruel place. It is through the architectural tools of 
layout, spatial arrangement and the configuration of light and material 
that Bentham establishes his idea of punishment and reform. 
Moving from pain to pleasure, we would now like to consider 
pleasure in the context of architecture’s power to organize human rela-
tionships and ensure social discipline. Beyond the panopticon, people 
are surprisingly resistant to architecture’s power to control them and are 
often sceptical towards overtly functional set-ups or any form of social 
determinism, employing imaginative responses to subvert or re-appropri-
ate. In fact, a lot of pleasure can be generated in daily life from misusing 
objects and spaces or using them for purposes that were not intended 
or uses that were not part of their original function. There is positive 
engagement in the creative and active moments of these acts of appropri-
ation. Developing this context, in our work as an artist and an architect, 
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we refer to Herman Hertzberger, a contemporary Dutch architect and 
educator who has spent most of his life collecting and designing architec-
tural settings that allow for and stimulate the spontaneous interpretation 
of users in pursuit of pleasure and empowerment. He argues that archi-
tecture has to be conceived in an open-ended way and advocates making 
spaces more receptive to unexpected uses and forms of interpretation 
and appropriation. Hertzberger states: 
If something is geared very specifically to a certain aim it functions 
the way it has been programmed to function, i.e. as it was expected 
to function. This is the sort of functionalism that the functionalists 
talked about, but it is also the minimum of utility that can be 
expected of architecture. And in order to achieve more than the 
minimum in the diversity of situations as they arise I am pleading 
for form and space with a greater ‘accommodating’ potential, like 
a musical instrument that sounds the way the player wants it to 
sound. The point is to increase this ‘accommodating potential’ and 
thus to make space more receptive to different situations. Once you 
start looking for them it is easy to find even in the most unexpected 
corners examples of usage that the designer (if any) certainly never 
envisaged.25
When working on our proposals for the Rootstein Hopkins Parade 
Ground, Bentham’s original panopticon site and the site of the failed 
Millbank Prison, we envisaged strategies that would oppose the idea 
of utilizing architectural means for the implementation of power/pain 
and were looking for structures that could be more open-ended and 
pleasurable, that could somehow be interpreted and appropriated, an 
intervention where use might not be predetermined, but an offering, 
something that could be imagined and would contain an active and 
creative act. 
Pentagon Petal
Pentagon Petal was a temporary intervention in the summer of 2016 
that reorganized the social environment of the Rootstein Hopkins Parade 
Ground. The intervention was based on the plan of Millbank Prison, 
editing and reinterpreting it into a more socially active figure: a flower-
shaped bench. The intervention played with ideas of exclusion and 
segregation while offering a generous place within the larger barren 
square (Figure 10.15, overleaf).
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Figure 10.15: Cottell/Mueller, Pentagon Petal, Terry Watts, 2016.
This process of editing and reinterpreting floor plans is key for us in 
redefining and reconditioning any normative or social behaviour linked 
to a particular space and recalibrating power structures. For Millbank, 
we went through a number of steps: we started by looking at the original 
plan of Millbank Prison and erased all structures that were related to 
control, oppression or surveillance. We removed the watchtowers, the 
guards’ quarters and the prison administration from the plan, leaving 
only the prisoners’ cells, accommodation and communal kitchens from 
the original floor plan. At the next step we radically scaled this figure 
down to a manageable size. By scaling it, we could reimagine its use. 
Figure 10.16 shows the vast plan of Millbank Prison drawn at 1:350 
scale in comparison to our bench drawn at 1:40 scale. Both geometric 
objects seem similar, yet each of them has a very different potential in 
terms of use, sociability and scope for public interaction. At the final step, 
we brought this new figure back onto the site and calibrated it for the 
specific location and its communities. 
Figure 10.16: Millbank Prison and Panopticon Petal drawn at different 
scales.
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When scaling and editing the plan, we were thinking about spatial 
dimensions and their impact on social uses and possible interpreta-
tions, very much like Bentham, but with the opposite motivation. We 
wanted the dimensions of this new object to be ambiguous and open, 
and yet relate to something familiar. We looked at the widths of a bed 
in the prison cell and we looked at the dimensions of a garden bench, 
and arrived at something that could be interpreted as either a bed or a 
bench. Our bench was an enormous 120 metres long and was able to 
accommodate up to 300 people, the same number as the first generation 
of prisoners in Millbank or the approximate number of prisoners in a 
Bentham-style six-storey panopticon. 
What interested us in the bench was that it is a very unassuming 
object. It is one you usually share. On a bench, you accept that you 
may be sitting next to somebody you do not know. More profoundly, 
sitting is a way of taking hold of a site – of appropriating and occupying 
a public site. In the urban environment, benches can be seen as highly 
problematic since they can produce loitering, which is often not desired. 
Contemporary urban benches can specifically be designed so that they 
cannot be slept on or used to congregate. We wanted the bench for 
the Rootstein Hopkins Parade Ground to be as generous as possible. 
This unconditional generosity was a very important aspect for us 
(Figure 10.17).
Figure 10.17: Cottell/Mueller, Pentagon Petal, Terry Watts, 2016.
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Figure 10.18: Cottell/Mueller, Pentagon Petal, Terry Watts, 2016.
To achieve this, the dimensions of the bench were kept deliberately 
ambiguous. You could see it as a platform or a pier, suggesting that you 
could walk on it. Or you could use it as a bench, and there were different 
opportunities for how to sit or lie on it: in a one-to-one in order to have a 
private conversation, or in a group around the pentagons, or you might 
lie down and enjoy the view. Each of the six pentagons or ‘petals’ – 
originally shaped to facilitate social control and designated for solitary 
confinement – was now reinterpreted by groups of students, staff or 
tourists for informal gatherings and for pleasure, in different configu-
rations and were used almost like rooms. The corners became specifi-
cally productive: many people liked to sit there, where they could face 
each other, or they would sit on the edges surveying the scene. Others 
would have picnics on it, sitting next to each other or opposite each other 
(Figure 10.18). 
By sitting together, the project brought the disparate communities 
loosely linked to the site together: the community of the college, the 
students, the staff, the tourists that were passing by on their way to the 
Tate, but also local communities living in the housing estates nearby. 
There was a group of local youngsters who used to congregate every 
night on one of the V-shapes around our bench, moving every night to 
a different section. When it was used for a staff party, the participants 
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unilaterally adopted one of the pentagon shapes as the ‘dancing room’. 
Local residents walked their dogs on the grass in the centre.
Through the intervention, there was suddenly an opportunity for 
people to gather in informal and unpredicted ways, in ways that were 
not forced and which brought together people who would usually not 
congregate. We were amazed at how many people came to us and said: 
‘I sat on your bench and still remember that as a special moment on the 
journey from one place to another.’ The installation tried to make sense 
of the otherwise barren nature of this large urban square by shrinking 
it into a confined space with a clear definition. We deliberated over 
whether the bench should be open or not, and how, if it was closed, 
this large object would form a barrier within the site. But this barrier 
turned out to be productive in generating and disrupting social activities. 
By providing a physical back for the occupants, the bench turned this 
previously unappealing exposed central grass square into an enclosed 
social, almost private, space. From being negative, it became usable and 
interactive, providing a small arena within the larger open square. 
This brings us back to Bentham and another scale comparison. 
Figure 10.19 shows an overlay of Bentham’s prison and the Pentagon 
Petal installation. From our previous description, the relatively intimate 
size of the Benthamic panopticon should be clear. Pentagon Petal is of 
comparable size, slightly smaller, tracing out Bentham’s building on the 
Rootstein Hopkins Parade Ground into which it would have easily fitted; 
the two structures of comparable size facilitate very different types of 
social observation and interaction. 
Figure 10.19: Scale comparison: Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon and 
Panopticon Petal.
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Pentagon Petal could be observed from three sides from the windows 
of Chelsea College of Arts, as seen here in Malcolm Quinn’s photograph 
taken from his office window (Figure 10.20).
Figure 10.20: Cottell/Mueller, Pentagon Petal, Malcolm Quinn, 2016.
Unlike the panopticon, the viewing point is shifted from the centre to the 
periphery. As previously noted, for people who live and work in the area, 
including the staff and students at the college, the plan of Millbank Prison 
is often, albeit mistakenly, referred to as Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. 
It is an image that is part of the cultural memory of this site, a figure that 
everyone recognizes. 
Our intention with this intervention, reflecting Bentham’s spirit, 
was to bring some clarity and utility to this place, but in contrast to 
him, in a non-determined and open-ended way. We were not pursuing 
an architectural determinism, we were not attempting social levelling, 
but rather to challenge fixed hierarchies and to produce a dynamic 
and, perhaps, democratic type of space that preserves life or rather the 
breadth of aliveness – a place of leisure rather than oppression. This 
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intervention, which temporarily re-configured this site, re-calibrated its 
social offering from one of pain to pleasure. 
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Among Jeremy Bentham’s myriad manuscripts, the arduous reading, 
editing and transcribing of which contributes to the work of many a 
scholar in this volume and quite a few scholars before now, one partic-
ularly peculiar manuscript was withheld from circulation at the time 
of Bentham’s death by his then editor John Bowring. This manuscript, 
written at some point close to his death in 1832, was entitled ‘Auto-Icon; 
or, Farther Uses of the Dead to the Living’.1 It argues for the benefits of 
preserving and displaying the heads of our dead bodies, a last act that 
would uphold Bentham’s utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number. Bentham’s amusing proposed models for Auto-
Iconism ranged from New Zealanders ‘in reference to the preservation of 
their friends’,2 to Persian edifices constructed by the skulls of men slain 
in battle,3 to the performances of the ‘Lecturer-Errant or Itinerant upon 
heads’ George Alexander Stevens4 (Figure 11.1). 
The late Canadian scholar Robert Fenn’s carefully annotated 
version of this essay attempts to correct what he deemed the damage 
done to Bentham’s legacy by the prudish Bowring. Bentham’s anti-reli-
gious writings and his manuscripts redeeming sexual irregularities were 
similarly considered inappropriate to be published. In this chapter, I 
would first like to discuss the Auto-Icon: the title of Bentham’s preserved 
body itself, the essay by the same name, and Bentham’s instructions 
annexed to his Last Will and Testament explaining the process by which 
he wanted his body to be ‘Auto-Iconized’. For Bentham, his self-portrait 
is what he described as ‘an auto-graph of a higher order’:5 autographic, 
in the sense that like a signed autograph, Bentham’s image works as an 
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indexical ‘graph’, or piece of writing, ‘of’ himself, bearing the physical 
trace – or more than a trace – of its subject. ‘Auto-Icon will soon be 
understood,’ Bentham proposes, ‘for a man who is his own image. … Is 
not identity preferable to similitude?’6 Despite a few infelicities-to-be 
about the robustness of the body itself (for example, the separated head 
being stolen by prankster King’s College, London students), Bentham’s 
Auto-Icon was arguably the fullest realization of his greatest happiness 
principle. Through the mingling of writing, image and corporeal 
body, Bentham’s Auto-Icon is the corpo-realization of what underlies 
Bentham’s theories of language, logic and legislation: the resolution to 
work language back to a tangible real entity. In many ways, as will be 
elaborated below, Bentham’s theories of language can be said to be his 
primary vehicle for his overall proposition of the requisite corporeality 
underlying his greatest happiness principle. 
Figure 11.1: Thomas Rowlandson (1757–1827), A Lecture on Heads, 
1808.
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.
I propose that Bentham’s notion of real entities is throughout his writings 
insistent, in particular, on a foregrounding of the human body. This fore-
grounding is evident through his applied metaphors of the body. But just 
as ‘the image of Bentham’ is not a figure but the ‘real thing’, so too in his 
writing Bentham works beyond metaphorical figure. For Bentham, the 
act of writing itself works to infuse his metaphorical figures of speech 
with the ‘real substance’ of the human body, realized not only through 
the hindsight of his Auto-Icon corpse, but through his construction of his 
vast body of writing as corpus. Ultimately, I want to consider Bentham’s 
writing – he did a lot of it! – as performative act. Reading Of Sexual 
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Irregularities, and Other Writings on Sexual Morality, and Not Paul, but 
Jesus in conjunction with the Auto-Icon supports Bentham’s aspiration 
for language to be grounded by physical substance. On some psycho-
logical level, conscious or unconscious, Bentham’s writing is a physical, 
corporeal activity that I want to examine in relation to the physical 
pleasures afforded by the ‘eccentric propensities’ and ‘equivalent 
pleasures’ offered by not Paul, but Jesus. In this sense, ‘Bentham’s Image’ 
encompasses the felicities and physical pleasures of the act of writing. 
Furthermore, ‘Bentham’s Image’, being Bentham’s own body, is also 
part of the negotiation of bequeathed ‘property’ that takes place upon 
one’s death. In Bentham’s world of greatest happiness, the physically 
closer an entity is to what it refers to, that is, the more an entity comes 
from an ‘own-ness’, the more successfully utilitarian it is. This tendency 
towards felicity happens because something proper to another thing is 
going to be more grounded in materiality and less prone to fictionaliza-
tion. The Auto-Icon, Bentham says, would allow for ‘every man [to be] 
his own broker’ or ‘every man [to be] his own lawyer’.7 Bentham proudly 
announces that, ‘A spick-and-span new subject-matter of property 
is brought for the first time into existence.’8 The image of Bentham is, 
therefore, highly Utilitarian not only in its social contribution but also 
in its epitomizing of the proper that comes through in Bentham’s overall 
philosophy: the image is Bentham’s ‘own’. 
A brief foray into Bentham’s contention with legal fiction lays 
the groundwork of Bentham’s desire to ground everything in the 
physicality of the human body. He particularly decries the maintenance 
of the ‘Fictions of Law’, legal ‘bodies’ constituted solely through linguistic 
positing. These fictional bodies of law get reiterated so frequently that 
what the language merely signifies is taken for something ‘real’. In a 
footnote to his discussion of motion, Bentham presents his allegory of the 
sitting automaton, a figure that appears to be real in that it is presented 
‘in the dress of a man … constructed by the ingenuity of the mechanist’9 
(Figure 11.2). 
As such, the constructed automaton personifies the deceptive 
operation of fiction that forms the bedrock of bad legislation and morality. 
The fiction of the legal person is part of Bentham’s overall critique of 
fiction. Charging from the earliest moment of his writing career onwards 
that the spread of Fiction is ‘pestilential’,10 Bentham’s immoderate 
solution of auto-iconization should not be surprising. The Auto-Icon as 
‘legal person’ is not a function of language, but an annexation of real 
property, and, as such, it is the ‘bodying forth’, the propriation, of the 
legal person11 (Figure 11.3). 
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Figure 11.2: Detail of automaton drawing reprinted from Brian Selznick, 
The Invention of Hugo Cabret.
Copyright © 2007 by Brian Selznick by 
permission of Scholastic Inc.
Figure 11.3: The Auto-Icon.
University College London.
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Bentham’s Last Will and Testament bequeaths not only his 
manuscripts – his corpus – but, first of all, his corpse, to the University 
of London Medical School.12 Revised on 30 May 1832, the Will opens 
with instructions for his dead body, as soon as ascertained dead, to be 
immediately delivered to his close friend Dr Southwood Smith, who was 
to preserve it in the manner expressed in the ‘Annex’ to the Will. But 
even preceding the explicit instructions in the ‘Annex’, Bentham tells his 
executors what is to be done with his skeleton: it is to be propped up in 
a chair ‘in the attitude in which I am sitting when engaged in thought 
in the course of time employed in writing,’ clad (and stuffed) in one of 
his typical black suits, his staff in hand.13 Part B of the Will, also entitled 
‘Auto-Icon’, is dated before the first part of the Will at 13 April 1830, 
and is written in a different hand from that of the Will: ‘What follows 
in a hand different from mine was drawn up some little time ago at my 
desire by Dr. Southwood Smith M.D. witness my hand Jeremy Bentham. 
[Bentham signs].’14 Bentham’s amanuensis will also become Bentham’s 
dissector. Three days after Bentham died, Southwood Smith carried 
out Bentham’s request. The doctor delivered an oration over Bentham’s 
corpse at the Webb Street School of Anatomy and Medicine and the 
dissection was performed shortly afterwards.15 
Southwood Smith’s hand, in both capacities of amanuensis and 
dissector, has a parallel in the editing hand. To say that Bentham wrote 
prolifically would be an understatement; he seemed to write obsessively, 
continuously, for over sixty years. He would have been writing with the 
presumption, and invitation, for the cutting, shaping hand of the editor. 
The sheer amount of handwritten pages in the manuscript boxes in UCL 
Library comprise a corpus: so many analogies can be drawn between 
Bentham’s written corpus and his actual body, both of which required 
intervention by a fashioning hand in order to achieve a presentable 
finished product, for the greater good. He also frequently inserts his 
own ‘hands’ into his manuscripts where he wants to make additions 
(Figure 11.4).
Reading the editors’ introduction to Of Sexual Irregularities, and 
Other Writings on Sexual Morality,16 one gets a distinct sense of the 
physical materiality of the manuscripts. Bentham had an elaborate 
writing process by which he left himself, and his future editors, 
indications or suggestions about insertions, incorporations, earmarks, 
chapter headings and sub-headings, running headings, descriptive 
headings, titles, margins, footnotes, ‘rudiments’ and appendices to the 
text sheets composed of unruled composition paper.17 Other notable 
markings include brackets and braces, numbering of various chapters 
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and sections, deletions and emendations (Bentham’s own and the 
editors’ too). Bentham apparently was not consistent with punctuation,18 
and so relied upon his editors for this mode of clarification. In order to 
help his editors with such sprawling textual stuff, Bentham organized the 
manuscripts into what he called ‘spencers’, on which he wrote descriptive 
headings. These so-called spencers served as helpful indexes in the 
content.19 He creatively re-deployed a word which, following the Oxford 
English Dictionary, otherwise refers to either a kind of wig, or a short 
double-breasted overcoat without tails, or to a kind of close-fitting jacket 
or bodice commonly worn by women and children.20 But Bentham’s 
usage of it also implies his writing is a body needing to be clothed, the 
spencers also helpfully giving that body its organization.21 Approaching 
Bentham’s work as a material writing scenario, the manuscripts are 
almost plastic in their readiness to be shaped, beckoning to be ‘worked’ 
by supplemental hands. We certainly get a sense of tangible substance. 
This substance is corporeal material, directly emanating from Bentham’s 
hand, a parallel body to what would become his Auto-Iconized body. 
Figure 11.4: A manicule, in Bentham’s hand (18 May 1823).
UC cxxxix. 330.
Throughout his writing, Bentham’s greatest happiness principle is 
conveyed figuratively through a fundamentally bodily lexicon. In more 
recent philosophical applications, we have seen that a bodily lexicon 
gets conferred upon consciousness and subjectivity. Bentham’s bodily 
approach was generally not about consciousness or subjectivity as much 
as it was about the way in which language, and the actions conferred by 
language, ought to be backed by the reality of a body. In this sense, the 
body worked as the material gateway to good principles of morals and 
legislation. For Bentham, ontology or being itself could only be based 
in substance that is perceived through the bodily senses. A real existing 
entity is real, for example, because it is ‘tangible’. 
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Bentham’s language is infused with signifiers of the body. Although 
his fundamental measuring units of pleasure and pain may signify 
beyond literal bodies, both those terms do bear immediate bodily 
denotations. Other terms also have bodily assumptions, although not 
so immediate. I am particularly interested in Bentham’s fundamental 
notion of ‘mischief’. ‘Mischievousness’ is the name given by Bentham to 
signify what is perhaps the launching point of his entire philosophical 
project: the infelicitous outcome of legislation based upon the fiction 
of natural and so-called unwritten law. ‘Mischief’ is Bentham’s name 
for the ‘the divergency from the common end of Happiness’.22 Bentham 
loved his etymological footing and his choice of the word ‘mischief’ is 
felicitous in and of itself. From the Middle English and Anglo-French 
word mes-chef, for misfortune, and from Old French meschever, to come 
out badly, without a head, chief, or end, ‘mischief’ is the ideal discourse 
for infelicitous outcomes that would have been the result of having no 
proper head, and, by inference, no proper body. We know that the head 
for Bentham stands in, synechdocally, for the entire body, because of 
what will be proposed in his Auto-Icon final essay. Once aware of the 
body-language Bentham loves to use so much, we see that most parts of 
the body frequently find their way into his general lexicon. Another term 
worth mentioning, particularly in the context of his writings on sexual 
irregularities, is ‘noxious’. In one of the main examples of the use of this 
term, Bentham condemns public opinion’s severe condemnation of what 
he sees as the ‘least noxious, or altogether innoxious’ instances (such as 
irregular sexual acts) because these condemnations are little governed 
by utility, whereas acts which he deems ‘most noxious’ are indulged.23 
Bentham also gives us the example, in Not Paul, but Jesus, of the act 
of usury being ‘innoxious’, and therefore not justifiably punishable by 
law.24 The Latin word noxa means ‘harm’. But the etymologically astute 
Bentham, ‘grecianized ear’ always on the alert,25 also knew that before 
the Latin noxa came the Greek word nekros, meaning ‘dead body’. 
‘Noxious’ refers to harm – deadly harm – done to the body. 
But Bentham was not operating exclusively on the levels of 
figurative language and etymology. He also addressed the primacy 
of the body on a thematic level. A consideration of Bentham’s anti-
religious manuscripts debunking existence in the after-life reveals his 
proposition for the primacy of the body to be the foundation of existence. 
In his very helpful book Bentham: A Guide for the Perplexed,26 Philip 
Schofield recounts Bentham’s rebuttal of his contemporaries’ religionist 
proposition that the soul would exist in the after-life without the body: 
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Bentham noted that during life human beings experience sensation 
and thought, and that such sensation and thought was located 
in the brain and nervous system. At death, however, both brain 
and nervous system ceased to function. Bentham asked: ‘A mind 
altogether without a body, in what sense, respect or degree is 
it to be identical with the same mind united with its body as in 
the present state?’ Mind, a fictitious entity, consisted in nothing 
more than a combination of pleasures, pains, wants, desires and 
propensities. All the pleasures and pains of the mind had their 
source in pleasures and pains of the body. How are these wants to 
be supplied, desires gratified, and propensities given way to, by a 
mind without a body?27
Bentham’s ‘objections absolutely insuperable’28 to the Christian 
proposition that a soul could ‘exist’ without a body as its indicator of 
pleasure and pain become manifest in his writing on sexual irregularities.
In Of Sexual Irregularities, and Other Writings on Sexual Morality, 
Bentham’s exposition of ‘that antipathy which springs up on the ground 
of taste … produced by difference of taste’29 provides a more complex 
understanding of Bentham’s contentions. ‘Antipathy’ also has bodily 
co-ordinates: the human breast, Bentham repeatedly writes, is the seat 
of antipathy. Bentham uses the word ‘breast’ in this context so frequently 
that it would prompt any close reader to try to figure out exactly how and 
why he employs it. The breast, for Bentham, is the ready seat of public 
odium, and he positions it as part of the artillery of injustice: 
The truth is that, by the epithet unnatural, when applied to any 
human act or thought, the only matter of which it affords any 
indication that can be depended upon is the existence of a sentiment 
of disapprobation, accompanied with passion, in the breast of the 
person by whom it is employed: a degree of dissocial passion by 
which without staying to enquire or to consider with himself 
whether the practice, and thence the conduct and character of 
him whose practice it is, be or be not in any way, and if in any way 
in what degree, noxious to society, he endeavors, by the use thus 
made of this inflammatory word, to kindle and point towards the 
object of his ill-will, that same dissocial passion in other breasts, for 
the purpose of inducing them to join with him in producing pain in 
some shape or other in the breast of him by whom the passion has 
been excited.30
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Here, Bentham’s uses words such as ‘passion’, ‘inflammatory’, ‘kindle’, 
‘join’, and ‘excited’ to characterize what happens when the word 
‘unnatural’ gets affixed to any given event or practice, public opinion 
thus spreading, like fire, to ‘other breasts’. Bentham follows this with 
several more examples of breast-passion, including the rebellion of 
the Stuart claimants to the throne having been deemed ‘unnatural’, 
thus ‘[producing] … in all breasts that are not already on his side, a 
disposition to join in whatsoever measures may be taken for causing him 
to suffer’,31 going on to set up antipathy, public opinion and judgmental 
taste as being unworthy foundations for morals and legislation, as they 
would most certainly fail the test of utility for the greater good. 
Religion was the main culprit in Bentham’s eyes for things anti-
thetical to his greatest happiness principle. As we shall see in the essays 
on sexual irregularities as well as in Not Paul, but Jesus, the dominance 
of Mosaic law and of the Mosaic dispensation of justice constructs active 
barriers against the general reception of Bentham’s radical revisioning of 
a non-metaphysical, non-moralizing foundation for legislation. He is up 
against the vengeful passion held and distributed across the ‘breasts’ of 
the people. Bentham proposes that Moses and the Old Testament laid the 
groundwork for religion itself and its ‘theatre of rigours’.32 This theatre of 
rigours was responsible, he writes, for the transposition of physical dirt 
and impurities into moral impurity. The belief in moral impurity took its 
strength in the lodging of fear of punishment into the adherents of Mosaic 
law. Much to Bentham’s horror, what is deemed ‘immoral’, for example, 
sexual intercourse with someone of the same sex or with another species, 
cannot be ‘washed away but with blood’,33 instigating a relentless justifi-
cation for boundless cruelty and misery which has no ‘real’ grounding. 
Bentham shows that the introduction of religion justifies the consequent 
leap from physicality to morality by invoking the breast as the seat of the 
gratification of antipathy and fear:
In the breast of Moses, the sentiment of antipathy found an object 
and an exciting cause in every sort of irregularity belonging to this 
class. Religion was at his command: in Religion, every caprice to 
which, in his fertile brain, imagination had ever given birth found a 
ready instrument, and that an irresistible one. In English the word 
impurity, in most other languages some other word or words that 
correspond to it, had been applied alike to objects unpleasant to 
sense, and offensive to imagination. In the head of tyranny, at the 
nod of caprice, physical impurities were converted into moral ones. 
Under Moses as under Bramah, the list of impurities thus created, 
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sometimes out of nothing, sometimes out of physical impurities, 
was a labyrinth without end. The more extensive and above all the 
more indefinite the system of penal law, the more transgressions 
on the part of the subject many: the more transgression, the more 
fear: the more fear in the breast of the subject many, the more 
power in the hand of the ruling few. Wherever the people are in a 
shivering fit, the physician of their souls is absolute. Observation 
was made of physical impurities, discovery was made of moral, 
and then converted into religious impurities: for the cleansing of 
physical impurities water might serve: moral impurities required 
blood.34
Here, the quick conversion from something physical to the register of the 
moral fed the fear, causing a ‘shivering fit’ and requiring an ‘absolute’ 
physician. For Bentham, operating in the abstract realm of antipathy 
and morality is dangerously ungrounded, paving the way for tyranny 
and absolutism. What gets lost in this transposition into antipathy is the 
requisite tangibility of the real body that ought to manage the springs of 
action. 
The anti-utilitarian, ascetic conversion from physical impurity to 
moral impurity presented as the starting point of Bentham’s critique 
on religion receives explicit parsing and exposition in a compelling 
subtext entitled ‘Purity – impurity’ that spans the bottom of three 
pages.35 Implying the arbitrariness of names and signs in typical proto-
semiotic fashion, Bentham homes in on the word ‘impurity’, from which 
so much misery has flowed. An ‘impure’ thing, he points out, can easily 
be brought back to its real state of purity because a real body, which 
is, for example, covered in dust, can be washed with water to become 
‘pure’ again. An impure mind, on the other hand, would be character-
ized by sin, wickedness and guilt. Hence, an impure body can become 
pure when the body is cleansed, and by analogy, an impure, guilty mind 
can be purified by cleaning away the psychological impurities. However, 
when an impure body bypasses the literal bodily referent (dirt, sexual 
irregularities, etc.) to signify immediately psychological impurities, here 
the play of fiction instigates its inexorable take-over, as Bentham states: 
‘Filth is on the body, therefore guilt, sin, wickedness, impurity is in the 
mind: here comes the false logic – here comes the wandering of the 
imagination – here comes the pernicious error. … Error is now mounted 
upon error.’36 
In order to check this error-mounted-upon-error, a problem 
that is specific to religionists and moralists but which also affects all 
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other applications of language, Bentham devised a complicated ‘filling 
up’ operation he called ‘phraseoplerosis’, followed by what he called 
‘paraphrasis’. In these dual operations, language is worked towards the 
physical, supplied with and thus translated into ‘real entities’ in order 
to move away from fictional abstraction.37 Philip Schofield clarifies this 
operation: ‘[P]araphrasis occurs when a sentence in which the name of 
the fictitious entity appears is translated into another sentence in which 
the words are either real entities, or are more nearly related to real entities. 
There is both a translation of the sentence, and a movement towards the 
physical.’38 One particular pathway to the physical that Bentham himself 
practices is the anchoring of his own writing in the etymological origins 
of given words. Bentham’s avowed possession of a ‘grecian ear’, which he 
is happy to impart ‘to an ungrecian ear’ in need of explanation,39 affords 
him an immediacy with the material, real referent behind a word, and 
so we can assume that he chooses his words carefully, that is, paraphras-
tically. In one example discussed in Chrestomathia, the word obligation 
comes from the Latin root ligo, meaning, to bind. The root produces 
an image of a band that not only visualizes the word obligation (which 
names the practice of being bound or fastened to any other) but grounds 
it in a material real entity – the original root. ‘[T]he root of the word, 
employed as a sign for the designation of that idea … lies in a material 
image, employed as an archetype or emblem: viz., the image of a cord, or 
any other tie or band.’40 The archetype that comes forth from the etymo-
logical origin acts as an index into what is real: ‘In the case of every name 
of an immaterial object, the archetype is at once an index and a holdfast to 
the sense of it’, Bentham writes, adding, ‘In the case of every name of a 
fictitious entity, the only sure test of intellection is paraphrasis.’41 But the 
reality of the etymological archetype behind a word seems, typically, to 
get repressed, yielding to an ‘original import [that is] misexpressive’.42 
Thus import itself, also to be understood as signification, works against 
expression, as indexed by the archetype, that would emanate from the 
real entity. The work of paraphrasis is considerable!43 
In today’s lingo, we might say that these linguistic manoeuvres 
encourage an ongoing ‘reality check’. From his writings on sexual irreg-
ularities, we can see that Bentham sees this movement away from the 
physical body into metaphysical abstraction as a hostile take-over of 
reality that results in vengeful and religiously justified violence such 
as using fire and blood instead of water to purify a dirty body. In Not 
Paul, but Jesus, Bentham sets up a binary opposition between Paul and 
Jesus, creating an axis respectively dividing mischief from utility. In 
this engaging text, Bentham takes issue with the religiously inspired 
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principle of asceticism. Instigated by Mosaic law and propagated by Paul, 
asceticism’s denial of bodily pleasure and its replacement of pleasure 
with the bidding of pain lies at the heart of Bentham’s contestation of 
Religion and Natural Law. Bentham’s exegeses on the New Testament 
and on the relevant books of the Old Testament scrutinize what he 
declares to be the fundamental mischievousness of asceticism. The focus 
on asceticism allows Bentham, and us, to comprehend in a more complex 
way the relation between the body and mischief in all of Bentham’s phil-
osophical propositions. Bentham proposes that ‘under the principle of 
asceticism [favoured by Paul but not by Jesus], condemnation is passed 
on the pleasures of the body without enquiry’,44 and that, furthermore, 
a disastrous sublation of physicality by morality, of the body by the 
mind, takes place. The Paul/Jesus axis serves to pinpoint the pivotal 
leap of logic underpinning the mischief perpetrated by asceticism. Jesus 
is put forward here as denouncing the leap into groundless pronounce-
ments of immorality. Jesus, explains Bentham, condemned the Mosaic 
assumption that ‘by a trifling physical impurity, a serious moral depravity 
might be produced’.45
Reading this pronouncement we cannot help but note that Bentham 
is not simply saying that religion and asceticism are replacing the body 
with the abstract mind. He is objecting to the heart being trafficked into 
the moral order: 
Here then may be seen a sentence of condemnation passed at any 
rate upon this part of the Mosaic Law: the assumption on which it 
had been grounded was the supposition that, by any thing taken 
in to a man’s body in a physical sense, his heart (Mat. xv. 18; Mark 
vii. 19) in a psychological sense – his heart put as usual for his moral 
character – could be defiled.46
The asceticists are not discounting the body; they are taking up the body 
for their own ‘erroneous’ and ‘disordered’ purposes. 
Bentham himself does not use the word ‘misappropriation’, but I 
think it is a useful term for characterizing the movement of mischief – 
which comprehends the linguistic move away from a word’s immediate 
reference to the body, from being proper to that which it is referring, to 
a word claiming to be ‘proper to’ its referent but which drops its proper 
physical connection in a kind of trick, a sleight of hand. This chicanery is 
difficult to spot because of what happens when antipathy takes harbour in 
the breast: the breast houses the heart, through the heart blood courses. 
The prodigious momentum of pathos works to overtake the bodily 
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grounding to which it vehemently lays claim. Bentham’s abhorrence of 
legislated punishment through bloodletting (e.g. capital punishment) 
would be a good example of what he sees as a violent claiming of the 
body for mischievous and malign purposes. 
The following passage from ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ explains the 
persecution of homosexual irregularity as an example of the violent 
commandeering of the breast, by those for whom antipathy forms the 
basis of morality:
Of the violence of that antipathy, whether real or affected, of which 
the propensities in question have, in the British isles, beyond all 
other countries, been the object – of the violence of that thirst 
which nothing less than the heart’s blood of the intended victims 
marked out for slaughter by the dissocial appetite has hitherto 
been able to satisfy. The principal causes have now been brought 
to view: and in the view thus given of them it has been seen that, 
in the number of them, no such quality in it as that of a tendency 
to make in any shape a defalcation [deduction] from the aggregate 
sum of human happiness has place: and that, in this dissocial and 
misery-engendering affection, whatsoever fault there is has for its 
seat the breasts, not of those who are the objects of this antipathy, 
but of those who harbor it.47
Thus Bentham takes issue with the co-opting of the body by the ascetics 
who have laid claim to blood and breast, not to mention to pain itself. On 
the contrary, for Bentham, the ‘sexual irregularity’ of the homosexual, as 
a ‘propensity’, is the better utilitarian model in that the actions performed 
are proper to the body performing the action, unlike the misappropri-
ated corpo-reality abused by moralizing religionists. 
In this final section before I conclude, I would like to expand upon 
the character of the body that Bentham defends so rigorously. This body 
type that he puts forward is one that is epitomized by Jesus’s teachings, 
by Jesus himself, and also by the homosexual body, defended examples of 
which abound both within the footnotes and body of Bentham’s writings 
on sexual irregularities and on religion. I want to suggest, perhaps boldly, 
that for Bentham, the homosexual body, with its propensities eccentric 
and its social and sexual intercourses, is an open body, a body that invites 
others to be a part of it, to partake of it. It is also a propense body that 
fulfils the reality check required for acquiring greatest happiness. Like 
the ‘socially effusive’ Greek male homosexual relationships Bentham 
cites as examples that existed without the imposition of metaphysical 
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‘spiritualization’ of the lovers,48 Jesus stands for a body felicitously 
open to the physicality of other bodies. Bentham argues that Jesus 
had intercourse with Mary Magdalene,49 with St John, who, Bentham 
repeatedly tells us in italics, was ‘lying on Jesus’ breast’50 (this would be 
an example of a ‘good breast’), and with the young male ‘stripling with 
loose attire’ who remained Jesus’ most faithful devotee.51 
Jesus’s intercourse, social and sexual, works here in opposition to 
the ‘wall of separation’ instituted by the Pharisees and their subsequent 
followers. For Bentham, ‘the avowed design – of keeping up a wall – 
an everlasting wall – of separation between this and every other: the 
prevention of all convivial and thence of all social intercourse’ is dissolved 
by Jesus when he says, in the books of Mark and Matthew: ‘There is 
nothing from without a man, that entering into him can defile him: but 
the things which come out of him, those are they that defile the man.’52 
Bentham embraces this welcoming of entry into the human body, as we 
see throughout ‘Of Sexual Irregularities’ when he sets up an equivalence 
between the appetite for food and the appetite for sex. He is proposing an 
intercoursing body with ‘inlets’ to pleasure, which he characterizes in a 
footnote to the first chapter of Not Paul, but Jesus: 
Though not the seats nor the sources, the eye and the ear are, in 
the instance of every individual, the necessary inlets to a large 
proportion of such pleasures of the mind as it falls in his way to 
enjoy: viz. to all those derived from discourse, whether by signs 
audible or visible – whether from hearing or reading. So likewise 
in the case of all the rest of the fine arts – Music, painting, &c., &c., 
let the seat be in ever so large proportions of it in the mind, the 
necessary inlet to it is in the body.53
This body of inlets defies the multiple prohibitions of ‘admixture’ called 
for by Mosaic law.54 
Conclusion
When Bentham wrote, and wrote, and wrote, he wrote with the 
assumption that other hands would be introduced into the corpus of his 
work; in particular the editorial hands of others, but also his own little 
drawn hands inserted into the manuscripts. One particular editor he 
desired to give his work shape, clarity, even some aesthetic guidance, the 
desire for whose editing hand was proposed in the concluding paragraphs 
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of the chapter ‘General Idea of Not Paul, but Jesus’, was William Thomas 
Beckford, author of the History of the Caliph Vathek, published in 1786. 
Bentham invites Beckford to be his editor and collaborator in the Not 
Paul, but Jesus venture (Figure 11.5). 
Figure 11.5: George Romney (1734–1802), William Beckford MP, 
1781–2.
Reproduced by kind permission of the National Trust.
Beckford was a writer and collector known for his homosexual 
encounters, whose novel Vathek described the sensual activities that 
Bentham embraced at least philosophically. We might even call Beckford 
an aesthete. Bentham calls upon him to be a partner, with whom he 
might confide secrets, who might supplement the manuscript with his 
notable literary talent: 
the author is desirous of finding, in an appropriate social 
intercourse, an external support for his faculties under a burthen 
of such a magnitude: – a sort of partner, in whose honour, in point 
of secrecy and all other points, he could confide, and by whose 
sympathy he might be cheered and supported: a co-operator, in 
whose literary talents whatever deficiency there may be in his 
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own might find a supply: who, in his own person, might find an 
amusement in giving form and order, and superior expression, and 
perhaps additional quantity, to the material which are in readiness 
to be supplied. … For all this, the author’s eye has turned itself of 
the author of the History of the Caliph Vathec.55
Bentham’s proclivity towards social intercourse and his invitation for 
someone to supplement his manuscript are in character with the body 
type that he placed in the domain of Jesus and the homosexual: a body 
that happily admits entry, that does not erect boundaries of separation; 
a body that enjoys the pleasures of social and sexual intercourse, 
thereby providing material grounding for greatest pleasure and greatest 
happiness. Beckford’s ‘sympathy’ and aesthetics are welcome because 
they are, in the figure of the homosexual Beckford, grounded in a real, 
propense body.
Is not Bentham’s dear friend Southwood Smith, called upon to 
dissect Bentham’s dead body, cutting into that body, a parallel figure 
to that of William Beckford, also called upon to give form and order, 
and expression, to the corpus in question, with his invited hand? We 
are back to Bentham’s Image. Bentham’s Image is Bentham’s body, but 
it is also Bentham’s writing, because Bentham’s Auto-Icon is a form of 
writing – what he himself named, in his ‘Auto-Icon’ essay, ‘auto-thanatog-
raphy’.56 Working with the voluminous manuscripts and their editorial 
supplements, we have a sense that Bentham’s relation to his own 
writing practice was one fully integrated with his radical philosophical 
departures from metaphysical foundations, namely, that the immediacy 
of the corporeal body is consistently present and that his written corpus 
is a body that invites the right of entry through various modes. Through 
this allowance of pleasure comes the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number. When the corpo-reality check is carried out, ‘Bentham’s Image’ 
and his written corpus deliver a steady supply of tangible substance.
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